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Landslide

11

The Liberals go backwards again

Josh Sunman, Zareh Ghazarian and Marija Taflaga

Abstract

The 2025 election was the worst result in the Liberal Party’s history, compounding their previous worst result in 2022. These results were largely driven by urban and suburban decline, with the party driven out of metropolitan Perth and Adelaide. The Liberals’ results were almost as poor in Melbourne and Sydney, while they suffered devastating and unexpected losses in Brisbane—home to Opposition leader Peter Dutton. The party entered the campaign with severe organisational impediments across the country. These organisational issues were patched over throughout Dutton’s leadership with a set of opportunistic, ideologically incoherent policy priorities, ranging from heavily interventionist nuclear and gas programs, to ‘sugar hit’ cost-of-living relief, such as cutting the fuel excise. Buoyed by the failure of the Indigenous Voice to Parliament referendum, the party ran a chaotic campaign that failed to address the concerns of the electorate. These factors contributed to a devastating defeat for the Liberal Party.

Keywords: Liberal Party; party organisation; party ideology; policy agenda; election campaign

The 2025 election was a disastrous result for the Liberal Party of Australia (LPA), which went further backwards from its 2022 defeat and suffered its worst result since its formation in 1944. The scale and nature of this defeat have given rise to debates about whether the party faces an existential crisis and what this means for its organisational future.

The Liberals failed to gain significant ground in their former heartland where Teal Independents retained seats won in 2022, except Goldstein. This was largely expected, as the Dutton Opposition had spent the term seeking to target outer suburban areas at the expense of wresting back wealthier electorates. However, this appeal also fell dramatically short. The party lost ground contrary to expectations in Victoria, as well as unexpectedly losing several Brisbane marginals—most devastatingly, Dutton’s own seat of Dickson. The party also had a worse performance than its 2022 nadirs in South Australia and Western Australia and was wiped out in Tasmania.

Dutton’s strategy of courting Labor’s traditional base in the outer suburbs was seemingly vindicated by the overwhelming ‘No’ vote in the Indigenous Voice to Parliament referendum, emboldening the Liberals’ embrace of ‘culture war’ issues and its flirtation with right-wing populism. This strategy was only tempered by growing disquiet over the governing approach of US President Donald Trump in the final weeks of the Albanese government’s first term. Despite having a broad political strategy, the Liberals entered the 2025 campaign with an underdeveloped policy envelope and the party organisation in a rundown state. The campaign appeared to lurch from one misstep to another, with party elder George Brandis later describing it as an exercise in ‘running out of people to offend’ (in Karvelas 2025). In the end, the results on the night laid bare how risky Dutton’s gamble had been. This chapter will utilise Stuart Ball’s framework of opposition success to assess the Liberals’ campaign performance. It examines the pre-electoral context, with a focus on the LPA’s strategic approach and organisational capacity, the shambolic campaign run by Dutton and the wider party and the scale of the LPA’s defeat.

Pre-campaign context

Developing a strategy in the aftermath of 2022

It is helpful to assess the strategic approach of the Liberal Party through the lens of Stuart Ball’s framework of opposition requirements. Ball’s essential argument is that whether oppositions are successful in regaining office depends on five factors: the injection of ‘fresh faces’ into the leadership team, maintenance of party cohesion, the visibility of a new or distinctive agenda, an efficient party organisation and an overall adaptability—that is, a hunger for office that prevails over notions of ideological purity (Ball 2005). Tim Bale builds on this framework by offering two broad strategic approaches followed by successful oppositions: impressionism and pointillism. In essence, impressionism captures parties which signal broad intentions and values without specific details, whereas pointillism focuses on the outlining of specific and detailed manifestos (Bale 2015: 62).

Peter Dutton adopted an impressionistic strategy throughout his tenure as Opposition Leader, signalling values and intent rather than providing programmatic detail. In his first press conference as leader, Dutton promised ‘strong policy to make the lives of Australians better’. In making this promise, Dutton (2022) signposted his key electoral focus, declaring that ‘our policies will be squarely aimed at the forgotten Australians, in the suburbs, across regional Australia’. This is an adaptation of a core construct of Liberal Party politics in Australia, the so-called forgotten people of LPA founder, Robert Menzies. As pointed out by Judith Brett (1992), Menzies outlined the LPA’s core constituency as the overlooked ‘middle classes’—not extremely wealthy, but outside Labor’s sectional focus on blue-collar workers. This construct is invoked in a ritual manner by most LPA leaders, but its meaning has changed over time to suit political circumstances and the electoral appeals of particular leaders. Dutton’s invocation combines the language of Menzies with the culturally conservative and masculine appeals of John Howard and, later, Scott Morrison—a clear example of impressionistic signalling rather than a set of detailed policies.

