Landslide
13
The Greens’ campaign
Stewart Jackson and Josh Holloway
Abstract
The Australian Greens entered the 2025 federal election hoping to consolidate and expand their parliamentary representation, with the re-election of high-profile MPs such as Adam Bandt and Max Chandler-Mather seen as likely. While the party secured six Senate seats, as expected, its lower house performance fell short: Bandt lost Melbourne and two of the three Queensland-held seats also fell to Labor. Despite these losses, the national House of Representatives vote remained stable and the Senate result underscored the party’s ongoing strength in proportional contests. This chapter argues that the Greens’ campaign was constrained less by voter repudiation than by structural and strategic challenges: resurgent Labor support, competition from climate-focused Independents and the difficulty of converting national support into local victories. In highlighting both setbacks and signs of growth, particularly in outer suburban areas, the 2025 election offers insight into the party’s evolving electoral terrain—and the recalibrations likely required for future success.
Keywords: Australian Greens; election; campaign; policy salience; results
The 2025 federal election offered the Australian Greens both significant opportunity and electoral risk. Following a period of growing influence in national politics, marked by three lower house wins in 2022 and a strengthened Senate presence, the party entered the 2025 campaign with significant ambitions. The Greens sought to not only retain current representation, but also secure decisive influence over a (Labor) minority government by way of expanded presence in the House of Representatives. Yet, soon after polling day, those ambitions had collapsed. The Greens lost two of their three Queensland seats and, most strikingly, party leader Adam Bandt’s long-held seat of Melbourne. While the party maintained its Senate representation, the result prompted a flurry of media commentary describing the election as a repudiation of the Greens’ political project.
This chapter takes a more tempered view. It argues that while the Greens’ 2025 federal campaign did fall short of its lower house ambitions, this outcome is better understood as a product of structural constraints and strategic tensions rather than widespread voter rejection. The party’s continued Senate success affirms a stable base of national support, while losses in the House point to the difficulty of replicating high-intensity local organising strategies, the challenge of adapting narrative and tactics in response to a resurgent Labor Party and growing competition from ideologically adjacent Independents. These results underscore the enduring tensions faced by policy-seeking minor parties operating within a preferential, majoritarian electoral system. This chapter therefore evaluates the Greens’ performance not solely in terms of vote share, but also in relation to institutional context, interparty dynamics, policy consistency, narrative framing and organisational execution.
A distinctive feature of the Greens’ recent strategy was emphasis on year-round local campaigning, mutual-aid initiatives and embedded grassroots organising. Yet, the 2025 election suggests this model has limitations. While powerful in electorates with existing activist networks and favourable demographics, its expansion into electorates with weaker campaign infrastructure and distinct political circumstances exposed limits to scalability. But even where this strategy was executed most successfully—indeed, where it was pioneered—in the electorates of Griffith and Melbourne, the party’s support still receded. Simultaneously, the party struggled to distinguish its national narrative as the Coalition’s campaign faltered and Labor’s electoral prospects improved.
The chapter proceeds in four parts. It first reviews the inter-election period (2022–25), identifying patterns in the Greens’ subnational performance and campaign development. The second section analyses the 2025 election results across the House and the Senate, drawing on both national trends and electorate-level data. The third section evaluates the campaign narrative, policy emphases, legislative positioning and organisational strategy, asking what worked, what did not and why. The concluding section reflects on the implications of these results for the Greens’ future, identifying both the constraints they face and the paths available for strategic recalibration.
The inter-election period: 2022–2025
For the period 2022–25, encompassing all State and Territory elections, including for the Brisbane City Council, the Greens generally experienced increasing vote share and rising seat numbers in lower houses. The 2022 federal election, in which the party won three Brisbane inner-city seats, was seen as a high point in the period leading into the 2025 contest. State elections in Western Australia, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania, however, brought mixed results—although only the ACT saw a significant slide in vote share (see Table 13.1). The Greens defended incumbent seats in New South Wales and expanded their numbers in Western Australia and Tasmania due to changes to those States’ electoral systems. In the Northern Territory, long considered one of the hardest jurisdictions for Greens breakthroughs, they succeeded in electing one MLA and came close to electing a second. However, both the ACT and Queensland brought reversals, even as the overall vote in Queensland remained steady. The ACT Greens, in particular, faced stiff competition from high-profile left-leaning Independents, and ultimately lost two seats.
