Landslide
9
Managing electoral disinformation
Abstract
While electoral disinformation did not have a significant effect on the outcome of the 2025 election, there have been increasing concerns about its dangers. Its defining characteristic is the deliberate intention to deceive. It can take several different forms, including targeting of a particular candidate or party, spreading false information about the electoral process (either to induce a person to vote in a particular way or to discredit an electoral outcome) and creating a general atmosphere of distrust and/or confusion. Contextual factors that can influence the impact of disinformation include the transparency of electoral processes, the degree of public trust in election management bodies, levels of political polarisation and a country’s political and electoral history. This chapter describes various mitigating measures already in place for federal elections in Australia and discusses challenges for the future, especially relating to ‘truth in political advertising’.
Keywords: electoral disinformation; transparency and trust; electoral integrity assurance; disinformation register; truth in political advertising
Although the 2025 federal election saw its fair share of claims by various contestants that others had told lies or misled voters, there was no false claim that stood out as having a decisive or even substantial effect on the overall election result. That said, there was an unusual level of attention paid during the life of the preceding parliament to what was seen as the looming challenge of dealing with disinformation, driven not least by the discourse surrounding the 2023 Voice referendum, patterns observed in other countries’ electoral events, concerns about the rising influence of social media and the possible use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools to produce materials the counterfeit character of which would not be immediately obvious.
This chapter therefore seeks to take stock of the status of the management of disinformation at federal elections in Australia as of 2025 and to outline various measures that have been adopted or proposed to mitigate its impact. The discussion that follows addresses how disinformation is defined and the forms it can take, contextual factors in Australia that can influence its impact, current legal provisions and processes aimed at controlling or mitigating disinformation at federal elections, the role played by the AEC in dealing with the problem and some policy proposals that have not yet been adopted.
What is electoral disinformation and what forms can it take?
The definition of disinformation adopted by the Australian Government’s Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (EIAT 2025a) is ‘knowingly false information designed to deliberately mislead and influence public opinion or obscure the truth for malicious or deceptive purposes’. That distinguishes disinformation from ‘misinformation’: false or misleading material passed on by mistake, without the intention to mislead. In practice, however, the distinction can be a difficult one to make, as the originator of a particular piece of information, and his or her motivations, may not be readily identifiable; such information will often pass through many hands, especially now that social media entries can be widely shared with a single mouse click, and between the two categories, there may be information recklessly disseminated with motives that are neither wholly malicious nor entirely innocent. Therefore, mitigation measures must often be constructed to be effective against both misinformation and disinformation.
As highlighted in Table 9.1, electoral disinformation can take many forms, giving rise to different threats and risks to the process depending on context, and calls for different remedies.
Table 9.1 Forms of electoral disinformation
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‘Micro’-level disinformation, affecting politicians, candidates or parties |
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Disinformation to influence a person to vote for (or against) a particular party or candidate |
This can range from lies about policy through to false attacks on the personal character or conduct of a candidate. A prominent case of targeted electoral disinformation in Australia was the distribution in the division of Lindsay, before the 2007 federal election, of unauthorised pamphlets from a fake Islamic group that supposedly praised the ALP for supporting terrorism. Several people with Liberal Party connections subsequently faced court and were convicted over the matter. |
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Disinformation not directly targeted at a particular party or candidate, but intended to highlight issues in a way that will benefit the political player(s) spreading the disinformation |
A classic example of this was candidate Donald Trump’s allegation during the 2024 US election campaign that people of Haitian background in Springfield, Ohio, were eating other residents’ dogs and cats. |
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Disinformation passed on with the aim of leading a political player to discredit himself/herself |
An episode of this type occurred in the last week of the 1996 federal election campaign, when the then treasurer Ralph Willis released two letters purporting to be between the Premier of Victoria and the Leader of the Federal Opposition. The revelation that both letters were forgeries proved to be highly embarrassing both for Willis and for the incumbent government. |
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Disinformation with political impact, the intentions of which may be obscure |
A case of this type arose in 2009 when Opposition leader Malcolm Turnbull was embarrassed by having criticised the government based on a leaked email that turned out to have been forged by a public servant, Godwin Grech. |
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‘Meso’-level disinformation, relating to a specific electoral process |