The party’s path to recovery from the 2022 result was hampered by lingering scandals from the Morrison government. These were the multiple-ministries scandal, the Robodebt Royal Commission and continued revelations from the Brittany Higgins case. The impact of these challenges was exemplified in the Aston by-election in 2023. This was necessitated by the resignation of former minister Alan Tudge, who had been implicated in the fallout from Robodebt and faced additional pressure over an extramarital affair. Aston was a historic defeat for the Opposition, with Labor claiming the seat on a 6 per cent swing and a final two-party-preferred vote total of 54 per cent. This represented the first time a government had won a seat from an opposition at a by-election since Kalgoorlie in 1920 (AEC 2023). These challenges speak to the Dutton Opposition’s difficulty in establishing ‘visibility’ for their new priorities and breaking from the Morrison government. The challenge was exacerbated by a shortage of ‘fresh faces’ in the core leadership team, as most were veterans of the tarnished Morrison government (see Ball 2005).

At the time of the by-election, the Coalition was deliberating on how to approach the Albanese government’s Voice referendum. The Nationals had pre-empted the Liberals, announcing their opposition in principle to the Voice in December 2022 (Karp 2022). Days after the Aston by-election, Dutton followed suit, announcing that the Liberal Party would also oppose ‘the Prime Minister’s Canberra Voice. It should be very clear to Australians by now that the Prime Minister is dividing our country, and the Liberal Party seeks to unite our country’ (Dutton and Ley 2023). The tone of this statement was highly partisan and arguably populist, labelling the so-called Canberra Voice championed by Albanese a divisive and elitist institution (see Chapter 4, this volume). While opposing the Voice referendum was broadly supported in both party rooms, there was some notable dissent. Julian Leeser quit as the responsible shadow minister and Andrew Gee defected from the Nationals. Finally, Ken Wyatt, the former Indigenous Affairs Minister and a proud Nyungar man, quit the party in protest.

Dutton successfully used the ‘No’ campaign to build momentum, attack the standing of the Prime Minister and paint the government as distracted from the cost-of-living crisis—achieving a distinctive and visible policy position vis-a-vis the government (see Ball 2005). The referendum’s defeat weakened Labor’s and Albanese’s confidence and boosted the Coalition’s morale. In hindsight, it also bred complacency. Dutton and the wider party viewed the failure of the Voice referendum as a vindication of their suburban strategy and evidence of Labor’s detachment from its traditional base, rather than a poorly prosecuted case for change through a referendum mechanism that has historically favoured the status quo.

A more prescient event that should have given the Opposition pause was the Dunkley by-election. Located in Melbourne’s outer south, Dunkley was consistently held by the Coalition from 1996 to 2019 and its demographic profile meant it was exactly the kind of electorate on which Dutton had pinned his electoral hopes. Labor retained the seat in the 2024 by-election despite suffering a 3.6 per cent swing against it. This result reflected the average swing of 3.5 per cent against governments in by-elections since 1984. However, considering Dutton’s stated suburban electoral strategy, the result was underwhelming (AEC 2024). Dunkley, as well as Aston, were both comfortably retained by the Albanese government in the 2025 general election and offered early warning signs that Dutton’s impressionistic strategy perhaps needed further refinement and policy detail.

The Liberal Party organisation

At the organisational level, the LPA’s party organs continued a downward decline, failing to demonstrate the efficiency and efficacy needed for electoral success (see Ball 2005). The party was out of office at the State level in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, compounding difficulties of resourcing, policy development, candidate selection and fundraising in those divisions. The South Australian and Victorian divisions remained riven by high-profile factional and leadership issues. The Tasmanian division held on to power in minority status, while the composite parties, the Liberal National Party (LNP) in Queensland and the Country Liberal Party (CLP) in the Northern Territory, had the most success, with both returning to government.