Across the 2022–25 period, various campaign strategies and slogans were used by both the ALP and the Coalition to counter some of the more high-profile efforts supported by the Greens. There was general agreement among all parliamentary parties that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was unlawful and should be strongly resisted (even as the details of how to do that varied). The war, however, compounded the lingering economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Although the Australian economy appeared to have rebounded, housing affordability remained a serious problem, with the housing market continuing to outpace wages growth. The disruption caused by turning a major grain producer (Ukraine) into a net importer of food, combined with European sanctions on Russian gas, contributed to price rises across Europe. While Australia was somewhat insulated from these European shocks, the consumer price index continued to rise through 2022 and 2023, before declining to closer to the pre-Covid mean (ABS 2025).
Table 13.1 Greens vote and seat shares, Australian elections, 2022–2025
|
Year |
State/Territory/national |
House of Representatives (%) |
+/– (%) |
Seats won |
+/– |
Senate (%) |
+/– (%) |
Seats won |
+/– |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
2022 |
SA |
9.1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
9.0 |
3.2 |
1 |
0 |
|
2022 |
Federal |
12.2 |
1.8 |
4 |
+3 |
– |
– |
6 |
+3 |
|
2022 |
Vic. |
11.5 |
0.8 |
4 |
+1 |
10.3 |
1.1 |
4 |
+3 |
|
2023 |
NSW |
9.7 |
0.1 |
3 |
0 |
9.1 |
0.6 |
2 |
0 |
|
2024 |
Tas.a |
14.4 |
4 |
5 |
+3 |
– |
– |
1 |
– |
|
2024 |
[Brisbane City] |
23.2 |
5 |
2 |
+1 |
– |
– |
– |
– |
|
2024 |
NT |
8.1 |
4 |
1 |
+1 |
– |
– |
– |
– |
|
2024 |
ACT |
12.2 |
–1.3 |
4 |
–2 |
– |
– |
– |
– |
|
2024 |
QLD |
9.9 |
0 |
1 |
–1 |
– |
– |
– |
– |
|
2025 |
WAb |
11.1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
10.9 |
4.6 |
4 |
+3 |
|
2025 |
Nationalc |
10.9 |
1.8 |
22 |
+5 |
9.8 |
2.4 |
11 |
+6 |
Notes: a Tasmania changed the number of seats in the House of Assembly from 25 to 35 in 2022. The Tasmanian Greens also hold one of 15 Legislative Council seats (Hobart, elected in 2024) that are elected at intervals not necessarily coinciding with House of Assembly elections; b Western Australia abolished the previous six multi-member districts in the Legislative Council, replacing them with a single Statewide electorate; c The federal Senate and the Legislative Councils in New South Wales and South Australia hold election by half at each election. The elected total of Greens upper house members is twenty.
Source: Various electoral commissions.
The 7 October 2023 attack on Israel by terrorist group Hamas, which claimed the lives of more than 1,200 people—including civilians, military personnel and police—and saw 251 people taken hostage, brought widespread condemnation. However, the Israeli Government’s retaliatory strikes and continuing war against Hamas, marked by a high civilian death toll, drew more divided political responses. This was particularly evident in Adam Bandt’s decision not to support an ALP-sponsored motion condemning Hamas because it did not also condemn actions by the Israeli Defence Forces (Clarke 2023). The Greens’ position became especially prominent when their senators staged a walkout from the chamber in protest at the Labor government’s ongoing support for Israel despite mounting allegations of war crimes (Karp 2023). This move attracted sharp criticism from political opponents and media outlets (see Stone 2024) but also drew praise from sections of the party’s activist base and aligned civil society groups. A consistent message from conservative media outlets was that the Greens were supporters of terrorist organisations such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps by endorsing rallies at which flags of these organisations were flown (Molan 2024; Hildebrand 2024). Though external to campaign mechanics, this episode likely shaped elements of the party’s public image and media coverage leading into the 2025 election.
Importantly, a new set of campaigning ideas began to take hold within the Greens during this period. The rise of the party in Brisbane was foreshadowed by the success of Jono Sriranganathan in the Brisbane City Council elections, followed by State-level victories for Michael Berkman and Amy McMahon (the latter losing her seat in the 2024 Queensland election). The Greens’ emphasis on inter-election doorknocking and community organising—including self-help and food delivery services during the Covid pandemic and the 2022 floods—proved successful in the 2020–22 period. The 2022 federal election campaign was explicitly modelled on these approaches, with potential Greens MPs campaigning early and intensely on local concerns. Max Chandler-Mather in Griffith and Stephen Bates in Brisbane focused particularly on renters’ rights, aircraft noise and housing affordability.
