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Landslide

10

The Australian Labor Party

Rob Manwaring and Emily Foley

Abstract

The Australian Labor Party’s landslide victory in the 2025 federal election marks a historic moment. Anthony Albanese joins Gough Whitlam and Bob Hawke as one of only three Labor leaders to secure consecutive terms. This chapter analyses the drivers behind Labor’s significant win, in the wider context of electoral volatility and long-term party adjustments. While exogenous factors such as the collapse of the Coalition and the Trump presidency played a role, we focus our analysis on three interconnected elements of Labor’s performance: the repercussions from its 2019 defeat, its record in office from 2022 to 2025 and its disciplined campaign in 2025. Drawing on other recent centre-left governments, we also make some observations about the future of the Albanese government. While Labor’s strategy was electorally effective, its ability to maintain a transformative policy agenda in the long term remains uncertain.

Keywords: Australian Labor Party; labourism; centre-left; policy; elections

An ALP win for the ages

On 3 May 2025, the ALP resoundingly won the federal election by a significant landslide. The party won an extraordinary 94 seats, reducing the Coalition to 43 seats in the 150-seat parliament. It was a Labor win for the ages. The last time a Labor leader won a second term in office was Bob Hawke in 1984. The Albanese win dwarfs Labor’s much more marginal win in 2010, when Julia Gillard secured a second term in office, albeit in minority government.

The scale of Albanese’s win is starkly impressive, with 94 seats comfortably the highest number the ALP has ever won, easily surpassing the 86 seats that Hawke won in 1987. If we account for the growing size of the House of Representatives, the only Labor leader to win a higher proportion of available seats was John Curtin in his extraordinary performance during World War II at the 1943 election. Curtin won 49 of 74 seats (66.2 per cent of seats available), while Albanese secured 62.6 per cent of the available 150 seats. Labor’s win was dominant, emphatic and, as Treasurer Jim Chalmers noted, it exceeded even the ALP’s ‘most optimistic expectations’ (Mealey 2025).

The legacy and impact of the Labor win are significant—notably, the impact on their political rivals. On the left side of politics, Labor won three of the four seats held by the Greens, including leader Adam Bandt’s seat of Melbourne. Prime Minister Albanese would also be pleased by the loss of Greens MP Max Chandler-Mather—a consistent thorn in the government’s side during the 2022–25 term. On the right side of politics, the ALP saw the collapse of the Liberals, the defeat of the Opposition leader Peter Dutton and the temporary dissolution of the Coalition. That said, the full extent of Labor’s win over the Liberals remains open to question. Famously, British Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher reflected that her greatest achievement was ‘Tony Blair and New Labour. We forced our opponents to change their minds’ (Burns 2008). While the Liberals face a long road back to power, the extent to which Labor has forced them to change their minds is less clear. The collapse in Liberal support owed more to the broader fragmentation of the centre-right (Bale and Kaltwasser 2021) than to the way a governing party had redefined the ideological and policy agenda.

The scale of Labor’s win occurs against the trend of the declining vote share of the major parties. Labor’s primary vote of 34.6 per cent was the first election in nearly 20 years in which Labor secured an increase on this metric. During the peak of the Hawke era, the party was comfortably assured of 40–45 per cent of the vote (Figure 10.1). The tectonic plates of Australian politics are shifting and the scale of the seat count risks masking these changes (Megalogenis 2024).

Figure 10.1 ALP vote share, 1980–2025

Figure 10.1 ALP vote share, 1980–2025

Source: Compiled by authors using AEC data.

An additional contextual factor was the timing of the election. As indicated by polling data (see Chapter 20, this volume), at the start of January 2025, the Coalition had a strong advantage over the ALP in both primary and secondary votes. Indeed, from the loss of the Voice referendum in October 2023 until the final few weeks of the short campaign in 2025, the Coalition led the ALP on both first preferences and two-party-preferred (2PP). With hindsight, the Queensland cyclone and floods and the 2025 (additional) Labor budget seemed to amplify the collapse in the Liberal vote. This timing reflects the broader fluidity in voting behaviour in Australia and situates the ALP’s win within a more volatile political environment (Cameron and McAllister 2022: 18–24). Labor’s win comes off a shrinking base, as only 12 per cent of all voters consider themselves ‘stable’ Labor voters (Cameron and McAllister 2022).

