Landslide
16
Third-party campaigning
Mark Riboldi and Ariadne Vromen
Abstract
The 2025 election again saw interventions from third-party campaigners across the political spectrum. Although right-wing digital campaigning organisation Advance received significant attention, particularly from progressive media, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) was the dominant campaigner. The ACTU outspent Advance in terms of digital advertising and, along with other anti-Coalition groups, outspent pro-Coalition groups at a rate of more than three to one. Further, analysis of TikTok data suggests that the ACTU was more successful in engaging potential voters outside their traditional supporter base. Meanwhile, the Australian Christian Lobby (ACL) and GetUp!—organisations with a significant presence in previous campaigns—dropped almost entirely off the map in 2025, with the ACL focusing on providing electoral education and GetUp! seemingly constrained by a lack of internal direction.
Keywords: Australian politics; third-party campaigning; Australian Council of Trade Unions; Advance Australia; GetUp!
Third-party influence over election campaigns and politics generally has a long history in Australia—historically dominated by the trade union movement and business interests, particularly those connected to mining and energy generation.1 The rise and fall of former ALP prime minister Kevin Rudd are a case in point. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) Your Rights at Work campaign was a key vehicle in electing Rudd in 2007 ahead of the Liberal–Nationals Coalition, as was the nascent digital-first campaigning organisation GetUp! (see Muir 2010; Vromen 2017). Just three years later, however, a public advertising blitz from the Minerals Council of Australia helped end Rudd’s tenure as Prime Minister, along with his proposed tax on the super profits of mining companies (Bell and Hindmoor 2014). In 2025, third-party campaigners across the campaign were no less active when it came to issues of energy generation or workers’ rights. However, the nature of which Australian third parties participate and how their campaigning connects with broader campaign trends have shifted over time.
In seeking to understand how third parties attempted to influence outcomes in the 2025 federal election campaign, this chapter analyses data from organisations’ social media advertising spending, from their social media accounts generally, from the emails organisations sent to their supporters and from the mentions of selected organisations in print media. Continuing studies from previous Australian elections (for example, Vromen and Rutledge-Prior 2023), we focus on left-leaning organisations the ACTU and GetUp! and the right-leaning Australian Christian Lobby (ACL) and Advance Australia (Advance). We also include third parties engaged in large-scale digital advertising, including climate change and renewable energy–oriented Climate 200, which supported a variety of Community Independent ‘Teal’ candidates (see Chapter 14, this volume). Together, these data offer insights into how third-party organisations attempted to mobilise their supporters, influence voters and impact agenda-setting during the election campaign. Specifically, they reveal the scale of the union movement’s campaigning against the Opposition leader Peter Dutton, contest around the Coalition’s nuclear energy policy and the veritable disappearance of GetUp! from the Australian electoral landscape.
Third-party actors in Australian elections
Regulation of third-party actors in Australian elections is a shifting landscape that arguably fails to keep up with the reality of what these groups do. The AEC requires registration and reporting for significant third parties—organisations that spend more than $250,000 on electoral expenditure in a financial year, essentially covering content that ‘seeks to influence’ people’s votes (AEC 2023). Additionally, organisations spending more than a disclosure threshold (currently $16,900) may elect to register as third parties for transparency purposes. Further, some organisations are separately registered as charities with the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC). ACNC registration can provide organisations with financial benefits such as access to public and philanthropic funding and deductible gift recipient status for private donations. However, these benefits typically come with restrictions on the kind of public advocacy in which organisations can engage—notably, a restriction on campaigning that endorses one candidate over another. Compared with non-ACNC registered organisations, which can campaign for or against a particular political candidate or party during elections, registered charities tend to present positions on issues, rather than candidates, requiring voters to draw the connections themselves.
We focus our analysis primarily on four organisations, Advance, the ACL, the ACTU and GetUp!, and, to a lesser degree, on a fifth, Climate 200. Unlike the other four organisations, Climate 200 exists primarily to support the election of political candidates, making them more a ‘party-like’ entity (Riboldi et al. 2024). Table 16.1 portrays these five organisations along with factors significant to the analysis: their 2023–24 income as reported to the AEC, as well as the number of followers they had on various social media platforms at the beginning of the official election campaign period.