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Disinformation about the voting process, spread with the aim of inducing a person to vote for a particular candidate or party |
A recent example of this arose in the divisions of Chisholm and Kooyong at the 2019 federal election, when signs were displayed at polling booths in Chinese script but with colouring similar to that typically used by the AEC bearing text that was held by the Federal Court to breach the prohibition in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 of the publication of matter likely to mislead or deceive an elector in relation to the casting of a vote. |
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Disinformation about the voting process, spread with the aim of depriving a party or candidate of a vote which they otherwise could have received |
This encompasses, for example, the distribution of bogus ‘how-to-vote’ cards, designed to appear to have been issued by a candidate who in fact had not done so and recommending a preference ordering different from the one recommended by that candidate. |
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Disinformation about the overall electoral process, spread with the intention of casting doubt on the legitimacy of a particular election or referendum result |
The statements and actions of Donald Trump following the US presidential election of 2020 exemplify this. Complaints preceding the 2023 Voice referendum about the AEC’s legally correct handling of ballots marked with ticks or crosses also fell into this category. |
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‘Macro’-level disinformation, intended to undermine democratic processes and trust on a large scale |
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Disinformation spread by or on behalf of malevolent foreign state actors, intended to undermine confidence in a country’s system of government |
Concerns about Russian attempts to influence the United Kingdom’s ‘Brexit’ referendum in 2016 were sufficiently well formed to give rise to a lengthy parliamentary committee inquiry. Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 seeks to create a mechanism for making more readily identifiable attempts by foreign actors at influence (covering much more than just the spreading of disinformation). |
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Disinformation spread by malevolent foreign non-state actors, intended either to undermine confidence in a country’s system of government or to influence the outcomes of political or electoral processes |
Such actors could include foreign media proprietors with a record of spreading disinformation; surrogates acting on behalf of foreign states or corporations; and foreign oligarchs. |
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Large-scale disinformation intended to sow confusion on a grand scale |
This strategy, described by former Trump presidential adviser Steve Bannon as ‘flooding the zone with shit’, has become a feature of public discourse in the United States, and reflects an insight propounded long ago by Hannah Arendt (1951: 474), who said: ‘The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist.’ |
Source: Compiled by author.
Australian contextual factors
First and foremost, Australians clearly are not indifferent to the dangers of electoral disinformation. Carson and Grömping (2025) report having ‘surveyed more than 7,000 people during March and April [2025] when the election campaign was heating up’, finding that a least ‘two-thirds of respondents said they had already encountered false or misleading election information’. They note also that an ‘overwhelming majority of respondents (94%) viewed political misinformation as a problem; more than half regarded it as a “big” or “very big problem”’.
The impact of an item of electoral disinformation will be much influenced by the immediate context in which it is disseminated. In some cases, it may be relatively innocuous—for example, if it is blatantly false but obviously posted online from a ‘parody’ account; is so wildly implausible on the face of it as to be unlikely to have much impact; has only very limited distribution; or is of significance to only a small class of voters. At the other end of the scale, claims amounting to disinformation could be the centrepiece of the campaign of a major political party.
In Australia several more enduring contextual factors are also significant. First, federal electoral processes and management have from the very outset been highly transparent, not only because candidates have a right to deploy scrutineers to monitor the voting and counting on election day, but also because those activities predominantly use simple manual processes, based on a paper ballot, which are intrinsically easier to observe, even by people with relatively little specialist expertise, than complex processes involving technology (such as electronic or internet voting).
Second, there exists a strong and longstanding political and public consensus on the role and trustworthiness of the AEC (Carson et al. 2025). Public expressions to the contrary are rare and the Opposition Leader’s ill-founded criticisms of the AEC’s approach to the handling of ballots marked with ticks or crosses at the 2023 Voice referendum probably gained a degree of public attention precisely because they were so unusual as well as irresponsible. If anything, there has been a decline in recent years in the volume of targeted criticism attempting to motivate distrust in the electoral system, and the H.S. Chapman Society, a civil society body that actively pursued such issues over several decades, now appears to be moribund. More typical was the statement issued by the Liberal candidate for the division of Bradfield on 14 July 2025 when announcing her intention to mount a court challenge to her narrow defeat (Kapterian 2025):
To be clear, there is no question regarding the integrity of our electoral system. In fact, this process has only served to reaffirm my faith in Australia’s democratic institutions. I am grateful for the AEC’s tireless work in delivering two very close counts.