The focus of this chapter is on understanding the critical factors in Labor’s performance, both during the campaign and more broadly. Clearly, external factors help explain the overall result (see Chapter 1, this volume). We highlight one external factor, or ‘silence’, which shaped the 2025 result and merits proper acknowledgement: the negligible influence of the Trumpet of Patriots’ campaign. In 2019, the $60-million campaign by billionaire Clive Palmer’s previous campaign party vehicle, the United Australia Party (UAP), was critical to Labor’s disastrous election result (Orr 2020). The UAP scare campaign against Labor’s supposed ‘death tax’ was a mobilising force against the ALP (but not for the UAP in terms of seats). In effect, the right and centre-right mobilised in tandem (not in coordination) against Labor and this played into longstanding voter perceptions of Labor as a party of ‘tax and spend’. In 2025, Labor faced a wholly disorganised and incoherent electoral threat from the right.

In our analysis of Labor’s performance, we attribute three critical elements to understanding Labor’s extraordinary electoral win:

  1. institutional learning—notably, the enduring influence of the 2019 election defeat
  2. the ALP’s record in office (2022–25)
  3. the strategic focus and impact of the ‘long’ and ‘short’ electoral campaigns.

The impact of the 2019 election defeat remains a strong influence on Labor’s campaigning and governing strategy (Emerson and Weatherill 2019; Wallace 2020). Albanese’s policy reset, especially in terms of tax policy, was critical to Labor’s victory. While not acknowledged in national secretary and campaign director Paul Erickson’s (2025) address to the National Press Club on Labor’s election performance, it shaped many of the key factors that he did raise. The strategic caution and incrementalism that marked Labor’s time in office were contrasted with the party’s framing of Peter Dutton as a ‘risk’ (Erickson 2025). Ultimately, the 2025 result reflects a two-term strategy by Labor, which, aside from the Voice referendum, had modest ambitions for its first term (Combet and Oshalem 2022). The ALP was ‘building on the foundations’, as Erickson (2025) described it, which enabled them to consolidate for a potential second term.

Labor’s first term in government (2022–25)

Labor’s first term in office since the troubled Rudd–Gillard era was challenging, and there was a strong risk that it would face an anti-incumbent backlash amid high inflation. The overall verdict on its first term chimes with a general perception that Labor was ‘small target’, incremental and lacking strong reformist ambition. That led respected economist John Quiggin (2024) to argue that Labor ‘doesn’t look like Labor anymore’. While we do not disagree with the ‘small target’ analysis, it fails to capture aspects of what the government aimed to achieve and indeed did achieve. Three core themes best capture Labor’s agenda and first term:

  • a central ‘labourist’ focus on improving wages and conditions and protecting key categories of workers
  • a cautious, protective strategy, especially in areas of fiscal, tax and welfare policy, often with the intent to neutralise politically problematic issues
  • competence and policy fixes, but often without a clear narrative or political success.

After some initial policy wins, Labor’s agenda was dominated by the Voice referendum and the subsequent loss of political momentum. In the second half of 2024, the government ramped up its policy agenda (for example, the social media ban for minors) to reclaim the political initiative. We draw on Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) ‘policy success’ framework to capture the key dynamics and themes of Labor’s policy record. Simply put, this framework disaggregates ‘success’ and ‘failure’ across three main criteria: 1) process success—how well the policy was developed; 2) programmatic success—a focus on goal attainment; and 3) political success—partisan or other political achievements. To give an overview of Labor’s first term, we condense the first two policy categories (process, programmatic) to make a proximate judgement about the overall policy coherence and impact of key signature policies.

Figure 10.2 Political and policy success: ALP in office, 2022–2025

Figure 10.2 Political and policy success: ALP in office, 2022–2025

Notes: HAFF = Housing Australia Future Fund.