Ongoing conflict between Dutton’s travelling campaign office and the main headquarters worsened throughout the campaign, with concerns throughout the party that Dutton’s team was making ‘on the fly’ announcements without proper consultation and utilisation of central resources (Kehoe 2025). Likewise, Senator Jonathon Duniam of Tasmania later complained of disconnects between the central campaign and more localised needs, arguing that local campaign teams had been constrained by central directives (Moran 2025; Chapter 2, this volume).

Low morale and poor State-level results had seen members quit or fail to renew memberships, with a related decline in revenue. In Victoria, membership sits between 8,000 and 10,000 people, with an average age of 68 years. In New South Wales, membership is estimated to be between 8,000 and 12,000 (Kolovos and Belot 2025). The lack of party members, and therefore volunteers, saw the Liberal Party reportedly rely on the Exclusive Brethren to hand out how-to-vote cards at election booths (Bachelard and Maddison 2025). While it was argued during the campaign that this was spontaneous grassroots action, it was revealed after the election that Brethren support for Liberal campaigns went beyond ad hoc canvassing, with the party’s Feedback voter-contact software having a package and log-in keys specifically for Brethren members (Maddison and Sakkal 2025). Additionally, a key Dutton advisor, Sam Jackson-Hope, had been allegedly tasked for much of the campaign proper to liaise between party campaign teams and Brethren supporters. It is estimated that in addition to on-the-ground campaigning, the Brethren made up to one million voter calls by the end of the election campaign (Maddison and Sakkal 2025).

The State divisions were also struggling to appear united. In the leadup to the election, the Victorian division was embroiled in damaging internal conflict after state Liberal MP Moira Deeming successfully sued the Victorian party leader John Pesutto for defamation (see Legg and Metzger 2025). In New South Wales, Peter Dutton ordered an intervention in that State’s division, appointing two conservative Victorian elder statesmen, Alan Stockdale and Richard Alston, and former NSW MP Peta Seaton as a three-person administrative committee with the aim of tackling dysfunctional factional organisation (Karp 2025; Stockdale et al. 2025). The Liberal Party’s Western Australian organisational decline continued, having been in a downward spiral after consecutive State landslide losses in 2017, 2021 and 2025. Likewise, the South Australian division had reached a new nadir after its 2022 State election loss, with its previous leader David Speirs resigning in disgrace after drug supply charges, and losing two by-elections to the Malinauskas Labor government (Sunman 2025: 319–20).

Considering the turmoil engulfing multiple State Liberal divisions, and the level of dysfunction present in the campaign, we argue that the Liberal Party’s lack of organisational efficiency was a major contributing factor to their 2025 defeat. The party also struggled to offer ‘fresh faces’ to the electorate, with its core leadership team comprising Morrison government ministers. On the criteria of ‘visibility’, the party struggled to move past the toxic hangovers from its time in office and offer a distinctive policy vision for a future Coalition government.

The campaign issues and dynamic

The lack of a coherent policy agenda from the Coalition was a substantial contributor to the breadth and depth of the Opposition’s defeat. Dutton and the wider frontbench failed to offer a set of clear, coherent policy pledges and principles and failed to ‘adapt’ their ideological preconceptions to the Australian electorate.

The Liberals’ poor campaign was not solely due to policy, however, as the shadow of Trump also hamstrung Peter Dutton’s natural style of campaigning. Initially from a police background, and with notable ministerial stints in Defence and Home Affairs throughout the Liberals’ previous terms in office, Dutton had developed a ‘strongman’ persona among the electorate (Blaine 2024; Long 2025; Chapter 2, this volume). This persona was ill-suited to an election held in the shadow of Trump and the machismo approach taken by his administration. This led to Dutton attempting to soften his image, which in turn seemed inauthentic and at times indecisive (Mizen 2025a). Dutton had run a tight, ‘cohesive’ Opposition—one that seemed to be well placed to defeat the government right up until the writs were issued. In the light of the campaign, this unity was revealed to be driven by a tightly controlled, highly centralised operation from the leader’s office—one characterised by a distinct lack of visible policy development and ideological rigidity.