Third, Australia to date has largely been free of the political tribalism, sustained by media ‘echo chambers’, which has been so destructive of democratic practice in the United States (where disinformation has thrived, purveyed by ‘news’ sources that reflect the intrinsic biases of a polarised population). On the contrary, Australian voters’ identification with political parties has been in long-term decline and the major parties’ share of the vote in 2025 was at a postwar record low.
Finally, Australia is not yet a country where politically ‘anything goes’. Political players still face some risk that proven engagement in disinformation (or other sharp practices) could lose rather than gain them votes.
Current legal provisions and mitigation processes
As of 2025, measures for limiting electoral disinformation and mitigating its effects on federal elections fall into two broad categories: those specifically focused on the electoral process and those with a broader focus but which may nevertheless be beneficial in the electoral context.
Electorally focused statutory requirements at the federal level
Electoral advertisements are subject to authorisation requirements, so that the persons or organisations responsible for them can be readily identified. The phenomenon of social media has given rise to a need for more complex legal provisions: where authorisation of printed material was at one time covered by a single section (328) of the Electoral Act, there is now an entire part (XXA) of the Act, comprising eight sections, addressing a range of different forms of advertising, as well as conferring various information-gathering powers on the Electoral Commissioner. Those provisions are supplemented by the nine-page instrument known as the Commonwealth Electoral (Authorisation of Voter Communication) Determination 2021, while the overall authorisation requirements are spelt out in a 32-page AEC better practice guide on authorisation placement, formatting and language (AEC 2025a). The Broadcasting Services Act 1992 and the Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991 also set out authorisation requirements for broadcast political advertisements. During the 2025 campaign, the AEC had to act in response to inadequately authorised corflutes and signs in the divisions of Bendigo, Bennelong, Blair, Boothby, Calare, Chisholm, Hawke and Menzies, and unauthorised leaflets in the division of Wentworth.
As noted above, Section 329 of the Electoral Act deals with misleading information in relation to the casting of a vote. However, as construed by the High Court in the leading case of Evans v Crichton-Browne, it does not apply to matter that could mislead a voter in his or her process of deciding for whom to vote, but only to the process by which that decision is given effect.
Section 330 of the Act also makes it an offence to make a knowingly false or materially misleading statement to an elector on polling day with respect to the elector’s enrolment. That section is clearly in need of revision, given that it provides no protection to the many people who now vote before polling day.
A distinctive feature of Australian elections is the election blackout: a prohibition on the broadcast of political advertisements in the two days immediately preceding polling day. Its aim has been to prevent the last-minute dissemination of disinformation that in practice could not be answered, as well as to give voters an opportunity for quiet reflection before voting; when enacted in 1942, it applied not just to advertisements, but also to virtually any broadcast comment on the election, candidates or issues in the campaign. However, it is now generally seen as an anachronism—first, because the ready availability of pre-poll and postal voting means that many voters will have cast their ballots before the blackout even comes into effect and, second, because it does not apply to social or print media. In the light of those trends, the Federal Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM 2023b: 124) recommended that ‘contingent on the Australian Government introducing truth in political advertising laws … the media blackout, known as the relevant period in the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, be removed’.
Amendments to that effect were included in the government’s Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Communications) Bill 2024, which was introduced but not brought on for debate, and which lapsed with the dissolution of the parliament before the 2025 election.
Beneficial measures with a broader focus
Recent legislation to limit social media access for persons under the age of 16, though not enacted with the explicit aim of restricting the impact of electoral disinformation, could well assist in that, by limiting the opportunity to embed falsehoods in the minds of an upcoming cohort of voters whose understanding of politics and government, and ability to evaluate information critically, may not always be fully developed.
Tools for limiting the effect of foreign purveyors of disinformation include the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme mentioned above and the power of governments to prohibit certain known purveyors of disinformation from entering Australia by application of the character test set out at Section 501 of the Migration Act 1958. The latter mechanism, for example, saw the notorious Holocaust denier David Irving refused entry on multiple occasions.
Electoral communications containing disinformation will also generally be subject to the law of defamation. Defamation, however, is, with very limited exceptions, a civil wrong, so while aggrieved persons may be able to sue for damages, there is no enforcement role played by a body such as the AEC. For almost 90 years, the Electoral Act contained a provision (Section 350) prohibiting the making of ‘any false and defamatory statement in relation to the personal character or conduct of a candidate’, but it was repealed in 2007 on the recommendation of the JSCEM. More generally, some electoral disinformation may fall foul of statute laws with a general application, such as the Commonwealth Criminal Code or the Racial Discrimination Act 1975.