The idea of the ‘permanent election’ was the basis of this organising, with the Greens identifying ongoing community contact as key to winning seats. This was most evident after the Brisbane floods, just before the 2022 federal election, when assisting people in need turned into garnering votes (Flenady 2022). While data-driven forms of campaigning have dominated recent electoral cycles (Kefford 2021), the Greens’ approach marked a potential shift in party–community relations. However, community organising and election campaigning have different ends—one focused on issue outcomes, the other on electoral outcomes. These goals are not inherently incompatible, but nor are they always aligned (Powell 2023). The 2025 campaign would become a test of whether the Greens could successfully scale this local organising model and convert it into durable national gains.
Results
There is a risk of overinterpreting the Greens’ election results. Opinion polling and expectations played a role in framing the outcome but, by the campaign’s final weeks, a clear pattern had emerged. The Greens had polled steadily between 12 per cent and 13 per cent nationally—and occasionally as high as 14.5 per cent. The poll aggregator Australian Election Forecasts (AEF 2025) predicted a modest Labor majority, with the Greens on track to win between two and eight lower house seats, with four most likely. On election night, however, the party faced a significant setback. The Greens lost Adam Bandt’s long-held seat of Melbourne, along with two of the three Queensland seats gained in the 2022 ‘Greenslide’ (Griffith and Brisbane). Although the national House of Representatives vote remained stable, the loss of high-profile MPs created a powerful narrative of decline. The Senate outcome, however, was notably stronger. The Greens comfortably returned a senator in each State, maintaining their overall Senate numbers, and, in some cases, obtained close to or even exceeded a full quota on first preferences.
The divergence in the Greens’ success across chambers is crucial. The 2025 election should not be seen as a repudiation of the Greens, but as an illustration of the structural constraints, strategic vulnerabilities and contested terrain the party must navigate, especially when expanding beyond its institutional heartland in the Senate. Indeed, there is considerable reason to doubt the narrative quickly emerging among media and political commentators that the results reflect a widespread repudiation of the party (Dalidakis 2025), mark a failed political project (Keane 2025) or should prompt an identity crisis akin to that now faced by the Liberal Party (Williams 2025). Some commentary seemed celebration masquerading as analysis, reading from the Greens’ electoral shortfalls supposed voter feedback on singular policy issues (Dyrenfurth 2025). The Greens did suffer significant setbacks in the House of Representatives, and these should not be minimised. Yet, the 2025 election also appears to be a consolidation of the party’s position and role in the upper house.
Lenses customarily used in evaluating the electoral performances of Labor and the Coalition often misidentify dilemmas faced by minor parties. First, the Greens are a policy-seeking, rather than purely office-seeking, party, making for goals quite distinct from those of major parties (Adams et al. 2006; Bischof and Wagner 2017). Second, the Greens’ organisational structure, even following centralising change, still makes for an internal balance-of-power that constrains the behaviour of the parliamentary party (Jackson 2016). Third, the Greens occupy a peculiar space in Australia’s electoral and legislative party systems. Unlike the Nationals, they lack any underpinning social cleavage capable of reliably corralling winning majorities. Unlike most successful Independents, the Greens advance a policy platform well left of the centrist ideological positions claimed by many Australians and cannot benefit from ‘anti-party’ sentiment. Except in Melbourne, when the Greens have won seats in the House, they have done so relying on precise ballot orders and party preference flows in complex multiparty contests. Predominantly, the Greens are a party of the Senate.

Figure 13.1 Greens vote share, House of Representatives and Senate, 1993–2025
Source: AEC.
Clearly the Greens have aspirations beyond the Senate. And voters did shift away from the party, including in lower house electorates previously represented by a Greens MP. Figure 13.1 charts the party’s national share of first preferences in the House and the Senate in elections from 1993 to 2025. At this level, the Greens’ 2025 performance is surpassed only by the 2022 and, for the Senate, 2010 elections. The Greens have never attracted sudden surges of support; rather, 2025 solidifies a long-term trend of gradual growth. But there is an apparent limit to their appeal, no matter the competitive conditions, at a share of roughly 12–14 per cent of the vote.
In some respects, though, nationally aggregated figures do not matter. At the subnational level there is only minimal variation, with sufficient support across States to reach a Senate quota either on first preferences (Tasmania) or relatively comfortably via distribution of preferences (all other States). At the House of Representatives electorate level, though, we see marked differences. Table 13.2 shows first-preference vote shares and absolute swings in electorates that: 1) were held by Greens MPs before the election (in bold); 2) were nominated by the party as target seats (italicised); or 3) recorded Greens support greater than 20 per cent in 2025. The Greens lost support in all four seats with incumbent MPs, though only marginally so in Griffith, Ryan and Brisbane. They meanwhile saw mixed success in their five ‘target seats’ of Wills, Richmond, Macnamara, Perth and Sturt (Australian Greens 2025). Given that the party also furnished considerable resources on other local campaigns, such as in Moreton (Smee 2025), it could be that the Greens’ limited resources were stretched far too thin across disparate seats—some of which, such as Macnamara and Sturt, had only a limited chance of electing a Greens MP.