Table 16.1 Key Australian third parties: Income and social media presence ahead of the 2025 election
|
Organisation |
AEC-reported income (2023–24) |
|
|
YouTube |
TikTok |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
ACL |
$6.2 million |
305,000 |
18,000 |
99,000 |
– |
|
ACTU |
$27.7 million |
202,000 |
32,000 |
3,000 |
10,000 |
|
Advance |
$15.7 million |
130,000 |
23,000 |
3,000 |
81,000 |
|
Climate 200 |
$5.9 million |
9,800 |
19,900 |
425 |
3,500 |
|
GetUp! |
$6.8 million |
489,000 |
50,000 |
30,000 |
22,000 |
Sources: AEC; Facebook; Instagram; YouTube; TikTok.
The ACTU is clearly the most financially secure of the five, likely reflecting its long history and institutional role as the peak organisation for the trade union movement. Led in 2025 by Secretary Sally McManus, the ACTU’s presence and following across social media channels are significant, though still generally less than digital-first campaigning organisation GetUp!. The ACTU is also the only organisation in this group with paid members: trade unions, which themselves have individual paid-up members. The large ‘membership’ claims of organisations such as Advance and GetUp! refer to the size of their email lists and are more accurately described as ‘supporters’ or ‘subscribers’, some of whom provide donations to fund these organisations.
Of the other organisations, the ACL is the most similar in ‘type’ to the ACTU. Founded in 1975, it is particularly active on socially conservative issues, having substantively opposed marriage equality, transgender rights and attempts to make abortion services safe and accessible. Unlike the other major third parties, the ACL is registered with the ACNC, meaning its political activities must focus more on their preferred policy issues, rather than directly advocating for or against a particular candidate, to maintain charitable status. Their CEO from April 2023 and during the election campaign was Michelle Pearse, a former Pentecostal pastor and former WA ACL State director.
GetUp!’s reported income in 2023–24 was on par with the ACL’s: both about 20–25 per cent of the ACTU’s $27.7 million. Founded in 2006 as a digital-first organisation focused explicitly on opposing the Coalition government, GetUp! rose to significance as a key actor in Australian elections, pioneering digital campaigning tactics that are now commonplace across the political spectrum (see Vromen 2017). Getup!’s 2022 election was noticeably lower profile than previous campaigns, corresponding with the rise of Climate 200, whose volunteer and donor bases—older, white and middle class—arguably have significant crossover. In August 2023, Widjabul Wia-bul woman Larissa Baldwin-Roberts became the first woman and first Indigenous CEO of GetUp!. However, Baldwin-Roberts left GetUp! in December 2024 in reportedly troubled circumstances, and the organisation entered the 2025 election campaign without executive leadership (McKinnon 2025; Wilson 2025a).
Advance began in 2018 as a conservative response to GetUp! and recorded more than twice as much income as GetUp! in 2023–24. The digital campaigning organisation received widespread attention for their work on the ‘No’ campaign in the Indigenous Voice to Parliament referendum in 2023 (Carson and Grömping 2024; Vromen et al. 2025). This activity led to accusations of circulating misinformation and disinformation and their reported international connections to the Atlas Network of right-wing think tanks (Walker 2023). Like the ACL, Advance went into the 2025 federal election campaign with a middle-aged white woman as their key spokesperson: former police officer Sandra Bourke.2 This shift in public-facing leadership might be seen as a reaction to the breakthrough success of the Climate 200–backed Teal Independents in 2022, all of whom were middle-class, middle-aged white women; the Teals’ success was partly attributed to the Coalition’s poor track record in preselecting women in winnable seats and in appealing to women voters generally (see Hayman 2025).

Plate 16.1 An image from social media of Advance’s anti-ALP advertising
Source: Advance, photo used with permission.
Data from the 2025 federal election campaign
To understand third-party activity and influence during the 2025 federal election, we collected data from publicly available sources such as the Meta Ad Library and the Google Ads Transparency Centre, direct observation of social media activity, organisations’ media appearances via Factiva and Google Alerts, as well as subscribing to the publicly available supporter e-lists of various third-party organisations. This allowed us to examine activity from a variety of perspectives.
Digital advertising
Based on data from the Meta and Google political advertising libraries between 28 March and 3 May 2025, the three highest spending third-party organisations in the election campaign were the ACTU, Advance and Climate 200 (Table 16.2). Together, these three organisations accounted for almost half the $8 million spent by the top 20 spending groups. Where Advance and Climate 200 placed the bulk of their advertising on Meta platforms Facebook and Instagram, the ACTU spent twice as much on Google advertising (via Google Adwords and YouTube) as they did across Meta. For their part, GetUp! spent just $42,000 on Meta and the ACL $37,500, with no Google spending for either. Both organisations started their Meta spending in week four of the campaign (18–24 April), by which time Advance and the ACTU, respectively, had already spent $325,000 and $116,000 on Meta.