Taflaga (2023) noted that the 2022 Liberal campaign was distinctly masculine and based on Morrison’s appeals to outer suburban electorates, although there was some effort from candidates in so-called Teal seats to offer a more socially progressive Liberal vision. In 2025 there was no concerted effort to offer different messaging to more up-scale traditional Liberal heartlands to reclaim seats from Teal Independents, with the party doubling down on the outer suburban strategy employed in 2022.

The party’s campaign relentlessly targeted the seats of Hawke and McEwen on Melbourne’s north-western fringe, Werriwa in Western Sydney and Whitlam, based in the Illawarra. Of these seats, McEwen and Werriwa recorded swings to the ALP below Statewide averages, Hawke no swing and Whitlam a rare swing to the Coalition. This suggests that, perhaps, had they been on track for a victory, these seats would have delivered the Coalition a majority. In hindsight, seemingly erroneous internal polling showing the Coalition highly competitive led to traditionally marginal seats such as Petrie being relatively undefended:

[T]he whole polling was wrong … The messaging from the campaign and the leader’s office was ‘we’re going to win additional seats, there’s no way the Labor Party can increase their majority, they will go backwards into minority government and that’s the best they can hope for’. (Howarth, cited in Elks 2025)

This misplaced optimism based on incorrect polling was arguably a large contributor to the Liberal campaign’s laser-like focus on the outer suburbs and potentially explains its failure to correct course on several damaging policies.

Nuclear and gas

The Coalition advanced one ‘big picture’ policy proposal: the introduction of nuclear power into Australia’s energy grid. However, the details of this major energy policy were left quite vague and it presented a big target for negative Labor campaigning. The Liberal plan touted the construction of seven nuclear power plants at the sites of former coal-fired power stations with a mixture of full-size and smaller modular plants (Dutton et al. 2024). Labor ruthlessly attacked this proposal, using the tagline ‘He cuts, you pay’, tying what they argued to be a $600-billion cost of construction to existing voter perceptions of the spectre of budget cuts to wider government programs and social services (see Chapter 3, this volume).

Internally, nuclear offered a somewhat clean solution to long-running disputes over energy policy in the Coalition. Conservative members of the Liberals, as well as the Nationals, had long opposed net-zero targets and the introduction of policies favouring clean and renewable sources of energy. These disputes were major contributing factors to instability in the Liberal leadership from 2009 to 2018 and Dutton’s pledge to introduce nuclear largely assisted party and Coalition cohesion.

In ideological terms, however, this policy represented a dramatic departure from core Liberal principles. As noted by Brett (2024), the Liberal Party has always emphasised the role of private enterprise over government and the role of the States over Commonwealth centralisation. This new policy marked a dramatic break from both principles, with the policy proposing Commonwealth Government intervention in a largely private market and overruling State-level concerns about the imposition of nuclear energy. This contradiction was acknowledged post election by frontbench Senator James Paterson:

The answer for the Liberal Party going forward on this is probably not … a government-initiated and managed and run program where taxpayers would finance and build them … [b]ut instead go for a more traditional Liberal … market-based approach, which is repeal the prohibition on nuclear power, and then leave it up to the energy industry. (cited in Coorey 2025)

The Liberals sidelined their nuclear proposals throughout much of the campaign (Cropp 2025), with gas receiving greater attention in terms of policy announcements. The centrepiece of the party’s gas plan was the creation of an East Coast Gas Reserve, mandating that the three largest gas providers reserve 20 per cent of Eastern Australia’s gas for the domestic market. This was proposed to be coupled with an Australian domestic gas security mechanism to force suppliers to offer gas to the domestic market at lower rates than gas exported to foreign markets. These measures were to be supported by a $300-billion critical gas infrastructure fund and a general policy of fast-tracking new gas projects (LPA 2025). Reaction from industry players was mixed, with Energy Producers Australia arguing the policy would lead to oversupply and deter investment, but companies such as Santos welcomed the approach (Greber 2025). Regardless of industry perspectives, this gas policy was highly interventionist, contradicting traditional Liberal approaches.