There is a limit to what electorate-level data can explain, but Table 13.2 does offer some initial insight. First, even accounting for the unfavourable boundary redistribution in Melbourne ahead of the election—doing so reduces the anti-Greens swing to –5.3 per cent—Bandt lost primary votes, and likely in large number to now-elected Labor candidate Sarah Witty. The Greens suffered swings against them even in suburbs long part of the electorate, while Labor increased its primary vote at nearly every booth. Booth-level results highlight that, for the Greens to regain Melbourne, they must significantly bolster their support in the eastern and southern sections of the electorate.
Outside Melbourne, though, Victorian results reveal a trend occurring in several States: the geographic patterns of Greens support are shifting. As votes declined in Melbourne (–5.3 per cent) and Macnamara (–4.2 per cent), they lifted significantly in Fraser (6.4 per cent), Lalor (4.9 per cent) and Maribyrnong (4.5 per cent). Likewise, in New South Wales, losses in Sydney and Wentworth were offset by gains in Page (6.7 per cent), Macarthur (5 per cent), Hughes (5 per cent) and Barton (4.9 per cent). In electorates such as Parramatta that had seen the Greens poll between 5 and 7 per cent from 2007 to 2019, the vote rose to more than 12 per cent. In the neighbouring seat of McMahon, the Greens’ vote went from less than 3 per cent in 2013 to 9 per cent in 2025. While ultimately demonstrating positive voter recognition outside inner-city cores, many of these electorates offer little immediate chance of future seat gains.
Table 13.2 Greens vote share in key seats, 2016–2025 (per cent)
|
2025 |
2022 |
2019 |
2016 |
|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Seat |
Primary vote |
Absolute swing |
Primary vote |
Absolute swing |
Primary vote |
Absolute swing |
Primary vote |
Absolute swing |
|
Melbourne |
39.5 |
–10.1 |
49.6 |
0.3 |
49.3 |
5.5 |
43.8 |
1.1 |
|
Wills |
35.4 |
7.1 |
28.3 |
1.7 |
26.6 |
–4.2 |
30.8 |
8.6 |
|
Griffith |
31.7 |
–2.9 |
34.6 |
11.0 |
23.6 |
6.5 |
17.1 |
6.8 |
|
Ryan |
29.0 |
–1.2 |
30.2 |
9.9 |
20.3 |
1.6 |
18.7 |
4.3 |
|
Richmond |
26.5 |
1.2 |
25.3 |
5.0 |
20.3 |
–0.1 |
20.4 |
5.1 |
|
Brisbane |
25.9 |
–1.3 |
27.2 |
4.8 |
22.4 |
3.0 |
19.4 |
5.1 |
|
Macnamara |
25.5 |
–4.2 |
29.7 |
5.5 |
24.2 |
0.6 |
23.8 |
3.6 |
|
Fraser |
25.3 |
6.8 |
18.5 |
10.2 |
8.3 |
– |
– |
– |
|
Cooper |
25.2 |
–2.2 |
27.4 |
6.3 |
21.1 |
–15.1 |
36.2 |
9.8 |
|
Grayndler |
25.1 |
3.1 |
22.0 |
–0.5 |
22.5 |
0.3 |
22.2 |
0.2 |
|
Perth |
24.5 |
2.3 |
22.2 |
3.3 |
18.9 |
1.8 |
17.1 |
5.1 |
|
Newcastle |
22.2 |
2.1 |
20.1 |
4.5 |
15.6 |
1.9 |
13.7 |
1.7 |
|
Moreton |
21.7 |
0.9 |
20.8 |
4.0 |
16.8 |
4.1 |
12.7 |
2.7 |
|
Sydney |
21.6 |
–1.4 |
23.0 |
4.9 |
18.1 |
–0.7 |
18.8 |
0.5 |
|
Maribyrnong |
21.2 |
4.9 |
16.3 |
1.5 |
14.8 |
5.2 |
9.6 |
–0.3 |
|
Cunningham |
20.4 |
–1.3 |
21.7 |
6.6 |
15.1 |
0.4 |
14.7 |
2.9 |
|
Sturt |
15.6 |
–0.8 |
16.4 |
5.2 |
11.2 |
4.1 |
7.1 |
–2.7 |
|
National |
12.2 |
–0.05 |
12.2 |
1.8 |
10.4 |
0.2 |
10.2 |
1.6 |
Notes: ‘Absolute swing’ here is calculated as the shift in recorded primary support from one election to the next, not accounting for boundary redistribution; Seats held by Greens MPs after the 2022 election are in bold text; additional Greens target seats in the 2025 election campaign are italicised.