Source: Compiled by authors.

In Figure 10.2, we provide a proximate representation of these policies to capture the dynamics of Labor’s agenda. We highlight a specific case to underscore why we have adopted the framework. In November 2024, the Labor government passed legislation banning those under 16 years of age from accessing various social media platforms. We judge this to have achieved a high level of political success and support, but with a relatively low level of policy success. While it was politically ‘popular’, particularly among parents, in terms of policy, it was far from an ‘evidence-informed’ approach. Experts and stakeholders, including the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC 2024), have expressed a range of concerns, including implementation shortcomings.

By and large, Labor delivered a set of policies that were reasonably successful, robust and coherent. One of the most high-profile was its ‘Future made in Australia’ policy framework, which set out priorities for specific industries and public infrastructure investment (Bathgate 2024). It was interventionist, seeking to meet the interests of both capital and labour, but also had a latent nationalism. We can broadly categorise many of these key initiatives as ‘labourist’—seeking to give material uplift and protection to specific categories of workers and low-income-earners. Labor passed a suite of industrial relations reforms relatively uncontroversially (Hegarty 2025) and, for a brief period, seemed to have built momentum after its Hawke-inspired Jobs and Skills Summit.

An emblematic example of this more successful agenda was Labor’s elevation of Medicare bulk-billing to the centrepiece of its 2025 campaign. This was both smart politics and smart policy. It is worth also contrasting this with Labor’s extensive health spending plans in 2019, which included a $1.7-billion package to subsidise cancer treatments. In 2025, there was evidence of policy learning: recalibrating health spending to target obvious and tangible benefits for many voters.

A second cluster falls within the broader category of cautious, ‘protective’ policies, some of which also sought to neutralise political problems. Here, there is a group of policies with moderate levels of political and policy ‘success’. The most positive of these might be the end to the ‘climate wars’ (or at least some reprieve), with Labor legislating its emissions reduction targets (Albanese 2022). This is a classic centre-left response; it identifies a significant policy problem and devises a policy to straddle ‘pragmatism’ with modest reforms. Labor’s key housing policies (the ‘right to buy’ changes and the Housing Australia Future Fund) might also fall into this category. They reflect a defensive posture by Labor, especially after the electoral damage of its proposed reforms to negative gearing in 2019. The ongoing sparring with the Greens over this issue reflected the delicate balance the Albanese government was striving to achieve between reform and ‘pragmatism’.

Within this subset of policies, it is critical to highlight Labor’s reform of the Coalition’s flagship ‘stage 3’ tax cuts. In opposition, Labor strategically supported the highly regressive tax changes, which removed a whole income tax bracket for middle-to-high income-earners. In January 2024, Labor legislated a suite of reforms, reversing the Coalition’s policy, while also delivering further tax relief for low-income and middle-income-earners (Bennett 2024). Labor expended a good deal of political capital and cycled through two budgets before announcing the change. Ultimately, the change neutralised the issue for Labor, although it had to defend breaking an election promise. While Erickson and Labor strategists might see this as ‘laying the ground’ for future reforms, Labor only sought to neutralise the issue. It strongly resisted calls to consider making much deeper structural reforms. A range of voices, including the Australian Financial Review (AFR), a ‘community’ tax conference organised by think tank Per Capita and a Green Paper by Teal Independent Allegra Spender (2024) were all seeking to push the Albanese government to countenance a follow-up to Ken Henry’s 2010 tax review under Kevin Rudd’s leadership. The AFR (2024) argued that the ALP’s changes had only served to ‘highlight the unprincipled mess of Australia’s tax system’. Politically, Labor will feel vindicated, as it enabled them to use this as a springboard for further pre-election income tax cuts, which wrong-footed the Opposition.

