

# Burgmann Journal

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Burgmann Journal is an interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed publication of collected works of research, debate and opinion from residents and alumni of Burgmann College designed to engage and stimulate the wider community.



**BURGMANN COLLEGE**

*Affiliated with The Australian National University*

*Capture our imagination*

EH BURGMANN 1944



Published by ANU eView  
The Australian National University  
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia  
Email: [anuepress@anu.edu.au](mailto:anuepress@anu.edu.au)  
This title is also available online at <http://eview.anu.edu.au>

ISSN 2201-3881 (Print)  
ISSN 2201-3903 (Online)

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Front cover by Casey White.

Printed by Griffin Press

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## Foreword:

It is easy to think of the process of education as being to fill a void, whether of information or experience or skills. Indeed, as a former lecturer – and in some good universities too – I often had reason to wonder at the ignorance of some of my students. Why were they so incurious about the world? Why had they not been taught this or that already? There certainly were, and still are, significant shortcomings in the Australian educational system, as much in the neglect of correct English as in weaknesses in mathematics and basic science. Before we beat our breast too hard, however, we should also celebrate our strengths.

There is another way to look at the idea of education, one that is founded not so much on the teacher's expectation of students, but rather on the experience of student learning. Those concerned with the design of courses need to use their imagination and remember what it was like to be a student, to be unsure where the process of learning was going and how things might end up. How could one possibly find something to say or do that would be of interest or advantage to others? For that was always the hope – along with someone paying you to do it! If, along the way, it seemed necessary to develop skills or explore other areas of knowledge, then one would do that. It is often said, for example, that Australian students should study other languages more and I would not argue against a better appreciation of the wonder of language, but my observation is that Australians are actually quite good at learning languages when they find they need them.

'Having something to say' was a favourite phrase of the great historian, Manning Clark – he had a few others, as well – and it nicely describes a great strength of Australian education. For over twenty years, Manning was the head of the Department of History, first in the Canberra University College of the University of Melbourne, and later in the Faculty of Arts of the Australian National University. He built a department of teachers who 'had something to say'. It is an achievement for which – perhaps a bit immodestly since I eventually became a member of the department – I think he has not received appropriate recognition. We did not all agree; political views ranged from the far Left to the extreme Right and our teaching styles varied from reliance on well-structured lectures which delivered the 'facts' to alternative strategies incorporating more student initiative, though the more exotic versions of such styles only came in the years after Manning's retirement. Always, however, there was a sense of collegiality and discussion, often lubricated with the odd glass of wine.

Students heard their teachers say many different things and there was no standard view of what was important in the past or, for that matter, in the present. The responsibility for finding 'something to say' lay with oneself as a student. And when one did find it, whether in tutorial discussion or essays or theses, one's voice was heard and respected – especially if it was properly based on evidence, expressed in accurate prose and used an acceptable style of referencing! It is no accident that so many students from that department have gone on to careers that really do make a difference and are still heard in national and international debates on all sorts of issues.

This is the best of the Australian educational tradition. True, students from English universities may often write more elegantly and Americans speak more confidently, the Dutch read more languages and the Germans have their knowledge better organised, but Australians have nothing to fear when it comes to asking the questions and even, sometimes, suggesting the answers. That is one reason why Australia is a good destination for so many students from countries where the educational system stresses mere knowledge, rather than critical thinking.

The articles which follow prove the point. They cover a wonderful spectrum of interests – I was surprised and delighted to find some personal connection with many of them – and that spread is as it should be. What they all have in common is the enthusiasm for ‘saying something’. I am aware too of how much in the way of skill and experience has been picked up, along the way, by the editors in the process of selection, editing, design and publication. Yet these contributions to discussion are only a distillation of much wider conversations and debates which flourish in an environment such as that provided in Burgmann, where those who commit to the community can ‘have something to say’, while listening carefully to the ideas of others, especially when they disagree with those ideas.

As a reader of the pages which follow, you too have the chance to take part in a variety of on-going discussions and perhaps, in the Australian way, you may even find a way to respond. May this be the first of many issues of *The Burgmann Journal*.

Campbell Macknight



## Editorial:

At the beginning of this project, we defined the scope of the Burgmann Journal to be ‘*an interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed publication of collected works of research, debate and opinion from residents and alumni of Burgmann College designed to engage and stimulate the wider community*’. And we are very proud to present to you that collection – a series of high quality articles of research, debate and opinion. The production process has been a journey for the contributors and editorial team alike.

The Burgmann Journal showcases quality work from current residents and alumni, from undergraduates and postgraduates, from arts students and medical students, from those just starting out in an academic career to those who are now successful professionals. The diverse range of topics reflects the breadth of expertise of the entire resident body, from classics and anthropology to evolutionary biology, medicine and even postmodern fashion. We encouraged contributors to ‘have their say’ and present their own point of view on a topic, thus making the journal more than a collection of research articles. We are in awe of the knowledge, skills and passion demonstrated by our contributing authors.

The dedicated editorial team has worked tirelessly and to a tight timeline to deliver a high quality product. This group of undergraduates and postgraduates working together as equals exemplifies the spirit of the Burgmann community and our academic network.

This is our first edition of the Burgmann Journal. We have learnt a great deal and we are proud of the result. We have not, however, done it on our own. Dr Philip Dutton, Principal of Burgmann College, is passionate about the academic and research community at Burgmann. Not only has Philip been a great champion of this project, he also contributed an article to the journal. Our thanks also go to Deirdre Pearce, Project Manager of Student Enrichment Programs at the ANU, for her advice and support as we went through the initial stages of planning for the journal. Last, but certainly not least, we would like to acknowledge and thank Professor Campbell Macknight for his invaluable contribution and advice at every stage of the process.

The Burgmann Journal is an embodiment of the Burgmann College community. We hope that this issue is the first of many.

Emma-Kate Potter

Patrick Carvalho



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## Burgmann Ideally

*Philip Dutton*

Just recently our new Chairman of Council Greg Mills asked me what an optimal size for a university residential college might be. He made it clear that he was not defining *optimal* as *optimum* by asking simply whether we might ‘build more beds’ as Chairmen sometimes do. Neither was he ruling out the simple question of size of population.

His question was more classical, somewhat reminiscent of the ancient, universal and adaptable question from Homer to Thucydides, from Socrates to Aristotle that so often engaged the ancient Greek mind and polis. At the true heart of this conversation was the question of the ideal size of a college for optimal community life.

As Kitto [1957, p. 271] tells us:

The Greeks thought of the polis (community) as an active, formative thing, training the minds and characters of the citizens; ... (whereas) we think of it as a piece of machinery for the production of safety and convenience.

Greg Mills is intrinsically more interested in the former idea rather than the latter one. McCaughey [1984, p. 153], the long serving Master of Ormond College and eventual Governor of Victoria, is most helpful in reminding us of an earlier time when this question was given serious attention.

When the Australian Heads of Colleges met in 1959 and in January 1962, there was much debate about the optimum size for a College. Ormond argued that Colleges could be good and useful communities if considerably larger than had been customary in Australia. The general consensus, however, was that the ideal size was about 150 members.

These first meetings of the Australian Heads of Colleges Association occurred at an interesting point in time. Until the post-war, Australia’s handful of universities were flanked by no more than 35 residential facilities, virtually all of which were of the fully collegiate style; fully catered, supported academically and pastorally and most often based in denominational foundations. The Heads of Colleges from University of Melbourne, Sydney University, University of Queensland and other state capital universities had come together

in solidarity for the first time to protect an ideal and not just an ideal size—an optimal life and not just an optimum size.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, following the report of the Murray Commission and the setting up of the Australian Universities Commission, universities and their denominational affiliates could expect substantial support for the construction of new residential halls and colleges, provided they were willing to increase the number of students for whom they would provide accommodation. Needless to say, universities, existing and new, took advantage of such access to capital. The sudden phenomenal growth was such that, whilst it had taken a full century for 35 university colleges to be established, it took only two more decades for 50 more to be built before government funding was eventually withdrawn.

The initiatives of the Menzies government from the late 1950s in expanding the higher education sector saw the establishment of a number of new universities such as Monash and La Trobe in Victoria, Macquarie, Wollongong and Newcastle in New South Wales, and Flinders in South Australia. This was accompanied by the building of numerous halls of residence in the years immediately thereafter. Figure 1 demonstrates these two contrasting periods of development [Dutton, 2005, pp. 21–31].

Twenty-five, or 71%, of the earliest colleges, established from 1856 to 1955, are denominationally based, reflecting some key aspects of the imported English model and personnel. The denominational era gave way more to the secular establishments of colleges and halls after 1956. Thenceforward until 1974 and the establishment of Robert Menzies College at Macquarie University, only 20% to 40% of new colleges had church roots. In the thirty-eight years since 1974, the number of church-sponsored developments has been virtually negligible. The opening of Anglican-based St Martin’s College (CSU Wagga) is a more recent development.

As phenomenal as this provision of higher education became after 1955, the collegiate ideal as a model from the first 100 years was not deserted. This short sharp era of growth had to some extent cast off the clerical collar to *try on* a more secular gown. But the overall design features of the 50 new colleges were based largely on the structure and




Figure 1: 100 Years of Australian University Colleges and Halls: 1856 to 1974. Between 1856 and 1890, only seven Colleges had been built in Australian Universities, all of them denominationally based. After 1956, the denominational era gave way to more secular establishment of halls and colleges.

function of the first 35, incorporating the following facilities in their central floor plan. Generally they have a library, a large and a small common room, a Heads residence, apartments and special rooms for residential tutors, a dining room, a television room, a piano or music room, and a games room. In essence, despite their secular origins, each incorporated in their own way all the notable features of the template for university colleges set up by the churches in the previous century. In fact, they strongly echoed the deeper traditions imported from English university College life.

This model of university life, the *Oxbridge* style, has had a considerable impact on the development of residential colleges in the Australian university context. It can be argued, in fact, that traditional English universities provided an ideal of what residential colleges ought to be. This is the *ideal* community of scholars, masters and students living together in an environment that fosters the pursuit of academic excellence.

In 1961, ANU's Bruce Hall, a product of this period of growth, was opened as the first dedicated collegiate residence at the Australian National University. Yet it was the acting Master of the more general purpose University House, Professor A. G. Ogston, who enunciated the seemingly important principle to the Heads of Colleges in 1962:

There are two kinds of Virtue [sic] which you can have in a College: in a small College, up to 120 or 150, 'everybody can know everybody', in a larger College up to 350, 'anybody can know anybody'. [McCaughey, 1984, p. 154]

Who needs or really wants a community where everybody can know everybody—and to what purpose? Is it not intrinsically more typical of a healthy community that would lead to a reversal of Ogston's view?

McCaughey's uncertainty about Ogston is apparent in his expression of doubt in the words 'apparently important principle'. This is a doubt that I strongly share with the former Master of Ormond. Having known him personally in the period leading up to his state governorship in the mid-1980s, we can be certain that his acceptance of Colleges sized more than 150 residents was not based on reasons of expediency. Nor was it aimed at an unprincipled access to government capital. Whilst Ogston's sentiment was enough to sway the conference into agreeing with such an enunciation, it did not stop a number of existing and emerging colleges recognizing the reality. Extra numbers meant extra government funds and decisions after 1960 to design Halls for fewer than 200 residents also became fewer. Although there are exceptions

to this around Australia, university colleges built thereafter tended to use the 200 or more collegiate model as a general benchmark.

Apart from the obvious coincidence that Burgmann College, with 350 residents, seems at an optimum size in Ogston's 'anybody' category, two important points may be drawn from these observations and then perhaps some implications for the future of our College.

Firstly, it is vital to understand the need to keep numbers at a level of collegiate viability; that is, where people can come to know others in academic, social and civic or pastoral support (whether this be 'everybody' or not).

Secondly, it was the drive for government funding that created such discussions over fifty years ago and the need to protect the collegiate nature of a student community that comes with smaller numbers. One senses the need for deeper values and higher aims than Ogston's simple measurement of everybody knowing everybody in a close community. Is his view, based on sociability as close community, just as likely to create a closed community?

It may be argued, in fact, that a community too close in terms of *everyone knowing everyone* may bring with it some of the more undesirable characteristics associated with highly charged, youthful, peer group communities. In addition to the inward looking restrictions of academic rigour and deadlines, students too often are tempted to celebrate moments of freedom in comfort (or celebrated discomfort) of close-knit peer group activities. If more open to public scrutiny or with a larger, more diverse group, such activities would be totally unacceptable to the general community. Although unacceptable behaviour by residents of university colleges occasionally still make the headlines, in the period from 1955 to 1974 and in the following decades, we have seen a gradual diminution of such behaviour. This has especially been the case in the residential sectors of the post-war universities.

Whether the number be 150, 200 or 350 or more, what is required to achieve the higher common factors of community (as distinct from the lower common denominators) is an opening up in order to broaden influences. These may include a mixture of lifestyles (catered and non-catered), age groups, greater numbers of postgraduates, cultural diversity and interaction with the outside community.

For a more direct treatment of the aims of the educational role of university residences, this paper turns to Ryan [2001] who, in his recent reflections upon the Yale experience, identifies five aims of residential colleges that seem both traditional and enduring in purpose. The identification of these

attributes, pertaining to a collegiate way of living, represents a summary of the combined British, Canadian and the Australian experience. Ryan offers his overarching insights on the basis of his own surveys as follows:

Ethics, citizenship, community, co-curricular programming and peer learning: these interrelated aims are ancient. ... They are by no means dependent on residence. But along the way, residence has been seen as a means of enhancing them. [Ryan, 2001, p. 71]

I am proud to say that Burgmann College has been in the forefront of the gradual shift in university college life since the 1970s towards the higher community values suggested by Ryan. This began over 40 years ago with the great leadership from its council, masters, staff and the residents themselves. It was an egalitarian, pro-social formula that gradually militated against initiation practices and created an ethos based on cultural and political enjoyments as well as the more predictable social and sporting outlets.

Residents today are more outgoing and with more pressure upon them to perform in their degrees. They are more often in paid employment as well as full-time study simultaneously. They have travelled more, been engaged in the community more and established impressive personal portfolios even before entering university. No longer is it seen as acceptable to enjoy the luxury of completing a three year degree in four or five years in order to enjoy an extended university student life. There are no more Commonwealth Government Scholarships. Nor have there been direct subsidies of any kind to residential colleges from government since 1984. Colleges that build facilities need to raise the money to do so and need to include a significant debt-service contribution in their annual budgets.

Perhaps it was a marriage of perfect convenience and not simply the rationalist machinery of state that insisted that colleges from 1956 onwards be built larger than 150 beds because, in essence, such benchmarks were all aimed at supporting the great opening up of universities and university places to more post-secondary students in the post-war period of prosperity.

There may be no ideal size but there is an ideal.

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## Confined Genius?

### Composition and Creativity in the Oral Poetry of Homer<sup>1</sup>

Tobias Tan

The works of the ancient Greek poet Homer, for whom an undergraduate wing of Burgmann College is named, are often looked upon as the first great works in the Western literary canon. But how creative was Homer? Milman Parry, probably the most influential Homerist of the twentieth century, revolutionised Homeric studies by arguing that Homer composed his poems in oral performances and therefore would have drawn most of his material and compositional tools from a long tradition of epic singers. Hence Parry regards Homer's works as the product of many generations of bards rather than the creative genius of an individual. This paper, whilst affirming the scholarly consensus around Parry's theory that the Homeric works are the product of oral performance, calls into question the implication that Homer's creativity was negligible because of this means of production. It argues that while every artistic endeavour has some limitations stemming from its mode of production, the mechanism need not be a creative straitjacket, but instead can be the very foundation for creative expression.

In the opening paragraph of his earliest published work, Milman Parry [1971b] writes that Greek epic legends

...were not themselves the original fictions of certain authors, but the creations of whole people, passed through one generation to another and gladly given to anyone who wished to tell them, so the style in which they were to be told was not a matter of individual creation, but a popular tradition, evolved by centuries of poets and audiences... there were certain limits of form to which the play of genius must confine itself.<sup>2</sup>

Parry's proposal, that the compositions of Homer were thoroughly traditional, revolutionised Homeric studies.<sup>3</sup> He further developed this line of inquiry by positing that Homer's tradition was an oral tradition by a comparative study of the oral poetry of South Slavic bards, a project brought to fruition by his student Albert Lord after Parry's untimely death [Lord, 1960]. The theory was able to encompass many features of Homeric style, such as formulae, enjambment and type-scenes, and to account for previously unresolved difficulties. This explanatory power meant that the theory has rightly gained widespread recognition in Homeric studies [Clark, 2004, p. 125; Scodel, 2002, p. 1].

One of the implications of the Parry-Lord oral theory, however, was to call into question the creativity of the individual bard(s) who performed the epic songs. Parry set up the problem in terms of how the credit ought to be assigned: 'what portion of Homeric diction is to be attributed to the tradition and what portion to the poet?' [Parry, 1971c, p. 8, see also p. 16]. In addressing this

'question of supreme importance' [Parry, 1971c, p. 16], Parry (and many of his followers) came down decidedly on the side of tradition, often implying that the individual performer was merely a conduit for an inherited art form [Lord, 1960, p. 40; Parry, 1936, p. 358; Parry, 1930, pp. 73,138,146; Parry, 1930, p. 73; Parry, 1932, pp. 12–13; Parry, 1971c, pp. 8,16; Parry, 1933, p. 195]; as our opening quotation shows, Parry argues that Homer and his ilk, through their reliance on tradition, were limited in their form and therefore confined in their genius. This study, however, argues that the leap from an oral theory of Homer's composition to conclusions about Homer's creativity – or, rather, lack thereof — are in fact a *non sequitur*.

## 1 Oral Theory

In an oral performance the singer is fundamentally limited by time. Unlike an author producing a written work, who has ample time to dwell upon each carefully chosen word, an oral performer is subject to greater time pressures in his or her efforts to produce a rapid succession of free-flowing lines [Lord, 1960, pp. 4,17,30; Parry, 1936, p. 358; Parry, 1930, pp. 77,140]. The difficulty is possibly compounded when one is composing poetry to a set metre — as is the case with Homeric hexameter. One strategy would be the verbatim memorisation of a previously composed song, as modern performers often do with their lyrics. Parry and Lord found, however, that the South Slavic bards composed their songs while performing and thus each performance of the same song varied [Lord, 1960, pp. 5,13; Parry, 1930, p. 14]. In order to compose as they performed, singers used various techniques to construct verse quickly. Parry and Lord recognised evidence of

precisely such techniques in Homer, leading them to conclude that he not only gave oral performances, but also composed as he performed [Lord, 1960, pp. 144–148].

The first and most obvious oral device is the formula, which Parry defines as ‘a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given essential idea’ [Parry, 1930, p. 80]. One example is the noun-epithet formula used for heroes and gods, such as πόδας ὠκύς Ἀχιλλεύς (swift-footed Achilles). Parry discovered that the oft-repeated adjectives used to describe any given character created formulae with different metrical values.<sup>4</sup> The oral poet thus had at his disposal a system of formulae which he could easily employ to assist him as he sang to his metre [Parry, 1971a, pp. xxv, xxvii].

The second feature of Homer’s poetry which Parry cites as evidence for its oral origins is the lack of enjambment. Enjambment occurs when a sentence and a verse are not coterminous. According to Parry, ‘the easiest formula for the oral poet to handle is that which is both a whole sentence and a whole verse’ [Parry, 1933, p. 194]. Hence one would expect oral composers to construct lines which are end-stopped<sup>5</sup> or lines which could form a complete sentence but are nevertheless continued in the following line (unperiodic enjambment),<sup>6</sup> as opposed to lines which do not form complete sentences (necessary enjambment) [Parry, 1929, p. 203]. In comparing Homer to the writers Apollonius and Virgil, who also compose in hexameter, Parry finds that Homer contains relatively few cases of necessary enjambment and attributes this to Homer’s oral composition [Parry, 1929, p. 203; Clark, 2004, p. 131].

The third piece of evidence for oral composition is the presence of the type-scenes.<sup>7</sup> These type-scenes provide a common structure for narrating occurrences such as arming, ship journeys and rituals. Before Parry and his followers discussed type-scenes in Homer, they were comprehensively recognised by Walter Arend [1933]. While Parry applauded Arend’s schematisation, he criticised Arend for failing to give an adequate reason for them [Parry, 1936, p. 358]. For Parry, the set form aids the bard with speedy composition, as is the case with formulae.

## 2 Implications for Creativity

Parry and his followers have argued that the necessary tools for oral composition, briefly summarised above, could not have been the creation of an individual. Rather, they were gradually built up by successive generations and passed down by the kind of master-apprentice model that Parry

and Lord observed in the Balkans [Lord, 1960, pp. 21–26]. Thus Wade-Gery’s characterisation of Parry as the ‘Darwin of Homeric scholarship’ [Parry, 1971a, p. xxvi] holds true, not only because Parry’s work represents a paradigm shift, but also because he shifts the focus away from a moment of creation in favour of a long and gradual process.

With respect to formulae, Parry sees them as largely traditional. The archaisms which provide the desired metrical result, where newer words would not, are thus preserved [Parry, 1930, pp. 135–136]. Although Parry admits that there is no definitive way to determine which formulae were Homer’s inventions and which were not, he asserts that an individual could only have contributed a handful of new formulae; the vast majority of formulae must have been passed down to him by the tradition [Parry, 1930, pp. 135–136; Parry, 1932, p. 7; Parry, 1971c, p. 18]. Similarly, Parry saw type-scenes as part of Homer’s inheritance rather than his own creation [Parry, 1936, p. 358].

Not only are Homer’s building blocks supplied by the tradition, but, for Parry, the poet is also constrained in how he deploys them. As we saw above, Parry argued that the selection of formulae in a given context is largely based on metrical criteria. This implies that, for example, a descriptive adjective in a noun-epithet is not chosen for its specific meaning or contextual relevance, but simply for its metrical expediency [Parry, 1971b, p. 426; Parry, 1971c, p. 22]. Thus, for Parry, the meaning of a formula can be reduced to its ‘essential idea’, for example, ‘swift-footed Achilles’ (πόδας ὠκύς Ἀχιλλεύς) conveys only the essential idea ‘Achilles’ [Parry, 1971c, p. 22; Clark, 2004, pp. 128–129; Minchin, 2001, p. 5; Parry, 1971a, pp. xxix, liv]. Hence many individual words are not a result of their composer’s creative decision, but rather a mere repetition of his tradition.

Parry provides a telling analogy for the composition he envisages. The bard is not a sculptor who shapes his own forms, but rather he is given a collection of prefabricated pieces with which to fashion his statue. Parry’s reflection on this analogy is worth quoting at length because it reveals his position on Homer’s creativity:

It may be...that the material is not so pliable, and that the best work must be much like all the other work of the school, and at the most, only an approximation of the author’s conception. Then there is another drawback. Would it not be an art which could be learned with little genius? Why could not anyone make a statue by fitting together the various pieces; since they fitted so easily it would be a task

requiring little ability in handling of the material? And even the greatest artist, might he not, sometimes, when at a loss, use a piece just because it fitted and would make little difference to the finished work? We must learn the merits of this sort of art [Parry, 1971b, p. 424].

Such speculations are not rare in Parry. Time and time again he subordinates Homer to his tradition [Parry, 1936, p. 358; Parry, 1930, pp. 73,138,146; Parry, 1932, pp. 12–13; Parry, 1971c, pp. 8,16; Parry, 1933, p. 195; de Vet, 2005, p. 267; Heubeck, 1978, pp. 5–6; Lord, 1960, p. 155; Parry, 1971a, p. iii]. The tradition is so dominant that it severely confines and limits Homer, leaving precious little room for his creativity. The credit for the creative genius evident in the epics, then, cannot be showered upon Homer, but must be carved up into tiny pieces and accorded to his countless unknown predecessors who shaped the tradition to which he was beholden.

### 3 The Case for Homeric Creativity

Does Homer's oral epic tradition indeed exclude him from being creative?<sup>8</sup> Any assessment of his creativity is immediately confronted with the fundamental obstacle of the lack of any direct comparisons [Lord, 1960, p. 158]. Hesiod's poetry and the Homeric Hymns attest to a similar *Kunstsprache*, with the same metre, the use of formulae, some of which can be found in Homer, and the presence of other dialects, but contains very different content [Frazer, 1983, p. 15]. Other epic from the Ancient Near East offer some points of comparison but, being removed by language and geography, do not provide other examples of Homer's tradition [Griffin, 1983, p. xv]. The attribution of the epics to Homer, rather than to a school, since antiquity may suggest that he is primarily responsible for them [Fowler, 2004b, p. 5; Parry, 1971a, p. xi]; similarly, that the epics are the only surviving versions may suggest their uniqueness. But both of these points are inconclusive.