Source: AEC.
Queensland instead demonstrates the precarity of representation in electorates marked by close three-cornered contests. What’s more, the LNP and ALP alike targeted Brisbane’s three Greens-held seats aggressively, alongside well-funded campaigns from right-wing groups such as Advance Australia and Better Australia (Massola 2024; Martin 2025). Advance Australia was reported to have a $14-million war chest amassed to specifically target Greens and Teal candidates (West 2025). In 2022, Chandler-Mather won Griffith with favourable preference flows from Labor’s Terri Butler after the latter failed to make the two-candidate-preferred count. In 2025, the order of primary votes shifted: the LNP dropped out earlier in the count and preferences flowed to Labor, unseating the Greens. In Brisbane, a minor drop in the Greens’ vote removed Stephen Bates from the two-candidate-preferred count, again handing victory to Labor. Only in Ryan, where the LNP suffered a larger decline, did the Greens hold on. Certainly, in each seat, the Greens’ vote went backwards. Yet, these modest losses do not warrant sweeping proclamations of outright repudiation of the party. Given that minor primary vote movement in these contests can be decisive, the Greens remain competitive in each.
What ought to concern the Greens, however, is the softness of their vote amid challenges from well-resourced Independents. That a significant portion of voters abandon the party when another viable non–major-party option is present has been evident since at least Nick Xenophon’s entry into federal politics, yet Teal and Community Independents have spread this effect beyond South Australia. Table 13.3 lists Greens’ primary votes and absolute swings in seats where Climate 200–backed Independents have won or attracted significant support in successive elections. A clear pattern is evident: where such Independents emerge, the Greens tend to lose vote share and struggle to regain it in subsequent elections. An element of ‘strategic voting’ may be at play here, where Independent challengers are perceived as having a greater chance of winning. Also likely is that Teal Independents in particular draw in part from a pool of issue-oriented and, especially, climate-oriented ‘soft progressive’ voters—whom the Greens cannot consistently claim as their own.
Table 13.3 Greens vote share in seats with Independents, 2016–2025 (per cent)
|
2025 |
2022 |
2019 |
2016 |
|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Primary vote |
Absolute swing |
Primary vote |
Absolute swing |
Primary vote |
Absolute swing |
Primary vote |
Absolute swing |
|
|
Fremantle |
11.6 |
–6.5 |
18.1 |
2.1 |
16 |
–1.7 |
17.7 |
5.8 |
|
Bean |
9.5 |
–5.3 |
14.8 |
1.7 |
13.1 |
– |
– |
– |
|
Curtin |
7.8 |
–2.6 |
10.4 |
–4.9 |
15.3 |
1.3 |
14.2 |
–0.6 |
|
Bradfield |
6.7 |
–2.6 |
9.3 |
–4.4 |
13.7 |
2 |
11.7 |
–1.2 |
|
Goldstein |
7.2 |
–0.6 |
7.8 |
–6.3 |
14 |
–1.9 |
15.9 |
0 |
|
Clarka |
13.2 |
–0.3 |
13.5 |
3.9 |
9.6 |
– |
– |
– |
|
Mackellar |
6.1 |
0 |
6.1 |
–5.4 |
11.5 |
–2.5 |
14.1 |
–0.1 |
|
Indib |
3.6 |
0 |
3.6 |
–0.6 |
4.2 |
0.4 |
3.8 |
0.4 |
|
Warringah |
8.8 |
1.4 |
7.4 |
1.3 |
6.1 |
–6.1 |
12.2 |
–3.3 |
|
Kooyong |
7.8 |
1.5 |
6.3 |
–14.9 |
21.2 |
2.7 |
18.9 |
2.3 |
|
Mayo |
13.6 |
1.8 |
11.8 |
2.5 |
9.3 |
1.2 |
8.1 |
–6.1 |
|
Wentworth |
10.2 |
1.9 |
8.3 |
0.8 |
7.5 |
–7.3 |
14.9 |
0.8 |
|
National |
12.2 |
–0.05 |
12.2 |
1.8 |
10.4 |
0.2 |
10.2 |
1.6 |
Notes: ‘Absolute swing’ here is calculated as the shift in recorded primary support from one election to the next, not accounting for boundary redistribution; The election at which a strong Independent emerges is highlighted in bold; a Andrew Wilkie was first narrowly elected in 2010 in the then seat of Denison, with no effect on the Greens. However, in 2013, Wilkie won easily, with the Greens dropping from 18.98 to 7.92%. b Cathy McGowan was elected in 2013 with the Greens’ vote dropping from 9.63 to 3.42%.