A third set of policies are those with merit but that have achieved little or no political success. A good example here are the issues and policy changes around immigration. In Inside Story, Peter Mares (2024) reviewed Labor’s immigration reforms under minister Andrew Giles, noting Labor had ‘significantly improved how the migration system works’. This chimes with other areas of policy, which, in Carol Johnson’s (2024) view, reflects the ALP’s ‘narrative failure’. Labor often failed to provide a clear set of stories, visions or political messages to articulate what they were seeking to achieve.

In short, Labor’s first term in office was generally a period of cautious, incremental government, largely overshadowed by the Voice referendum result. What this broad narrative misses, however, are the ways in which the ALP, especially through many of the measures from Jim Chalmers’ budgets, implemented a range of targeted labourist strategies. Yet, in many policy areas, Labor either lacked a clear narrative or its efforts seemed unfocused. At the start of 2025, despite some achievements, their electoral prospects were not looking strong.

Labor’s campaign strategy

Long campaign: November 2024 to March 2025

The Albanese government’s re-election in 2025 marks a significant moment in Australia’s political landscape, not so much for its drama or transformative promises, but rather for its disciplined execution of a centre-left campaign. Considering the troubling polls from January 2025, which hinted at the possibility of a minority government, the ALP had already begun to roll out its ‘long’ campaign. Albanese himself began flagging key campaign initiatives and policies by the second half of 2024 and, by November, had already started selecting Labor’s campaign team. While Chapter 3 of this volume offers a more detailed examination of Labor’s electoral strategy, broadly speaking, the ALP concentrated its campaign efforts on four key battleground States: Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia.

Labor entered the election campaign defending 14 seats with margins of less than 4 per cent (Tillett 2025). With just 79 seats at the end of its first term, the ALP’s slim majority meant that losing as few as two seats could result in a hung parliament unless offset by gains elsewhere. Retaining marginal seats won in 2022 was a priority, particularly in Western Australia, where Labor had secured gains in Tangney, Hasluck and Pearce. Labor’s campaign also focused on retaining mostly outer suburban electorates in Sydney and Melbourne, such as McEwen, Bruce and Hawke.

Queensland was critical for Labor, which aimed to regain ground in seats lost to the Greens in 2022, such as Brisbane and Griffith. For the first time, Labor established a dedicated team and worked with advertising agency The Shannon Group to target these electorates and counter the growing Greens vote. Electoral redistributions further complicated the landscape, making some seats more marginal. Bennelong in New South Wales and Wills in Melbourne were seen as increasingly favourable to the Liberals and Greens, respectively.

Despite concentrating its efforts on marginal electorates that Labor deemed vulnerable, the party managed to secure some unexpected wins, such as Petrie, in Brisbane’s north, and Moore, in Western Australia (Truu 2025; Armstrong 2025). These victories helped reinforce Labor’s position beyond the expected battlegrounds in what shaped up to be a successful campaign.

In one of Albanese’s first pre-election ‘vision’ speeches, in November 2024, he highlighted Labor’s first-term accomplishments, underscoring what would become central pillars of Labor’s campaign agenda: health and education. This also signalled the beginning of Labor’s substantive policy announcements with a commitment to legislate 100,000 annual fee-free TAFE places as well as wiping 20 per cent off student university HECS debts (Albanese 2024a). The following month, Albanese announced a second significant election commitment, this time within early childhood education, where Labor would establish a $1-billion fund to build and expand childcare centres in outer suburbs and regional Australia (Albanese 2024b).

Anthony Albanese had begun travelling around Australia in campaign mode almost immediately after the summer break ended. By the second week of January, Albanese had already visited Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia. This attempt to get moving early in the year can partly be attributed to Labor’s weak position in public polling. However, by engaging early with voters across Australia, Labor’s proactiveness could also be seen as a way to ensure that Albanese himself was well-practised and organised in the leadup to the official campaign, considering his track record in the previous election, which was marked by a number of gaffes and slip-ups.