Table 16.2 Highest digital advertising spending by third-party campaigners, 28 March – 3 May 2025
|
Organisation |
AEC status |
Frame |
Meta |
|
Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
ACTU |
STP |
Anti-Coalition |
$477,000 |
$928,000 |
$1,405,000 |
|
Advance |
STP |
Pro-Coalition |
$1,047,000 |
$296,000 |
$1,343,000 |
|
Climate 200 |
STP |
Anti-Coalition |
$896,600 |
$99,000 |
$995,600 |
|
Australian Taxpayers’ Alliance |
– |
Anti-Greens/Teals |
$214,400 |
$296,000 |
$510,400 |
|
Liberals Against Nuclear |
– |
Anti-Coalition |
$246,000 |
$156,000 |
$402,000 |
|
Australians for Prosperity |
– |
Anti-Greens/Teals |
$235,000 |
$159,000 |
$394,000 |
|
Climate Action Network Australia |
TP |
Anti-Coalition |
$392,400 |
$0 |
$392,400 |
|
Hothouse Magazine |
STP |
Anti-Coalition |
$287,700 |
$87,000 |
$374,700 |
|
Better Australia |
STP |
Anti-Greens/Teals |
$149,400 |
$153,000 |
$302,400 |
|
It’s Not a Race |
STP |
Anti-Coalition |
$187,700 |
$67,000 |
$254,700 |
|
Nuclear for Australia |
– |
Pro-Coalition |
$236,500 |
$0 |
$236,500 |
|
United Workers Union |
STP |
Anti-Coalition |
$149,400 |
$87,000 |
$236,400 |
|
Clean Energy Council Limited |
– |
Anti-Coalition |
$209,300 |
$0 |
$209,300 |
|
Jobs for Mining Communities |
STP |
Anti-ALP |
$164,600 |
$15,200 |
$179,800 |
|
Energy for Australians |
– |
Anti-ALP |
$136,600 |
$16,900 |
$153,500 |
|
Greenpeace Australia Pacific |
TP |
Anti-Coalition |
$150,600 |
$0 |
$150,600 |
|
The Climate Council |
TP |
Anti-Coalition |
$122,100 |
$10,300 |
$132,400 |
|
Parents for Climate |
– |
Anti-Coalition |
$122,600 |
$0 |
$122,600 |
|
Australians for Affordable Energy |
– |
Anti-Coalition |
$110,600 |
$0 |
$110,600 |
|
Australian Conservation Foundation |
STP |
Anti-Coalition |
$105,600 |
$0 |
$105,600 |
|
Total |
– |
– |
$5,641,100 |
$2,370,400 |
$8,011,500 |
Note: STP = significant third party.
Sources: AEC; Meta Ad Library; Google Ads Transparency Centre.
Of the top 20 spending organisations across Meta and Google, about half were already registered with the AEC as significant third parties (STPs). Four of the 10 organisations that spent over the AEC’s STP threshold of $250,000—on social media advertising alone—were not registered as STPs before the election: Australian Taxpayers’ Alliance, Liberals Against Nuclear, Australians for Prosperity and Climate Action Network Australia. Two other organisations, Nuclear for Australia and the Clean Energy Council, likely also spent over the threshold when other costs are taken into account but were not registered as STPs. This suggests that the AEC’s STP register could not necessarily indicate which organisations were significant actors before the election campaign, hampering transparency about where money is being spent to influence elections and to whose benefit.

Plate 16.2 An ACTU Facebook banner used during the campaign, spotlighting their ‘Don’t risk Dutton’ frame
Source: ACTU, photo used with permission.
Comparing the primary frame of these third parties shows that anti-Coalition groups significantly outspent anti-ALP ones (Riboldi 2025). Anti-Coalition third parties include those with an anti-Dutton focus—such as the ACTU’s ‘Don’t risk Dutton’ slogan, which was picked up across the broad left, and the meme-oriented campaigning of Dan Ilic’s It’s Not a Race—as well as explicitly anti-nuclear groups. The last included most of the highest-spending environment and climate-focused organisations as well as Liberals Against Nuclear, which spent more than $400,000 across Meta and Google campaigning against their own party’s signature energy policy. Collectively, the 13 anti-Coalition organisations in Table 16.2 spent close to $5 million on social media advertising alone during the election.