Source: AEC.
One further development was the emergence of Independents endorsed by The Muslim Vote (TMV) in three seats: Blaxland, Watson and Calwell. Although initially thought to split the Greens’ potential gains among Muslim voters, the party’s vote in those electorates instead largely held steady or increased slightly. In Blaxland and Watson, TMV candidates drew primarily from the major parties, with the greater share coming from Liberal candidates, with the Greens seeing modest increases. Nonetheless, before the election, the Greens had strongly supported action on Palestine and greater efforts for an enduring peace in the Middle East, so would have expected greater results for this stand, even as the TMV candidates pitched themselves as ‘centrist’. Only in Calwell, in a complex and highly competitive seat with 13 candidates, did the Greens experience a small decline.
In sum, the 2025 results delivered a dual verdict. The Greens remain a stable and electorally viable minor party, with national support sufficient to retain considerable Senate influence. But results in the House of Representatives exposed the fragility of that support in local contests, particularly in crowded electoral fields. These dynamics will not mark the end of the Greens’ lower house ambitions. Yet, they do underscore the need for a recalibrated strategy—one more attuned to the party’s organisational limits, changing geographic strengths and the increasingly competitive terrain of left-of-centre politics in Australia.
The campaign: Narrative, policy, tactics
What might help explain these results? Several trite explanations appearing in post-election media coverage—the party has become too extreme, too obstructionist, too distant from an imagined single-issue environmentalist past—may nicely align with ALP (and Advance) campaign rhetoric but are nonetheless unpersuasive on the available evidence. If the Greens are now more ‘extreme’, it is an extremism shared by a significant and relatively stable proportion of Australians. Likewise, lacking individual-level data, it cannot be ruled out that the party’s legislative tactics influenced voting behaviour. But the divergent swings across electorates suggest that voter response was far from uniform. Much has also been made of the supposed shift in party priorities away from the environment. Yet, the Greens, like their antecedent parties (such as the United Tasmania Group), are better understood as ecologically based, not ecologically focused. Their platforms have long encompassed a broad social-democratic agenda. In what follows, after a discussion of campaign narrative, we explore each of these points in turn.
Narrative
The Greens’ campaign launched with a guiding narrative: ‘Keep Dutton out and get Labor to act.’ This framing likely suited a context in which a minority government appeared possible. Yet, as the Coalition’s campaign faltered, the Greens failed to pivot to a narrative that clearly differentiated themselves from a resurgent Labor Party. Voters may have believed keeping Dutton out was more likely achieved by voting Labor, while the Greens’ presence in the Senate would pressure Albanese towards progressive outcomes. Nonetheless, much of the Greens’ campaign rhetoric remained focused on power-sharing in a minority government. Greens support for a Labor minority was premised on several core demands: adding dental to Medicare, reforming negative gearing and capital gains tax, capping rents, banning new fossil fuel projects and ending native forest logging (Dick 2025).
Yet, having ruled out (quite reasonably, given the ideological gap) supporting a Dutton-led Coalition, the Greens offered little public strategy for the more likely scenario: that Labor would win a majority and decline to engage with the party’s demands. Here, the campaign seemingly lacked a backup plan. With Labor increasingly dominant in polling from April, the Greens’ continued emphasis on a minority power-sharing frame may have sounded implausible or redundant to voters. What’s more, apart from the environment and climate change, Labor advanced what was arguably a credible alternative set of positions in policy areas central to the Greens’ campaign. Overall, this dynamic reflects a broader challenge for policy-seeking minor parties. Their success is a function of not just their own narrative or issue positions but also their ability to maintain distinctiveness as major parties respond (Meguid 2008).
Policy
Have the Greens become more ‘extreme’ (Dyrenfurth 2025)? Have they turned away from environmental issues to become a ‘party of renters’ (Roe 2025)? In a post-election edition of the 7am Podcast, journalist Mike Seccombe summarised former Greens leader Richard Di Natale’s view that the party’s platform in 2025 was largely unchanged from previous elections:
[I]n terms of substance, actually, the platform that they took to this election, which wasn’t so successful, was the same as the one that they took to the previous election, at which they were very successful, and essentially the same as the one that they took to the election before that. (Seccombe 2025)
The evidence suggests that Di Natale is broadly correct. The policy positions, and salience afforded to different policy areas, in Greens’ platforms show considerable consistency. Table 13.4 uses Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 2024) data—which code election platforms into quantifiable policy categories—to measure the degree of consistency in Greens, Labor and Liberal election platforms from 2004 to 2022 (as of writing, 2025 data are unavailable, but see the media release analysis below). The score for each party is the sum of absolute differences between the salience attributed to each policy category across a pair of elections, divided by two and then subtracted from 100, rendering a percentage of overlap. The higher the overlap figure, the greater is the consistency across a party’s two platforms. The figures reveal, accordant with the policy-seeking orientation of the Greens (Adams et al. 2006), that the party maintains a more consistent platform, relative to the major parties, regardless of broader electoral conditions. Barely one-quarter of the Greens’ policy emphases change from one election to the next.