Cost of living and work conditions

This ideological incoherence was also reflected in the party’s approach to cost-of-living issues. Rather than advancing a set of philosophically cohesive policies targeted at addressing inflation and lowering tax burdens, the Liberals opted for ‘sugar hits’ such as lowering the fuel excise by 25 cents per litre for 12 months and a promise of a $1,200 cost-of-living tax offset. Here, however, the Opposition found itself outmanoeuvred by the Albanese government into not supporting a tax cut in the lowest tax bracket. Once again, Senator Paterson offered some helpful post-election analysis:

[W]e made some tactical errors which confused some of our supporters, for example, opposing a tax cut and going to an election saying we’re going to reverse a tax cut … When people vote Liberal, one of the things they expect from us is lower taxes. (cited in Kehoe 2025)

The proposed unwinding of work-from-home arrangements for Canberra-based public servants was another ill-fated policy. Initially announced without shadow cabinet consultation by opposition finance and public service spokeswoman Jane Hume, and later backed by Peter Dutton, the announcement spiralled throughout the electorate. While targeted only at Canberra-based public servants, the proposal caused voters to doubt the Coalition’s overall position on flexible working arrangements. Had the party paused to consider, it may well have realised the massive potential impact forcing remote workers back to the office could have on voters during a cost-of-living crisis (see Chapter 6, this volume). Dutton eventually backed down from the policy after public blowback, but not until after lasting electoral damage had been done.

Defence and immigration

The Liberals also suffered from their traditional ‘home base’ policy areas of defence and immigration being neutralised throughout the campaign. Defence was sidelined due to three factors: Dutton’s overzealous ‘verballing’ of the Indonesian President over supposed deployment of Russian long-range aircraft to Indonesian airbases, Donald Trump’s destabilisation of global affairs and disparaging comments from the party’s candidate in Whitlam regarding women serving in the defence force, with shadow defence minister Andrew Hastie also sidelined due to similar past comments (Hannaford 2025). After the election, Hastie discussed his frustrations over the central campaign failing to announce developed policies in a timely manner—a critique supported by shadow education minister Sarah Henderson (Karvelas 2025).

Likewise, the immigration debate was won by Labor with their policy of international student caps—forcing the Opposition into a ‘me too’ position. The Liberal Party has traditionally ‘owned’ both defence and immigration as policy areas. That is, the Liberals are generally preferred by the electorate to handle these issues (Cameron and McAllister 2019). Labor, in contrast, has experienced a lot of political trauma from immigration in election campaigns, ranging from the Tampa affair in 2001 to the potent ‘stop the boats’ campaign in 2013. Fears of appearing to be ‘Trump-like’ also played a role in discouraging the Liberals from pursuing a hard immigration agenda; they sought to avoid comparison with Trump’s tough-on-immigration approach involving mass deportations and denigration of minority groups (Butler 2025). These factors combined undermined the Coalition’s ability to capitalise on their traditional areas of strength through high-profile policy proposals.

The overall policy agenda (or lack thereof) presented by the Liberal Party contributed to the severity of its defeat. It failed to advance a clear, visible agenda to the electorate. It gave into comfortable, but unpopular ideological impulses, contributing to the scale of its defeat.

Liberal Party results

The Coalition lost government in 2022 after the Liberal Party lost 16 seats and the LNP in Queensland lost an additional two seats. Combined, the Coalition held 58 seats in the House of Representatives in the Forty-Seventh Parliament of Australia. In contrast, Labor won 77 seats in the 151-seat chamber, giving it a thin majority (increasing to 78 with the Aston victory). These numbers may have provided some hope to the Liberal Party that it could return to government, or at least force Labor into minority status after a single term, as it had in 2010.

There was a sense in the leadup to the 2025 election that the Coalition was making up ground and would improve its representation in the new parliament. In January and February 2025, for example, the Coalition led the government on a two-party-preferred basis, according to published opinion polling (Beaumont 2025). Despite such strong results, it was still unlikely that the Coalition could win enough seats to hold a majority in the House of Representatives. A minority government appeared to be inevitable.

Following this surge in support in early 2025, however, the Coalition’s support appeared to slip (see Nicholas et al. 2025). By March, Labor had closed the gap, with the Coalition starting to trail as the election was called. As the campaign rolled on, Labor continued to attract support and polls showed it was on track to hold on to government. Nevertheless, Opposition leader Peter Dutton maintained that internal party polling was stronger for the Liberal Party than published polls (Nilsson 2025). As discussed above, these internals were based on flawed assumptions about voting behaviour, influenced by the Voice referendum result.