Right-wing third-party campaigning on social media was more disparate. Only Advance and Nuclear for Australia appeared explicitly pro-Coalition: Advance negatively targeted both the ALP and the Greens, and Nuclear for Australia supported Coalition policy. Together, these two organisations spent just over $1.5 million—more than three times less than the anti-Coalition organisations. Campaign messaging by other right-wing third parties was variously anti-Greens, anti-Teals or anti-ALP, but the disparate nature did not necessarily equate to a pro-Coalition message. Thus, while right-wing groups collectively spent more than $3 million on social media advertising, about one-quarter of this may have sent voters to candidates and parties other than the two Coalition parties.
TikTok and YouTube
On TikTok and YouTube, the primary third-party contest was again between Advance and the ACTU. Further, the ACTU’s ‘Don’t risk Dutton’ frame was more dominant than Advance’s mixture of anti-ALP ‘Weak, woke, sending us broke’ and anti-Greens ‘Greens truth’ framing on TikTok, 30 per cent of whose global audience is aged 18–24, with about 70 per cent of Australian Millennials having TikTok accounts (MacFarlane 2025). For their part, GetUp! and the ACL appeared to be less prominent on these platforms than their counterparts, though for different reasons.

Plate 16.3 Advance billboard in Wickham Street, Fortitude Valley, Brisbane, January 2025
Photo: Courtesy of Headpress Pty Ltd.
Engagement on TikTok is commonly measured by the accumulation of ‘likes’, comments and ‘pins’ received on each post. While Advance and the ACTU (Australian Unions on TikTok) released a similar amount of TikTok content during the campaign, Advance had a significantly higher number of followers on the platform than the ACTU or GetUp! and garnered twice as many engagements per post, on average, compared with the ACTU (Table 16.3). The ACL did not use TikTok at the time of the election. Advance’s most popular post was an attack on Australian Greens leader Adam Bandt: ‘Australia could have a Deputy Prime Minister who refuses to stand in front of the Australian Flag. Can’t vote Greens. Not this time.’ Posted on 22 April, by polling day, the post had 12,174 engagements and had been viewed 150,500 times. Comparatively, the ACTU’s most popular post—‘It’s not about making things better for us. You deserve better. #DontRiskDutton, #auspol’—posted on 21 April, had just 39,300 views and 2,900 engagements across a similar time frame.
Table 16.3 Third-party campaigner TikTok posts and engagement, 28 March – 3 May 2025
|
Organisation |
Followers |
Posts |
Engagement |
Engagement per post |
Engagement per follower |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
ACL |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
|
ACTU |
10,000 |
60 |
19,700 |
109 |
1.97 |
|
Advance |
81,000 |
70 |
45,900 |
218 |
0.56 |
|
GetUp! |
22,400 |
17 |
975 |
19 |
0.04 |
Source: TikTok.
While these engagement numbers appear to benefit Advance, looking at them as a factor of total account followers reveals a different story. In their TikTok posts during the campaign, the ACTU overall received about two engagements per follower, whereas Advance’s rate was about one-quarter of this—a ratio of 0.56 of engagement to followers. This suggests that the ACTU posts were reaching people outside their follower base, which is vital for converting voters from one preference to another. Similarly, Advance’s low engagement-to-follower ratio on TikTok supports anecdotal arguments from Coalition insiders that Advance’s campaign operated ‘in an echo chamber’ (Koutsoukis 2025).
For their part, GetUp!’s 17 TikTok posts across the election period had an average of just 19 engagements per post and 0.04 as an engagement-to-follower ratio. Even considering a reported lack of donations flowing into the organisation, these numbers are surprisingly low. Because TikTok does not feature paid political advertising, it should have been an ideal platform for GetUp!—which started the campaign with twice as many followers as the ACTU—to attempt to influence the voting public, and especially younger voters, organically. Their most successful post of the period, on 31 March and receiving just 143 engagements, did not even relate to the election but to water contamination due to fracking near Borroloola in the Northern Territory.
GetUp!’s engagements on YouTube were similarly low (Table 16.4). Their most viewed video on the platform, ‘Who is the real Dutton?’, was released on 3 April and received a total of 8,243 views between then and polling day. The ACL’s effort on YouTube was similarly humble, posting only one video throughout the campaign despite having almost 100,000 channel subscribers (see Table 16.1). Posted on 3 April, the ACL’s video related to their primary election output, their ‘Federal Election 2025 Australian Votes Website’. The three-minute video largely served an electoral education function. It recommended that people vote ‘below the line’ to ensure they know where their vote would go and that ‘a vote for a minor party is never a wasted vote’. The video also advocated for people to vote ‘according to truth’ on issues such as ‘biological reality’—presumably a coded reference to avoid voting for trans-supportive minor parties such as the Australian Greens.