Table 13.4 Intraparty policy overlap: Greens, Labor and Liberal, 2004–2022 (per cent)
|
Election platforms |
Greens |
Labor |
Liberal |
|---|---|---|---|
|
2022–2019 |
76.3 |
66.8 |
72.2 |
|
2019–2016 |
75.2 |
71.2 |
42.6 |
|
2016–2013 |
65.2 |
55.2 |
47.9 |
|
2013–2010 |
73.5 |
53.9 |
54.7 |
|
2010–2007 |
73.9 |
49.2 |
58.7 |
|
2007–2004 |
78.8 |
47.3 |
70.2 |
Source: Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 2024).
But what policy areas do Greens election platforms typically address? Figure 13.2 charts the proportion of Greens policy platforms dedicated to issue variables that, at any election from 2004 to 2022, made up at least 5 per cent of their platform. Darker shading corresponds with greater emphasis on a policy platform, while the top three most salient policy areas are highlighted with their percentage share. For example, in 2022, the top three most salient policy issues in the Greens’ platform were welfare expansion, environmental protection (including from climate change) and anti-growth economics (mostly focused on sustainable development). Positive statements on unions and initiatives on enhancing equality closely followed. While precise salience figures shift from one election to the next, there is a ‘typical’ Greens platform from which the party rarely strays. The Greens’ most successful elections, 2010 and 2022, are among the upper and lower ends of environmental issue salience; descriptively, at least, there seems to be little relationship between ‘attention’ given to the environment and electoral wins.
Lacking Manifesto Project data for 2025, we instead thematically code media releases distributed by the party’s media list during the campaign. While media releases differ from election platforms, they nonetheless exhibit a policy focus, reflect with greater accuracy the initiatives pursued by the parliamentary party and allow us to address some pervading myths. Table 13.5 shows the results of a thematic coding process, whereby each media release was assigned one primary policy theme.1 What is immediately obvious is that any claims of a minimisation of the environment in the Greens’ campaigning should be treated as dubious at best.

Figure 13.2 Policy salience in Greens election platforms, 2004–2022
Source: Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 2024).
Table 13.5 Greens media release themes
|
Policy theme |
Count |
|---|---|
|
Environmental protection |
8 |
|
Campaign narrative and electioneering |
7 |
|
Education expansion |
7 |
|
Housing |
6 |
|
Climate change |
5 |
|
Public service |
5 |
|
Energy and resources |
4 |
|
Media and communications |
4 |
|
Arts |
3 |
|
First Nations |
3 |
|
Health |
3 |
|
Cost of living |
2 |
|
Economic management |
2 |
|
Trade |
2 |
|
Women |
2 |
|
Childcare |
1 |
|
Foreign policy |
1 |
|
Immigration |
1 |
|
Industrial relations |
1 |
|
Law and justice |
1 |
|
Welfare expansion |
1 |
|
Total |
69 |
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Environmental protection emerged as the most frequently cited theme (11.6 per cent), followed by education expansion, campaign narrative and housing. If we include releases specifically focused on climate change, the combined environment/climate share rises to 18.8 per cent—by far the highest combined thematic grouping. Other prominent areas included energy and resources, public service reform and arts policy. Some surprises emerge: while welfare expansion is a core policy area for the party, it was the primary theme in just one campaign release—curiously, given the party’s voter base—on lifting the age pension. Likewise, while health policy was central to the Greens’ demands for supporting a Labor minority government, it appeared late in the campaign and the party’s spokesperson, Senator Jordon Steele-John, was absent from associated media releases. Conversely, the Coalition’s proposed cuts to the public service gained repeated attention.
Both the distribution and the substantive content of the releases suggest a campaign focused on connecting key policy areas—the environment, housing, education and public services—with tangible cost-of-living concerns. In this sense, the Greens were not abandoning environmentalism or embracing a new economic agenda, but rather advancing a socially rooted green politics—one that attempts to integrate distributive and sustainability claims. This approach aligns with what Adam Bandt (2023) and others have termed a kind of ‘green social democracy’.