Perhaps the most enlightening comparison is Snodgrass' survey of extant early Greek art in order to ascertain the extent of Homer's influence. His findings are 'hard to reconcile with the view of a gradual evolution of the texts of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*' [Snodgrass, 1998, p. x], instead inferring, in the case of the *Odyssey*, that 'there is a plurality of versions on offer, of which Homer's, in much the form that we now have it, is one' [Snodgrass, 1998, p. x]. Surely this evidence counts against Parry's insinuation that Homer's work is only an incremental addition to an already well-established

tradition. Nevertheless, the lack of any extant literary comparisons or earlier forms of Homer's tradition makes any definitive statements about Homer's creativity difficult.<sup>9</sup> A case must be made from within the Homeric corpus and with this in mind we turn our attention to a brief case study.

### 4 Type-scenes in the *Iliad*

One example of a device which Parry attributes to the oral tradition is the arming type-scenes in the *Iliad*, in which various heroes don their armour in preparation for battle.<sup>10</sup> Even to the casual observer, the similarities between these passages are evident. For example, they all preserve the same order in which items are armed and there are significant repetitions of whole or part lines (see Table 1).

Despite repetitions, the difference between the scenes suggests that they are applied with some flexibility: elements can be customised, such as the origin of the corselet;<sup>12</sup> the scene can be interrupted for the insertion of long descriptive sections<sup>13</sup> and then be reactivated;<sup>14</sup> the structure of the scene can be preserved whilst using an unconventional formula;<sup>15</sup> and, the scene can be combined with other repeated material.<sup>16</sup> It is also instructive that no one scene can be easily identified as the archetype or pure form to which the others have made additions or subtractions.<sup>17</sup> Homer also shows that he does not feel compelled to use the scene where it would create unnecessary repetition.<sup>18</sup>

Moreover, the variations between the type-scenes are far from arbitrary; they have important literary functions, for example: each of the scenes generates suspense in anticipation of a battle [Armstrong, 1958, p. 342; Griffin, 1983, p. 36]; the detailed descriptions of the precious metals and ornaments of Agamemnon's armour continue to develop his characterisation as the foremost leader and richest king [Arend, 1933, p. 94; cf. Minchin, 2001, p. 102]; likewise, Achilles' extended arming scene highlights his greatness as a hero [Armstrong, 1958, pp. 353–354; Clark, 2004, p. 135]; and, Patroklos' inability to wield Achilles' spear<sup>19</sup> foreshadows Achilles' own use of the spear<sup>20</sup> and connects the two battle scenes to suggest that Achilles will also suffer Patroklos' fate [Scodel, 2002, pp. 4–5].

Similarly, the seven events in the funeral games exhibit a common contest structure, only this time the sequence is not one of successive items (to be worn) but actions which take place. Each event follows a typical order consisting of prizes being prepared, the challenge announced, competitors stepping forward, preparation for the competition, the contestation and finally the collection of prizes; and yet 'the seven events differ from each other in

Line	Arming scene line references			
	Paris	Agamemnon	Patroklos	Achilles
κνημίδας μὲν πρῶτα περὶ κνήμησιν ἔθηκε	3.330	11.17	16.131	19.369
καλὰς, ἀργυρέοισιν ἐπισφυρίοις ἀραρυίας:	3.331	11.18	16.132	19.370
δεύτερον αἶψ' ἰθὺς περὶ στήθεσσι ἐδυσε(ν)	3.332	11.19	16.133	19.371
ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' ὥμοισιν βάλετο ξίφος (ἀργυρόηλον/ἐν δέ οἱ ἦλοι)	3.334	11.29	16.135	19.372
χάλκεον, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα σάκος μέγα τε στιβαρόν τε:	3.335	-	16.136	19.373
κρατὶ δ' ἐπ' ἰφθίμῳ κυνέην εὐτυχτον ἔθηκεν	3.336	cf. 11.41	16.137	cf. 19.381
ἵππουριν: δεινὸν δὲ λόφος καθύπερθεν ἔνευεν.	3.337	11.42	16.138	19.382
εἶλετο δ' ἄλκιμα (δοῦρε, τά/ἔγχος, ὅ) οἱ παλάμηφιν ἀρήρει.	3.338	cf. 11.43	16.139	-
βριθὺ μέγα στιβαρόν: τὸ μὲν οὐ δύνατ' ἄλλος ἀχαιῶν	-	-	16.141	19.388
πάλλειν, ἀλλὰ μιν οἷος ἐπίστατο πῆλαι Ἀχιλλεύς	-	-	16.142	19.389
Πηλιάδα μελίην, τὴν πατρὶ φίλῳ πόρε χεῖρων	-	-	16.143	19.390
Πηλίου ἐκ κορυφῆς, φόνον ἔμμεναι ἠρώεσσιν.	-	-	16.144	19.391

Table 1: Comparison of Common Lines in Arming Type-Scenes<sup>11</sup>

interesting ways' [Minchin, 2001, p. 48]. As was the case with the arming scenes, each contest is customised depending on the characters involved [Alden, 2001, pp. 31-33; Richardson and Kirk, 1993, p. 166].

This brief and cursory examination of type-scenes already shows that it can be employed with great flexibility and adaptability [Armstrong, 1958, p.135; Edwards, 1987, p. 47; Heubeck, 1978, pp. 7-8], suggesting that, far from being a constrictive device that the composer must slavishly follow, the type-scene can be deployed creatively. Moreover, the existence of a convention means that the composer can use deviations from the norm to subvert the audience's expectations in order to emphasise or surprise [Scodel, 2002, p. 13; Scodel, 2004, pp. 50-51]. As Robert Alter remarks, 'what is really interesting is not the schema of convention but what is done in each individual application of the schema to give it a sudden tilt of innovation or even to refashion it radically for the imaginative purposes at hand' [Alter, 1983, p. 52].

Elizabeth Minchin argues that the common structures in Homeric poetry are not instantiations of an artistic convention, but rather the poet can draw upon routine experiences which become sequenced cognitive scripts in one's memory [Minchin, 2001, pp. 32-72]. This account of the poet composition moves us further from Homeric type-scenes as regurgitation of a fossilised form to narrative units which have common structure and yet are discernibly malleable, since only the bare bones of a structure are set out by the script and even these elements can be adapted. Minchin concludes:

We should therefore set aside the image of Homer the conformist poet, who is limited in his singing by the scope of his traditional material. Rather, he is a

creative poet who can work as he chooses, within the broad guidelines of his inherited stories [Minchin, 2001, p. 42].

What we find in Homer, therefore, is not only the stability of the oral tradition described by Parry, but also significant scope variation and innovation. Hence both the similarities and differences must be acknowledged, as Arend [1933] recognised:

Thus arises that which is peculiar and unique about Homeric art, the interplay between fixed form and differing ornamentation..., between the necessary and the coincidental, typical and individual, repetition and variation, and has preserved for us a picture of the distinctively Greek conception of reality that saw unity in plurality and yet, within this unity, did not forget the plurality.<sup>21</sup>

Although we only have space here to consider a type-scene, recent studies have also shown that formulae and enjambment in Homer are also used with more flexibility than Parry granted them [Clark, 2004, pp. 126,133-134; Heubeck, 1978, p. 7; Fowler, 2004a, p. 222; Friedrich, 2000; Hainsworth, 1968; Scodel, 2002, pp. 2,12]. Parry's sculpting analogy must therefore be adjusted. Homer is not simply assembling prefabricated components as though they were fixed Lego blocks. Instead he demonstrates that he can take a chisel to the spolia of his tradition to shape them for his purposes.

## 5 Tradition, Composition and Creativity

In addition to examples where Homer exhibits innovative uses of his tradition, Parry's rejection of Homeric creativity is also questionable on several theoretical grounds.

First, Parry's oral theory, insofar as it merely attempts to describe a *technology of production*, cannot adequately access creativity. To suggest alternative artistic analogy from Parry's sculpting analogy, a composition theory is akin to studying the equipment, pigments and brush-stroke technique of a master painter. Whilst such a study may well shed some light on both how the painting was created and explain the forms we encounter (as the Parry-Lord theory inevitably does for Homer), it cannot necessarily judge the creativity of the work. Only by gazing upon the finished masterpiece and being moved by it can one gain an appreciation for the aesthetic achievements of its creator.

The dominance of Parry-Lord theory and the subsequent fixation on the processes of production has led to some rather perplexing results. In the introduction to his popular translation of the *Iliad*, Martin Hammond obligingly summarises the oral tradition of Homer so as to be faithful to Homeric scholarship in the wake of Parry. And yet, after acknowledging that this theory 'accounts for some immediately noticeable features of the texture of the Homeric poems', he implores the reader to 'dismiss it largely from his mind, and not allow it to distort his intuitive response to Homer's poetry' [Hammond, 1987, p. xv]. This tacit acknowledgement that an all-consuming focus on the 'practical technique' at the expense of its 'literary effects' [Hammond, 1987, p. xvi] can hinder the reader from appreciating the poetry of Homer. It reveals the limitations of Parry's theory in addressing the creative dimension of Homer's works that are also recognised in many other scholarly works [Heubeck, 1978, pp. 15–17; Parry, 1971a, pp. xlviii–l; Armstrong, 1958, pp. 339–340; Bremer et al., 1987; Clark, 2004, p. 129; Fowler, 2004a, p. 229; Griffin, 1983, pp. xiii–xvi; Minchin, 2001, p. 5].

A second objection opposes Parry's assumption that belonging to a tradition necessarily stifles creativity. If Parry's insistence on the pre-eminence of tradition over the individual is a correction of the modern obsession with the (literary) author as an autonomous individual seemingly creating in a vacuum, then this may well be a welcome development. This obsession, however, is equally as problematic for modern authors as it is for Homer; for which poet has not been influenced by traditions?

As Hans-Georg Gadamer so perceptively saw, we all work within a set of traditions and rely upon them to make sense of our world [Gadamer, 2004, pp. 277–285]. Thus all poets, if only by virtue of their reliance upon language, are subject to tradition. Whereas a literate composer may combine the words provided by her tradition (and

occasionally coin new ones or extend the meaning of existing ones with metaphors) in new and creative ways, so Homer can combine the formulae of his tradition in new and creative ways [Clark, 2004, p. 127; Fowler, 2004b, p. 6; Parry, 1929, p. 209; Scodel, 2004, p. 54]. Every member of a tradition is also its interpreter [Clark, 2004, p. 130; Reece, 2011, p. 907; Scodel, 2004, p. 54].

It is true that some traditions and methods of production have inherent limitations. To return to our painting analogy: pastels as opposed to oil paints, canvas as opposed to wet plaster, will readily lend themselves to certain textures and effects, and not others. Each technology presents different challenges and opportunities; but one must be chosen. Traditions, therefore, although they can be limiting in some respects, also provide the very foundation and medium for creative expression.

Finally, Parry's structuralist assumptions contributed to his discounting of Homer's creativity.<sup>22</sup> French structuralism attempted to apply de Saussure's *langue/parole* distinction to larger units of narrative. Hence they sought to find a fundamental deep structure which generated collections of narratives [see Greimas, 1984]. For example, Propp's classical analysis of Russian fairy tales abstracted the protagonists into various generic and homogeneous character types and similarly discovered a fixed set of interactions between these characters which, where present, always occurred in the same order.<sup>23</sup> This structuralist method can also be seen in the work of Parry and his followers, as they attempt to discover a fixed set of rules (*i.e.* a grammar or *langue*) for the production of all orally composed epics [Lord, 1960].

Structuralism has since fallen out of favour in many disciplines [de Vet, 2005]. It has been criticised as reductionist because it attempts to squeeze diverse texts, each with their own particularities, into a one-size-fits-all mould. By focusing on the commonalities of structure, the structural method often lost sight of creative variation. Roland Barthes, himself an erstwhile structuralist, abandoned the movement, stating that it was not so much as texts had in common that made them interesting, but what was unique about them [Barthes, 1970, p. 2]. It is somewhat ironic, then, that the constraints of Parry's own 'tradition' – namely structuralism – led him to see Homer as creatively confined by his oral tradition.

## 6 Conclusion

The lack of direct comparisons with Homer's poetry prevents us from making any definitive assessments regarding his creativity. What have been pursued here, however, is the more modest goal of disputing

Parry's claim that Homer's participation in an oral tradition excludes him from being a highly creative poet. Indeed the traditional elements employed by Homer are the very tools which can be used to express creativity. By calling into question some of the theoretical limitations of Parry and his milieu and by drawing upon more recent scholarship on Homer's oral composition, we can see that there was ample scope for Homer to use his tradition in highly creative and compelling ways.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>I am indebted to Elizabeth Minchin for her most helpful feedback on an earlier version of this manuscript.

<sup>2</sup>Published in Milman Parry, 'A Comparative Study of Diction as One of the Elements of Style in Early Greek Epic Poetry' in Parry [1971b]. This was originally Parry's Master of Arts Thesis completed in 1923.

<sup>3</sup>Statements to this effect abound in the literature. See, for example, Fowler [2004a, p. 221]. The Homeric question is beyond the scope of this study. In much the same way as Griffin, I use 'Homer' as shorthand for the composer(s) of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* without entering into debates surrounding the authorship of this work: see Griffin [1983, p. xvi].

<sup>4</sup>Parry [1930, p. 88]. On occasion, there is more than one formula for a given character and metrical value [Cf. Lord, 1960, p. 50].

<sup>5</sup>*i.e.* the sentence and line are coterminous.

<sup>6</sup>Parry, following Denis, refers to this type of enjambment as unperiodic enjambment [Parry, 1929, p. 203]. Elsewhere it is also known simply as adding enjambment [Clark, 2004, p. 131].

<sup>7</sup>Also known as typical scenes or themes.

<sup>8</sup>For a convenient annotated bibliography on Homeric originality, see Holoka [1973].

<sup>9</sup>However improbable, the discovery of a manuscript, which shows that Homer was largely parroting the already highly developed plot, characterisation and expression of his master, cannot in theory be precluded.

<sup>10</sup>Paris: Homer, *Iliad* 3.330–338; Patroklos: Homer, *Iliad* 16.130–144; Achilles: Homer, *Iliad* 19.367–391; and Agamemnon: Homer, *Iliad* 11.15–46; cf. Athene: Homer, *Iliad* 5.733–747, Homer, *Iliad* 8.384–392.

<sup>11</sup>Minor variations recorded in brackets. Where there is only a slight similarity a line number has been given for comparison. For a more detailed synopsis, see Arend [1933, p. 6].

<sup>12</sup>Homer, *Iliad* 3.333; 11.20; 16.134. See also Clark [2004, p. 134].

<sup>13</sup>Homer, *Iliad* 11.20–28, 30–40; 374–380.

<sup>14</sup>Homer, *Iliad* 11.29, 41ff; 19.381–382.

<sup>15</sup>Homer, *Iliad* 19.381–382.

<sup>16</sup>Homer, *Iliad* 16.141–144; 19.367–391.

<sup>17</sup>Although the shortest type-scene, the arming of Paris (Homer, *Iliad* 3.330–338), has nearly all of its lines replicated in another scene, the description of the corselet (Homer, *Iliad* 3.333) is changed in the Patroklos scene (Homer, *Iliad* 16.134) and omitted in the Achilles scene (Homer, *Iliad* 19.367–391). Moreover, both the Patroklos scene (Homer, *Iliad* 16.139) and the Agamemnon scene (Homer, *Iliad* 11.43), in their inclusion of agree against the Paris scene at this point (Homer, *Iliad* 3.338).

<sup>18</sup>Homer, *Iliad* 3.339. Cf. Lord [1960, p. 90].

<sup>19</sup>Homer, *Iliad* 16.140–144. See Griffin [1983, p. 36].

<sup>20</sup>Homer, *Iliad* 19.388–391.

<sup>21</sup>Translated by the author: "So entsteht das Eigenartige und Einzigartige der homerischen Kunst, der Wechsel von fester Form und verschiedener Ausschmückung..., von Notwendigem und Zufälligem, von Typischem und

Individuellem, von Wiederholung und Variation, und hat uns bewahrt ein Bild der eigentümlichen griechischen Wirklichkeitsauffassung, die in der Vielheit das Eine sah, und doch über der Einheit das Viele nicht vergaß" [Arend, 1933, p. 27; see also Scodel, 2004, p. 49].

<sup>22</sup>In Paris, Parry was a student of Antoine Albert Meillet, who had been a student of Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of semiotics, see de Vet [2005, p. 268]. Parry's student Lord, also approvingly cite key figures in the French structuralist movement, see Lord [1960, p. 284].

<sup>23</sup>See Propp [1970]. Lord approvingly cites Propp, see Lord [1960, p. 284].

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# The Relevance of Coercive Diplomacy despite its Mixed Results

*Nishank Motwani*

Diplomacy is an important instrument for successful conflict resolution. However, diplomacy alone is not sufficient and this necessitates the employment of other means for successful conflict resolution. One such means is coercive diplomacy. This strategy uses a firm ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach with inducements and assurances to manipulate the adversary’s cost-benefit analysis in the coercer’s favour. Although coercive diplomacy is backed by the threat or the use of limited force, its results are mixed as they can range from success, partial-success and end in failure. A closer examination of its outcomes reveals that on the whole it is not a very successful strategy. This article begins by closely examining coercive diplomacy as a theoretical concept to elucidate its risks and rewards as a strategy. Subsequently, three valuable case studies of coercive diplomacy are analysed to demonstrate its success, partial-success and failure. The varying outcomes illustrate the difficulties coercers encounter when attempting to influence the adversary’s cost-benefit calculus in their favour. Yet, despite its mixed results, coercive diplomacy will remain an important instrument for states attempting to settle conflicts in their favour particularly when they can generate strong domestic and political support to demonstrate their resolve in countering threats affecting their own security and survival [Schultz, 2001]. Issuing threats under such conditions raises their perceived credibility and can be used to signal a stronger resolve to the targeted state by the coercer even though the likelihood of resorting to military force is small [Schultz, 2001]. Hence a combined diplomatic strategy with a degree of limited coercion as an option will retain its value when conditions supporting it in fact exist and can be exploited.

Diplomacy is tirelessly pursued by agents of opposing parties in conflict resolution processes to reach an acceptable negotiated settlement. Such bargaining processes necessitate a degree of common interest between the parties involved: reaching agreement is only possible if the parties’ interests, though different, overlap at some point—and if this overlap is recognized [Bull, 1977, p. 170]. In instances where compromise, exchange, or collaboration between opposing parties is impeded by a lack of common interests, other conflict resolution instruments are needed. States and non-state actors frequently use non-diplomatic soft and hard instruments to advance their political objectives in conflict situations. Soft or nonaggressive instruments that are highly visible, but limited in their effectiveness, include economic sanctions (general and targeted), arms embargoes and boycotts. Hard or aggressive instruments that involve a more careful calculation of costs and benefits (due to the potential for greater risks and rewards) include military intervention, coercion and brute force. The wide array of instruments available to states demonstrates that diplomacy is not always sufficient for successful conflict resolution. Therefore, this article will argue that diplomacy is by no means sufficient by itself and will examine coercive diplomacy as an instrument for successful conflict resolution and assess its effectiveness.

This article will begin by briefly discussing the complex relationship between diplomacy and war. Second, the concept of coercion is used to explain the intersection of diplomacy and the

use or threat of force. Third, the key concept of coercive diplomacy is conceptualised. Fourth, coercive diplomacy is applied against three conflict resolution processes to demonstrate its success, partial-success, and failure—thus illustrating its varying degrees of success. This highlights the fact that no single instrument is sufficient to facilitate conflict resolution processes and the mixed results of coercive diplomacy evidences the risks coercing states encounter in their attempt to coerce others.

## 1 Diplomacy and War

Diplomacy is considered to be the antithesis of the use of force in conflict resolution processes. Hedley Bull defined diplomacy as ‘the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.’ [Bull, 1977, p. 162] The stress on ‘peaceful means’ emphasizes the distinction between ‘diplomacy’ and ‘war’ in particular. However, while diplomacy and the use of force appear deeply polarised, they are instead intimately connected. Diplomats and appointed state agents use diplomacy to prevent conflict as much as threaten the use of force to achieve political objectives. This shared but tense relationship is captured in Thomas C. Schelling’s seminal *Arms and Influence* in the phrase ‘the diplomacy of violence’ [Schelling, 1966, p. 1], referring to the informal and implicit—but powerful—messages the use of armed force can deliver [Ayson, 2008, pp. 62–67]. Schelling further expands by asserting, ‘The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.’

[Schelling, 1966, p. 2] Thus, the use of force is intrinsic to the value of diplomacy, and war also functions as a diplomatic tool: ‘diplomacy is pursued in the shadow of war, and war is waged in the shadow of diplomacy.’ [Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009, p.35]

## 2 Understanding Coercion

The intersection of diplomacy and the use of force is most prevalent in coercive diplomacy; a subset of coercion. Coercion has been defined by Thucydides, Lawrence Freedman and Schelling, respectively, as the ability of states to force their will upon their adversaries and manipulate their perception of risks and rewards [Thucydides, 1975, p. 402]; ‘the deliberate use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices’ [Freedman, 1998, p. 15] and; the deliberate use or threat of force to cause harm—exploiting the adversaries’ wants and fears [Schelling, 1966, p. 3]. Collectively drawing from these definitions, coercion aims to alter an opponent’s cost–benefit analysis by inflating the perceived costs and reducing the perceived benefits of his or her decisions. The coercer’s objective is to present the adversary with a situation in which compliance is preferable to defiance [Schaub, 2004, p. 389].

Coercion’s emphasis on using the threat or use of force to persuade an opponent to cease aggression feeds into the broader definition of coercive diplomacy, which as the term suggests involves a limited scale of coercion. Coercive diplomacy can be viewed on a continuum between diplomacy at one end and military force at the other end in which it is located somewhere in the middle. While definitional problems persist, coercive diplomacy can be characterized as an engagement that ‘seeks to persuade an opponent to cease aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping... just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution and to give credibility to the threat that greater force will be used if necessary.’ [George and Simons, 1994, p. 9]

## 3 Coercive Diplomacy Conceptualised

Coercive diplomacy can be distinguished from deterrence and compellence as strategies of coercion. Although the boundaries blur at times, each contains unique characteristics [Sperandei, 2006, pp. 261–263]. Deterrence aims to discourage the enemy from initiating hostilities by threatening harm in response and thereby increasing the risk of the costs outweighing the gains [Snyder, 1993, p. 350]. Compellence, a term coined by Schelling, aims to use threats to extract concessions and influence the adversary to do something they would otherwise not do.<sup>1</sup> While coercive diplomacy also

involves using the threat or limited use of force to induce an adversary to change its behavior, an important distinction is that it is essentially a reactive strategy, aiming to influence an adversary to stop or undo the consequences of actions already undertaken [Byman and Waxman, 2002, p. 231].

In addition to the reliance on threats and the limited use of force, coercive diplomacy might also offer inducements to encourage cooperation [Byman and Waxman, 2002, p. 227]. Coercers often use ‘sweeteners’ to encourage compliance by providing a face-saving exit point for the adversary and the ability to underplay the costs of compliance [Drezner, 1999, p. 188]. Inducements can decrease the adversary’s political costs of compliance, allowing them to accept a resolution without damaging domestic political support and prestige. The challenge for coercers offering concessions, however, is that they not be perceived to be weakening in their resolve: concessions might signal the coercer’s diminishing ability to absorb the costs of retaliation by the adversary. Consequently, it is important for the coercer to balance the ‘carrot’ with a firm ‘stick’, to demonstrate the incentives of compliance and the consequences of non-compliance, respectively.<sup>2</sup> If the adversary fails to comply with either threats or inducements then coercion has not occurred, as the coercer has failed to induce fear in the mind of the adversary.