Table 16.4 Third-party campaigner YouTube public videos and views, 28 March – 3 May 2025
|
Organisation |
Videos |
Views |
Views per video |
|---|---|---|---|
|
ACL |
1 |
2,500 |
2,500 |
|
ACTU |
– |
– |
– |
|
Advance |
25 |
4,655,000 |
186,200 |
|
GetUp! |
4 |
9,000 |
2,250 |
Source: YouTube.
While from Table 16.4 it appears the ACTU produced no videos during the campaign, they spent more than $900,000 advertising on Google platforms, the primary one of which is YouTube, suggesting that, unlike Advance, the ACTU chose not to make their advertisements publicly viewable on their YouTube page. Instead, the ACTU’s video ads, focusing almost exclusively on the ‘Don’t risk Dutton’ frame, are registered but unviewable in the Google Ad Transparency Centre.
In contrast, Advance spent just under $300,000 on Google platform advertising, entirely on videos, suggesting that organic views of the ACTU’s videos on YouTube could have been much higher than Advance’s if they had chosen to make them public. Most of Advance’s publicly available videos were 15 or 30 seconds long, suggesting that they were designed primarily as advertisements and for easy recirculation on other platforms. Of Advance’s 25 videos, 12 attacked the Australian Greens and 13 the ALP, with total public views split fairly evenly at 2.38 million and 2.28 million, respectively. This broad equivalence between Advance’s key frames suggests the organisation’s public focus was roughly equal across the ‘Greens truth’ and the ‘Weak, woke, sending us broke’ campaigns. Whether either campaign was effective is a different question, despite Advance’s post-election claim that their primary focus was always on ‘destroying’ the Greens (see Sheehan 2025).
Supporter emails
While public-facing social media channel campaigns try to reach and persuade voters, third parties’ emails to existing supporters reveal how these groups try to activate and mobilise their base towards action. This includes the way these organisations ‘claim and frame’ election results. The key organisations studied here sent emails to supporters every two–three days across the campaign period, with a mixture of ‘calls to action’ that included asking supporters to make donations, register for webinars, sign e-petitions and volunteer for in-real-life campaign activities (Table 16.5). Furthermore, the frequency with which these organisations mentioned particular key words—‘truth’, ‘Dutton’, ‘Greens’ and ‘Albo/Albanese’—provides insight into their electoral target.
Table 16.5 Third-party campaigner supporter emails, calls to action and keywords, 28 March – 10 May 2025
|
ACL |
ACTU |
Advance |
Climate 200 |
GetUp! |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Total emails |
13 |
13 |
19 |
16 |
18 |
|
Calls to action |
|||||
|
Donate |
5 |
– |
7 |
14 |
8 |
|
Register for webinar |
4 |
2 |
– |
– |
– |
|
Sign e-petition |
– |
– |
4 |
– |
– |
|
Visit website |
4 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
|
Volunteer on the ground |
– |
4 |
1 |
– |
3 |
|
No call to action |
– |
3 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
|
Keyword mentions |
|||||
|
‘Truth’ |
115 |
– |
17 |
2 |
18 |
|
‘Dutton’ |
2 |
58 |
– |
16 |
121 |
|
‘Greens’ |
35 |
– |
118 |
– |
– |
|
‘Albo/Albanese’ |
3 |
3 |
26 |
2 |
10 |
Source: Supporter emails.

Plate 16.4 An ACTU social media image highlighting union member on-the-ground campaigning during the election
Source: ACTU, photo used with permission.
Advance and GetUp! sent a similar number of emails, with a similar ratio of donation requests, whereas nearly all Climate 200’s emails before polling day asked supporters for donations. The ACTU’s emails involved no donation requests, potentially signifying a type of organisation that still has paid members rather than mainly supporters or subscribers. Through their ‘calls to action’, the ACTU and GetUp! also focused on activities that brought supporters into contact with the organisation, including calling for ground campaign volunteers.