Of course, media releases reveal only the ‘supply side’ of party communication. What voters heard—and internalised—may have differed. This divergence between intended and received messaging is especially significant for minor parties with limited earned media access. But if public opinion, or media reporting, shifted towards seeing the Greens as more radical or less environmentally focused, the available data suggest these were shifts in perception rather than reality. Policy content remained broadly stable and environmental themes retained significant salience. The more pressing question, then, is whether the balance and clarity of messaging were effective. In a campaign in which Labor surged, the Greens’ policy offers—often veering into areas of traditional Labor ‘ownership’—may have lacked clear anchoring in voters’ minds, allowing other narratives to take hold.
Parliamentary tactics
Central to Labor’s campaign was the portrayal of the Greens as obstructionist. This line of attack—while somewhat cynical, given Labor’s routine refusal to negotiate—gained traction in part because it was grounded in basic facts, such as the Greens’ role in delaying the government’s housing policy agenda. Before the campaign, the Greens already deemed it necessary to defend their approach to the Forty-Seventh Parliament, with Bandt acknowledging ‘we pushed hard this year, and pushing the government isn’t always pretty’ (Middleton 2024). The defensive stance continued into the campaign, as party rhetoric and releases alike emphasised the benefits of Labor–Greens cooperation. Negative campaigning, meanwhile, was more targeted towards Dutton and the Coalition.
Yet, the effects of this parliamentary record on voting behaviour are difficult to assess. Swings against the Greens occurred in some seats but not others; if the ‘obstructionist’ frame worked, it did so unevenly. More importantly, the Greens’ parliamentary tactics appeared to lack a clear internal logic. Early in the Forty-Seventh Parliament, they backed Labor’s climate safeguard mechanism, despite its inadequacies, after securing a cap on emissions (Macintosh and Butler 2023). Later, they extracted $3 billion in additional housing investment by holding up Labor’s housing bill. But, over time, this assertiveness faded. The party eventually voted for numerous government bills after securing only minor concessions (Karp 2024). Late in the parliamentary term, the Greens even indicated willingness to support Labor’s environmental protection reforms without a climate trigger, which was arguably a modest and symbolic ask, previously backed by Albanese himself.
This pattern suggests a party caught between its programmatic roots and its desire to influence. Minor parties often struggle to balance the competing imperatives of legislative impact and ideological distinctiveness (Pedersen 2011; Spoon 2011). For the Greens to frame a series of policy problems as crises, to maintain credibility, the party then needed to be seen as engaging in either principled opposition or constructive negotiation. Instead, the result may have been a muddled message to voters about what the party stood for in parliament, and why.
Conclusion
For the Australian Greens, the election was seen as a test of their newly adopted on-the-ground campaign techniques, which appeared to have limited impact in key seats where they were most actively deployed. The campaign result itself, particularly the loss of multiple lower house MPs, was widely seen as a failure for the party, even though the national House of Representatives vote share remained essentially unchanged. In contrast, six senators were re-elected relatively comfortably, despite a national swing of about 1 percentage point against the party. So, was this such a bad election?
The immediate aftermath of election night was sobering. Greens leader Adam Bandt began the evening confident of victory, only to see not just two of the three Queensland seats lost, but also his own seat of Melbourne fall to Labor. Other target seats came close but ultimately returned unsuccessful candidates. Even the Senate result was quickly overshadowed by the post-election defection of WA Greens Senator Dorinda Cox to the ALP. The subsequent election of Queensland Senator Larissa Waters to the party’s leadership signalled a geographic shift in the party’s centre of gravity—away from the traditional bases of Victoria and Tasmania and dramatically north. While the Tasmanian branch has experienced some renewed success at both State and federal levels, it can no longer be regarded as the undisputed core of the party. Likewise, the once-solid Greens stronghold in Melbourne—long a symbol of the party’s inner-urban strength—now appears vulnerable.
Yet, despite the storm clouds surrounding the 2025 result, there is a silver lining. Greens campaigns outside the inner city performed relatively well, particularly in Western Sydney and suburban Melbourne, suggesting that the party’s support base may be gradually shifting. The success of ongoing campaigns at the local and State levels, as well as strong alignment with key public concerns such as housing and climate, point to a viable future trajectory—even as the inner-urban foundation of the party’s vote has softened. What the 2025 election revealed was not the collapse of the Greens’ political project or widespread repudiation, but a set of structural and strategic challenges that now demand the party’s attention.
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1 Some careful interpretation is required with such coding, and there are policy initiatives announced in media releases that span multiple policy areas—for instance, advocating greater renters’ rights around the installation of solar panels covers, inter alia, law reform, climate action, cost-of-living relief and energy costs. To address this complexity, coding is determined by language used, emphasis and the portfolio responsibilities of the Greens spokesperson responsible for the release.
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