By 12 March, Labor was poised to launch its formal campaign; however, the timing was complicated by Cyclone Alfred in Queensland. This was significant, given that a delay in calling the election date meant the ALP would be tasked with delivering one last Federal Budget before entering a caretaker period. In line with its broader first-term agenda, Labor utilised the Budget as an opportunity to position cost-of-living relief and reforms in health care, housing and education as central to a second-term ALP government. Importantly, Labor’s emphasis that the Budget contained ‘the single largest commitment to Medicare since its creation’ (Chalmers 2025) positioned health care as central to Labor’s election campaign and policy agenda.

Furthermore, the Budget included a commitment to introduce additional ‘modest’ tax cuts (Chalmers 2025) for taxable incomes between $18,201 and $45,000, entailing a 1 per cent cut in 2026, followed by a further 1 per cent cut in 2027. Labor’s tax cuts were opposed by Opposition leader Peter Dutton, who called them a ‘cruel hoax’ (Lane 2025) and pledged to repeal the measures if elected. As both major parties began announcing their respective economic campaign agendas, it appeared odd that Labor would be campaigning on lowering taxes—an economic position historically held by the centre-right, economically conservative Liberals.

Short campaign: March to May 2025

Cyclone Alfred, while harrowing for Queenslanders, proved serendipitous for the ALP, enabling Albanese to display bipartisan crisis leadership alongside Queensland Premier David Crisafulli, while Coalition leader Dutton drew criticism for attending a fundraiser in Sydney as the cyclone approached. The delay also gave Labor time to refine its messaging and organise a streamlined, disciplined campaign in contrast to the Coalition’s blunder-prone, incoherent effort. By the time Albanese called the election, the vision and strategy of the ALP’s campaign for its second term were already abundantly clear. Albanese’s press conference on 28 March announcing the election presented voters with a choice of visions for the nation. Albanese clearly articulated Labor’s strategy as a choice to continue ‘building Australia’s future’ in contrast with a Dutton-led Coalition government, which would take Australia ‘back to the failures of the past’ (Albanese 2025a). The rhetorical use of the slogan began to take more of a literal effect at Labor’s campaign launch in Perth on 13 April, with the centrepiece of Albanese’s speech a pledge to establish a $10-billion fund to build 100,000 new homes for first homebuyers across the nation (Albanese 2025b).

In Albanese’s final speech in the last week of the election campaign, the overarching emphasis on health care was driven home. At a Labor rally in Sydney, Albanese continued to emphasise that Medicare and health were not only central to the Labor tradition, but also ‘part of the Australian story and one of the most meaningful expressions of the fair go that we have’ (Albanese 2025c). In announcing Labor’s commitment to rebrand an existing healthcare telephone hotline into 1800 MEDICARE and substantially invest in its expansion, Albanese presenting his own Medicare card, as he had done throughout the campaign, reinforcing Australia’s egalitarian history of universal health care and that Labor would protect it.

Labor’s campaign narratives

To understand Labor’s campaign strategy in 2025, we draw on Bartlett and Rayner’s (2014) analysis of campaign narratives. Taking inspiration from Somers and Gibson’s (1994) framework for understanding public narratives, Bartlett and Rayner identify four questions that are important for understanding the types of narratives employed by major parties in election campaigns. These questions are: 1) what are the main objectives and concerns of the parties (plot); 2) what is at stake (drama); 3) what is the arrangement of events and what causes are attributed to them (explanation); and 4) what are the types of framing or symbols that are employed (selective appropriation)?

In the 2025 campaign, the ALP utilised a combination of three separate but overlapping campaign narratives, contributing to their electoral success in forming a majority government. First, Labor drew heavily on what Bartlett and Rayner call the ‘job isn’t done’ narrative throughout both its long and its short campaigns. This narrative is unique to incumbent governments in their bid to return to office. It is a largely optimistic vision that seeks to build on the party’s track record from its first term, while juxtaposing the Opposition as committed to unravelling the hard-won gains and achievements made. Throughout the campaign, Labor consistently sought to position itself as a hardworking, high-achieving first-term government with a strong record of economic productivity and cost-of-living relief and a strong emphasis on social reforms. Labor’s main slogan of ‘Building Australia’s future’ drew on the party’s record and achievements in its first term, while acknowledging the work still ahead.