Drawing on the work of Schelling, the success of coercive diplomacy is contingent upon five primary factors. First, the coercer must convince his adversary that the threat is credible and that the costs of non-compliance will be severe. Second, the adversary must be convinced that the coercer has the will and capability to use force in case of non-compliance. Third, the adversary must be given time to respond to the coercer’s threat. Fourth, perhaps the most difficult challenge for the coercer is to deliver assurances to the adversary that his compliance will not lead to further demands in the future. Fifth, neither the coercer nor the adversary must perceive the conflict as an end in itself and there must be a degree of common interest in avoiding a full-scale war.<sup>3</sup> It is particularly important for the coercer and adversary not to perceive the conflict as an end in itself, due to the danger of it assuming its own dynamic.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, an exercise in coercive diplomacy necessitates that the coercer maintain ‘escalation dominance’, which is to deny the adversary the freedom to alter the costs of the conflict in his or her favour. Due to the risk of the conflict escalating and breaching the cost threshold of the coercer, it is imperative for the coercer to have the capacity to absorb greater costs than his adversary and still benefit from negotiations.

#### 4 Success, Partial-Success and Failure in Coercive Diplomacy

The outcomes of conflicts involving coercive diplomacy might be restricted to a binary definition of either a success or failure. The limitation with this approach is that it fails to incorporate degrees of success that might have been achieved. For instance, while trying to coerce an adversary into compliance, a coercer may settle for partial-compliance. Hence, coercive diplomacy has neither failed nor succeeded but its effect is located in between the two ends of the spectrum of failure and success. This illustrates that coercive diplomacy might result in partial-success due to the lessening of the coercer's demands. Thus, three separate conflict resolution processes of coercive diplomacy that canvass success, partial-success and failure are discussed below.

#### 5 A Case of Success in Coercive Diplomacy: Libya

On December 19, 2003, the then Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi stunned the world with his decision to dismantle and surrender his regime's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.<sup>5</sup> This significant development effectively ended Colonel Gaddafi's isolation and is the strongest case for successful coercive diplomacy since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis [Kim, 2010, p. 422]. This dramatic development only nine months after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 suggested to some that Libya had acquiesced and surrendered its nonconventional weapons programs and renounced terrorism as a consequence of the Iraq invasion and removal of Saddam Hussein. While this view gained some popularity, it overlooked the deliberate and long-term US policies toward Libya that produced the conditions for Tripoli to reverse its clandestine WMD programs and support for terrorism [Burweila, 2006, pp. 5–6].

The United States' successful exercise in coercive diplomacy against Libya was a strategy that began with the administration of George H.W. Bush in 1989 and continued through the William J. Clinton and George W. Bush administrations until the December 2003 rapprochement. The normalisation of ties was a product of carefully calibrated carrot-and-stick diplomacy and can be traced to four key policies.<sup>6</sup> The first policy advocated a change of Libya's policies rather than seeking a regime change. Second, the effective enforcement of economic sanctions imposed multilaterally and sustained over time allowed them to become effective and apply continuous pressure on Gaddafi's regime. Third, having a wider multilateral strategy as opposed to a

unilateral one was instrumental in containing Libya. Fourth, offering inducements and assurances step by step produced the milieu for bolder concessions. The four policies were implemented in stages over the next fourteen years with deftness and most crucial were the limited objectives to get Libya to change its policies rather than threaten Gaddafi with regime change.

Libya was placed on the US State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1979 and was accused of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988—killing 270.<sup>7</sup> In the face of intense pressure from the US and UK over Flight 103's bombing, Libya sought reassurances that concessions on terrorism and WMD would not result in further demands or regime change. After obtaining assurances, Libyan authorities surrendered two suspected Libyan intelligence agents for trial, which also opened the door for more concessions to come with respect to its WMD program [Zakaria, 2006; Jentleson and Whytock, 2005–06, p. 7]. Removing regime change from the list of objectives facilitated the environment under which deeply mistrusting parties could move toward mutual benefits. Similarly, Libya's decision to cease its WMD program most likely stemmed from security concerns—that abandoning its WMD program actually provided Libya more security than continued development [Kaplan, 2007].

The effect of three decades of economic sanctions had significantly impacted Libya's economy [Squassoni, 2006, p. 2]. Although sanctions alone could not alter Gaddafi's policies on terrorism and WMD programs, they played an important role of accumulating his costs of non-compliance, which softened his resolve in continuing his policies. Furthermore, the US-led multilateral strategy that contained Libya signalled that international support against Tripoli could not be fractured. For coercive diplomacy to work, the target state must see that it lacks the ability to split the multilateral coalition and thus the credibility of the strategy is enhanced even more [Jentleson and Whytock, 2005–06, pp. 50–55].

Libya's decision to comply with comprehensive WMD disarmament demands was a product of skilled and deliberate long-term US policies, which was a successful exercise in coercive diplomacy. By demanding policy change and not regime change, the US signalled its objectives were restricted to changing Tripoli's behaviour. This policy was backed by coercive economic and political levers with the intent of manipulating Libya's decision-making process, particularly at inflating its costs and lowering its benefits. The credibility of US-led policies against Libya stemmed from

its preponderant military power. It is highly likely that Libya understood the consequences of its non-compliance. After all, both Tripoli and Benghazi had suffered military strikes by US and UK forces in April 1986 to make the threat of force credible yet again.

## 6 A Case of Partial-Success in Coercive Diplomacy: Kosovo

Between March and June 1999, NATO's 'Operation Allied Force' bombed selected targets in Yugoslavia to compel the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to stop Serbian hostilities against Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo. The seventy-eight day aerial bombing campaign in coercive diplomacy achieved its result, though only partially. Both NATO and Milosevic claimed 'victory', with the latter proclaiming that the agreed peace plan guaranteed Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and also closed the issue of possible independence of Kosovo [Jentleson and Whytock, 2005–06, pp. 50–55]. On the other hand, NATO won the war but it was a limited victory and it did not achieve it quickly as it had planned [Solana, 1999, pp. 119–120]. The analysis of this case will emphasise why NATO's exercise in coercive diplomacy achieved only partial-success.

The US-led NATO war against Serbian forces began with miscalculations and lacked a coherent strategy for several key reasons. First, NATO committed itself to an aerial-bombardment campaign to compel Milosevic and expected a quick cessation of Serbian hostilities based on the short twelve-day bombardment of Bosnia in 1995. The restriction of the use of force to aerial bombardment diminished the value of the threat being delivered to Milosevic's government. Second, from the outset, the US administration had ruled out the use of ground forces, which most likely emboldened the Milosevic leadership and prolonged the duration of the war. Third, the aerial bombing was restricted to limited targets, which not only lowered Milosevic's cost of non-compliance but also allowed Serbian forces to continue their hostilities against Kosovar Albanians. Fourth, the US acted without UN authorization, which reflected a weaker coalition of states open to possible fracturing. Finally, disagreements among principal US policy makers and international partners interrupted the agreement of steps on how to respond to Milosevic's non-compliance. As the war dragged on and Milosevic continued to defy compliance, the US-led NATO campaign expanded its 'limited' bombing target list and was considering the use of ground forces if aerial bombing failed to compel Milosevic.

After seventy-eight days of heavy bombing, Milosevic agreed to a settlement and claimed victory even in defeat. Although NATO had effectively won the war and compelled Serbian authorities to withdraw from Kosovo, NATO's attempt at coercive diplomacy resulted in a partial-success for several reasons. First, the principal objective of NATO's war was to protect Kosovar Albanians from being targeted by Serbian forces, however the strategy adopted by NATO instead was confined to aerial bombardment. This did not protect Kosovar Albanians and instead exacerbated their targeting by Serbian forces, which continued for seventy-eight days [Mandelbaum, 1999, p. 5]. Second, the risk-averse position of American and NATO forces and lack of agreement about sending ground forces exposed a serious limitation to the adversary, which prolonged the war. It explicitly exposed the coercer's cost threshold against which the adversary could readjust its own cost-benefit calculation—clearly evident in Milosevic's decision to protract the engagement and not capitulate to NATO demands. Third, these concerns exposed a critical disconnect between policy objectives and military means—an air campaign lacking ground forces due to political pressures as well as a lack of domestic civilian support for expanding the intervention among NATO member countries [Lavalley, 2007, p. 25]. Finally, NATO's serious miscalculation about Kosovo's profound historical and cultural significance to the Serbs not only resulted in an under-appreciation of the adversary's cost threshold but also affected NATO's own costs and also challenged the effectiveness of airpower as a coercive agent [Lambeth, 2001, p. 234].

The objective of 'Operation Allied Force', to protect Kosovar Albanians from Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign, failed to arrest those mass killings. The operation however succeeded in compelling Serbian military and paramilitary forces to withdraw from Kosovo and reversed the campaign unleashed by Milosevic as he was forced to accept NATO's demands. This paved the way for NATO's peacekeeping mission, Kosovo Force—KFOR—to enter Kosovo, which at its height reached 50,000 soldiers to maintain a 'safe and secure environment' for all the inhabitants of Kosovo [North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2012]. Despite the presence of KFOR even today, the mission that led to its creation only achieved partial success as it failed to compel Milosevic to cease violence against Kosovar Albanians for a period lasting slightly more than eleven weeks—even though that was the primary objective of the mission. The humanitarian intervention also set a dangerous precedent of using force against another

sovereign state as it lacked UN Security Council backing. It is for these key criticisms that although NATO achieved its military objective of compelling Milosevic, its exercise in coercive diplomacy only partially-succeeded.

## 7 A Case of Failure in Coercive Diplomacy: India

A crisis between India and Pakistan erupted following the attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001, perpetrated by two Pakistani terrorist groups.<sup>8</sup> In response, India mobilised its military and its offensive strike corps along its international border with Pakistan to compel its neighbour into renouncing terrorist activities and cross-border infiltration against India. The conflict de-escalated in October 2002 without India's four key demands being satisfied. New Delhi's four demands were: the handover of 20 criminals and terrorists residing in Pakistan; the ceasing of cross-border infiltration of terrorists into Indian territory; the closure of all facilities/terrorist training camps and ending all forms of direct and indirect political-economic-logistical support given to terrorists operating in Pakistan; and a 'categorical and unambiguous renunciation' of terrorism in all its varieties [Roy-Chaudhry, 2004].

From the set of four key demands made by New Delhi, Pakistan only complied with the fourth by taking limited action against the terrorist groups responsible for the attack on the Indian parliament and making a public pledge not to permit terrorism in the name of Kashmir from inside its territory. However, this outcome was not a product of New Delhi's application of direct pressure on Pakistan's military-led regime of General Pervez Musharaff but the result was rather due to the sustained effort and persistence of the international community led by the US, as well as the Group of Eight nations and multinational organisations such as the European Union that urged Pakistan to stop cross-border infiltration of terrorists into India [Rana, 2002, pp. 1–4]. For instance, the international community's effort in extracting one key demand from Pakistan gained traction once the US designated both the terrorist groups responsible for the attack on the Indian parliament as 'foreign terrorist organisations'. This limited gain however was confined to rhetoric and did not result in the total halting of cross-border infiltration into Indian territory. Consequently, the analysis of this case will emphasise why New Delhi's exercise in coercive diplomacy failed.

While there was no intent to initiate war, the threat to do so was vital to pressure Pakistan into compliance [Mooth, 2005]. Drawing upon Schelling's model, New Delhi's threat to initiate

hostilities had to be seen by Islamabad as both compelling and credible [Ganguly and Kraig, 2005, p. 318]. Hence, total mobilisation of India's armed forces was necessary to deliver a credible threat of force. However, the use of force from India's calculus was not an option despite the mobilisation for four reasons.<sup>9</sup> First, seeking Pakistan's compromise on Kashmir was near impossible as Pakistan's stake in Kashmir is practically unyielding. Second, motivation levels of both India and Pakistan were at their zenith, which closed the space for bargaining. Third, both perceived the conflict to be a zero-sum game—thus both were willing to absorb costs of escalation. Fourth, for India, Pakistan's nuclear capability limited its military options and any sign of escalation would indefinitely result in diplomatic intervention from the international community [Ganguly and Kapur, 2010, pp. 55–60]. Hence, although India's strategic options were very limited, it focused its strategy on managing the crisis by exerting direct military pressure on Pakistan and involving the US-led international community to pressure Islamabad diplomatically into addressing India's concerns about terrorism [Kapur, 2009, p. 199].

In the next stage of the crisis India made its demands to Pakistan but three critical components necessary for coercive diplomacy to yield the intended results were in direct contrast to the strategy employed. First, a tenet of coercive diplomacy is that a coercer must reassure the adversary that compliance would not lead to further demands. India made the critical miscalculation of not only expanding its demands but raised them without achieving any compliance. This occurred when New Delhi articulated its first demand but then issued three others even though it had not achieved compliance in a single case [Bratton, 2010, p. 595]. Furthermore, in doing so, India introduced a competitive element into the coercive diplomatic process, which strengthened Islamabad's non-compliance. Second, India offered no time frame for Pakistan to comply with its demands, which again was a direct breach of coercive diplomacy [Bratton, 2010, p. 595]. Third, India offered no rewards to induce Pakistani compliance, which made compliance from Pakistan increasingly difficult [Kalyanaraman, 2002, p. 485]. As a result, the Indian exercise in coercive diplomacy clearly failed to induce the conditions necessary for Pakistan into compliance as Islamabad remained defiant throughout the stand-off. For instance, Pakistan responded to India's military mobilisation with its own military build-up, moved its ballistic missiles closer to the international border with India and during May 2002 test-fired three ballistic

missiles in four days [Kalyanaraman, 2002, p. 486].

Pakistan's defiance in the face of India's coercive diplomacy strategy did not produce the results New Delhi had intended to achieve and on the contrary uncovered the limited options India could put into effect when attempting to coerce Pakistan into compliance. Even India's limited gain on the public pledge made by Pakistan's then military leader General Musharaff in his address to the nation on 12 January 2002 about not permitting terrorism in the name of Kashmir from inside Pakistan's territory resulted indirectly as New Delhi leveraged the international community into exerting pressure on Islamabad as a means to force it to appreciating Indian concerns with respect to cross-border infiltration [See Musharaff, 2002]. In conclusion, Pakistan's high stake in Kashmir and its willingness to absorb massive costs for non-compliance and its perception of the conflict as a zero-sum game made India's demands highly unrealistic, no matter how much pressure New Delhi exerted on Islamabad.

## 8 Conclusion

Coercive diplomacy delivers mixed results. The varying outcomes presented – from success and partial-success to failure – demonstrates the difficulties faced by coercers when attempting to skew the adversary's cost-benefit calculus in their favour. Yet despite its mixed results, this strategy nevertheless serves as an important instrument under circumstances that necessitate coercive states' ability to absorb higher costs for favourable strategic outcomes. As illustrated in the three case studies, coercive diplomacy's unique characteristic is its capacity to fuse the threat or the use of limited force with inducements and reassurances. In doing so, it fills a clear gap in the states' strategic toolbox. Thus from a theoretical perspective and as a policy option, it seems likely that the employment of coercive diplomacy will persist particularly when states can generate domestic and political support to respond to security threats and strategic challenges and to convey more forcefully their resolve to a targeted state.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Compellence can be defined as the use of threats or limited force to induce the opponent into giving up what is desired by the coercer. Compellence aims to affect the enemy's will rather than its capabilities and hence it is a politico-military strategy and a test of opposing wills [Treverton, 2000, p. 1; Plehn, 2005, p. 6].

<sup>2</sup>At the heart of coercive diplomacy lies the cost-benefit analysis model, which attempts to evaluate and alter the adversary's perception of risks and rewards. However, it fails to provide insight into the adversary's valuation of goals and priorities, thus making it difficult to use the

cost-benefit model to reach an informed decision on whether the adversary can be forced into compliance. This is particularly important since coercive diplomacy is a dynamic two-party activity and the manipulation of the cost-benefit model will certainly generate resistance from the adversary, so it must also consider the adversary's decision calculus. Despite this significant limitation, the cost-benefit model still yields tremendous value in designing coercive strategies. See Sullivan [1995, p. 11], Balfe [2003], Byman and Waxman [2002, p. 14].

<sup>3</sup>The five points that discuss the factors necessary for the success of coercive diplomacy have been sourced from Schelling [1966, pp. 1, 3–4, 69–76, 89].

<sup>4</sup>Coercive diplomacy has been researched by other scholars that include the works of George and Simons [1994] and Jakobsen [2007]. The work of Alexander George and his associates is authoritative on coercive diplomacy and they have identified two sets of variables that determine the success of coercive diplomacy. The first is a set of contextual variables and the second a set of conditions favouring success. The contextual variables are used to assess whether coercive diplomacy is a possible strategy in a given crisis. The successful variables are the second stage of the process and are used if the contextual variables suggest that coercive diplomacy can be applied. While the studies contribute substantially to our understanding of the conditions needed for the success of coercive diplomacy, the selected approach for this paper is the one conducted by Thomas Schelling. The primary reason for this selection lies in Schelling's fifth point in his 'five-point' conditions for the success of coercive diplomacy, which he calls 'compellence'. Schelling's fifth point states that neither the coercer nor the adversary must see the conflict as an end in itself. The importance of this point is fundamental as it emphasizes the danger of the conflict gaining its own dynamic, which must be prevented at all costs. While Schelling's emphasizes this point, the work of the other aforementioned scholars does not and hence this is the primary reason for selecting Schelling's work.

<sup>5</sup>Concurrently, Gaddafi declared a halt on the development of long-range missiles exceeding 300 km and within months ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. See Hochman [2006, p. 63].

<sup>6</sup>The four key policies have been adopted from Jentleson [2006, pp. 1–9].

<sup>7</sup>Libya was removed from the US State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism on 15 May 2006. See St John [2006, p. 5], Kaplan [2006].

<sup>8</sup>The two terrorist groups responsible for the attack were the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM). See Ganguly and Wagner [2004, p. 493].

<sup>9</sup>Three of the four key reasons in this paragraph have been adopted from Kalyanaraman [2002, pp. 483–486].

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# Gender-Based Violence in Papua New Guinea

## Trends and Challenges

Laura Baines

Gender-based violence (GBV) is a phenomenon that occurs globally, to varying degrees and with various consequences. This essay investigates GBV, specifically family violence, where most often the victim is the wife and the perpetrator is the husband, in the context of Papua New Guinea (PNG). I argue that although GBV is difficult to measure, small-scale studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that GBV is severe and widespread, and in some instances worsening. In PNG society, there remain several challenges that inhibit the substantial reduction of GBV. Cultural challenges include the existence and adherence to bride price traditions; women's lack of political representation, affecting how this issue is dealt with at the highest level of society; and the traditional village court systems, which align judgments with customary male-biased law. There are State sector challenges present that also inhibit a reduction of GBV, such as inadequate and biased policing services; and inefficient, sporadic and underfunded support services (e.g. hospitals and emergency shelters). Change in PNG cannot be achieved in a short time frame. It may take generations for significant change to be made in communities so that women are viewed as equals and for GBV not to be seen as the 'norm'. When this occurs, a reduction in severe and widespread GBV may be experienced in PNG.

*'Wife beating is an accepted custom... we are wasting our time debating the issue'.<sup>1</sup>*

Women in Papua New Guinea (PNG) are marginalised in every sphere of life. During her March 2012 visit to PNG, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women commented that gender-based violence (GBV) against PNG women has been and is still endemic. This occurs in a country where entrenched patriarchal attitudes and gendered stereotypes exist in regards to both women's status and their 'role' in society [Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 2012]. In this essay I argue that although this phenomenon is difficult to measure, anecdotal evidence and small-scale studies suggest that GBV remains a socially and culturally accepted custom. I outline the view that there exist a range of cultural barriers, for example, bride price and women's economic dependency on men; and State sector barriers, such as inadequate support services and ineffective judicial systems, that prevent the substantial reduction of GBV in PNG.

## 1 Gender-based violence in Papua New Guinea

### 1.1 What is gender-based violence in Papua New Guinea?

GBV refers to violence that is driven by and manifested through gendered power relations and unequal relationships [Spees 2004 cited in Eves, 2006]. This essay discusses a subset of GBV, family violence, particularly between spouses where most often the victim is the wife, and the perpetrator

is the male. Although GBV can occur in any arena (from the familial home to the street to the battlefield), and can be perpetrated by both males and females [Counts, 1990], the most common form of GBV in PNG, 'wife-beating', occurs in the domestic sphere, perpetrated by a woman's intimate partner [Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, 1992]. Violence within the confines of the domestic sphere is often considered to be a private matter. Furthermore, because of the socialisation of violence in PNG, GBV is often considered the 'norm', so much so that it invariably goes unnoticed [Bradley and Kesno, 2001, UN Women Australia, 2011].

GBV can be perpetrated by a range of offenders, such as: spouses, partners, friends, family members, others (e.g. police), or those offenders who are unknown to the victim [Counts, 1990]. GBV can take many forms in PNG and can include:

- Physical violence—hitting, use of a weapon, or being targeted through tribal violence;
- Emotional abuse—controlling behaviour, imposing isolation and insults;
- Economic abuse—restricting access to financial and material resources; and
- Sexual violence—forced sexual activities [UNIFEM, 2010, UNFPA, 2011].

Gender equality in Papua New Guinea is preserved as a legal notion in the country's Constitution. However, even though PNG is

a signatory to CEDAW<sup>2</sup> and to the Beijing Declaration<sup>3</sup>, there is currently no legislation that specifically criminalises GBV in PNG [McLeod, 2005, Kidu, 2012]. Spousal rape was, however, criminalised in an amendment to the Criminal Code in 2003.<sup>4</sup> There has been more recent work done on a Family Protection Bill, which seeks to criminalise GBV. The Bill has been through two parliamentary readings but was not supported in its third reading [Kidu, 2012].

As stated by Amnesty International [2010], GBV has been, and continues to be, very much culturally and socially sanctioned in PNG. Furthermore, there still is an acceptance of violence at the highest levels of society. As noted above, it is widely recognised that the government of PNG has taken limited action to address GBV and because of this, GBV remains a major issue [Amnesty International, 2010, Hinton and Earnest, 2010]. Macintyre [2000] illustrates the social acceptability of violence at the grassroots level, commenting that many PNG police report women being beaten while other individuals, including family, look on without intervening. In some instances, ‘sometimes people stand and watch an assault as if it is a form of entertainment’ [Macintyre, 2000, p. 42].

## 1.2 What is the extent of gender-based violence in Papua New Guinea?

### 1.2.1 Data collection issues

Lewis et al. [2008] comment that there is no nationwide systematic way of measuring GBV. A lack of data collection on GBV can be seen as representing ‘acceptance as a custom and of women’s invisibility’ [Government of Papua New Guinea, 2009, p. 51]. Several other issues also impact on data collection. For example, some medical clinics impose a ‘fight fee’ (pait fi) that victims must pay in order to be treated.<sup>5</sup> This amount is substantially less if an individual does not have injuries as a result of a fight. As a result, many victims will lie to medical staff, skewing GBV data [Eves, 2006].

### 1.2.2 Indicative statistics of GBV in PNG

Although it is difficult to quantify GBV, various historical small and mid-scale studies undertaken by non-governmental organisations and government-related agencies have attempted, to some extent, to do so. All of these studies point to the same picture: that GBV is pervasive, and has been and continues to be a serious problem, reflecting its acceptability in society. For example, the Law Reform Commission of Papua New

Guinea’s [1992] research of 1203 women and 1192 men discovered that 67% of women in PNG had been hit by their husbands. The findings show high regional variation, with close to 100% of wives reported that they had been hit by their husband in the Highlands Province, whereas, in the Oro and New Ireland Provinces, this figure was closer to 50% [Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, 1992].

Although there still remains an absence of comprehensive GBV data, more recent anecdotal and small-scale studies indicate that GBV continues to be severe and widespread. Furthermore, in some contemporary instances GBV is reported as even increasing and becoming more severe, indicating that the practice is still seen as acceptable [Government of Papua New Guinea, 2009, Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 2012]. For example, a recent qualitative and quantitative study by Ganster-Breidler [2009] of 200 women in five sites suggests that GBV is still pervasive. On average, 75% of women reported that they were the survivors of physical and sexual violence, and 65% of women reported that they had been the victims of either physical or sexual violence.

## 1.3 What are some of the impacts of gender-based violence in Papua New Guinea?

The Australian Agency for International Development [2008], in a 2007 study, identifies GBV as a major barrier to the development of PNG, with serious effects on victims, and significant impacts for the community and country as a whole. The health impacts of GBV on an individual are wide-ranging, from injury, psychological morbidity (from anxiety to suicidal thinking), sexually transmitted infections and death. Some women flee their familial homes, voluntarily or otherwise, as a result of GBV [Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, 1992, Fox, 2011].

Furthermore, GBV in PNG also has significant measurable economic costs through a loss of worker productivity and income, lower rates of accumulation of social capital and high costs to the healthcare system [Brouwer et al., 1999]. If there are children present in the relationship, like their mothers, they can also experience negative physical, mental and social impacts. The offender, usually the husband, may be physically harmed as a result of retaliation or defence by the female, or may feel a sense of guilt, embarrassment or insecurity after the event [Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, 1992].