When it comes to framing, the ACTU’s supporter emails centred on their campaign slogan of ‘Don’t risk Dutton’ (58 references to Dutton across 13 emails). GetUp!’s focus on mentioning ‘Dutton’ in their emails (121 mentions across 18 emails—almost seven times per email) mirrored the ACL’s focus on ‘truth’ (nine per email) and Advance’s on the Greens (six per email). In contrast to the other organisations, while the ACL’s emails focused significantly on the idea of ‘truth’ and framing the Greens as opponents (mostly in relation to abortion law reform legislation in State parliaments), their emails were nonpartisan, focusing on electoral education and values reinforcement.
In terms of supporter emails after polling day, all five organisations sent at least one ‘claim and frame’ email, mostly announcing their supposed impact on the campaign. Advance, for example, claimed to have ‘destroyed’ the Greens while blaming the Coalition campaign for the ALP’s election victory. The ACL’s two emails in this period focused on framing the result as a desire for stability over change as well as highlighting opportunities to influence the new government. Both emails asked for donations (two of their total of five donation requests during the election period). GetUp! also asked for donations in a post-election email, in which they highlighted their activity during the campaign. Climate 200’s initial post-election emails focused on the uncertainty in results—this was understandable, given that several of the results in Teal seats were close and votes were still being counted.
Newspaper attention
To examine the influence of third-party organisations on the election campaign, this chapter uses articles from the LexisNexis news database published from the beginning of March to the end of May 2025 for 12 main broadsheet and tabloid newspapers across Australia, including the Guardian. Incorporating only articles mentioning one of the four key third parties in the headline or lead paragraph resulted in a dataset of 21 articles: 10 Advance-related articles; nine ACTU articles; two ACL articles; and no GetUp! articles. This spread follows the broad levels of activity described above. Other Australian media outlets not in LexisNexis—mainly the Saturday Paper and Crikey—also ran feature articles on third-party campaigning groups during the election and we discuss some of these below.
Overall, more progressive newspapers (the Guardian, the Saturday Paper and The Sydney Morning Herald/Melbourne’s Age) paid disproportionate attention to Advance, potentially exaggerating their electoral influence and impact. These articles were largely investigative, focusing on Advance’s sources of funding and campaign tactics, and all labelled Advance as either a ‘conservative’ or a ‘hard-right’ organisation. Some of these articles placed Advance in a broader hard-right ecosystem internationally and nationally, describing links to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), the Atlas Network and the network of local anti-Teals and anti-renewables groups that emerged during the campaign. For example, The Sydney Morning Herald/Melbourne Age ran an extended 4,000-word feature on Advance in their Good Weekend magazine on 19 April. The article is written as an exposé, starting with: ‘It claims to be a grassroots group promoting free speech and common-sense policy to ordinary Aussies but Advance’s propaganda machine—and its deluge of disinformation—are linked to the far right in the US’ (Elliott 2025).
Due to the focus on the money and political connections behind Advance and, to a lesser extent, the framing of its campaigns as ‘Trump-like’, there was little scrutiny of to whom Advance appeals or how it attempted to change votes. The more conservative newspapers—that is, the Australian, the Australian Financial Review (AFR) and News Corp–owned tabloids the Daily Telegraph and the Herald Sun—paid attention to Advance only with reference to the organisation’s anti-Teal messaging and in articles that were mainly about Climate 200 and its influence on the election campaign.
In contrast, two conservative newspapers (the Australian and the AFR) were the main outlets to focus on the ACTU during the election, primarily portraying them as a pro-worker lobbyist campaigning on industrial relations law and raising the minimum wage. Only two of a total of nine articles make any overt mention of the ACTU as a political campaigner, either ‘on the ground’ or digitally (Hannan 2025; Marin-Guzman 2025). Both articles were published in conservative newspapers (the Australian and Australian Financial Review) and refer to the ACTU’s electorate-based campaigning on workplace reforms, equal pay, health care and AI regulation. Both were largely sympathetic to the ACTU campaign, unlike coverage in other conservative and News Corp outlets, and did not offer views from business or other political actors to counter union claims. Beyond these examples, the role of the ACTU and union movement in organising and voter mobilisation appeared to be underestimated or simply ignored, especially by the more progressive newspaper outlets. Neither the Guardian, the Saturday Paper nor The Sydney Morning Herald/Melbourne’s Age published features on the prominence of Australian unions in the election campaign, let alone their role in helping the ALP to a historic electoral win (see also Chapter 10, this volume).