One response to the problem of disinformation is the rise of nonpartisan fact-checking. In the United States, this has been required on an almost industrial scale: at the end of President Trump’s first term of office, the Fact Checker webpage maintained by the Washington Post (Kessler et al. 2021) stated that Trump had ‘made 30,573 false or misleading claims as president’. (This finding, of course, was not accepted by Trump and his supporters.) While a fact-checking operation run jointly by the ABC and the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) closed in June 2024 after 11 years of operation (RMIT ABC Fact Check 2024), the Australian Associated Press (AAP) website still includes a ‘FactCheck’ page (AAP 2025), on which were published numerous entries addressing misleading and/or false claims that had been made about the 2025 election process.
There has, however, been a reversal of some high-level support for such operations. While Meta had in the past provided grants to partners AAP, RMIT and Agence France-Presse to support their fact-checking activities (Gauja et al. 2023), Meta’s head, Mark Zuckerberg, has more recently expressed concerns about ‘censorship’ and is moving to defund fact-checking programs, starting with those in the United States (Rushton 2025).
For its part, the Digital Industry Group Inc. (DIGI 2022) has developed the Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation, which has been adopted by Adobe, Apple, Facebook, Google, Legitimate, Microsoft, Redbubble, TikTok and Twitch, and which commits the signatories ‘to safeguards to protect Australians against harm from online disinformation and misinformation, and to adopting a range of scalable measures that reduce its spread and visibility’.
The role of the AEC
The AEC, as the body responsible for the conduct of federal elections in Australia, has been playing an increasingly prominent role in addressing the problem of disinformation. It was established on 21 February 1984 with bipartisan support on the unanimous recommendation of the Federal Parliament’s Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform (JSCER). Paragraph 2.30 of the committee’s September 1983 First Report (JSCER 1983: 39) stated, among other things:
The Committee sees great merit in the existence of an Australian Electoral Commission with a statutory basis and which is seen to operate independent of political influence. Accordingly, the Committee recommends the establishment of an Australian Electoral Commission as an independent statutory authority.
The AEC’s regulatory powers in relation to electoral processes are primarily derived from the Electoral Act. Paragraph 7(1)(c) of the Act also makes it a function of the AEC ‘to promote public awareness of election and ballot matters, and Parliamentary matters, by means of the conduct of education and information programs and by other means’. While this provision is sufficiently broad to enable the commission to play an active role in combating electoral disinformation, the extent to which it will in fact do so is in practice determined by its chief executive, the Electoral Commissioner. Over time, different holders of that office have brought varying perspectives to bear on what should be the organisation’s priorities: some have been inclined to focus primarily on the mechanics of the electoral process, while others have taken a more expansive view. Under the leadership of Tom Rogers, who by the time of his retirement in late 2024 had served longer in the position than any of his predecessors, the commission played a more active role in seeking to address the problem of disinformation than at any time in its history, and that approach was continued by Jeff Pope, who acted in the position of Electoral Commissioner at the 2025 election.
At the strategic level, the AEC has given enhanced recognition to the importance of fostering electoral integrity as well as ensuring the conduct of mechanical election processes to a high standard; this joint emphasis is clearly stated in its 2024–25 Corporate Plan (AEC 2024), which now lists, as the first of the commission’s ‘key activities’, maintaining ‘the integrity of electoral and regulatory processes’. To that end, the AEC has undertaken several significant initiatives.
First, the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce mentioned earlier, chaired at the operational level by the AEC, has been established as a whole-of-government body:
[It is] responsible for ensuring that federal electoral events are unaffected by interference … [which] is achieved by:
- Monitoring the information environment for potential interference including mis and disinformation on the electoral process
- Sharing information on potential risks or threats with relevant agencies
- Advising the Electoral Commissioner on how identified risks or threats can be mitigated. (AEC 2025b)
In January 2025, the taskforce published an ‘Election Security Environment Overview’ (EIAT 2025b), which noted that electoral disinformation and misinformation constituted a potential threat to the integrity of Australia’s electoral system. On 1 July 2025, however, the taskforce board, in a document that put on the public record advice it had given to the acting Electoral Commissioner (EIAT 2025c), stated:
Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (EIAT) agencies did not identify any foreign interference, or any other interference, that compromised the delivery of the 2025 federal election and would undermine the confidence of the Australian people in the results of the election.