## 2 Challenges to addressing GBV in PNG<sup>6</sup>

### 2.1 Cultural challenges

Bride price, which is common in many areas of PNG, is cited by a wide variety of authors as being a major barrier to the reduction of GBV. Bride price allows for a marriage to be affirmed, and a cementing of alliances, through an exchange of wealth, such as money, or intangible (for example songs) and tangible goods (for example pigs), principally from the grooms side to that of the brides. The concept of bride price has major consequences for how women are viewed in marriage. In some PNG communities, bride price legitimises a husband's control over his wife. With increasing modernity and an emphasis on cash, bride price can promote the idea that the wife is simply viewed as property of the husband. Some husbands (and in some instances, also the wife) therefore see GBV as an acceptable correction for wives who do not live up to their expectations about what the 'role' of the women in a marriage may be [Counts, 1990, Lepani, 2008]. Furthermore, as commented on by Amnesty International [2006], the cultural trait of bride price makes it difficult for a woman to leave an abusive marriage as her family would have to repay the amount, which many families either cannot or will not do.

Women's lack of political representation in the PNG Government has implications for how GBV is addressed at the highest level. The Equality and Participation Bill was passed last year and guarantees women 22 seats in the June 2012 national election. However, the enabling amendment to the Constitution has yet to be passed, meaning that the 22 reserved seats have not yet been implemented [Blackwell, 2011]. This lack of representation inhibits issues that directly affect women, such as GBV, from being fairly and equally discussed. Furthermore, it becomes more difficult for GBV to be pushed as a national priority [Australian Agency for International Development, 2008].

GBV can be seen as a way for men to affirm authority. It is argued that increasing modernity in PNG has resulted in men feeling anxiety due to a shift in power relations. Men feel they are no longer in control and therefore perpetrate acts of GBV as a means of re-establishing their authority [Josephides 1994 cited in Lepani, 2008]. As described by Amnesty International [2006], GBV is regarded as acceptable—it is an 'inevitable dimension of domestic relationships and a *valid way for men to assert authority* over partners who are deemed lazy, insubordinate or argumentative' [Amnesty International, 2006, p. 12, my emphasis].

Many men believe it is acceptable to physically demonstrate their authority by punishing a woman who has transgressed the social norms that dictate what a woman's 'role' in society is [Macintyre, 2000, Amnesty International, 2006]. Furthermore, due to the prevailing gender ideology in PNG, violence is seen as 'normal' for men to perpetrate, reinforced through the socialization of masculinity [Amnesty International, 2006].

As noted, the PNG Constitution places men and women as equals in society. However, this is not the case in practice. It is undeniable that women have had and continue to have a lesser status than men [Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, 1992, Abirafeh, 2009]. The US Department of State comments that in PNG women have been severely discriminated against in comparison with their male counterparts in every area of society—culturally, politically, socially, and economically [US Department of State 2011 cited in Refugee Review Tribunal, 2011]. This clearly has implications for GBV. Because women are seen as second-class citizens, they are at a higher risk of being the victims of GBV in the public or private sphere; or when reported to police, women's GBV grievances are not taken seriously [McLeod, 2003]. In addition, the acceptability of GBV continues to be excused due to women's perceived lesser status [Government of Papua New Guinea, 2009].

As highlighted by Macintyre [2000], many women accept the existence of GBV for a range of reasons, including their dependence on men for their economic survival.<sup>7</sup> Women's economic reliance on the male breadwinner of the family, as well as a general lack of control and access to economic resources (such as land), makes it very difficult for women to leave an abusive relationship or complain about GBV. Furthermore, there is a lack of preference in PNG for educating girls, a situation that will foster their economic dependency on males in the future [Australian Agency for International Development, 2008, Hinton and Earnest, 2010].

The Australian Agency for International Development [2008] comments that many rural women with GBV grievances find it difficult to seek justice via the formal court system, as these services are located in larger towns and cities. Rural women are then forced to rely on the community-based village courts. However, the village court system is strongly biased towards males. Male-dominated village courts often fail to take note of and protect women's rights, offering almost no protection to women victims of GBV. In addition, village courts rely on largely traditional patriarchal customary law that takes precedence over most other formal legislation. This means that, generally, no formal punishment or only

weak sanctions will be ordered. In some cases compensation may instead be paid to the victim's family [Government of Papua New Guinea, 2009, Human Rights Watch, 2012]. However, this can in fact increase incidences of GBV as some men are not willing to part with any of their income and blame the woman for this [Dubois, 2010].

## 2.2 State sector challenges

Poor police conduct is an issue that is cited by many authors as a real challenge. As highlighted by Amnesty International [2006, 2010], police policy<sup>8</sup> states that GBV must be treated as seriously as common assault, but in reality this is not occurring. It has been argued that women fear reporting incidences of GBV to the police because they are frightened of being asked to undertake a sexual act. Violence against women by male police officers is reported to be frequent at night, when women police officers<sup>9</sup> have finished work. In general, police lack the skills or willingness to inform GBV victims of their rights and similarly often do not refer women on to support services. Few police report GBV cases unless the act has been particularly extreme, as the attitude of police is often that GBV is a 'family matter'. Furthermore, if incidences are investigated, they are often addressed in an inadequate manner, resulting in a lack of conviction [Australian Agency for International Development, 2008; Human Rights Watch 2005 cited in Refugee Review Tribunal, 2011].

As discussed earlier, a further barrier to the reduction of GBV is the country's ineffective formal judicial system. Authors cite the view that many women feel the system is difficult to access, is intimidating, as many women lack knowledge of their rights and laws, and is expensive, as there is limited legal aid. In the rare situation when a conviction occurs, sentences are generally disproportionately light. This then gives society the impression that GBV is acceptable. Appropriate punishments are an important part of public education. Ensuring that communities appreciate the serious nature of GBV may be a deterrent for potential perpetrators. In addition, for those few instances that result in appropriate sentences, there is concern about the lack of behavioural rehabilitation and counselling for men whilst in prison [Australian Agency for International Development, 2008, Human Rights Watch, 2012].

State-run support services, such as counselling and healthcare to assist victims of GBV, are generally ineffective, financially and technically under-resourced and are largely urban-based, resulting in access issues for rural women. In addition, there is also a general lack of emergency

shelters for abused women, with most being similarly located in urban areas. Authors also cite the view that the lack of training (both gender-based and technical) of medical and counselling staff is a significant issue [Government of Papua New Guinea, 2009, Médecins Sans Frontières, 2011, Human Rights Watch, 2012]. Some medical clinics currently charge fees for writing a medical certificate, which many women cannot afford due to their economic dependency on men. A medical certificate is necessary for a GBV prosecution to be commenced by police [Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 2012].

Amnesty International [2006] comments that by 2006 the largest State-initiated civil education campaign was undertaken as part of the Law Reform Commission's work. The aim of this campaign<sup>10</sup> was to change socio-cultural attitudes around the acceptability of GBV, as well as educating the public on criminal law. Since this campaign, there has been little by way of further large-scale Government-initiated civil education efforts, apart from those undertaken by NGOs, which generally have been small-scale. As stated by Eves [2006], there are issues in designing civil education campaigns in PNG, where there is high linguistic diversity. Furthermore, the cultural relevancy of GBV campaigns, where GBV is still widely accepted, is also an important issue to consider when developing and implementing GBV reduction education campaigns:

How do you make culturally relevant and meaningful concepts that are foreign and have no comparable points of reference or resemblance within the culture? ... Unless people can identify with the images employed in posters, they will be dismissed as not relevant, or misinterpreted [Eves, 2006, p. 55]

## 3 Conclusion

In conclusion, substantive as well as anecdotal evidence confirms that GBV has been, and remains, a serious issue in PNG. I have shown that GBV is still socially and culturally sanctioned, both at the community and Government levels. The cultural and State sector challenges limiting the reduction of GBV are complex in nature, ranging from bride price to women's lack of political representation and an ineffective formal judicial system. Clearly, these challenges cannot be addressed and change achieved in a short time frame. I consider it may take generations, in some instances, for real and significant change to be made in communities so that women are viewed as equals in society, causing a reduction in widespread and severe GBV.

The international community needs to continue to make a stand and compel the PNG Government to promote the necessary changes, for example, to introduce effective GBV laws. The PNG Government itself needs to take a stronger public stance that GBV is not acceptable. When this happens, widespread and severe GBV in PNG may, in time, become a phenomenon of the past.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Comment made by a parliamentarian in 1987 during floor debates on wife battering in Papua New Guinea [Heise 1994 cited in El-Mouelhy, 2004].

<sup>2</sup>The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979. It is often described as an international bill of rights for women [Division for the Advancement of Women, 2012].

<sup>3</sup>The United Nations-initiated Beijing Declaration was signed by participating countries at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995). The Declaration aimed to outline a plan of action to achieving greater gender equality [UN Women, 1995].

<sup>4</sup>In reality, although this was legislated, it is not often enforced formally. Few men are actually prosecuted [Kidu, 2012].

<sup>5</sup>It is interesting to note that the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, in her recent visit to PNG, commented that there has been an order to stop the charging of these fees. However, many clinics are still charging fight fees [Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 2012].

<sup>6</sup>As PNG is a culturally and linguistically diverse nation [Knauff, 1999] the following section presents a generalised range of some of the cultural challenges which may not be applicable to all cultural groupings which are present in PNG.

<sup>7</sup>Other reasons for women's acceptance of GBV include: not to split up the family by the woman leaving, some women have no other house to escape to and do not want to be homeless, and that they accept it is their husband's right to abuse them [Macintyre, 2000].

<sup>8</sup>Specifically, the 1987 Constabulary Standing Order on Domestic Violence and the Circular issued in 2007 by the Police Commissioner making it mandatory for all police to prosecute those who are perpetrators of GBV [Australian Agency for International Development, 2008].

<sup>9</sup>Interestingly, only 5.6% of police officers were female in 2006 [Amnesty International, 2006].

<sup>10</sup>Posters with the message '[w]ife beating is a crime' were distributed and these were supplemented by television advertisements [Amnesty International, 2006].

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## ‘Caliban Rediscovered?’

### On the Rise of the Global Indigenous Movement<sup>1</sup>

*Jaimal Sandhu*

This paper addresses the problematic construction of the concept of ‘indigeneity’ in global political discourse. It assesses the value of this concept given its significant shortcomings as a qualitative empirical term. The conclusion is drawn that despite these shortcomings, the concept of ‘indigeneity’ can be effectively employed as a rhetorical and political strategy to protect certain vulnerable groups and agitate for positive rights.

The publication of Adam Kuper’s article ‘The Return of the Native’ [Kuper, 2003] set off a flurry of debate regarding the concept of ‘indigeneity’. Much – it seemed – was at stake. Kuper’s position held that the concept of ‘indigeneity’ was essentialist and demonstrably meaningless – that it was nothing more than the Victorian notion of the ‘primitive’, dressed up in late-twentieth century multicultural clothing. Furthermore, fostering such a fiction could ‘have dangerous political consequences’, distracting from ‘real local issues’ and exacerbating ‘local ethnic frictions’ [Kuper, 2003]. Critics responded that equating indigeneity with primitivism was a caricature. They argued that the concept provided a powerful means by which deprived groups could redress discrimination, through international forums and the benefits of association with a global cause [see Kenrick and Lewis, 2003, Saugestad, 2003, Turner, 2003].

Others staked out the ground in the middle. While recognizing the difficulty of formulating an empirical definition, Barnard [2006] argued that ‘indigenous people’ as an anthropological concept could be differentiated from legal and political conceptualizations. Ultimately, this paper takes a similar view. It argues that, as empirically fallacious as ‘indigeneity’ – as a global concept – is in ethnographic terms, it nevertheless has a functional use in articulating common concerns experienced by a diverse range of minorities in international forums and globalised discourses.

#### 1 Defining the elusive.

Despite a history that can be traced back to the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries [see Brown and Guillermo, 1999, on Indigenous Issues, 2012], the most conspicuous effort toward building a transnational indigenous movement began in the 1970s. This process emerged primarily in those countries that had been subjected to European invasion and settlement, particularly, those of the New World and Australasia [Kingsbury, 1998, p. 421]. The World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) was founded in Canada in 1975, and the cause was officially taken up by the United Nations with the

formation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1982 [on Indigenous Issues, 2012]. Over the next few decades the movement grew to include networks throughout Asia and Africa as well.

Such a movement begged the question of who ‘indigenous peoples’ actually were. It is over this same period then that attempts were made to formulate a working definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ or ‘indigeneity’ on which, presumably, the growing political and legal activism could be predicated. Thus, Cobo [1986] produced a definition in a UN commissioned report, as, subsequently, did the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1989 and the World Bank in 1991 [cited in Kingsbury, 1998].

There are differences, some controversial, between all these definitions. For example, Martínez Cobo’s definition requires that indigenous peoples, ‘Have a historical continuity with pre-invasion and precolonial societies’ [Cobo, 1986; cited in Kingsbury, 1998, p. 420]. The ILO definition relaxes this requirement by stipulating only that indigenous peoples ‘retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions’ [cited in Kingsbury, 1998, p. 420]. The World Bank does away with ‘historical continuity’ altogether, suggesting only that ‘indigenous peoples...describe social groups with a social and cultural identity distinct from the dominant society’ [cited in Kingsbury, 1998, p. 420].

It is clear, even in this very brief overview, that attempts to define ‘indigeneity’ are problematic. In many contexts, Martínez Cobo’s definition is overly restrictive, whereas the World Bank extends the definition almost to any minority group that would claim the status.

One solution, according to Barnard [2006, p. 9], is to just accept that recognising ‘indigenous people’ involves an intuitive, ‘even mystical’ factor; that we simply ‘know an “indigenous people” when we see one’. However, with far-right nationalist groups increasingly invoking ‘indigenous’ rhetoric in countries as diverse as Norway, England and India, such a vaguely stated

proposition is untenable. Furthermore, as Li [2000] has pointed out with reference to Indonesia, even minority groups sharing similar historical and socio-cultural circumstances within the same country can articulate different positions with respect to 'indigenous' identity.

Clearly then, any concept of 'indigeneity' is bound to be incoherent. But is it dangerous? There is a strong case to be made that it is.

## 2 A dangerous fiction...?

The most powerful argument in support of this view is that the adoption of a fictive concept such as 'indigeneity' can, in some circumstances, actually exacerbate discrimination and inequality. Tsing [2007, cited in Trigger and Dalley, 2010, p. 51] demonstrates how, in Indonesia, where '[a]most everyone is "indigenous" in the sense of deriving from original stocks' the local concept of 'indigeneity' (*pribumi*) is used to 'legitimate discrimination against Chinese Indonesians, who cannot be *pribumi* however many generations their ancestors may have been there'. Igoe [2006] argues that, in Tanzania, 'indigenous status' is restricted to those with access to international forums and substantial monetary resources; thus, despite the forced relocation of between 10 to 20 million people during the period 1973-1976, the Tanzanian indigenous peoples' movement represents only around half a million rural people. In Botswana, Nyamanjoh [2007, cited in Trigger and Dalley, 2010, p. 51] describes how the more recently arriving Tswana majority have established their version of indigeneity over the more marginalised (and 'historically the most autochthonous') Basarwa people.

Examples such as these have led some commentators to conclude that such an unsubstantial concept as 'indigeneity' only serves to obstruct reality and can be manipulated by those in power and those with access to power.

## 3 ... Or a 'useful tool'?

Despite the lack of an empirical definition, however, there are grounds for suggesting that the concept still has utility in political and legal discourse.

In the legal sphere, Kingsbury [1998, p. 415] outlines the way in which a 'constructivist approach' can be used to view the concept of 'indigeneity' as embodying 'a continuous process in which claims and practices in numerous specific cases are abstracted in the wider institutions of international society, then made specific again at the moment of application in the political, legal and social processes of particular cases and societies'. Through the discourse of the emerging international indigenous movement, a

multitude of diverse groups that had been subject to discrimination within specific national contexts have been able to articulate shared experiences and mobilize themselves in a way that they had hitherto been unable to do (as has been demonstrated in Latin America with the Amerindian movement). This momentum has culminated in the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2002, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. Whilst the exact definition of 'indigenous people' may be fluid, even elusive, much more international attention is now focused on the way in which states, corporations, and NGOs engage with marginalised, rural peoples.

Politically, this means that channels have emerged (although, as outlined above, not universally) through which such subaltern peoples may pursue collective claims. As Robins [2003] points out, indigenous rights activists can deliberately employ the concept of 'indigeneity' as a rhetorical device in pursuit of political goals. He provides the example of the returning of land in and around Kalahari Gemsbok National Park in Southern Africa to members of the 'Khomani San community' that had been forcibly removed in the 1960s, the result of extensive NGO lobbying and media attention which relied heavily on the construction of the San as 'indigenous' and 'bushmen' [Gordon, 1999]. For Robins, this is an example of Gayatri Spivak's notion of 'strategic essentialism' in action [see Spivak and Rooney, 1997].

Li [2000], in her above-mentioned paper on indigenous identity in Indonesia, circumnavigates the question of 'essentialism' altogether. She draws on the work of Hall [1990] to argue that 'indigeneity' is not an essential identity, but a 'positioning'. By stressing the political nature of group formation, Li argues that indigenous identity need not be an empirically tangible and fixed quality, but rather a fluid concept, shaped by particular historical circumstances. Whilst also acknowledging the risks that stem from 'limiting the field' [Li, 2000, p. 151] of the world's poor to focus on those that use an indigenous rhetoric, she demonstrates in her study how such positioning can never the less benefit certain disadvantaged groups that employ the term.

Despite its limitations as an empirical descriptor, these examples illustrate the way in which indigeneity, as a political strategy, can be an effective tool in agitating for social justice and collective rights.

## 4 Reconciling science and politics.

Dove [2006] notes that the popular international interest in indigeneity in the 1970s and 1980s took place during a time when theoretical trends



in anthropology were moving in the opposite direction. Concepts such as 'tradition', 'ethnicity', and 'culture' – in many ways the product of earlier generations of scholars – were called into serious question: culture and ethnicity were not discrete realities but constructs; much 'tradition' was invented. 'Indigeneity' too, it was argued, was as much an analytical construction arising out of historical and political processes as any kind of intrinsic characteristic. However, as is frequently the case, there was a clear disjuncture between the theoretical zeitgeist within the social sciences, and the broader trends in societies themselves. As colonial regimes collapsed, people around the world were voicing new national identities, reasserting ethnic distinctions, rediscovering suppressed customs and traditions. Diverse aboriginal groups were awakening to a shared political identity, coming into view of a new, global narrative with which, for whatever reasons, they identified.

Lefebvre [1968] argued that, 'Since they have a starting point and a foothold in reality (in praxis), or rather, to the extent that they do, ideologies are not altogether false'. Kuper [2003, p. 400], worries that the 'business [of anthropology] should be to deliver accurate accounts of social processes'. However, by making the differentiation, as Barnard suggests, between indigeneity as a political, legal and ideological concept, as opposed to a demonstrable empirical category, it is possible for anthropologists to understand the utility of the term in the broader struggle for social justice. A response by Heinen [2003, p. 262] to Kuper's article is explicit on the point, saying that 'scientific investigation and political action should be clearly distinguished even when pursued successively by the same person'. Indeed, Kuper [2003, p. 266] himself tacitly recognises as much when he agrees, 'advocacy should not be confounded with ethnographic research or scientific argument'.

Whatever misgivings some anthropologists may have about the empirical validity of the concept of indigeneity, it is clear that it retains a currency outside the discipline. Whilst it is true that the concept can be exploited cynically and obscure more complicated realities with its idealised rhetoric, it can also harness global support toward local cases of exploitation by drawing on the common tropes of a grand international narrative. In this way, the concept of 'indigeneity' can be a useful tool for political persuasion and the establishment of legal norms. Barnard is right to suggest that the concept has utility even if one rejects it as an anthropological concept.

## 5 Conclusion

The concept of 'indigeneity', for better or worse, is not going anywhere anytime soon. In view of this, anthropologists need to continue to engage with the concept, both within their discipline as well as in the broader public sphere. To this extent, Kuper's paper was a timely and powerful contribution to the debate. However, if anthropologists wish to contribute their expertise in any meaningful way to a growing global movement aimed at achieving social justice for the disadvantaged, they will need to go beyond a negatively framed empirical position to recognise the fluid, polythetic, and highly political nature of contemporary indigenous identity. In doing so, they may recognise the utility that the concept can serve in the pursuit of positive rights.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>The title of this paper is taken from Stanner [1962]

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# Stroke – An Analysis of the Multifactorial Causation in Australia

*Sarah Latham*

Stroke is one of Australia's greatest killers, second only to coronary artery disease (CAD), accounting for 6% of all deaths and claiming 8,300 lives annually [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012]. Stroke is the clinical outcome of a pathological vascular event, either ischaemic or hemorrhagic in nature, which manifests as a focal or global neurological deficit [Kumar and Clark, 2009]. There have been significant improvements in cardiovascular health in Australia in the last 50 years with a consequent decline in the number of stroke-related deaths [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004, Penm, 2008]. However, for those affected, a disproportionate burden is carried by Australia's Indigenous people who experience stroke at an incidence rate 2.8 times higher than that of their non-Indigenous counterparts [Katzenellenbogen et al., 2011]. Furthermore, whilst the literature documents both the "traditional" biomedical and behavioural risk factors implicated in stroke risk, these factors alone, even with their heightened prevalence, cannot sufficiently explain the considerably higher levels of morbidity and mortality observed in Indigenous Australians [Penm, 2008]. I present a multifactorial model for stroke among Indigenous Australians to account for distal factors, particularly social and economic, as well as the more proximal traditional risk factors.

## Stroke

Cardiovascular disease, including cerebral, cardiac and peripheral vascular diseases, is Australia's number one health problem in terms of morbidity and mortality [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004]. Stroke causes 6% of all deaths annually, second only to coronary artery disease (16%) [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012]. Defined as "a syndrome of rapid-onset cerebral deficit, lasting >24 hours or leading to death, with no cause apparent other than a vascular one" [Kumar and Clark, 2009, p. 1126], stroke is the common clinical outcome of several different pathogenic processes. These processes can be classified as [Kumar and Clark, 2009, Penm, 2008]:

- Ischaemic stroke; principally due to an artery supplying blood to the brain becoming suddenly blocked.
- Haemorrhagic stroke; secondary to blood vessel rupture with subsequent bleeding into the brain tissue (intracranial or subarachnoid haemorrhage).

Age-standardised death rates have been falling since 1968 [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004, Burnley and Rintoul, 2002]. It is the contention of Jamrozik and colleagues that the decline in incidence rate, as opposed to case fatality, is chiefly due to an improvement in risk factor prevalence [Jamrozik et al., 1999]. However, despite improvement, recent evidence indicates the incidence rate ratio is 2.6 and 3.0 for Indigenous men and women relative to other Australians, respectively [Katzenellenbogen et al., 2011]. This increased risk is a consequence of distal socioeconomic, cultural and environmental factors, as well as the established "traditional" biomedical

and behavioural risk factors. Prevention of stroke is challenging as a consequence. Nevertheless, a clear understanding of all risk factors is essential in order for further risk factor modification and stroke prevention to occur [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004].

## Patterns of Disease

Recent times have seen significant improvements in Australian cardiovascular health as a consequence of both improvements in risk factor prevalence as well as advances in treatment [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004]. Even so, stroke remains a leading cause of mortality and loss of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), with the total burden expected to increase in parallel with Australia's aging population [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004].

Based on self-reports from the National Health Survey, an estimated 1.2% of the population will have a stroke at some point in their lives, with elderly Australians and females most frequently affected [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004]. However, with age-standardisation, the incidence rate is actually 32.2% greater in males, who interestingly, also tend to be affected at a younger age, are more likely to be hospitalised and are more likely to die from stroke [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004].

Indigenous peoples are 1.5 times more likely to be hospitalised and twice as likely to die from stroke as other Australians. The greatest disparities are seen in the younger age-categories, reflecting the difference in age-specific mortality rates [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004, Thrift and Hayman, 2007].

## Burden of Disease

In 2012, stroke was projected to be the sixth leading specific cause of disease, accounting for 4% of the total burden [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2010]. Premature death accounts for 70% of this burden, however for survivors, stroke is also associated with significant disability [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2010], with 76.6% of stroke victims reporting functional limitations in activities such as speaking, thinking, moving and communicating [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004]. So whilst stroke prevalence is close to only half that of CHD, those affected by stroke are approximately twice as likely to have ongoing disability [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2010].