Any hope that the Liberal Party would regain seats it lost in 2022, and even win new seats off Labor, evaporated quickly on election night. Early results after the close of polling stations in Eastern Australia at 6 pm showed a swing against the party. By the time polling stations closed in Western Australia, the extent of the party’s loss across the eastern States was clear. As a symbol of how bad the Liberal Party’s performance was, Peter Dutton on the night delivered a concession speech not just for the party, but also for his own seat. Of the three parliamentary factions, the conservative ‘National Right’ remained the largest inside the parliamentary party, but its only ‘new’ member was Jacinta Nampijinpa Price, who defected from the Nationals. The Moderates, while still smaller as a proportion of the party room, gained two new members. The election of Sussan Ley (of the Morrison/Alex Hawke–aligned Centre-Right) over Angus Taylor from the National Right suggests that the Right’s dominance has waned since Dutton’s tenure, but the party room remains finely balanced (see Mizen 2025b).

House of Representatives results

The results across the country gave an indication of how the Liberal Party’s policies failed to resonate with voters. As Table 11.1 shows, the party’s primary vote was just 20.7 per cent. This indicated a 3.2 per cent swing against the party compared with the 2022 election. Moreover, the party managed to win just 28 seats—a net loss of seven seats compared with the previous election.

Table 11.1 Liberal Party primary vote at the 2025 election

State/Territory

Primary vote (%)

Primary vote change since last election (%)

Two-party-preferred (%)

Two-party-preferred change since last election (%)

Seats won

Seats won or lost since last election

National

20.7

–3.2

44.8

–3.1

18

–8

NSW

24.2

–4.1

44.7

–3.9

6

–4a

Vic.

27.6

–1.9

43.7

–1.5

6

0

Qldb

34.9

–4.7

50.6

–3.5

16

–5

WA

28.7

–5.5

44.2

–0.8

4

–1

SA

28.0

–7.3

40.8

–5.2

2

–1

Tas.

24.5

–8.4

36.7

–9.0

0

–2

ACT

21.2

–5.3

27.5

–5.5

0

0

NTc

33.8

4.4

45.7

–1.3

0

0

Notes: a The Liberal candidate for Bradfield, Gisele Kapterian, lost the seat by 26 votes, with the case being before the Court of Disputed Returns at the time of writing; b The Queensland result is for the LNP; c The NT result is for the CLP.

Source: Green (2025).

The strongest swing against the party occurred in Tasmania, where the Liberals held two of the five seats in the State. It suffered big swings—9.4 per cent in Bass and 15.2 per cent in Braddon—losing both to Labor emphatically, leaving the party without a lower house representative in the State. As Table 11.1 shows, the party’s performance in other States was also poor. Its result in Queensland, where the Liberal and National parties merged in 2008, was particularly bad as it lost five seats rather unexpectedly, including that of Peter Dutton. Labor managed to win seats in Queensland that had not been particularly competitive since the homegrown advantage of Kevin Rudd in 2007.

As expected, the party’s primary vote impacted its two-party-preferred result, which went backwards on both measures in all jurisdictions except the Northern Territory. At the national level, the Coalition won just 44.8 per cent and only managed to win more than 50 per cent in Queensland. In every other jurisdiction, the Coalition lagged Labor on a two-party-preferred basis. Further analysis of the Liberal Party’s results indicates the party failed to resonate with voters from across metropolitan and non-metropolitan electorates (see Table 11.2). In metropolitan seats, the strongest swings against the party were in South Australia (7.8 per cent) and in Queensland against the LNP (5.51 per cent). The swing in metropolitan seats in Victoria against the Liberal Party was the lowest, at just 1.65 per cent. The CLP’s vote went up significantly in the Northern Territory seat of Solomon, but the party was unable to repeat the strength of its Darwin vote in the 2024 Territory election.

Despite the loss of key marginals to Labor, there was a rare positive story for the Liberal Party in Victoria, where the party had lost previously safe seats to the so-called Teal Independents. Tim Wilson, the former MP for Goldstein, recontested the seat and defeated Independent Zoe Daniel by just 175 votes. In so doing, he became the first Liberal to win a seat off the Teals and demonstrated that the Liberal Party could attract support through a campaign that was focused on local matters and effectively marshalled local resources.