Organisationally, the AEC has established its Defending Democracy Unit, which constitutes the key repository within the organisation for corporate knowledge of issues of electoral integrity and disinformation, serves as a focal point for AEC liaison with other government bodies and with international counterparts focusing on similar problems and works with the AEC’s Media and Digital Engagement Section to monitor disinformation and misinformation on a day-to-day basis, and responds as appropriate.
In recent years, and particularly in the runup to the 2025 election, the AEC pursued an active, multifaceted and at times ‘edgy’ social media strategy, much of which involved responding rapidly to items of misinformation and disinformation. An ‘AEC TV’ YouTube channel has been a significant initiative in this area. Up-to-date mechanisms are used to monitor key social media channels so that public posts relating to electoral issues can be rapidly identified.
The AEC’s website now contains a Disinformation Register (AEC 2025c), on which specific items of disinformation relating to the administration and mechanics of the electoral process are debunked. The organisation follows a structured process for determining what items of disinformation are to be addressed and for ensuring that responses are clear and accurate and have been approved at a high level. For the 2025 election, the following specific pieces of disinformation were included and addressed:
Six million ballot papers went missing and weren’t counted in the 2025 federal election.
There are substantial inconsistencies or errors in the electoral roll that make voter fraud and ‘vote rigging’ easier.
There is a formula to casting a ‘Vote of No Confidence’ (VONC)—people leave the ballot paper blank and instead write ‘no suitable candidate to meet my will’. This can cause an election to be re-run if enough people cast their vote that way.
A video circulated online shows an AEC polling official rubbing out votes marked with pencil.
Prior to February 2025, the AEC has never attended citizenship ceremonies to enrol new citizens.
The AEC can compel a group to become a registered political party.
The AEC should check, and are empowered to check, the constitutional eligibility of candidates during an election.
The AEC knows the date of the election before voters do.
Your preferences are controlled by political parties.
In each case, the AEC provided a succinct and clear response. For example, in relation to the claim that an AEC official had been filmed rubbing out votes marked with a pencil, the Disinformation Register entry read as follows:
Correct information
The video that was shared on social media is from the 2023 NSW state election—this is an election that is not run by the AEC. The NSW Electoral Commission explained at the time that their polling official featured in the video was completing the paperwork required to run the polling place.
AEC ballot paper handling processes include the use of uniquely coded security seals, weatherproof packaging and tamper proof tape. Multiple officers are involved in the sign off of the packaging and receipt of materials. AEC counting processes are also highly transparent and manual. Around 100,000 staff—members of the community—count the votes and candidate appointed scrutineers observe the process. Results data is then published to the tally room in real time so people at each count can verify that the information published is what they saw for themselves.
The AEC supplies pencils for voting because they don’t smudge when ballot papers are folded, they are cheaper than pens and they don’t run dry in tropical conditions. Voters are welcome to bring a pen to a polling place and use it to mark their ballot paper if they wish.
AEC action
The AEC responded to social media commentary on multiple channels. An AEC TV video about the issue was used in the communication. (AEC 2025b)
More generally, the AEC has been pursuing a range of information initiatives united by the slogan ‘Stop and Consider’, the fundamental aim of which is to encourage people to think critically about things they are told, rather than routinely accepting possibly dubious claims at face value. Advice on useful ways of reflecting on information was included in the AEC document entitled Your Official Guide to the 2025 Federal Election (AEC 2025d), which was distributed to households across the country.
The AEC also distributed messages through a range of social media channels, including AEC TV, emphasising (using the slogan ‘Your vote, your choice’) that a secret ballot is a guaranteed individual right and a key feature of the Australian electoral process.
Finally, the AEC in the late 1990s initiated, and continues to support in partnership with four international bodies, the BRIDGE electoral capacity-building project—a unique set of learning resources that now includes a module on cybersecurity and disinformation. BRIDGE courses have now been taught in more than 100 countries.
Taking stock of all the measures and initiatives outlined above, the problem of electoral disinformation has been addressed seriously in Australia and significant steps are being taken to try to deal with it. There are, however, some notable challenges and constraints that administrators and policymakers face.
First, enforcement of Australian laws against foreign entities such as X or Meta may in practice be difficult and may give rise to pushback at the political level (a notable theme from the Trump administration).