The near absence of news media attention to GetUp! during this campaign reflected the lack of election-related activities undertaken by GetUp! itself. This continues its decline since the 2022 election and is in contrast with the 2010 election campaign, when GetUp!’s successful challenge in the High Court over electoral enrolment was front-page news, and their 2016 election campaign against ‘hard-right’ candidates, which pioneered targeted Facebook advertising in Australia (Vromen 2017, 2018). Online news platform Crikey published two articles about GetUp!, both of which spoke to this shift. The first was published mid-campaign and entitled ‘GetUp! CEO quietly departs as the group goes missing in action during election campaign’ (Wilson 2025a; see also Wilson 2025b).
Implications and conclusions
Third-party campaigners are clearly significant actors in Australian elections, spending substantial amounts campaigning to mobilise their supporters and influence the public agenda and voter intentions. The 2025 election reveals three main conclusions and areas for future research on third parties in Australian politics. The first relates to how to better understand the electoral and political influence of these non-party actors. Elections are important focusing events in which all kinds of organisations can gain public attention. Many also have a stake in electing governments that will be more sympathetic to their issue agendas. The near-exclusive scholarly and media focus on political parties, election candidates and voters in Australia has come at the cost of systematic analysis of the electoral and political influence of non-party, civil society organisations in Australia. Third parties are too often wrongly conceptualised as ‘partisans in disguise’—even the union movement is not always clearly partisan and there are ideological differences between unions. While the ACTU and the ALP have informal linkages and many individual unions are directly affiliated to the ALP, some are not. Further, union movement positions on workers’ rights and industrial relations policy are rarely homogeneous. The ALP itself, with a declining and ageing membership, is increasingly reliant on a union member–driven ground campaign to deliver pro-ALP and anti-Coalition messages. Understanding the ACTU’s—and other third parties’—issue agendas and campaign work is vital to properly appreciating their influence on Australian politics and policy agendas beyond mere support for one party over another.
Similarly, Advance’s messaging and issue agenda might align with segments of the Liberal and National parties and be influential over some Coalition politicians, but post-election commentary suggests this was not necessarily connected to an organised pro-Coalition strategy (Koutsoukis 2025). Likewise, the climate movement’s focus on opposing nuclear energy (that is, being anti-Coalition) potentially gave the ALP a free ride on the issue, to the detriment of the Greens and the Teals—neither of which, admittedly, ran a particularly strong pro-climate campaign (see Chapters 13 and 14, this volume).
The second question relates to whether existing regulation of election campaign fundraising and the spending of politically active third-party organisations is fit for purpose when it comes to digital campaigning and social media advertising. Only half the organisations that should register as ‘significant third parties’ and make funding and expenditure disclosures accordingly, based on social media spending alone, were registered before the election. Transparency around which organisations might plausibly influence an election campaign is important for the integrity and credibility of the system. To better capture and understand these organisations and their influence, ‘live’ disclosures and declarations of expenditure on campaign digital media advertising are needed. This would also bring Australia in line with countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom that focus less on third parties declaring donations and more on capping their election-specific expenditure (Lawlor and Crandall 2018), and, in Canada’s case, also require third parties to file returns during the campaign period. In Australia, Meta and Google make online advertising spending data available, but the community currently relies on curious scholars and journalists to understand it, or else waits for the AEC declaration made up to 12 months later.
Relatedly, it may be time to re-evaluate the regulation of advocacy organisations and charities via the ACNC. Currently, registered charities are broadly permitted to advocate for and support policies that advance their interests, but they cannot be seen to support or oppose particular candidates or parties as it may result in the charity having engaged in a ‘disqualifying political purpose’. For many Australian charities, especially organisations that campaign on environmental or international development issues, it has been risky to publicly advocate on issues of relevance to them during an election campaign. This real risk of losing charitable status may inhibit a range of organisations from advocating for causes in which they have legitimacy and expertise, reducing political campaigning to a smaller group of well-funded and often more polarised actors.
Third, this chapter suggests that part of the academic neglect of third-party campaigning organisations is the dauntingly complex ecosystem within which they operate. Organisations evolve over time and shift their activity depending on issue salience, the political landscape and their human and financial resources. For instance, how might we explain the non-action of once prominent groups in 2025? The ACL’s transgender rights–related campaigning activity in 2025 appeared significantly more muted than in 2022 and largely focused on the Greens. It is possible the issue was less salient and thus less ‘mobilisable’ in religious communities than an issue such as marriage equality, yet the ACL’s shift to a low-key ‘electoral information’ campaign, rather than one more aligned to a preferred major party, bears consideration.