Some populations are disproportionately affected by stroke due to socio-economic status, geographic location and Indigenous identification [Anderson, 2011]. Investigation of Indigenous stroke burden reveals DALYs are on average 3-fold that of non-Indigenous Australians [Katzenellenbogen et al., 2011]. This inequality is greatest in the 35-44 year old age group, for which the difference is 8-fold. Furthermore, these figures may underestimate the true picture given that the burden is often calculated using mortality and hospitalization data, and recording of Indigenous identification in hospital records is often lacking.

One hypothesis for the immense Indigenous burden involves looking beyond established risk factors. Well-established factors are likely to be amplified through variation in access and uptake of primary health care, reasons for which are likely to be associated with knowledge of the role of modern medicine, as well as financial, social, cultural and geographic barriers. These are potentially important factors that should be addressed as part of a preventative healthcare model to close the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous stroke morbidity and mortality.

## Stroke: “A Multifactorial Disease”—A comparison of Significant Risk Factors and Causality Between Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Australians

Stroke occurs as the result of biomedical and behavioural factors. As with many diseases, the more severe the risk factor, the greater the risk of disease. Furthermore, as the number of risk factors increases, so does the negative impact on health [Penm, 2008]. Indigenous Australians are 3.9 times more likely than non-Indigenous Australians to have five or more stroke risk factors and are less likely to have only one or two risk factors [Penm, 2008].

However, whilst the prevalence of behavioural and biomedical factors is indeed high amongst Indigenous Australians, this is unlikely to fully explain the increased burden among Indigenous Australians. Environmental and socioeconomic factors are also important [Penm, 2008]. The multifactorial model in Figure 1 illustrates the contributions of these proximal and distal factors and the reciprocal nature of their interactions in stroke's pathogenesis.

## Biomedical Risk Factors

Hypertension, hypercholesterolaemia, hyper-/dys-lipidaemia, diabetes, obesity, carotid stenosis, atrial fibrillation (AF) and certain haemo-biological markers such as a raised CRP are known risks for stroke [Kumar and Clark, 2009, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004, Penm, 2008, Feigin et al., 1994, Li et al., 2010, MacDonald et al., 2004, Maple-Brown et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2007]. More recent research has also proposed the role of additional factors in stroke aetiology, as is documented in Figure 1.

Hypertension is the most frequent and treatable risk factor [Kumar and Clark, 2009, Feigin et al., 1994] and is present in two thirds of patients [Bejot et al., 2009]. Self-reported prevalence among Indigenous Australians is up to five-fold that of non-Indigenous Australians [Leonard et al., 2002]. Indigenous Australians also experience obesity at a significantly higher rate [Leonard et al., 2002], and whilst the literature has not yet reached a consensus on the degree to which obesity contributes to stroke risk, the Framingham study has identified irrefutable links between obesity and other biomedical factors such as hypertension, hypercholesterolaemia and blood glucose levels as well as an independent link with stroke-mortality [Feigin et al., 1994].

Stroke is also associated with abnormalities in cholesterol and lipid profiles. Interestingly, raised cholesterol levels have been found to be a prevalent independent risk factor within the general Australian population [Bejot et al., 2009], whereas the Indigenous profile is characterized by raised levels of triglycerides and low levels of high density lipoproteins (HDL) [Leonard et al., 2002, O'Neal et al., 2008]. This difference may in part be associated with the heightened prevalence of diabetes in the Indigenous community, given that low HDL can be related to insulin resistance. It is also associated with obesity and inflammatory cytokines [O'Neal et al., 2008] demonstrating how individual risk factors exacerbate and potentiate others. Biomedical factors also interact with behavioural risk factors as is evidenced by the negative effect of risky alcohol consumption on

HDL-cholesterol [O'Neal et al., 2008]. This difference in lipid profile may prove significant in the explanation accounting for the variation in stroke prevalence.

Diabetes is another condition noted as an independent risk factor for stroke, with Indigenous Australians affected at a rate six times that of the general Australian population [Bejot et al., 2009]. Diabetes additionally assumes a compounding role through its potentiation of hypertension and dyslipidaemia [Leonard et al., 2002]. Furthermore, diabetes not only augments stroke risk in the affected individual, recent research points to the potent intergenerational effect of abnormal glucose tolerance in mothers as contributing to early onset obesity and diabetes in their children, leading to self-perpetuation of risk across the generations [Leonard et al., 2002].

Lastly, atrial fibrillation (AF) is likely to contribute to the increased stroke risk experienced by Indigenous Australians [Thrift et al., 2011]. Whilst, the exact prevalence of AF in Indigenous Australians is unclear, it would not be surprising if it were substantial, given the increased prevalence of its major causes, *i.e.* Ischaemic and Rheumatic Heart Disease [Bejot et al., 2009, Thrift et al., 2011].

However, in spite of the extensive list of biomedical risk factors and their well-documented heightened prevalence within the Indigenous community, these elements have not arisen in isolation and other factors must be examined.

### Behavioural Factors

Smoking [Kumar and Clark, 2009, Feigin et al., 1994], physical inactivity [Burnley and Rintoul, 2002, Leonard et al., 2002, Yau and Hankey, 2011], alcohol consumption [Kumar and Clark, 2009, Burnley and Rintoul, 2002] and a diet low in fruit and vegetables [Burnley and Rintoul, 2002, Feigin et al., 1994, Yau and Hankey, 2011] have all been identified as “health behaviours” associated with stroke risk. Given that these factors are involved both independently in stroke’s causal pathway as well as potentiating each other and biomedical factors, their part in the multifactorial model should not be overlooked.

Alcohol consumption and stroke follow a J-shaped dose-response relationship, whereby moderate consumption is associated with the lowest incidence of stroke and risky alcohol consumption increases stroke risk, as well as the likelihood of developing hypertension, hyperlipidaemia and obesity [Burnley and Rintoul, 2002]. Furthermore, although few Indigenous Australians drink alcohol, for those that do, comparatively, there is a much higher prevalence of consumption at harmful levels compared with non-Indigenous Australians (10.5%

v. 3.3%) [Burnley and Rintoul, 2002, Turrell and Mathers, 2000].

Smoking acts as another major risk with substantial evidence to support its role in stroke pathogenesis [Kumar and Clark, 2009, Feigin et al., 1994]. Cigarette smoking clearly demonstrates the interplay of behavioural and biomedical risk factors given that it is an important risk factor for carotid atherosclerosis [Feigin et al., 1994] as well as itself being exacerbated by a sedentary lifestyle [Turrell and Mathers, 2000]. Whilst there has been a reduction in smoking rates in the general population, the prevalence still remains significantly, *i.e.* 2.3-fold, higher in the Indigenous community [Leonard et al., 2002].

### Socioeconomic and Environmental Factors

Socioeconomic, environmental and cultural factors influence biomedical and behavioural factors and the reciprocity between these factors intensifies their relative contributions to risk.

Relative deprivation, as a result of low income, high unemployment and low educational attainment may reduce health status through effects on nutrition, housing and knowledge of behavioural risk factors. Turrell and Mathers [2000] contends that people of low socioeconomic status (SES) are more likely to engage in behaviours detrimental to their health, and that this is not only influenced by class but also by childhood and familial environments. This may partially explain how health differences are perpetuated across generations. Whilst these factors pertain to all Australians, the prevalence of these risk factors is exponentially greater in remote Aboriginal communities where overcrowding, poor infrastructure, high unemployment and low income are endemic [Turrell and Mathers, 2000].

The remote location of these communities reduces the availability of fresh food, leading to a diet high in processed carbohydrates. Whilst direct evidence is sparse, anecdotal evidence suggests the present rates of diabetes, cardiovascular diseases and obesity have evolved with the introduction of a “westernised” diet and lifestyle. As well as obesity, adults of low SES are also more likely to experience hypertension and pathological lipid profiles [Turrell and Mathers, 2000]. Furthermore, whilst low SES should not hinder access to health care given our nationalized health system [Turrell and Mathers, 2000], geographic isolation unquestionably plays a role in access to both primary and emergency health care in terms of distance, transport availability and ambulance response time [Burnley and Rintoul, 2002, Thrift and Hayman, 2007]. This is especially significant given that the 2006 Census reports 69%

of Indigenous Australians live in regional or remote areas [Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004].

Finally, the differences in cultural values may act as an additional barrier to Indigenous utilisation of Australia's 'Western'-model health system, given the differences in beliefs, language and identity that can impede the provision of culturally-sensitive health care.

## Conclusion

Significant progression in medical management and risk factor modification since the 1960s have been paralleled with a notable decline in Australia's stroke-related mortality and morbidity [Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004]. However certain groups, especially our Indigenous population, continue to experience a greater burden of ill health compared with their non-Indigenous counterparts. Due consideration of the multifactorial causation of stroke supports understanding of how the excess risk arises not only from biomedical and behavioural factors, but also geographic isolation and relative socioeconomic and educational disadvantage [Penm, 2008, Thrift et al., 2011]. However, a concerted effort to understand both the proximal factors, as well as the broader context in which Indigenous people live, can take Australia one step closer to combating the challenge posed by Indigenous stroke, and efforts can subsequently be directed towards effective prevention and management [Anderson, 2011].

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


Figure 1: A multifactorial model for the development of stroke, demonstrating the distal to proximal progressive interaction of risk factors as well as the elements reciprocity.



## Vivienne Westwood and Postmodern Couture: A Corrupter of Modernism and 'Good Taste'?

*Catherine Baxendale*

From the Victorian haute couture of Charles Worth to the space age collections of Pierre Cardin, fashion emerged as 'the embodiment of progress' in the modern era, giving material form to social and technological change [Pena, 2012]. Conversely, postmodernists regarded as illusory the association between fashion and progress in their projection of historicised and 'deconstructed' forms [Pena, 2012]. While the modern body was archetypal and unequivocally gendered, postmodern couture frequently embraced an androgynous and consciously atypical beauty. In the aftermath of a 2004 retrospective at London's Victoria & Albert Museum, an abundance of literature has emerged on Vivienne Westwood as a leading proponent of postmodern fashion. As Mark Ledbury posits, 'Postmodernism, with its emphasis on the ludic, the anti-hierarchical, the androgynous, on process, surface and the performative' [Ledbury, 2006, p. 3] directly underpinned Westwood's designs. The chief impetus for her work, she claims, is an 'irritation with orthodox ways of thinking and a certain perversity' [Golbin, 2001, p. 200]. As a quintessentially British designer acclaimed for her playful reappraisals of national dress, Westwood contributed to the postmodern dislocation of core and periphery in fashion during the 1970s and 80s, whereby Paris was challenged as the leading centre of design. This paper shall firstly examine Westwood's codification of punk in the 1970s as an affront to modernist sensibilities, before considering how Westwood's synthesis of contemporary and historical dress subverted modernist conceptions of linear history and traditional notions of class, British nationalism and gender. It shall then analyse Vivienne Westwood's employment of marketing techniques and the extent to which her commercial success as a designer of couture signifies a betrayal of her anarchist roots.

### Westwood's consumer punk

As 'the great priestess of punk' [Golbin, 2001, p. 200] during the late 1970s, Vivienne Westwood was at the forefront of a vicious attack on 'good taste' as dictated by the conservative modern establishment. By the mid 1970s, the radical social liberation movements of the 1960s had abated, and punk emerged in London and New York as a revolt against the 'stultifying cultural quietism' that ensued [Blake, 2012]. As Westwood explains, '[w]e were interested in rebellion – we felt that the hippie movement had waned, and we were never interested in their clothes' [Wilcox, 2004, p. 11]. Punk and the postmodern mode were intrinsically linked. [Price, 2012] since punk was a self-reflexive form of alienation from mainstream bourgeois culture that perverted social and sexual norms. Vivienne Westwood and Malcolm McLaren's establishment of SEX in 1974 and Seditionaries in 1976 on 430 Kings Road, Chelsea marked the commercialisation of sadomasochistic punk subculture [Museum, 2004]. Westwood's designs were aggressively 'distasteful'. At SEX, Westwood purveyed the accoutrements of sexual fetishism, designing restrictive bondage equipment of black rubber and heavy chains [Crane, Spring 1999, p. 64]. This undercurrent of sexual violence and perversity parodied the commodification of sex in mainstream culture [Blake, 2012]. Westwood's 'deconstructed' punk designs represented a corruption of modern consumerism, since finished products were literally

being ripped apart and their intended purpose subverted. Westwood's garments were intentionally slashed, torn and frayed, and '[s]afety pins were worn as gruesome ornaments through the cheek, ear or lip' [Steele, 1997, p. 287]. Westwood's use of materials was decidedly anti-hierarchical. Her employment of '“cheap” trashy fabrics', such as vinyl and lurex in 'vulgar designs', offered 'self-conscious commentaries on the notions of modernity and taste', since so many of the materials she appropriated had long been dismissed by the high fashion establishment as 'obsolete kitsch' [Steele, 1997, p. 287]. She created 'razor-slashed T-shirts' [Crane, Spring 1999, p. 66] emblazoned with anarchist or pornographic images and text, as in the 'Cambridge Rapist' and 'Paedophilia' designs [Wilcox, 2004, p. 12]. Westwood's 'Destroy' T-shirt for Seditionaries featured a deconstructed collage headed by the design's eponymous anarchist slogan [Wilcox, 2004, p. 15]. The inverted figure of Christ on the cross and a postage stamp depicting the Queen overlaid an enormous red swastika, evoking the irreverent lyrics of punk rock icons The Sex Pistols, of whom Malcolm McLaren was the manager: 'God save the Queen, the fascist regime' [Museum, 2004]. Westwood and McLaren were prosecuted for obscenity in 1975 for selling a T-shirt depicting a pair of trouserless cowboys which purportedly 'expos[ed] to public view an indecent exhibition' [Wilcox, 2004, p. 12]. Westwood declared, '[m]y job is always to confront the Establishment to try and find out where

freedom lies and what you can do: the most obvious way I did that was through the porn T-shirts' [Wilcox, 2004, p. 12]. Westwood's self-conscious destruction of clothing and the body in her punk designs conveyed 'derisive and nihilistic attitudes' toward mainstream modern culture [Crane, Spring 1999, p. 66].

### Dressing up the past

Vivienne Westwood's 'fashion historicism', which has dominated her designs from the late 1970s to the current era, is a synthesis of past and present conducive to parody of British nationalism, class and binary gender. In 1984 postmodern theorist Frederic Jameson contended that postmodern historical quotation represented a plundering of the past, 'a kind of deathly recycling of history which emptied it of meaning, rendering it bankrupt, good only for costume drama and fantasy' [Evans, 2007, p. 26]. Although it is questionable as to whether Westwood's collections render history devoid of meaning, Jameson's statements are nonetheless highly pertinent to the historical eclecticism of Westwood's designs. As Caroline Evans observes, 'Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s Westwood continued to lead bold and swashbuckling raids on the past, treating history and culture as a dressing-up box from which to recreate the self as a flamboyant and spectacular creature' [Evans, 2007, p. 22]. The terms 'plundering' and 'raiding' are inconsistent with the genuine reverence with which Westwood embraced traditional modes of dress, however. Her appropriation of traditional designs was not iconoclastic, Westwood maintaining, 'I am a great believer in copying – there has never been an age in which people have so little respect for the past' [Wilcox, 2004, p. 9]. Westwood's recycling of historical motifs was directly derived from serious study of traditional patterns and techniques. Westwood and McLaren's 'Pirate' collection of 1983, which was to earn her widespread acclaim in the mainstream fashion industry, was inspired by an eighteenth-century engraving of a pirate in the Victoria and Albert Museum [Museum, 2004]. Her 'pirate trouser' was an adaptation of a design for '18th-century men's breeches in the Museum's National Art Library' [Museum, 2004]. For Westwood, one had to appreciate to appropriate, and her historicism was literally 'woven into the fabric' [Wilcox, 2004, p. 9] of her clothes: 'When you look into the past, you start to see the standards of excellence, the good taste in the way things were done, put together, formed. By trying to copy technique, you build your own technique' [Wilcox, 2004, p. 9].

### Flaunting feminisms and genders

Westwood's appropriation of historical dress assigned new meaning to particular garments, as exemplified by her use of the corset, which featured prominently in the iconic 'Harris Tweed' collection of Autumn-Winter 1987–8. The 'Stature of Liberty' corset included in the collection was based on eighteenth-century designs, which elevated and flattened the bust [Wilcox, 2004, p. 21]. Presented as outerwear, the corset's traditional connotations were utterly reversed – a garment used to constrain and disguise a woman's body became a means of flaunting it. Westwood reclaimed the corset, long derided as an emblem of female oppression, such that it 'began to be reconceived as a symbol of female sexual empowerment' [Wilcox, 2004, p. 21]. A corset included in the 'Portrait' collection of Autumn-Winter 1991, featuring a photographic print of French Rococo painter Francois Boucher's Daphnis and Chloe (Shepherd watching a Shepherdess) of 1743–5, alluded to sexual voyeurism and exemplified Westwood's tendency to synthesise the styles of the past with the production techniques of the present. Westwood's historicism also provided a means of subverting interrelated traditions associated with gender, class, and the nation. Westwood's 'Voyage to Cythera' of 1989–90 was an exploration of androgyny, featuring female models in tailored ensembles inspired by the 'dandyism' of the early nineteenth-century aristocracy. One outfit featured a mustard Harris Tweed 'Savile' jacket with a black velvet collar over a white shirt and unfastened tie bearing the Westwood insignia. This accompanied a pair of beige Lycra leggings based on the 'pantaloon' of early 19th-century tailoring' [Wilcox, 2004, p. 110], which were adorned with a mirrored fig leaf design in the crotch. The fig leaf was an exercise in postmodern artifice, giving the impression of modesty but in fact drawing attention to the wearer's genitalia [Barnard, 1996, p. 53]. The get-up was intended, Westwood claims, 'to look like a girl dressed like a man with no trousers on' [Wilcox, 2004, p. 100]. In 'Harris Tweed' and 'Anglomania' (1993–4) Westwood presented a 'gentle parody' of the grand narrative of British nationalism [Museum, 2004]. In both collections, Westwood employed traditional British tailoring techniques to create suits and 'mini-kilts' in the nationally distinctive fabrics of tartan and tweed [Museum, 2004]. The centrepiece of 'Harris Tweed', a faux-fur ermine cape and tweed crown [Wilcox, 2004, p. 100], made a mild mockery of the British monarchy, suggestive of the contrived nature of the institution's pomp and ceremony. As Rebecca Arnold maintains,

Westwood deliberately represented the British nation through its aristocracy, yet simultaneously refuted the concept of a natural hierarchy by asserting that social status could be artificially constructed through dress [Arnold, 2002, p. 161]. As Westwood proclaimed, the 'English aristocracy is only the middle-class with knobs on' [Arnold, 2002, p. 161]. Westwood's exploration of gender, class and the British nation in appropriating historical modes of dress conspicuously disrupted modernist conceptions of linear history.

### Marketing strategies for the postmodern media

Vivienne Westwood's 'progression' from a vanguard of punk subculture to the doyenne of the British fashion industry necessitated her exploitation of diverse marketing strategies to forge a distinctive image of her brand in a media saturated postmodern age. Malcolm McLaren and Vivienne Westwood's establishment of SEX and Seditionaries represented the commodification of subcultural styles 'into retail products', marking the collapse of 'the old model which divided the pure subculture from the contaminated outside world' [McRobbie, 1994, p. 156]. Westwood's codification of punk in the late 1970s represented 'the practice of the "trickle-up" theory in fashion', which evidenced 'a rejection of authority in the fashion establishment' [Pena, 2012]: the street influenced the catwalk, and not the converse. Fashion blogger Ag wrote on *Eat French Bread* in 2007 that Westwood permanently altered an established pattern of design inspiration in favour of a thoroughly postmodern outlook: 'The new generations have seen any clear definitive style is too easily reduced to cartoon copies and appropriated by the mainstream, so they pastiche dead styles, and ideas, to create something that refuses meaning and categorisation' [Sheridan, 2010, p. 120]. SEX and Seditionaries were a very effective means of publicising Westwood's designs, placing her work out on the street and in close proximity to potential customers and investors. Such was their success that the stores facilitated the formation of a distinctive social milieu, since they 'functioned also as meeting places where the customers and those behind the counter got to know each other and met up later in the pubs and clubs.' [Stanfill, 2002, p. 339] Michael and Gerlinde Costiff, devoted customers of Westwood from the outset of her career, played an important marketing role in hosting parties that attracted a specific 'set' of flamboyant trendsetters that came to idolise Westwood. In 1989 the Costiffs founded 'Kinky Gerlinky', a series of 'monthly London club nights' involving highly ostentatious costume parties in

which Westwood's designs stole the show [Stanfill, 2002, p. 341].

Vivienne Westwood's foray into high fashion was also dependent upon favourable commentary in the fashion media. According to Jayne Sheridan, '[i]t was the Pirate collection that, by being seen in Fashion magazines, attracted buyers' [Sheridan, 2010, p. 119]. Writing in *The Face*, fashion critic Jon Savage approved of the 'Pirate' collection's subversive qualities: 'The clothes are superb: inverting style codes in a way that's both subtle and shocking' [Sheridan, 2010, p. 119]. Sheridan maintains that 'Pirates' was a veritable turning point in Westwood's career, earning her admiration from the formidable Grace Coddington of *British Vogue*: 'the Fashion world had up until then regarded Westwood as a subversive shop-owner rather than a serious designer' [Sheridan, 2010, p. 119].

As an established fashion designer, Westwood continually upped her international profile and the accessibility of her brand through collaboration with major designers in and out of the fashion industry. She released a brand of cosmetics in association with She Uemura, created a homeware range for Wedgwood and designed an 'orb' watch in 1992 for Swatch [Wilcox, 2004, p. 32]. The release of Vivienne Westwood fragrances *Boudoir* (1998) and *Libertine* (2000) demonstrated the diversification of her brand [Wilcox, 2004, p. 32]. Vivienne Westwood is currently in collaboration with denim label Lee and Brazilian footwear brand Melissa, offering affordable prêt-à-porter designs available from online fashion outlet and social media site ASOS [2012].

Westwood's induction into the fashion establishment culminated in her receipt of an Order of the British Empire in 1992 and the title of Dame Commander in 2006 for her outstanding contribution to British fashion [Stanfill, 2002, p. 339]. Her acceptance of these accolades, however, has caused many to question whether she has remained faithful to the seminal principles that informed her anarchistic punk designs at the outset of her career. Her more vehement critics regard her as an opportunistic chameleon – 'a publicity manipulator who uses controversy to build a Fashion empire' [Sheridan, 2010, p. 135]. Malcolm Barnard argues that Westwood critically undermined the integrity of punk style, making attainable 'a ready-made version of punk rebellion' [Barnard, 1996, p. 138]. Westwood's creation of a standard image of punk, he contends, predicated its appropriation by the dominant classes, such that 'what started as a challenge to that system is rendered harmless to them' [Barnard, 1996, p. 138]. However, Jayne Sheridan convincingly dismisses

this charge, claiming that without Westwood and McLaren 'the distinctive style and what it stood for would not have been unified and remembered' [Sheridan, 2010, p. 121]. Westwood's commercial success and acceptance by the mainstream fashion industry arguably does not compromise the integrity of her initial designs. Rather than a 'sell-out', Westwood may be seen to exemplify a quintessentially postmodern form of rebellion: her entry into the establishment presented a means of challenging its conventions.

## Conclusion

Postmodernism has continually informed Westwood's designs. Her early experiments with the subcultures of punk and sexual fetishism were deliberately confrontational, threatening established notions of social and sexual propriety. Westwood's pastiche of historical dress was used to interrogate accepted norms surrounding gender, status and nationalism. The promotion, diversification and increased attainability (whether actual or apparent) of her brand has established Vivienne Westwood as a leading exponent of the postmodern while ensuring her continued recognition by the mainstream fashion industry.