Second, the increasing dissemination of election-related material in languages other than English gives rise to the need for translation, which at the very least has the potential to slow the process for responding to disinformation, thereby giving greater opportunities for falsehoods to proliferate. Any such translation must also be sensitive to the complexity of metaphors and figurative usage in languages other than English.
Third, certain material may be of an official nature, which takes it outside the scope of potential official responses to disinformation. The Yes/No pamphlets published before a referendum are an example of such material, as are accurate reports of statements made in parliaments, which are covered by parliamentary privilege.
Finally, any legislative provisions aimed at curbing disinformation must be carefully crafted to ensure that they do not exceed a parliament’s powers because of the constitutionally implied freedom of political communication.
Policy proposals not yet adopted
Among the smorgasbord of mechanisms for managing electoral disinformation connected with Australian federal elections, there is one conspicuous absence: a legal requirement for political advertising to be truthful. Legislative initiatives to that end have a history going back more than 100 years (Maley 2019) and were pursued during the previous parliament by several Independent MPs. Their efforts were buttressed by the work of various academics (Ng 2024; Hill et al. 2022) and advocacy bodies (Australia Institute 2025); and the JSCEM (2023a: 106–7), in its June 2023 interim report on the Conduct of the 2022 Federal Election and Other Matters, recommended:
that the Australian Government develop legislation, or seek to amend the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, to provide for the introduction of measures to govern truth in political advertising, giving consideration to provisions in the Electoral Act 1985 (SA) … and that the Australian Government consider the establishment of a division within the Australian Electoral Commission, based on the principles currently in place in South Australia, to administer truth in political advertising legislation, with regard to ensuring proper resourcing and the need to preserve the Commission’s independence as the electoral administrator.
The government, while nominally accepting those recommendations, thereafter gave no particular priority to their implementation. Legislation to give effect to them, the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Communications) Bill 2024, was introduced only on 18 November 2024 and, as noted above, was never brought on for debate and lapsed with the dissolution of the Forty-Seventh Parliament. That was probably no bad thing, as the bill was problematical in several respects, including the following:
- It would have established a system of civil penalties for false and misleading advertising, rather than specifying an offence. One consequence of that would have been that a transgressor would not face the risk of being disqualified from membership of parliament by Section 44(ii) of the Constitution, which comes into play only when a person has been ‘convicted’ of an ‘offence’.
- Communications from parliamentarians that were funded via their parliamentary allowances would have been exempted from the ‘truth’ requirements set out in the bill.
- It would have been explicitly stated that a contravention of the civil penalty provisions could not be a ground for the Court of Disputed Returns to overturn a candidate’s election.
- A regulatory role would have been played by an Electoral Communications Panel, a majority of the members of which would be appointed on the recommendation of the incumbent minister. There would have been no prohibition of the appointment of persons with known partisan political backgrounds.
- From the membership of the Electoral Communications Panel, smaller ‘Decision Panels’ would have been constituted to deal with specific issues and complaints. A Decision Panel would have been required to decide within two days of having a complaint referred to it, except in the case of complaints made on the Thursday or Friday before polling day or on polling day itself, when a decision would have been required within 24 hours. Such deadlines would have been manifestly absurd, given the steps that would typically be needed to investigate even simple complaints properly (Maley 2024), let alone those involving complex issues.
Overall, the bill appeared to have been crafted to give the impression of putting in place an effective scheme for guaranteeing truth in political advertising without cramping the style of current political campaigners to any great extent. In that respect, it had overtones of the approach taken to the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Commission—now seen in some quarters as having failed to live up to expectations.
Final reflections
The experience of the 2025 election suggests that the problem of electoral disinformation is yet to become critical in Australia, in contrast to the situation prevailing in some other democracies—most notably, the United States. Local protective factors include the existing legal framework, the AEC’s proactive approach to warning of disinformation’s potential dangers and a relatively widespread community scepticism regarding statements made by politicians and political parties.
Looking forward, legislating for truth in political advertising is likely to remain a matter for debate in the next parliament. In late July 2025, Independent MP Zali Steggall and Independent Senator David Pocock introduced in their respective houses bills essentially identical to the government’s lapsed bill, with the explicitly stated aim of putting the issue back on the public agenda. They reintroduced them in the first sitting weeks of the Forty-Eighth Parliament. Whether those bills will proceed, either as introduced or in an amended form, remains to be seen.
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