The second narrative employed by the ALP during its campaign was that of ‘experience versus inexperience’, which again is commonly used by incumbent governments in presenting themselves as stable and capable. In contrast, leaders present the opposition party as a risk that would jeopardise progress. Following Labor’s election victory, Erickson highlighted this narrative in his Press Club speech, reflecting that Labor sought to increase its electoral support by emphasising its track record as a ‘responsible’ government with an economic strategy that helped to bring down inflation without increasing unemployment or triggering a recession (Erickson 2025). In highlighting their responsible economic measures, Jim Chalmers and Minister for Finance Katy Gallagher would frequently emphasise that during a continued period of ‘extreme global economic volatility … now is the worst time to risk a Dutton-led Coalition Government that would make Australians worse off’ (Chalmers and Gallagher 2025). In campaign speeches, Albanese would highlight the Opposition’s incompetence, stating that they would take the nation ‘back to chaos and confusion, when this moment demands measured leadership and safe hands’ (Albanese 2025b).

Finally, the ‘fear’ narrative functions to provoke strong negative emotions by warning voters that electing the Opposition would bring harm to them and their way of life. Within Labor’s utilisation of the frame narrative, the threat posed by Peter Dutton was the centrepiece and focal point. Campaign slogans such as ‘Don’t risk Dutton’ and ‘Dutton cuts, you pay’ successfully prosecuted the argument that Dutton as prime minister would involve ‘cutting and wrecking’ (Albanese 2025b) in areas such as health and education. Undoubtedly, the Trump presidency also played a part in stoking voters’ fears of economic and political uncertainty.

Broadly, Labor’s re-election strategy can be categorised as leaning into its incumbency, emphasising competence and stability during a period of ongoing domestic and global economic uncertainty, coinciding with slight national economic improvement. The party largely avoided contentious topics such as climate change, the war in Gaza, relations with China and Trump, instead foregrounding cost-of-living pressures and public services, projecting itself as a party of competent economic stewards. Integral to Labor’s pitch was its clear ownership of health and education policies with values of egalitarianism and fairness that only a Labor government could protect and advance. Drawing on valence politics and issue ownership theory, Labor capitalised on its perceived strength in public health, successfully tying its campaign to the everyday concerns of voters. Perhaps most notable is Labor’s growing emphasis on traditionally progressive areas, such as education and gender equity, while championing fiscal restraint. From fee-free TAFE to early childhood education subsidies aimed at increasing women’s workforce participation, the ALP was attempting to reassert social policy leadership without alienating centrist voters.

The politics of stability: ‘Thin’ Labourism revisited

In our analysis of the 2022 federal election, we argued that the current Labor Party could best be understood through the prism of ‘thin’ labourism (Manwaring and Foley 2023), on which we have since elaborated. Our central argument was that while Albanese Labor is often described as ‘small target’, incremental and cautious, these descriptors fail to sufficiently capture the ideological aims and contours that shape a critical part of its agenda. Drawing on Michael Freeden’s distinction between thick and thin ideologies, we identify a distinctive strand, ‘labourism’, which informs what the ALP seeks to achieve (Manwaring and Foley 2023: 190–91). Indeed, it has stronger descriptive qualities than Jim Chalmers’ efforts to build a ‘values-based capitalism’. Thin, or ‘new’, labourism also has a much stronger focus on securing gender policy gains, notably through Labor’s focus on childcare reforms and targeting support for pay awards in key female-dominated parts of the care economy.

We make a few additional observations about the project of thin labourism. First, it reflects a general reticence by Labor to shift towards supporting broader social-democratic conceptions of equality (such as on grounds of race or sexuality) and it is generally defensive on cultural (rather than economic) policies (Karp 2023). Labor’s post-Voice positioning on First Nations politics is emblematic here. This reticence to promote wider forms of social (and cultural) equality also dovetails with forms of conservative politics within the broader electorate (and the party’s right faction). Third, the political economy of thin labourism is less ambitious in efforts to reform capitalist economic structures than thicker, older versions of social democracy (Bailey 2009), and less willing to tackle some forms of entrenched inequalities. Centre-left politics entails a compromise working with the market economy and labourism prioritises material gains over structural reform. The ALP’s new version of labourism is a political project of systemic stability.