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# Japan's 'Hairy Aborigines': Changing Western Conceptions of the Ainu Race in the Japanese Colonial Context

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Between the sixteenth and early twentieth centuries, European and American observers came to classify the Ainu, the indigenous inhabitants of Hokkaido and surrounding islands in northern Japan, as members of a hairy 'white' race, naturally meek, primitive, and distinct from the other inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago. This article analyses historically-mutable foreign conceptions of the Ainu 'race', as recorded in period anthropological studies and travel accounts, within the context of growing Japanese dominance over the northern periphery. Perceptions of 'physical' Ainu traits, such as relative hairiness, strength and stature changed as a result of Japanese colonial policies. Understandings of Ainu 'whiteness' and supposed ancestral linkages with European peoples were formulated in response to Tokugawa-era enforcement of Ainu distinction and Meiji-era assertions of Ainu difference, alongside increasing classification of the Japanese as 'Asiatic' peoples. Finally, conceptions of the Ainu as a naturally primitive, sedentary, stone-age hunter-gatherer people were a direct result of Japanese colonial policies discouraging Ainu agricultural practices, maritime activities and metal-working industries.

The Ainu, a people indigenous to Hokkaido and surrounding islands [Walker, 2001, p. 5], represented an enigma for the European and American travellers, anthropologists and racial scientists that came into contact with them between the sixteenth and early twentieth centuries [Fitzhugh, 1999, p. 13]. To account for these people, seemingly distinct from their southern Japanese neighbours, foreign observers developed a series of competing and conflicting notions of Ainu racial identity throughout this period [Fitzhugh, 1999, p. 17]. Through drawing on previous historical analysis, period anthropological works and travel accounts, this article seeks to demonstrate the historical mutability of comparisons and characteristics that Europeans and Americans deemed signifiers of Ainu 'race', thereby accounting for transformations in perceptions of the Ainu over time. This article aims to analyse these changing understandings of Ainu 'race' through contextualising them within alterations in Japanese-Ainu relationships, power dynamics and hierarchies associated with Japan's colonisation of the northern frontier, demonstrating the historical transformation of supposedly biological markers of Ainu distinction including hairiness, stature and constitution, the development of a 'Caucasoid' origin theory to account for a perceived Ainu whiteness, and the formation of a distinct Ainu material culture, deemed naturally primitive by foreign observers.

## 1 The Historical Mutability of 'Physical' Traits of Ainu Difference

Some observed physical distinctions between the Ainu and Japanese 'races' were exacerbated by historical processes, particularly the notion of 'Ainu' hairiness. Early Western descriptions of the

Ainu, such as the sixteenth century accounts of the Jesuit missionaries Paul of the Faith [Kreiner, 1999, p. 125] and Louis Frois [von Seibold, 1895, p. 98] emphasised the extraordinary hairiness of these people, with their long beards and moustaches [Kreiner, 1993, p. 14]. Later foreign observers similarly determined excessive hairiness to be a distinctly Ainu trait [Majewicz, 1993, p. 130]. Ainu hair was frequently typified as thick [Starr, 1904, p. 108] and unkempt [Lyman, 1875, p. 339], and most onlookers considered it a defining characteristic of Ainu race [Hitchcock, 1892, p. 440]. The American anthropologist Frederick Starr, upon travelling to Hokkaido in 1904 to 'secure a group' of Ainu to perform at the 1904 Saint Louis Exposition, even asserted that the Ainu were 'probably the hairiest people on the globe' [Starr, 1904, p. 109]. Relative hairiness was understood as a means of biologically distinguishing 'Ainu' people from the apparently less hairy Japanese [Hitchcock, 1892, p. 450]. Foreign observers typified Ainu people by their ostensible hairiness.

While there may well have been some genetic differences between Ainu and Japanese populations, this stark dichotomy between hairy Ainu and smooth-skinned, clean-shaven Japanese was also exacerbated by Tokugawa-era (1603–1867) policies promulgated by the rulers of Matsumae domain in southern Hokkaido. Following Tokugawa Ieyasu's 1600 victory at the Battle of Sekigahara, and the subsequent establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate [Walker, 2001, p. 36], the domain lands of the Matsumae clan were incorporated into the expanding Tokugawa realm as vassal territories [Kikuchi, 1999, p. 78]. The Matsumae Lord was granted the title of 'Great King' of *Ezo* (Hokkaido) [Walker, 2001, p. 41], and the clan was given sole

responsibility over the new regime's contact and trade with the Ainu people [Howell, 1994, p. 85]. This Shogunate-sponsored monopoly, awarded in 1603 [Siddle, 1999, p. 69], became the basis for much of the domain's economy [Walker, 2001, p. 37]. The Matsumae lords also derived their legitimacy as domain rulers within the Tokugawa realm from their status as an intermediary between the Shogunate regime and the natives of *Ezo* [Hudson, 1999, p. 231]. Matsumae wealth and authority was therefore entirely predicated upon the existence of the Ainu as a distinct people, culminating in a policy of preventing Ainu assimilation and emphasising Ainu ethnic distinction [Howell, 1994, p. 85]. Enforced physical differentiation formed an integral part of these measures, including controls on Ainu hairstyles. Alongside provisions forbidding Ainu people from wearing 'Japanese-style' sandals and hats [Walker, 1999, p. 124], regulations declared that Ainu hair was to be kept long and unkempt, in order to differentiate the native people from Japanese peasants [Howell, 1994, p. 89]. Japanese fishermen and farmers in the region were also required to emulate approved 'Japanese' hairstyles and prohibited from wearing Ainu clothing [Hudson, 1999, p. 231]. The long, unkempt hair foreign observers considered distinctly Ainu, particularly when compared to 'Japanese' traits, was as much a result of ruling policy as underlying biology.

There were also significant transformations in accounts of Ainu physical strength and stature as a result of changing power dynamics amongst the Ainu and the Japanese. Sixteenth century Jesuit accounts of the Ainu, drawn from Japanese sources [Kreiner, 1993, p. 14], described them as a large people, strong and warlike. Paul of the Faith commented on their large build and martial prowess [Kreiner, 1999, p. 125], and Louis Frois marvelled at the strong constitution of a people 'bold in war, and much feared by the Japanese' [von Seibold, 1895, p. 98]. Following his 1618 visit to Hokkaido, Father Girolamo de Angelis similarly described the Ainu as stout, strong and taller than the Japanese [Kreiner, 1993, p. 16]. These accounts of Ainu strength and military prowess are evidently a product of a time when the Japanese presence in Hokkaido was relatively light, and there was ongoing armed conflict between the two peoples [Siddle, 1999, p.68]. Japanese dominance in Hokkaido was not yet assured, with outposts constantly under threat and an Ainu force led by the chief Koshamain almost driving the Japanese from the island in 1457 [Siddle, 1999, p.68]. Following Koshamain's War, periodic conflict and skirmishes continued until the culmination of Shakushain's War in 1669 [Roth, 2005, p. 80],

a final attempt to overcome 'Matsumae's trade monopoly and increasingly unfair exchange rates' [Walker, 2001, p. 51]. With the defeat of the Ainu forces and the assassination of chief Shakushain, the Matsumae were able to exert greater control over the previously autonomous inhabitants of central Hokkaido, leading to greater Japanese dominance in the region [Siddle, 1999, p. 70]. Early foreign accounts of the Ainu as a strong and warlike race reflected their ongoing conflict with the Japanese prior to Shakushain's War.

Later nineteenth and twentieth century descriptions of Ainu strength, constitution and stature were, however, markedly different from early accounts, emphasising Ainu shortness and an apparently passive, yielding nature. Previous notions of Ainu tallness [Kreiner, 1993, p. 16] were replaced with understandings of the Ainu as quite short [Lyman, 1875, p. 390], despite acknowledgement of regional variations [Starr, 1904, p. 107]. While still recognised as a physically strong people [Starr, 1904, p. 75], with robust constitutions and great powers of endurance [Hitchcock, 1892, p. 440], the Ainu were more typically presented as porters instead of warriors, with American geologist Benjamin Lyman, who undertook a geological survey of Hokkaido from 1874-1876 as an employee of the *Kaitakushi* (Hokkaido Development Agency, an office established in 1869 by the modernising Meiji government to develop the northern periphery after the overthrowing of the Tokugawa regime and the 'restoration' of the Meiji Emperor in 1868) [Irish, 2009, p. 149], commenting on the use of sizeable groups of Ainu men to carry supplies [Lyman, 1875, p. 345]. Images of the Ainu as a race of fierce fighters [Kreiner, 1999, p. 125] were superseded by perceptions of the Ainu as a gentle [Greedy, 1884, p. V], peaceful people [Starr, 1904, p. 52] in need of Japanese protection from outsiders [Greedy, 1884, p. 22]. Nineteenth and twentieth century observers even considered the Ainu so 'naturally' passive and yielding that previous accounts of Ainu martial prowess had been imagined or exaggerated [Starr, 1904, p.74]. New conceptions of Ainu vulnerability and submissiveness stemmed directly from the Japanese colonial context. With the effective subduing of Ainu resistance after Shakushain's War [Siddle, 1999, p. 70], and the continual expansion of Japanese presence and influence [Walker, 2001, p. 74], the Ainu were considered weak, due to their dependent status [Greedy, 1884, p. 22] and inability to prevent the Japanese colonisation of Hokkaido [Starr, 1904, p. 52]. Similarly, the perception of Ainu men as labourers stemmed from a gradual incorporation of Ainu people into large-scale Hokkaido industries,

particularly Japanese-managed fisheries [Howell, 1999, p. 98], often as forced labour [Morris-Suzuki, 1998, p. 13], and the utilisation of Ainu porters on expeditions sponsored by the *Kaitakushi* [Lyman, 1875, p. 345]. Foreign conceptions of natural Ainu strength, constitution and martial ability were significantly shaped by alterations in local power dynamics, with previously strong and warlike Ainu people newly considered weak and yielding after the consolidation of Japanese colonial dominance.

## 2 Changing Understandings of Ainu Whiteness and 'Caucasoid' Origins

Over time, most foreign observers gradually conceived of the Ainu as an ancient white race, sharing a common ancestry with the peoples of Europe. Changing perceptions of the meaning of Ainu 'whiteness' were a significant factor in the development of this consensus. The earliest foreign account of the Ainu, written by Jesuit missionary Paul of the Faith, described them as a 'white people' [Kreiner, 1999, p. 125], as did the seventeenth century reports of Father Girolamo de Angelis [Kreiner, 1993, p. 16] and the trader John Saris, a representative of the British East India Company that visited the Tokugawa court in 1613 [von Seibold, 1895, p. 101]. Dutch explorer Maerten Vries contrasted this whiteness to the 'yellow skin' of other peoples he had come into contact with during his 1643 expedition to explore the Sea of Okhotsk and the Northeast of Japan [von Seibold, 1895, p. 105]. These distinctions in colour did not, however, discretely distinguish the Ainu from the Japanese, nor lead to an identification of the Ainu as distant relatives of European peoples. Vries also described an old Japanese man living amongst the Ainu as white, and commented that fairer skin was a sign of old age or higher class, particularly amongst women [von Seibold, 1895, p. 106]. Therefore, while many of the Ainu people encountered by Europeans were individually identified as white [Kreiner, 1993, p. 16], distinctions of colour were considered significant indicators of factors such as age, class and sex, and not necessarily a sign of racial difference. Early observers did not consider the apparent whiteness of Ainu peoples to be a sign of commonality with Europeans, or distinction from the Japanese.

Later visitors began to perceive differences in colour between the Ainu and the Japanese. While the Ainu were still generally seen as white [Starr, 1904, p. 108], the Japanese gradually began to be described as yellow [Lyman, 1875, p. 394] or Asiatic [Starr, 1904, p. 108]. The Ainu were now understood as being quite distinct from the Japanese in terms of physical characteristics

[Tamura, 1999, p. 57]. Alongside growing emphasis of the differences between the Ainu and the Japanese, European observers began to observe commonalities between the Ainu and themselves. The Ainu were said to share a likeness with Russian peasants [Majewicz, 1993, p. 29], and American anthropologist Frederick Starr asserted that the Ainu resembled the 'whites of the European race' [Starr, 1904, p. 108]. With Japanese people increasingly identified as Asiatic, later observers began to view the Ainu as distinctly white, sharing some similarities with the peoples of Europe. Changing perceptions of Ainu whiteness as an indicator of race and heritage were intimately linked to developing conceptions of the Japanese as an Asiatic people.

With apparent similarities between the Ainu and European peoples, foreign racial scientists and anthropologists began to search for a common ancestry between the two peoples. This hunt for common origins, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century [Kotani, 1999, p. 137], was conducted within the context of the gradual professionalisation of anthropology, particularly archaeology and physical anthropology [Wilkinson, 1993, p. 158], coupled with a lingering romantic fascination with the apparently white inhabitants of an isolated island in the Far East [Kreiner, 1993, p. 36]. Moving beyond cursory observations of the physical similarities between the Ainu and Europeans [Tamura, 1999, p. 57], seemingly rigorous and scientific investigations such as examinations of Ainu skeletal structures [Hitchcock, 1892, p. 440], suggested linguistic relationships between Ainu and 'Aryan' or Indo-European languages [Tamura, 1999, p. 61], and supposed similarities between Ainu *yukara* epics and Norwegian folk-songs [Kreiner, 1993, p. 36] were taken as evidence of a common ancestry. The Ainu gradually came to be perceived as the last remnant of an ancient 'Caucasian-like' people [Arutinov, 1999, p. 29], previously widespread across the Asian continent [Starr, 1904, p. 110], before being surrounded [Kotani, 1999, p. 137] and subsumed by later Mongoloid, or Asiatic, migrations [Arutinov, 1999, p. 29]. The Ainu represented one of the 'most ancient of all white races' [Pilsudski, 1912, p. V], sharing a common ancestor with the peoples of Europe [Wilkinson, 1993, p. 158]. This theory was popular up until the mid-twentieth Century, even though much of the evidence for the 'Caucasoid' origins of the Ainu was problematic [Ishida, 1999, p. 53]. Linguistic commonalities were overstated [Tamura, 1999, p. 61], and much of the theory was still based primarily on the apparently 'Aryan' or 'Caucasian' appearance of the Ainu and their difference from surrounding 'Mongoloid'

populations [Fitzhugh, 1999, p. 14]. Though some observers, such as linguist Basil Hall Chamberlain (a professor at the Tokyo Imperial University from 1886-1912), pointed out the flaws in this theory [Chamberlain, 1887, p. 11], and alternative theories suggesting the Ainu people were in fact the ancient Mongoloid [Hitchcock, 1892, p. 450] ancestors of the modern Japanese [Kreiner, 1999, p. 127], or perhaps ‘Australoid’ peoples [Ishida, 1999, p. 52] sharing ancestry with the populations of Oceania [Lyman, 1875, p. 394], the theory of Ainu Caucasoid origins remained dominant [Arutinov, 1999, p. 29]. In order to account for the apparent colour distinctions between the Ainu and Japanese peoples, nineteenth and twentieth century European anthropologists and racial scientists generally came to rationalise Ainu whiteness through the development of a theory of ancestral commonality with the peoples of Europe.

Local contextual factors and interactions with Japanese scholarship also impacted on this reification of Ainu whiteness and differentiation from ‘Japanese’ identity. As previously stated, sumptuary and superficial distinctions between the Ainu and Japanese peoples such as clothing [Walker, 1999, p. 124] and hairstyles [Howell, 1994, p. 89] were strictly enforced in the northern domains [Hudson, 1999, p. 231] for most of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, exacerbating Ainu physical difference [Howell, 1994, p. 85]. Similarly, official attempts to discourage Ainu people from using the Japanese language [Morris-Suzuki, 1998, p. 23] prior to the eventual enacting of the assimilationist 1899 Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act [Siddle, 1999, p. 72], which forced Ainu children to attend classes taught in Japanese (alongside other assimilation strategies) [Irish, 2009, p. 200] meant that linguistic differences were more evident to foreign observers. In the 19th and Early 20th Centuries, Japanese researchers also began to study the Ainu [Nobayashi, 2003, p. 144], often supporting the findings of their European colleagues by emphasising Ainu distinction. Japanese commentators such as historian and literary theorist Shiratori Kurakichi, a professor at Tokyo Imperial University from 1904–1925, tended to echo European assertions of the uniqueness of the Ainu language, particularly in comparison to the languages spoken by the surrounding peoples [Tamura, 1999, p. 62], thereby crediting assertions of Ainu linguistic distinction. Claims that the Ainu shared an ancestral relationship with the peoples of Europe were to some extent validated by Japanese declarations of Ainu difference. Period commentators such as author and playwright Edward Greey [Greey, 1884, p. 23] and anthropologist Frederick Starr observed that

the Japanese were fearful of foreigners believing that the Ainu were their ancestors, or that ‘the Japanese culture [had] come out of the Ainu’ [Starr, 1904, p. 98]. In the midst of the formalisation of the modern Meiji nation-state and determined to achieve *bunmei* status (‘civilisation’) [Morris-Suzuki, 1998, p. 24], the modernising Japanese were loath to be associated with the seemingly ‘primitive’ barbarian inhabitants [Kikuchi, 2004, p. 157] of the rough, wild northern island [Houchins, 1999, p. 149] they were in the process of taming [Siddle, 1999, p. 72]. Remnants of enforced Tokugawa-era physical and linguistic difference and Meiji-era (1868–1912) denials of connections between the ‘civilised’ Japanese and the ‘primitive’ Ainu served to exacerbate and validate European understandings of the Ainu as a people separate from the Japanese.

### 3 Coming to See the Ainu as a ‘Naturally’ Primitive People

Over the course of European contact with the Ainu, Hokkaido’s native people were increasingly understood as a naturally primitive people. Early accounts of the Ainu did not necessarily typify them as uncivilised. Though primarily deriving their subsistence from hunting and fishing [von Seibold, 1895, p. 100], the Ainu were also recognised as practising agriculture [Kreiner, 1993, p. 23]. There were also accounts of Ainu involvement in a relatively extensive maritime trade network [Sasaki, 1999, p. 87]: in 1618, Father Girolamo de Angelis noted that the Ainu traded with the populations of neighbouring islands [von Seibold, 1895, p. 100], and in 1643, the explorer Maerten Vries commented on the Ainu possession of goods originally acquired from the peoples of the Amur Basin, Sakhalin and Manchuria, as well as the Japanese [von Seibold, 1895, p. 121]. Vries also described the Ainu as a relatively ‘civilised and educated people’ [Kreiner, 1993, p. 17]. The Ainu were not identified as particularly primitive or uncivilised by those they came into contact with during early periods of European exploration.

Nineteenth and twentieth century observers, however, reified the Ainu as a naturally primitive people, incapable of civilisation and advancement. American anthropologist Romyn Hitchcock, a curator at the Smithsonian Institute in the 1880–1890s, portrayed the Ainu as having refused to advance beyond the Stone Age, despite a century of contact with the civilising Japanese [Hitchcock, 1892, p. 433], instead remaining ‘barely a step above savagery’ [Houchins, 1999, p. 153]. Incapable of further civilisation [Chamberlain, 1887, p. 1], the Ainu lived as semi-nomadic hunters and fishermen [Pilsudski, 1912, p. V],



remaining as a modern example of a very ancient stage of human civilisation [Kreiner, 1999, p. 126]. The Ainu were now deemed to lack any understanding of agriculture [Lyman, 1875, p. 387], and unable to overcome the powers of nature [Pilsudski, 1912, p. XI]. While foreign observers including the geologist Benjamin Lyman [Lyman, 1875, p. 480], the anthropologist Frederick Starr [Starr, 1904, p. 75] and the author Edward Greey [Greey, 1884, p. 44] applauded Japanese attempts to 'civilise' the Ainu, and supported the incorporation of Ainu labourers into farming and fishing industries [Pilsudski, 1912, p. v], many considered Ainu advancement to be ultimately unachievable [Hitchcock, 1892, p. 432]. The Ainu were understood as a sedentary people, having been isolated in Hokkaido for over a thousand years before the arrival of the Japanese [Starr, 1904, p. 3]. Even when evidence of previously extensive maritime trade routes was presented to Starr in the form of beads originating from Manchuria [Sasaki, 1999, p. 87], he assumed that these goods had simply been obtained from Japanese merchants [Starr, 1904, p. 36]. Later anthropologists began to conceptualise the Ainu as a naturally uncivilised people, incapable of progress, even when presented with contrary evidence.

The relative primitiveness of nineteenth and twentieth century Ainu hunter-gatherer material culture used to confirm this 'naturally' uncivilised status was, however, a relatively recent result of local colonial processes. The apparent 'Stone Age' technology of the Ainu, and their reliance on Japanese trade for metal goods [Hitchcock, 1892, p. 433] was a direct result of Matsumae regulations developed in the aftermath of Shakushain's War. An embryonic iron-working industry had operated amongst the early Ainu [Morris-Suzuki, 1998, p. 30], with blacksmiths skilled enough to rework and improve poor quality imports [Fukasawa, 1998, p. 19] practising widely in Hokkaido [Morris-Suzuki, 1998, p. 30]. However, following Shakushain's 1669 revolt, iron weapons and tools were confiscated by Matsumae domain officials, and the sale of iron products to Ainu people was prohibited in an effort to prevent future armed opposition [Fukasawa, 1998, p. 19]. While these restrictions were eventually relaxed, the Ainu metalworking industry sharply declined [Fukasawa, 1998, p. 19], before disappearing completely alongside the later ubiquity of Japanese imports [Morris-Suzuki, 1998, p. 30], accounting for the Ainu people's 'Stone Age' technology. Similar processes resulted in a gradual abandonment of agriculture amongst the Ainu. Though early visitors reported Ainu people growing crops [Kreiner, 1993, p. 23], later Ainu peoples came to rely on hunting, gathering and trade with the

Japanese for subsistence [Howell, 1994, p. 77]. Ainu agriculture deteriorated throughout the Tokugawa period, as cultivation was forcefully opposed by Japanese merchants and Matsumae administrators [Morris-Suzuki, 1998, p. 30]. The sale of farming implements [Fukasawa, 1998, p. 13] and seeds to Ainu people was prohibited [Morris-Suzuki, 1998, p. 18]. If discovered farming, Ainu were fined, and their crops confiscated [Fukasawa, 1998, p. 12]. Active restriction of Ainu agriculture served to ensure both the availability of Ainu labour for the lucrative fishing industry [Walker, 2001, p. 76] and the maintenance of a profitable market for Japanese rice and sake [Walker, 2001, p. 86]. Matsumae control also led to the decline of the Ainu maritime trade. Though Ainu trade networks were initially quite broad, with groups interacting with Manchurian peoples, Siberian peoples and other neighbouring populations [Howell, 2008, p. 130], the Matsumae clan increasingly began to dominate Ainu access to outside trade after being granted a monopoly over Ainu trade in 1603 [Walker, 2001, p. 37]. With the gradual infiltration of Japanese trading posts into Ainu lands, contact with other parties was discouraged [Siddle, 1999, p. 70], making later Ainu appear more sedentary than their seafaring ancestors. Aspects of Meiji era Ainu material culture that contributed to their conceptualisation as an ancient, primitive race were historically constructed within the context of Matsumae suzerainty.

#### 4 Conclusion

European and American conceptualisations of Ainu race between early contact and the twentieth century were evidently mutable, shaped by alterations within a continually changing Japanese colonial framework, which was in turn influenced by shifting international relations. Supposed physical traits used to typify the Ainu race, such as hairiness, were as much constructed in the context of early Japanese suzerainty, and later sovereignty, as biologically determined. Similarly, with growing Japanese domination over Hokkaido, the previously strong and warlike Ainu race came to be seen as a weak and yielding people in need of protection. Notions of Ainu whiteness as demonstrative of racial distinction were formulated alongside comparisons with the Japanese, increasingly identified as 'Asiatic'. Newly recognised as characteristically white, the Ainu people were conceived of as an ancient white race, sharing a common ancestry with their fellow European Caucasoids. These conceptions of Ainu whiteness were exacerbated by enforced Ainu physical and cultural distinction throughout the Tokugawa era and validated by Japanese

scholarly assertions of Ainu difference. Finally, though nineteenth and twentieth century observers considered the Ainu to be a naturally primitive people, incapable of civilisation, the seemingly rudimentary form of Meiji era Ainu culture had been shaped by colonial discouragement of Ainu agriculture, maritime trade and metalworking, transforming them into a sedentary society of hunter-gatherers. Changing conceptions of Ainu race were significantly influenced by transformations in Ainu culture, enforced physical distinction and constant comparisons with the Japanese in the context of increasing colonial dominance.

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# Does Social Analysis Change the Discourse of Development?