It is also important to ask: what has gone ‘wrong’ with GetUp!? There were significant reports of internal problems and a massive decline in fundraising and staff resources (Wilson 2025a, 2025b), and suggestions of debilitating internal debates over priorities in their policy issue agendas, from the Voice referendum to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza to cost-of-living issues (McKinnon 2025). Post election, Crikey claimed GetUp!’s social media use and tactics were outdated and risk-averse and, somewhat ironically, suggested GetUp! could learn from Advance. GetUp! board chair Glen Berman was quoted saying:
I’m not trying to suggest that I like Advance’s campaigning, but I do think Advance is taking risks. And I think that’s something we can really learn from. We know we need to rediscover that kind of ability to be humorous, be fun, to take risks. (Wilson 2025b)
There is clearly crossover between the donor and volunteer bases of GetUp! and Climate 200, but this does not entirely explain their decline in electoral significance. It will take more targeted research to better understand this notable decline.
Overall, for third-party campaigning organisations to maintain relevance in the electoral context, they need voter support, media and public attention and an ability to wield political influence. This is one area where the ACTU and associated unions have remained dominant, whereas other organisations, including the ACL and GetUp!, appear to have come in and out of the ecosystem depending on their agenda, resource base and capacity to mobilise.
References
Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). 2023. Electoral Matter and Electoral Expenditure. Fact Sheet, 22 February. Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission. www.aec.gov.au/parties_and_representatives/financial_disclosure/files/electoral-matter-and-electoral-expenditure-fact-sheet.pdf.
Bell, Stephen, and Andrew Hindmoor. 2014. ‘The structural power of business and the power of ideas: The strange case of the Australian mining tax.’ New Political Economy 19, no. 3: 470–86. doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2013.796452.
Carson, Andrea, and Max Grömping. 2024. Influencers and Messages: Analysing the 2023 Voice to Parliament Referendum Campaign. 22 April. Melbourne: LaTrobe University. osf.io/n2h5a/files/8nqg2.
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Hannan, Ewin. 2025. ‘“Just put Libs last”: Unions go on defence amid drift from Labor.’ The Australian, 28 March. www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/actu-urges-protesting-voters-to-put-coalition-last/news-story/4baea0c7c1b4fcf076bf586ddee92a3e.
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Lawlor, Andrea, and Erin Crandall. 2018. ‘Policy versus practice: Third party behaviour in Canadian elections.’ Canadian Public Administration 61, no. 2: 246–65. doi.org/10.1111/capa.12266.
MacFarlane, Rebecca. 2025. ‘Australian TikTok statistics to inform your strategy in 2025.’ 12 May. Chicago: Sprout Social. sproutsocial.com/insights/tiktok-statistics-australia/.
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McKinnon, Alex. 2025. ‘GetUp! In crisis—CEO ousting, job cuts and clash on Palestine prompt staff revolt.’ Deepcut News, 21 May. www.deepcutnews.com/p/getup-in-crisis-ceo-ousting-job-cuts.
Muir, Kathie. 2010. ‘“Your Rights at Work” campaign: Australia’s “most sophisticated political campaign”.’ Labor History 51, no. 1: 55–70. doi.org/10.1080/00236561003654735.
Riboldi, Mark. 2025. ‘Follow the money: The organisations that spent the most on social media during the election.’ The Conversation, 20 May. theconversation.com/follow-the-money-the-organisations-that-spent-the-most-on-social-media-during-the-election-256784. doi.org/10.64628/AA.nga6ksjah.
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Wilson, Cam. 2025a. ‘GetUp! CEO quietly departs as the group goes missing in action during election campaign.’ Crikey, 14 April. www.crikey.com.au/2025/04/14/getup-ceo-departs-group-missing-2025-election-campaign/.
Wilson, Cam. 2025b. ‘Donations are nosediving and staff fleeing. But GetUp!’s chair is feeling optimistic—and wants to take risks.’ Crikey, 21 May. www.crikey.com.au/2025/05/21/getup-campaigning-2025-federal-election-glen-berman/.
1 The AEC defines ‘third-party’ campaigners as actors that are neither candidates nor political parties. In other contexts, these might be referred to as interest groups, third-sector organisations or civil society organisations.
2 This was a change for Advance from both the 2022 election and the Voice referendum campaign. Matthew Sheehan was CEO and main spokesperson throughout this period. Former Advance (and Institute for Public Affairs) staffer Jacinta Nampijinpa Price, who later entered the Senate, was the Voice referendum ‘No’ campaign’s chief spokesperson.
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