Table 11.2 Liberal Party primary vote in metropolitan and non-metropolitan electorates (per cent)

State/Territory

Metropolitan primary vote

Metropolitan primary vote change since last election

Non-metropolitan primary vote

Non-metropolitan primary vote change since last election

National

23.9

–3.4

16.2

–2.9

NSW

30.9

–4.6

6.1

–3.6

Vic.

28.6

–1.7

26.0

–2.4

Qlda

31.7

–5.5

37.4

–4.2

WA

27.8

–4.8

32.8

–8.4

SA

25.0

–7.8

35.0

–6.4

Tas.

16.42

–5.08

29.72

–10.6

ACT

21.16

–5.35

n/a

n/a

NTb

35.99

+10.28

30.99

–3.48

Notes: a The Queensland result is for the LNP; b The NT result is for the CLP.

Source: Compiled by authors from AEC (2025c, 2025d) data.

Senate results

The Liberal Party’s fortunes were no better in the Senate. As Table 11.3 demonstrates, the party’s vote fell in every jurisdiction, except in the Northern Territory, where it increased by 1 per cent. The party’s vote fell most dramatically in Tasmania (with a swing of –8.48 per cent). In New South Wales, where the Liberal Party ran a joint ticket with the Nationals, the primary vote fell by 7.29 per cent. The party’s result meant that it could not secure a third seat in the State (which, under the Coalition Agreement, caused the Nationals’ Perin Davey to lose)—a result that was replicated in Victoria and Queensland. The party’s performance in Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania meant that it had to rely on preferences to achieve a second Senate quota. The net result of this election was that the Coalition lost one seat each in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia, leaving it 27 of the 76 seats in the new Senate.

Table 11.3 Coalition performance in the Senate

Jurisdiction

Primary vote (%)

Swing (%)

Quota

NSW

29.44

–7.29

2.06

Vic.

31.41

–0.88

2.20

Qlda

30.93

–4.30

2.16

WAb

26.61

–5.06

1.86

SAb

27.57

–6.36

1.93

Tas.b

23.54

–8.48

1.65

ACTb

17.76

–7.04

0.53

NTc

32.73

+1.03

0.98

Notes: a The Queensland result is for the LNP; b The Liberal Party ran a separate Senate ticket to the Nationals in Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania and the ACT; c The NT result is for the CLP.

Source: AEC (2025b).

Conclusion

The 2025 election result was a low point for the Liberal Party. It represents the party’s most comprehensive defeat at the federal level in its history. Beyond its paltry seat total, the party finds itself politically and institutionally adrift. While the election of Sussan Ley as the party’s first female leader represents a significant milestone, much of her shadow cabinet comprises former Morrison government ministers in key portfolios—a distinct lack of ‘fresh faces’. The greatest success of the Dutton Opposition was its outward projection of unity, even though this unity stifled the development of a visible and coherent policy agenda. Organisationally, the party is largely in chaos, with many of its State branches either moribund or in active factional disarray. It remains difficult to see how an ‘efficient’ party organisation can be rebuilt before an election due in 2028. The Dutton Opposition was ideologically rigid and failed to ‘adapt’ to the electorate on policy. A key test for Ley is whether she can recalibrate the party to appeal effectively to lost traditional Liberal voters, while successfully pursuing soft Labor voters in the outer suburbs.

References

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Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). 2024. ‘Dunkley, Vic.’ Tally Room: 2024 Dunkley By-Election. [Updated 21 March 2024]. Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission. results.aec.gov.au/29778/Website/HouseDivisionPage-29778-210.htm.

Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). 2025a. ‘First preferences by candidate.’ Tally Room: 2025 Federal Election. [Updated 28 May 2025]. Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission. results.aec.gov.au/31496/Website/SenateStateFirstPrefs-31496-NSW.htm.

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Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). 2025c. ‘Metropolitan results.’ Tally Room: 2025 Federal Election. [Updated 10 June 2025]. Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission. results.aec.gov.au/31496/Website/HouseDemographicFirstPrefsByParty-31496-NAT-Metropolitan.htm.

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