## Some Thoughts on Practice in Development Institutions

*Susanna Price*

Statements that encompass notions of ‘people first’ or ‘people at the centre’ have resonated with objectives that increasingly reflect aspirations for sustainable poverty reduction and social development for the developing world, such as the Millennium Development Goals. What does this mean for development practice as revealed in influential financial institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) which provide investment loans, credits and grants in a range of sectors aimed at creating physical and social infrastructure? Before 1970, such development investments proceeded without strategies for social analysis in countries that lacked the mechanisms to regulate the social risks and impacts. Not surprisingly, many investments failed. Pioneering social researchers formulated a ‘text’ within key development institutions – an evolving composite of policies, methods and procedures setting out the objectives, content and method for participative social analysis in the institutional framework. Contending that most investments need socio-cultural understanding and engagement for their success and sustainability, they set social analysis alongside economic, financial and environmental analysis as a requirement in planning developments. Defining development ‘discourse’ as fields of knowledge, statements, and development practice, I contend that, whilst the social ‘text’ has achieved a range of positive outcomes, including international recognition among governments, the private sector and civil society, it has contributed more conclusively to changing development statements than to changing development practice – the ‘text’ more than the ‘effect’. This issue is pertinent in the context of Australia’s intention to strengthen its policy and funding engagement with multilateral organisations over the next four years and to ensure it is getting value for money and results from this growing engagement [AusAID, 2012b].

### 1 Social ‘Factors’: A Problematic Category

For the World Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) ‘investments’ comprise loans, credits and grants in a wide range of sectors.<sup>1</sup> Before 1970 ‘social factors’ were rarely addressed directly in planning such development investments. Conceptualised merely as ‘the residual, inexplicable, or problematic aspects of development’,<sup>2</sup> they were invoked, alongside ‘human factors’ to explain why development investments failed [Apthorpe, 1970].

With the shift from linear concepts of development ‘take-off’ to notions of redistribution with growth in the 1970s came a new awareness of the importance of people. Pioneering social researchers drew upon detailed case studies of the social costs of ‘socially-blind’ investments. They joined development institutions from the 1970s onwards to create disciplinary space and to formulate policies, tools and methods for addressing social issues with the participation of stakeholders. Their aims, broadly expressed, were to recognise the social processes inherent in development investments; to anticipate social changes; protect those at risk; match investment design with people’s aspirations; and so boost investment returns and prospects for success and sustainability.

Pioneering social researchers at the World Bank visualised three sets of challenges: to formulate the

approaches to participative social analysis, drawing upon the body of social science thought; to secure the necessary institutional recognition, support and resources for implementation; and, later, to promote such approaches broadly in the public and private sectors [Cernea, 1991, 1995, 1996, 2005, Davis, 2004]. In this paper I revisit some milestones that produced a ‘text’ – an evolving, articulated composite of policies and procedures that set out the objectives, content and method for participative social analysis within an institutional setting.

Statements on development objectives have changed markedly since 1970.<sup>3</sup> Broadening their mandates beyond growth to redistribution with growth many development institutions, including the multilateral development banks (MDBs)<sup>4</sup>, have, echoing pioneering social analysts [Cernea, 1985, 1991, 2005], articulated the need for ‘people first’ or ‘people at the centre’. They have embraced sustainable poverty reduction and social development objectives, for example, in the Millennium Development Goals from 2000 onwards [United Nations, 2001]. The social analysis ‘text’ has benefited from these changes – but has it, in turn, changed the development discourse?

Defining ‘discourse’ as fields of knowledge, statements, and development practice, following Foucault [de Sardan, 2005], I contend that whilst the social analysis ‘text’ contributed to positive outcomes, it has more evidently changed statements rather than practice – the ‘text’ more than the

‘effect’ [Bebbington, 2006]. Full delivery of the ‘text’ in practice poses challenges to development institutions such as the MDBs if it appears to conflict with their core business imperatives. Is this, from a Foucauldian perspective, an attempt to solve social problems through calculated ‘arts’ rather than a ‘process leading to the need for systemic change’ [Xu, 2009, p. 45]? Is change to be purely cosmetic? This question resonates with the recent focus on the complex social and political processes at play within which the knowledge-generating ‘text’ evolves in influential development institutions, such as the MDBs, and impacts, through their investments, at the local level [Mosse, 2011, Apthorpe, 2011].

## 2 Regulating Social Impacts of Investments

Since the US National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA 1969/70) formally linked the prediction of social impacts to investment planning in a regulatory framework [Burdge, 2004], various governments have similarly recognised that likely investment impacts could be human and cultural, as well as physical [Becker, 1997]. In concept NEPA widened investment decision-making, to encompass human and cultural factors through what became Social Impact Assessment (SIA). Environmental impact statements required social as well as physical sciences.<sup>5</sup> This called for efforts to define social impacts; to predict changes in the distribution of those impacts; to identify the winners and losers of investment decision-making; and, in case of investment approval, to formulate mitigative measures to protect the personal and property rights of the losers [Barrow, 2000].

Development investments have, however, been implemented in developing country frameworks that have little regulatory recognition of social risks or impacts. Whilst many governments established frameworks for environmental impact assessment by the late 1980s, full enactment of SIA requires additional agency regulations, procedures and resources [Burdge, 2003].<sup>6</sup> Across developing countries most investments have been implemented outside a SIA regulatory framework altogether, whilst for some investments, the policies and procedures of international and bilateral organisations and corporations have been applied [Esteves et al., 2012]. SIA practitioners,<sup>7</sup> exploring a ‘more democratic, participatory, constructivist understanding’ of SIA [Vanclay, 2003], and seeking to extend its reach, emphasise the benefits for communities, governments or corporations in undertaking their own SIAs as a participative planning exercise shaping their own development objectives [Becker and Vanclay, 2003, pp. 2–3].

## 3 Social Analysis in Development Institutions

What were the social policies and procedures of international and bilateral organisations governing certain investments? As development institutions continued to package investments comprising resources of finance, equipment and personnel in the form of projects,<sup>8</sup> researchers aimed to recognise and transform ‘social factors’ beyond the residual and inexplicable reasons for investment failure. Planned projects in the context of induced development inevitably resulted in social changes, providing the opportunity – and rationale – for social analysis in project decision-making. Detailed case studies demonstrated to the pioneers that taking account of sociological knowledge could not only increase project returns but could also minimise social risks and address wider social objectives. A widening global development discourse increasingly articulated poverty reduction goals to address basic human needs [World Bank, 2003b] – invoking more nuanced conceptualisations of the ‘intended beneficiaries’, together with methods designed to ensure that they benefited.

### 3.1 The First Initiatives in Social Analysis

The bilateral aid agency USAID issued in 1975 guidelines for social soundness in project appraisal.<sup>9</sup> Shortly thereafter, social specialists at the World Bank developed a case for social analysis. They viewed social analysis as an ‘indispensable tool for guiding development institutions and for facilitating the participation of key social actors in the definition and execution of projects’ [Cernea and Kudat, 1997, p. ix]. These specialists had, from the 1980s, set a three-fold approach for ‘putting people first’ that represented a ‘major advance in the Bank’s thinking’ [World Bank, 2003b, p. 78]: formulating the detailed methodologies necessary to analyse project-specific social dynamics, risks and opportunities; deriving wider principles through systematising effective practices; and formulating social policies – policies which would require grounding through social analysis in each new application. The detailed methodologies drew upon sociological and anthropological approaches of social research, survey and structured interactions among people affected, highlighting participative strategies. Importantly, the methodologies were tailored to the World Bank organisational culture – they were intended to apply through all stages of the project investment cycle: planning, design, appraisal, approval, implementation, completion and evaluation [Cernea, 1985, 1991].

### 3.2 Social Policies for People at Risk

Spurred on by a combination of civil society pressure, human rights links, internal institutional reform and concerns about reputational risk in contentious cases certain social policies that originated at the World Bank have spread globally [Cernea, 2005]. The World Bank's 1980 *Policy on Involuntary Resettlement* [World Bank, 2002] aims to protect people displaced by development projects – and thereby risking impoverishment – by providing measures for their fair compensation and rehabilitation. This policy, together with a World Bank 1982 *Policy on Indigenous Peoples*, spread to other multilateral development institutions, and to private sector entities concerned with managing environmental and social reputational risk.<sup>10</sup> They now form the 'social safeguards' and, together with environmental policies, are part of an internationally recognised set of safeguard standards, considered by some legal specialists as part of international administrative law [Hunter, 2010]. Voluntary codes such as the Equator Principles are an example for the private sector. The Equator Principles claim over 70 signatory financial institutions, or an estimated 70 per cent of international project finance debt in emerging markets. Signatories 'commit to not providing loans to projects where the borrower will not or is unable to comply with their respective social and environmental policies and procedures' [Principles, 2012].<sup>11</sup>

For similar reasons the involuntary resettlement policy spread to bilateral donor organisations through Guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD, 1992]. AusAID recently introduced agency-specific guidelines for displacement and resettlement of people in development activities [AusAID, 2012a].

Where project investments trigger the social safeguards, the institutions and private sector signatory corporations require social analysis as a basis for application in each new site. For example, the World Bank requires detailed resettlement planning and implementation arrangements in each new case of displacement, based upon direct, interactive, and participative fieldwork.<sup>12</sup>

### 3.3 Social Analysis in Project Decision-Making

Whereas the policies on resettlement and indigenous peoples focused on population groups at risk – the displaced, the indigenous – social researchers within the World Bank sought to generalise social analysis, contending that virtually

all investments raised social issues of some kind [Cernea and Kudat, 1997]. Yet

the institution called only for specialists in economics, finance, and technology, thus condemning their products, the projects' design, to be good only on financial, economic and technical dimensions, but to be ignorant and inappropriate in terms of their social adequacy [Cernea pers. comm., June 2012].

Social specialists integrated 'sociological aspects' into project appraisal in the World Bank's 1984 Operational Manual Statement (OMS) 2.20. This meant that, before approval, project investments had to demonstrate an understanding of the social context in which they were to be implemented. The social analysis includes questions such as: did the project design match the socio-cultural, demographic, and productive characteristics of its intended beneficiaries? Was it compatible with the perceived needs of the intended beneficiaries? Had an appropriate social strategy been developed, in consultation with people affected, for project implementation and operation in order to elicit and sustain beneficiaries' participation, including the participation of women?

By 1997 high level World Bank staff announced social analysis as integral to 'gathering information and using knowledge ...harmoniously complements the Bank's traditional economic and technical analysis and its environmental assessments' [Linn and Seregeldin, 1997, p. xvii]. Analysis of social context and structures, together with participation of people affected in decision-making, were judged to be essential to 'identifying the priorities and designing the content, institutional structures and delivery mechanisms of development interventions that people would want and sustain' [Linn and Seregeldin, 1997, p. xvii]. In this view, social analysis had changed the development discourse, having contributed to moving the development paradigm from an 'almost exclusive focus on bricks and mortar and on physical capital to a more people-centered approach that recognises human and social capital as critical factors in sustainable development' [Linn and Seregeldin, 1997, p. xviii].

Bilateral (or country-specific) development agencies, adopting the assumption that social analysis formed an integral part of project planning and management, formulated their own guidelines. For example, AusAID issued *Social Analysis and Community Participation Guidelines* [AusAID, 1989], whilst integrating social issues into key stages of the project cycle in its project planning manual. The British bilateral agency issued *A Guide to Social Analysis for Projects in Developing*

*Countries*, founded on the assumption that ‘all development necessarily expresses social objectives, requires social mechanisms in order to achieve those objectives, and has social consequences’ [Overseas Development Administration, 1995, p. 2].

Regional multilateral development banks (MDBs), such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) followed.<sup>13</sup> ADB staff, for example, produced official Guidelines<sup>14</sup> that set a wide ranging agenda. Echoing earlier themes the 1993 ADB Guidelines reflected a growing perception that ‘people are the centre of development and that development is for all people’ [Asian Development Bank, 1993, p. v]. This meant setting social analysis on a par with other perspectives in all stages of the project cycle. It meant recognising the operational relevance of participatory approaches, gender analysis, co-operation with non-government organisations, and benefit monitoring and evaluation. At the project level social analysis aimed to minimise social risks and costs of investments, and also to enhance social benefits through participative strategies, by underpinning project screening, processing and management [Asian Development Bank, 1993].

The ADB Guidelines went further still by defining, mapping and categorising the ‘social dimensions’ in terms that could be applied to ADB’s organisational culture and operational processes. These ‘social dimensions’ were defined initially to include poverty reduction, women in development, human resource development and attention to vulnerable groups – and to link with ADB’s revised strategic objectives that broadened its initial focus on economic growth.<sup>15</sup>

### 3.4 Beyond the Project Cycle

ADB’s 1993 Guidelines took social analysis a step further still, by positing a proactive role for social analysis in the policy-setting country and sector analytical work through which investments were selected. Reflecting the growing international preoccupation with poverty reduction following a decade of structural adjustment, the Guidelines anticipated that social analysis would support a clearer linkage between ADB’s newly crafted strategic objectives and their realisation in the selection of investments. Current ADB policy and operational procedures for both public and private sector projects and programs continue to articulate links between social analysis, social development and the achievement of ADB’s overarching goal of poverty reduction.<sup>16</sup>

World Bank social specialists adopted a similar approach, taking social analysis ‘beyond the

environmental paradigm’ to ‘realise its full potential’. For example, they designed pro-poor and socially strategic development interventions that included policy reform [Dani, 2003, p. 2]. Building on a deepening engagement with people, Participatory Poverty Assessments from 1992 aimed to include the views of the poor in poverty analysis and strategy formulation to reduce poverty through public policy [World Bank, 2003b]. Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) [World Bank, 2003a] aimed to link social analysis to economic analysis to form a basis for proactively selecting projects and programs [Dani, 2003, p. 2].<sup>17</sup>

This reflected a widening agenda within the World Bank, spurred by a 1996 Task Force which envisaged a more proactive role in mainstreaming social analysis in both project and analytical work, recognising that

even economic institutions are embedded in social relations, that getting the prices right is not enough, that poverty is not just about income, that formal rules are often different from (if not actually in conflict with) informal ones, that government commitment to delivering services may sometimes be an empty promise [World Bank, 2003b, p. 81].

Participation at the World Bank moved from a focus on project-based consultation at stages of the project cycle to a broader ‘empowerment agenda’ involving community driven development, civic engagement, and social accountability [Davis, 2004]. Building on the social policies for the displaced, the indigenous, and women the World Bank began to support policies and institutions that would foster social inclusion. These new foci, together with an interest in local level institutions, social capital and governance, led to massive new loans targeting local levels of government and civil society under innovative governance arrangements [Davis, 2004]. This challenged social specialists to develop new analytical tools for different levels of social reality: local, meso, macro, regional or global [World Bank, 2003b].

In order to answer increasing public criticisms of its operations the World Bank adopted a new business model, ‘motivated largely by recognition that the Bank’s development programs were excessively driven by a culture of lending, with insufficient attention to client needs and the quality of results, which are crucial to development effectiveness’ [Independent Evaluation Group, 2012]. Despite reservations from some economists [Cao, 2005] the new model built upon the social policies and procedures by proposing a comprehensive development framework



[Independent Evaluation Group, 2012]. This framework put people and poverty reduction at the centre, prioritising partnerships and ‘harmonising’ approaches with other development institutions [Kagia, 2005, Johnson, 2005].

#### 4 The ‘Text’ and its ‘Effects’: Translating Statements into Action?

Have these evolving statements on development been translated into action? Integrating new forms of analysis into practice challenges institutional process. It requires supportive structures, understanding and commitment by senior staff, resources, expertise, time for participatory efforts, and scope to innovate based on shared experience of what works. It requires buy-in from the institutions, their borrowers and recipients to achieve outcomes – especially where the processes may raise complex questions that challenge entrenched interests [Bebbington, 2006]. Otherwise, policy ‘texts’ become merely empty statements, those ‘sudden declarations of fashionable support for participatory approaches from politicians, planners, economists and technocrats ... under the cloud of cosmetic rhetoric, technocratic planning continues to rule’ [Cernea, 1991, p. 25].

Reflecting on the chequered history of social analysis at the World Bank, Cernea and Kudat found that the Bank lacked the staff, institutional mechanisms and corporate culture to ensure consistent, systematic use of OMS 2.20.

Simply placing new rules on the Bank’s internal guidebook proved to be not enough for triggering the profound changes in staff work patterns that meeting the new demands implied [Cernea and Kudat, 1997, p. 6].

Not only did many World Bank projects lack social analysis, but, in addition, ‘the vast majority of programs financed domestically in developing countries don’t have social analysis’ – due to a complex set of constraints including ‘inertia, technocratic and econocratic approaches, lack of awareness about the power of social investigation, traditional mindsets, and obsolete paradigms’ [Cernea and Kudat, 1997, p. 6].

Whilst the World Bank has, since 1996, devoted significant resources to environmental and social safeguards, recent independent evaluations have identified certain internal constraints to the adoption of new approaches at the World Bank that limit their developmental effectiveness [Independent Evaluation Group, 2012]. Organisational constraints limit cross-sector

collaboration and knowledge flows both internally and externally, impeding the ability of staff to capture innovation and share experience, whilst staff members lack the incentives to focus on quality of outcomes. This has particularly constrained efforts to address environmental and social safeguards, and has crowded out other forms of social analysis [Independent Evaluation Group, 2012]. Whilst there is continual pressure to innovate in forms of social analysis as the lending modalities evolve, the capacity of the institution is limited to implement those innovations both internally and among borrowers.

The ‘text’ can be retained, but emptied of agency. In the case of ADB, its overarching poverty reduction objective encompassed social development as one of three key pillars [Asian Development Bank, 1999, 2004]. Despite growing inequality in the region, ADB’s current Long Term Strategic Framework 2020 [Asian Development Bank and Bank, 2008] emphasises ‘inclusive growth’, without mentioning social development, neither setting operational strategies nor financing priorities to address it, nor confirming the importance of social analysis in boosting investment returns and addressing social factors of poverty. The few social development staff work with dedication, often making do with relatively small amounts of grant and trust funding. AusAID’s recent review found weaknesses in application of ADB procedures for social and poverty analysis in practice [Australian Government, 2012].

Disjunctures may also arise through different perceptions of an institution’s ‘core business’. Many MDB staff consider the lending imperative as paramount and, whilst overlooking the potential for improved returns, begrudge additional policy or procedural demands that may appear to inhibit that lending. ADB, for example, having approved multiple social and poverty policies,<sup>18</sup> found loan approvals stagnating. ADB’s board and management concluded that ‘traditional products were no longer meeting...the needs of its key clients, and that new products and less arduous procedures were needed’ [Asian Development Bank, 2006, p. 7]. Streamlined and ‘improved safeguard policies’ were singled out for an Innovation and Efficiency Initiative that would ‘package’ [Asian Development Bank, 2006, p. 11] key ‘change areas’, including simplified business processes. Management aimed explicitly to reduce transaction costs and loan processing times [Asian Development Bank, 2008, p. 20]. New financial instruments such<sup>19</sup> as the multitranches financing facility, would move more money faster, with most sub-projects being prepared and approved only after Board approval. This challenged traditional forms of

pre-approval social scoping and social analysis, without providing meaningful alternatives.<sup>20</sup>

The World Bank, currently engaged in a process of profound reform [Bank Information Centre, 2012], may be treading a similar path. Independent evaluation has identified internal pressures to lend that favour large, speedily prepared and fast-disbursing loans. An innovation drive seeks out new, fast disbursing financing modalities. Since 1997 the World Bank's operations have been shifting in response to a decline in requests for investment financing as diverse private sector financing sources increase. Investment financing is giving way to programmatic and policy-based loans which provide untied, direct budget support to governments for policy and institutional reforms aimed at achieving a set of specific development results [Independent Evaluation Group, 2012]. As part of the far-reaching reform process, operational policies on investments, environmental and social safeguards are all under review for possible streamlining, which may lead to dilution of standards [Bank Information Centre, 2012].

## 5 The Challenge for Social Researchers

Differing perspectives on ownership of the core values highlight the challenges for social specialists working for such institutions. They may feel as outsiders to the core business concerns, as 'advisors' to the 'decision-makers'. They may face constant pressures to produce and 'sell' new knowledge products that possibly distort sociological knowledge to meet institutional imperatives [Mosse, 2011].

The ambiguous position of social specialists may mask a deeper disjuncture – the role of a policy maker differs profoundly from that of social researcher. Whereas anthropological researchers, for example, deconstruct categories in order to make meaning explicit, policy makers construct and reconstruct, they 'aim to alter social ordering, not just interpret it, and to effect such transformations through the channeling of resources' [Green, 2011, p. 48]. This difference opens up new enquiry: the internal dynamics at play in the knowledge-generation for the 'text'; and the 'interrelation of policy ideas, institutions and networks of knowledge workers who served the development industry' [Mosse, 2011, p. 2]. Makers of social policy and procedures may be more aware than others about how poverty reduction efforts are fractured, re-shaped and unravelled through national and local socio-political processes [Pottier et al., 2003]. Yet institutions remain optimistic, seeking managerial solutions to mobilise continued support for international aid. This raises tensions in apparently opposed professional values,

in the constant demands 'to turn the political into the technical, to represent the mess of ordered practice in ordered expert or moral categories, the management of demands for transparency and the fragility of expert identities that depend upon these processes' [Mosse, 2011, p. 18].

External social researchers have deconstructed the disjunctures between objectives and outcomes as development projects and programs roll out [de Sardan, 2005]. Craig and Porter [2006] critiqued the harmonised 'Joined-Up Poverty Reduction Paradigm' of the World Bank's new business model for failing to tackle the substantive factors of poverty and for increasing inequality. Others critiqued the new approaches as efforts to render poverty as technical and therefore amenable to managerial solutions [Li, 2011, Mosse, 2011]; or as neo-liberal market penetration in a new guise [Carroll, 2010]. More generally, Apthorpe [2011] satirised the virtual reality of 'Aidland' as unable to address the important social questions in poverty reduction.

## 6 Conclusion

The social analysis 'text' has helped to mobilise and channel the attention of institutions, governments, private sector and civil society around the evolving development discourse. It has contributed people-centered and poverty reduction perspectives to the evolving set of development policy statements. Realising the full potential of the 'text', however, depends upon management structures and processes, and the level of commitment by development institutions – and by corporations, borrowers and implementers. It also depends upon the capacity of those agents to ask the right questions about substantive social factors of poverty and growing global inequality, and to realise effective responses. This requires a level of reflexivity – following the example of pioneering social researchers – about the political and social context in which the 'text' is formulated, and applied in local spaces.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>For the World Bank, investments provide financing for 'activities aimed at creating the physical and social infrastructure necessary to reduce poverty and create sustainable development. Over the past two decades, investment operations have, on average, accounted for 75 to 80 percent of the Bank's portfolio' but this percentage is falling as policy-based loans assume new importance.

<sup>2</sup>Francis and Jacobs: Footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup>From the postwar emphasis on achieving stages of economic growth in which developing countries would 'catch up' with the developing world, statements on development objectives, whilst varying in emphasis between countries, agencies, and stakeholders, have generally become more nuanced to encompass poverty reduction, social development, sustainable development and good governance.

Civil society has increasingly influenced the development discourse, for example, on issues such as human rights, debt relief and sustainable development.

<sup>4</sup>The multilateral development banks, supported by multiple countries, include the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

<sup>5</sup>In the USA, methods and tools for social impact assessment (SIA) were developed, firstly, through legal cases which tested the limits of SIA for specific applications [Burdge, 2004]; and secondly, through work by social researchers, for example through a 1994 Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment of the Interorganisational Committee on Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment.

<sup>6</sup>Burdge [2003] includes only Canada, USA, Australia and New Zealand.

<sup>7</sup>The International Association of Impact Assessment (IAIA) sought to make SIA more relevant and useful globally by formulating International Principles for SIA [Vanclay, 2003]. Advocates maintained that these Guidelines widened SIA and moved it to 'a more democratic, participatory, constructivist understanding' [Vanclay, 2003]. The IAIA International Principles for Social Impact Assessment [2003] state that: 'Social Impact Assessment includes the processes of analysing, monitoring and managing the intended and unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, of planned interventions (policies, programs, plans, projects) and any social change processes invoked by those interventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about a more sustainable and equitable biophysical and human environment' [?, p. 2].

<sup>8</sup>Projects may focus on any one or more sectors. Over the years a project has come to be defined as 'a set of interrelated expenditures designed to achieve, within a specific period, mutually agreed objectives of (a) increasing, rehabilitating, maintaining better or using more fully productive capacities or economic and social infrastructure; (b) strengthening local institutions concerned with preparing, implementing or operating such programs through technical assistance and training; or (c) providing services related to such expenditures (such as for design, engineering, supervision of construction or other assistance in implementation).' [World Bank, 1994, p. 1] Investment funds from international financial institutions and bilateral donors are generally disbursed against projects which have specific foreign or local expenditures including pre-identified equipment, materials, civil works, technical and consulting services, studies, and incremental recurrent costs. The loan, credit or grant agreement may include conditions of disbursement for specific project components.