We can see further evidence of thin labourism with the emerging paradigm of what we term ‘strategic unionism’.1 Would the average Australian voter have noticed during the 2025 campaign that the Labor Party has a formal relationship with various trade unions? The short answer is: unlikely. Unions remain a critical source of revenue for the ALP and make up 50 per cent of delegates at its national conference. Yet, the trade unions and their peak body, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), were largely absent from the public and media discourse during the election (for a complementary perspective, see Chapter 16, this volume). The trade unions’ mostly low-profile influence can be seen through the lens of ‘strategic unionism’—a political strategy whereby trade unions aim to secure crucial gains for their members and certain categories of workers in a low-profile, anti-confrontational manner, most often through state institutions, to influence legislation with the ALP in office. The low-profile, yet important role of the unions can be attributed to several factors.

Most prominently, the scandal that engulfed the construction branch of the Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union (CFMEU) cast a pall over labour politics and trade unions (Dunckley and Bachelard 2024). The allegations of criminal activity and links with organised crime led to the ALP suspending its affiliation with the CFMEU’s construction wing (Remeikis 2024; Sakkal and Rooney 2024). This scandal, along with wider structural issues—notably, declining union density—poses legitimacy risks for both unions and the ALP.

In addition, many unions support Labor, but ideologically this is mostly through their opposition to the Coalition. As the ACTU (2025) noted after the election, ‘Australians couldn’t risk Dutton’. Unlike the WorkChoices campaign in 2007, the unions have since been mostly galvanised by opposing the return of the centre-right. Crucially, with the advent of a potentially long-running Labor government, unions see an opportunity to increase their representation in key economic institutions, including the Reserve Bank (Sakkal and Massola 2023). These gains mean that, aside from strategically cultivated dissent (mostly from the left-leaning unions and their concerns about AUKUS at the ALP National Conference in 2023), the unions remain quiet but important supporters of the Albanese government. Strategic unionism is, then, a component of the overall variant of labourism pursued by the Albanese government.

Conclusion: Future dilemmas for the Albanese government

As the Albanese government heads into a second, and potentially third, term of office, it would do well to reflect on the fortunes of other recent centre-left governments—notably, those in the United Kingdom, Germany and New Zealand. The demise of German chancellor Olaf Scholz’s SPD ‘traffic-light’ coalition government (2021–24) is instructive (Münchau 2024). Ultimately, the failure at the heart of the Scholz government was the inability to oversee and build support for economic transition, especially in the era of deindustrialisation (Reuters 2024; Kampfner 2024).

A key tension for the centre-left is the difficulty in balancing calls for reform with the pursuit of a pragmatic labourist politics. In the United Kingdom, Sir Keir Starmer’s Labour government attempted a series of deeply unpopular welfare reforms and caused itself much political damage with a series of policy U-turns (Smout and Ravikumar 2025). Albanese’s Labor has also attempted welfare reform (for example, with the National Disability Insurance Scheme), yet reform measures fail when they are poorly explained or lack a clear rationale. Both governments have been criticised for not having a compelling governing narrative.

The fate of Jacinda Ardern’s Labour government in New Zealand is the most pertinent for the Albanese government (Duncan 2025). It narrowly won office as a minority government in 2017, stormed to an extraordinary majority win in 2020, but lost office and momentum at the 2023 election. The Ardern government was undone for a range of reasons, but primarily due to an inability to ‘deliver’ or make significant policy inroads into a suite of core issues—notably, the housing crisis (Duncan 2025: 247). Historic political victories can prove short-lived with impatient electorates.

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  1. 1 We use the term ‘strategic unionism’ in a specific way in our analysis of the ALP’s campaign, but it is useful to note that the term has been deployed in a different way in earlier works (see Irving 1994: 7).


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