<sup>9</sup>USAID's Guidelines were intended to ensure that the design of projects matched the socio-cultural terrain in which they would be implemented.

<sup>10</sup>The International Finance Corporation and the ADB both require their private sector sponsors to meet resettlement policy standards.

<sup>11</sup>The procedures, based on the newly revised (approved January 2012) Performance Standards of the International Finance Corporation, which draw upon World Bank policies and procedures, encompass environmental and social management systems, labour and working conditions, community health, safety and security, land acquisition and involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples and cultural heritage, amongst others [International Finance Corporation, 2011b]. IFC has a manual for stakeholder engagement [International Finance Corporation, 2011a].

<sup>12</sup>Fieldwork and planning includes land survey; census and socio-economic survey of the people to be displaced including their population parameters, their forms of organisation and settlement, resource use, networks and productive activities;

structured interactions to inform and engage those people in resettlement planning decisions; setting of eligibility criteria and resettlement entitlements; feasibility assessments for resettlement sites and for livelihood improvement; and plans for participation of displaced people during the resettlement process and its aftermath [World Bank, 2004].

<sup>13</sup>See also Harrison and McDonald [2003] for a discussion of SIA in the Caribbean Regional Development Bank.

<sup>14</sup>ADB Guidelines on *Incorporation of Social Dimensions into ADB Operations* [1993]; followed by *ADB Handbook for Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Projects* (1994), Manila.

<sup>15</sup>ADB's Medium Term Strategic Framework [1992–1995] reaffirmed economic growth as the main goal, but insufficient for poverty reduction, whilst emphasising the 'quality and sustainability of such growth (including equity aspects)' and an increased focus on 'issues of social significance based on a participatory approach to development, greater gender and social analysis, benefit monitoring and evaluation and cooperation with... NGOs' [Asian Development Bank, 1993, p. 47].

<sup>16</sup>ADB's Operational Policy and Procedures (OM) Section C3 on the Incorporation of Social Dimensions into ADB Operations [Asian Development Bank, 2010, revised]. Social analysis, according to this document, contributes to sound social development outcomes that depend on greater inclusiveness and equity for policies and institutions; greater empowerment for poor, vulnerable and excluded groups; and greater security and ability to manage risks. At the country level ADB's operational procedures for social analysis require identification of social, institutional and policy constraints that determine social risks and patterns of social exclusion; together with opportunities to overcome such risks and barriers, so as to promote inclusion, gender equity, and empowerment for poor and marginalised groups. Social analysis is required to explain the contributions of each project intervention to sector impacts and to the results in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the region, as well as to ADB's inclusive growth agenda [Asian Development Bank, 2010, OP 1].

<sup>17</sup>The World Bank's User's Guide on PSIA [World Bank, 2003a] includes prior analysis of the likely impacts of specific reforms, analysis during reform implementation, and analysis of completed reforms. Prior PSIA is intended to inform the choice, design, and sequencing of alternative policy options. During implementation, the monitoring of a reform and its impacts can lead to refinement of the reform, a reconsideration of the pace/sequencing or institutional arrangements of the reform, or the introduction or strengthening of mitigation measures. Finally, after completion PSIA assesses the actual distributional impacts of a completed reform, which helps analysts understand the likely impacts of future reforms.

<sup>18</sup>ADB approved, in rapid succession, policies on involuntary resettlement [Asian Development Bank, 1995a]; indigenous peoples [Asian Development Bank, 1998a]; co-operation with NGOs [Asian Development Bank, 1998b]; gender and development [Asian Development Bank, 1998c]; and an inspection function to provide a forum for project affected people to appeal to an independent body relating to ADB's compliance with its operational policies and procedures in ADB-assisted projects [Asian Development Bank, 1995]; as well as the overarching policy on poverty reduction [Asian Development Bank, 1999].

<sup>19</sup>A multi-tranche financing facility, similar to a standby and non-contingent line of credit, relevant for both debt equity and guarantee finance, targets mainly investment programs, large projects, and credit lines [Asian Development Bank, 2006].

<sup>20</sup>'Getting the balance right...[was]... a key institutional challenge, brought into sharper focus in ADB's safeguard policies' [ADB and Asian Development Bank, 2007,

p. 8]. ADB proposed a Safeguard Policy Update [Asian Development Bank, 2005] to develop 'approaches tailored to the varying safeguard systems and implementation capacities of ADB's developing member countries; safeguard policies that are more adaptable to new lending modes and instruments; and improved internal processes and resource allocation' [Asian Development Bank, 2008, p. 21; [Asian Development Bank, 2009]]. Since policies and legal frameworks in developing member countries, based as they were on laws for land acquisition, rarely matched the elements of ADB's 1995 policy standard [Jayewardene, 2008, Price, 2008], this opened up the possibility that people displaced under ADB-financed projects could expect lower standards that varied according to their country of residence.

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# Religious Education & Consumerism

*Ben Archer*

Student attitudes towards secondary religious education are generally negative, with many students viewing Catholic diocesan-developed curriculums as being nothing more than indoctrination [Brelsford, 2005, O'Grady, 2003]. Adolescents today are identified as a key target market for businesses and advertisers who seek to influence adolescent behaviour and spending patterns. It is possible for Religious education teachers to adapt curriculums and still engage adolescents in the environment they are currently experiencing. This will allow them to grow spirituality and into early adulthood. This paper will utilise both a literature review and primary research to initiate discussion into the practical implications of adapting modern media into the religious education classroom.

Religious education is compulsory in Years 7–10 in every Catholic School in Australia, while over 70% of all schools make it compulsory for Years 11–12 (Appendix A). 20% of all secondary school students currently attend Catholic schools [Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011] and as a result, are being exposed to some form of religious education in their schooling lives. Therefore, it is important that Religious Educators are aware of contemporary issues surrounding adolescent spirituality and how this will affect instruction in the Religious education classroom.

Adolescents are one of the primary targets for advertising, with multiple businesses and companies identifying adolescents as their primary target market [Shim et al., 2011]. Because adolescents are now seen as primary consumers of some products and services, media outlets target them with messages, images, sounds and activities designed to encourage them to spend money. This introduces a new aspect of adolescent spirituality which has not been a major factor in previous generations—consumerism.

Consumerism is a phenomenon that has far-reaching consequences into the human psyche. The visual and auditory stimuli that are given to adolescents and adults are akin to that of an opiate [Pellegrino cited in Waliszewski and Smithouser, 2001]. When this is combined with the invitation to spend money or make a purchase, the act of buying something becomes a part of the adolescent psyche. It is of paramount importance that teachers of religious education are aware of the effects of modern media and technologies if they are to engage students in religious education into the senior years.

## 1 Literature Review

Multiple authors have provided extensive overviews of the modern adolescent's spiritual state. The most comprehensive piece published recently is from Graham Rossiter [2010], who correctly highlights that youth spirituality is complex by nature, however youth spirituality has become

even more complex by the move towards personal choice and individualisation. These concepts have begun to make their way into Religious education pre-service teacher courses, with both Richard Rymarz [2008b] & Maurice Ryan [2006] highlighting the role of contemporary youth spirituality in textbooks for students of Religious education courses. Both Rymarz and Ryan describe the current curriculum-focussed movement towards privatisation of religious beliefs and how young people no longer identify themselves as religious, instead viewing themselves as primarily spiritual [Rymarz, 2008b, p. 22]. This has a wide-reaching effect in Religious education, as the term 'religion' is often rejected by young people in favour of the term 'spiritual' [Ryan, 2006, p. 69]. Büssing et al. [2010] describe different aspects of adolescent spirituality and make direct links between overall satisfaction with their lifestyles and their level of spirituality.

Linking in with this, young people who report themselves as being religious often regard themselves as spiritual. Raftopoulos and Bates [2011, p. 160] describe a direct link between young people who profess a religious affiliation with a spiritual dimension and the degree of resilience demonstrated through 'low point experiences'.

Butt and de Run [2010, p. 190] highlight how advertisers take advantage of adolescents' higher susceptibilities to self-consciousness, embarrassment and peer pressure as part of marketing strategies designed to increase their own profits and market share. Butt and de Run [2010, p. 199] furthermore describe marketing theory in that if businesses are able to establish brand loyalty at a young age that loyalty will continue as the consumers grow older.

## 2 Aspects of Adolescent Spirituality

Adolescent spirituality is complex by nature it is, however, possible to highlight several key areas of spirituality that are useful for the Religious education environment. Later age adolescents are growing towards self-actualisation and are therefore more prone to considering issues surrounding their

own spirituality. Rossiter [2010, pp. 142–143] highlights seven areas that adolescents consider when coming to terms with their own spirituality:

- The meaning of life is now a matter of personal choice. Personal meaning is constructed by individuals.
- The experience of the individual is the paramount of authenticity. One person's experience is truth for that one person.
- The individual is their own authority and has the power to shape the outcome of their own life.
- The individual is also less certain about the nature of God. The idea of a benevolent God is attractive and comforting, but not necessarily plausible.
- Family and community are no longer as important in day to day activities.
- There is greater knowledge of the rest of the world, and greater flow of ideas and concepts.
- The world is changing at a greater pace than before. Technological advances and trends are coming about more rapidly than they have in prior generations.

The research of Büssing et al. provides further insight into Rossiter's aspects of adolescent spirituality. Their research demonstrates how positive interactions with family provide such a feeling of emotional wellbeing and support; they are regarded as a spiritual encounter [Büssing et al., 2010, p. 39]. Conversely, adolescents also approach any ethical/moral challenges with a large degree of scepticism, as they are constantly presented with hypocritical messages from the media and that society, as a whole, which appear to reduce people to mere numbers instead of treating them as complex individuals [Büssing et al., 2010, p. 25]. This can lead to adolescents having 'several unsolved problems and unmet promises [which] may lead to unrestricted autonomy as social norms seem to become less important' [Büssing et al., 2010, p. 26].

Using broad concepts from both Rossiter & Büssing et al., the spirituality of an adolescent can be divided into the following areas:

- Search for meaning.
- Understanding personal experience.
- The role of the individual.
- Understanding the existence & nature of God.

- Importance & role of family, community and media.
- Reception and acceptance of new ideas and concepts.
- Importance of accepting and keeping up with current trends.
- Discernment of ideas, concepts and emotions.

Therefore, Religious Educators need to develop and adapt their programs in order to ensure that their programs are addressing the above areas to remain relevant and engaging for the students, as explained below.

### 3 Effects of Consumerism on Aspects of Adolescent Spirituality

As adolescents are identified as one of the key target markets for advertisers and the impact of modern media is akin to an opiate [Waliszewski and Smithouser, 2001], it is important that Religious Educators are aware of some of the impacts that consumerism will have on adolescent spirituality.

#### 3.1 Search for Meaning & Understanding the Existence and Nature of God

The adolescent's search for meaning can cover a broad section of everyday life. Primarily, it can be a search for meaning within the self, posing questions such as: 'Why do I exist?'; 'What meaning is there in the world?'; 'Why do bad things happen?'. The personal quest that the adolescent embarks on when they consider these questions can often end with more questions than answers. Given that it is a quest that all adolescents will undertake in one capacity or another, the topic 'Search for Meaning' is compulsory study for students of Religion Studies in both the ACT [ACT Board of Senior Secondary Studies, 2011] and in South Australia / Northern Territory [South Australian Certificate of Education Board, 2011].

The effect of consumerism in this aspect of the adolescent's spirituality is quite stark. Taylor [2009, p. 421] describes how advertisers deliberately ascribe meanings to brands and products when they are marketed towards an adolescent audience. An example of this type of advertising is Michael Hill Jeweller's '14' campaign, which features a young teenager getting excited about her upcoming birthday, which will involve getting her ears pierced, and her very first set of Michael Hill earrings. The television advertisement finishes with the tag 'celebrate you'. The juxtaposition of an upcoming birthday, with an adolescent 'rite of passage' of



an ear piercing [Macleod, 2006] with Michael Hill products and the tagline ‘celebrate you’ combine to give the message that you find meaning in yourself with the assistance of Michael Hill Jewellery.

### **3.2 Understanding Personal Experience & Discernment of Ideas, Concepts and Emotions**

Personal experience within the adolescent years will have long and far-reaching consequences with regard to how adolescents approach spirituality in their adult years. Julie Collins [1999], writing about her experiences running a retreat for adolescent males, describes the long-reaching effects of some of the experiences the adolescents had in the retreat. One participant on the retreat discussed how the experience formed an integral part of his spirituality in later life—that God was not somewhere ‘on his throne’ [Collins, 1999, p. 12], rather, God was involved in daily life and this new understanding helped him get through College.

This is another area that can be affected by consumerism and consumer culture. 44% of adolescents surveyed in the United Kingdom described attending a music festival as the most exciting experience of their lives [Roberts, 2009, p. 22]. As a result, advertisers are eager to ensure good product placement and messages are shown throughout the festival, and even becoming part of the festival experience. Once the festival itself is over, the association between brands and experience continues, as highlighted by several testimonials from marketing managers and companies following the Glattonbury music festival [Roberts, 2009, p. 24].

### **3.3 The Role of the Individual & Reception and Acceptance of New Ideas and Concepts**

Adolescents often wrestle with the idea of their individuality, as supported by Erikson’s Stages of Development, which is identified by the 12–18 age bracket as a struggle between identity & role confusion [McLoughlin, 2009]. During this stage, adolescents develop their own sense of identity and a sense of individualism which will support their decisions and actions as they move towards adulthood. With regard to spirituality, adolescents will determine whether or not they can rely on their own judgement, and whether or not they will accept a belief/faith system as part of their own personal identity. Rymarz [2008a] identifies this aspect as one of the most crucial with regards to progression to adulthood. Without an affirmation

of a faith/belief system being present in this stage of development, the individual can be left in a vulnerable position when exposed to alternative systems of belief [Rymarz, 2008a, p. 5].

## **4 Implications for Religious Educators**

It is important for Religious Educators to ensure that concepts and ideas taught take into account the above factors. When students are given an opportunity to express their own understanding of spiritual concepts in relation to the above concepts, students recorded a marked improvement in their own attitudes and engagement towards Religious education (Appendix B—Questions 6 & 8).

Religious Educators face a daunting challenge with regard to taking curriculums and developing them into engaging programs for students. If students are expected to develop and grow spiritually through a religious education program, then programs need to assist students in finding their own paths through the areas outlined above. This can be achieved by encouraging students to take part in ‘social interactions, in mission/outreach projects, in enduring and [creating] dependable relationships in families and communities’ [Brelsford, 2005, p. 359]. By engaging students in a religious education program that enables hands-on, real world experience, students are more likely to find a practical and beneficial use for religious education in their adolescent years.

Furthermore, adolescents are also able to articulate some of the problems or issues they are facing with regards to understanding their own spirituality. O’Grady [2003, p. 222] suggests one method of creating an engaging program by inviting students to provide suggestions for broad concepts to be covered and then adapting curriculums based on student feedback. Adolescents will highlight key areas of importance for themselves which can be linked to the key aspects of spirituality. Using the notions outlined above, Religious Educators will be able to create programs that are engaging as well as provide meaningful guidance for adolescents as they progress towards adulthood.

It is also important for Religious Educators not to view consumerism as an enemy or nemesis to their own goals. Rather, consumerism often provides opportunities for Religious Educators to bring some elements from the environment which students are experiencing and use them for case study and reflection material [Berryman, 1998, p. 377]. Religious Educators only have limited interaction with their students in comparison to the exposure that the modern media provides. Therefore, Religious Educators need to be able to adapt and use material from the modern media as stimulus material for their own teaching. 62% of

students identified the use of video material as an element to an 'exciting lesson' and 50% of students identified the use of computers as an element to an exciting lesson (Appendix B). Conversely, more traditional activities such as role plays, readings and reflections were not identified as elements of an exciting lesson (Appendix B).

## 5 Conclusion

Religious Educators need to be aware of the various aspects of adolescent spirituality if they are to create engaging and exciting programs and learning materials for their students. Adolescent spirituality is complex by nature, and the rapidly changing social environment means that the challenges faced by Religious Educators 20 years ago are vastly different to the challenges faced today. However, by developing programs that explicitly address some of the aspects of adolescent spirituality such as role identity, modern media and approaching consumerist tendencies as aides and not enemies, Religious Educators will be able to not only create programs that are engaging and exciting, but also provide meaning and guidance for adolescents as they move towards adulthood.

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**Appendix A**

Survey of Compulsory Religious Education Curriculums in Australian Dioceses (compiled by the author)

State/Diocese	Years 7–10	Years 11 & 12
<b>Australian Capital Territory</b>		
Canberra–Goulburn Diocese	Compulsory	School Decision: – 1 school compulsory – 7 schools not compulsory
<b>New South Wales</b>		
Armidale Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Bathurst Diocese	Compulsory	School Decision: – 3 schools compulsory – 1 school not compulsory
Broken Bay Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Lismore Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Maitland–Newcastle Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Parramatta Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Sydney Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Wagga Wagga Diocese	Compulsory	Not compulsory
Wilcannia–Forbes Diocese*	N/A	N/A
Wollongong Diocese	Compulsory	School Decision: – 2 schools compulsory – 6 schools not compulsory
<b>Northern Territory</b>		
Darwin Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
<b>Queensland</b>		
Brisbane Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Cairns Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Rockhampton Diocese	Compulsory	School Decision: – 4 schools compulsory – 3 schools not compulsory
Toowoomba Diocese	Compulsory	School Decision: – 3 schools compulsory – 5 schools not compulsory
Townsville Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
<b>South Australia</b>		
Adelaide & Port Pirie Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
<b>Tasmania</b>		
Tasmania Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
<b>Victoria</b>		
Ballarat Diocese	Compulsory	Not compulsory
Melbourne Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Sale Diocese	Compulsory	School Decision: – 4 schools compulsory – 3 schools not compulsory
Sandhurst Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory

State/Diocese	Years 7–10	Years 11 & 12
<b>Western Australia</b>		
Broome Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Bunbury Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Geraldton Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory
Perth Diocese	Compulsory	Compulsory

\*Wilcannia–Forbes Diocese does not have secondary schools

## Appendix B

Survey of a Year 10 Religious education class, taught from Northern Territory Catholic Education Office Religious education Curriculum with assessment tasks and topics derived from the 9 aspects of adolescent spirituality outlined in the paper. Class was taught in Semester 1, 2011.

### 1. What was your favourite part of RE this semester?

Showing Faith	11.1%	1
Easter Story	22.2%	2
Social Justice	66.7%	6

### 2. What did you like about it?

‘It’s about helping fight poverty and all that Jazz’  
 23/6/2011 9:40 AM  
 ‘it was something i havnt done before’  
 23/6/2011 9:37 AM  
 ‘It was fun’  
 23/6/2011 9:32 AM  
 ‘I liked this subject because human right and fighting poverty and all things in this area are things i have strong opinons about’  
 23/6/2011 9:30 AM  
 ‘i like learning about humen rights and i find the topic interesting’  
 23/6/2011 9:26 AM  
 ‘it was bit more complicated than the other topics’  
 23/6/2011 9:25 AM  
 ‘it was fun’  
 9/6/2011 10:43 AM  
 ‘That I got to learn what lives are like in different countries’  
 9/6/2011 10:40 AM  
 ‘i liked learning about the easter events and what its about’  
 9/6/2011 10:39 AM

### 3. What did you think of the assignments this semester?

	Bad <sup>a</sup>	Annoying <sup>b</sup>	Meh <sup>c</sup>	OK <sup>d</sup>	Great <sup>e</sup>	Rating Average	Response Count
Modern Music Assignment	0.0% (0)	11.1% (1)	22.2% (2)	33.3% (3)	33.3% (3)	3.89	9
Short Story	0.0% (0)	22.2% (2)	33.3% (3)	44.4% (4)	0.0% (0)	3.22	9
Charity Advertisement	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	22.2% (2)	44.4% (4)	33.3% (3)	4.11	9

<sup>a</sup> ‘It was bad—I hated it’

<sup>b</sup> ‘It was annoying’

<sup>c</sup> ‘Meh’

<sup>d</sup> ‘It was OK—found it a bit annoying’

<sup>e</sup> ‘Thought it was great’

**NB:** It is noted that the sample size is less than ideal however it is the size of the cohort who participated in this program. Future research into this area should contain a much larger sample.

**Question 4 & 5 are removed as they are commercial-in-confidence.**

**6. What did you think of RE this semester?**

	Really agree	Agree	Meh	Disagree	Really disagree	Response Count
RE was really interesting this semester.	0.0% (0)	55.6% (5)	33.3% (3)	11.1% (1)	0.0% (0)	9
RE was really easy this semester.	22.2% (2)	66.7% (6)	11.1% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	9
I think I learnt something about myself this semester.	0.0% (0)	22.2% (2)	66.7% (6)	0.0% (0)	11.1% (1)	9
I think I learnt something about God this semester.	0.0% (0)	33.3% (3)	55.6% (5)	0.0% (0)	11.1% (1)	9
I looked forward to every RE lesson we had.	0.0% (0)	33.3% (3)	44.4% (4)	11.1% (1)	11.1% (1)	9

**7. Finish this sentence: ‘I know a lesson will be exciting when we do...’**

Computer work.	50.0%	4
Videos.	62.5%	5
Drawing.	37.5%	3
Debating.	50.0%	4
Reading.	0.0%	0
Acting and role plays.	0.0%	0
Listen to the teacher talk.	25.0%	2
Reflections.	25.0%	2
Go for a walk around the school.	50.0%	4

**8. What was your favourite part of RE this semester?**

‘The music assignment was good because we could be in the computer labs, and listen to our music, but for once we actually were allowed to listen to music’

23/6/2011 9:43 AM

‘workin in a group’

23/6/2011 9:41 AM

‘The Retreat’

23/6/2011 9:36 AM

‘idk’

23/6/2011 9:34 AM

‘drawing, colouring and learning about new things’

23/6/2011 9:32 AM

‘the fact that there was very few lessons’

23/6/2011 9:28 AM

‘That I got to learn so much’

9/6/2011 10:45 AM

‘doing the music assignment and the title pages’

9/6/2011 10:42 AM





## Shivers

*3 Channel HD Composite Video Loop*

Liam James



The work, *Shivers*, is a continual investigation into youth's formation of identity. As an artist I make selective re-creations of reality according to my judgments, my emotional response and my understanding of society. I endeavor to make art that is beautiful, that expresses rather than teaches, art that creates an endless plain of contemplation for the viewer.

My youth are a physical faction and at the same time a wider idealistic concept. Although roughly formulated around an age group, the definition expands outside these parameters and is constructed around a stage in life. Connected to their actions, beliefs, the early foundations of a personal moral code and a need to examine their understanding of self and place with the context of society.

As Ayn Rand, the ethicist, states the job of the artist is to express their most important metaphysical question and to me this is youth's questioning of the metaphysical, as they begin to formulate the questions and search for answers of self and place.

Our identity is an expression of our consciousness; it is a projection of our ethical self, which is formed from the collection of knowledge we have absorbed in our life, which informs our decision-making, our taste, our opinions and our loves.

We create art, as an expression of our perception of man, of what we believe is core to humanity. With this work I endeavour to express to the viewer man as a creature of thought, who searches for definition.



## An Indian Girl

Arunima Jain



This painting was inspired by images of ordinary scenes in Rajasthan, India that consisted of women engaging in conversation, walking with pots of water, and preparing food. The beauty and elegance of the Indian girl and her captivating expression was a small segment of one such scene, almost inappropriately limited to the corner of the image.

The composition of this painting is unique, created based on personal interpretation of the scenes. The presence of the carved pillar, jewellery and bindi serve as cultural cues that allude to Rajasthan. The light that illuminates her face is not uniform, creating the impression that she is gazing from a sheltered darker background. A sense of timidity and uncertainty is accentuated through her posture and the blurred or hazy environment.

However the main focus of this painting is the expression of deep thought (open to personal interpretation) through the girl's eyes. The lighting and the use of brighter colours for the jewellery and bangles, relative to the dusty hues of the surround, aim to draw attention to her entrancing gaze.

On deeper reflection, the painting is perhaps indicative of my own nostalgia for a culture that I am much connected to but separate from. I hope to show a sense of appreciation to that culture through this painting...