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FOREWORD

Preparing a piece of writing for publication takes a great deal of commitment, enterprise and enthusiasm. This volume represents the combined energies of a group of more than 60 authors, editors, artists, and researchers associated with Bruce Hall and the ANU. At a time in which students and staff at universities need to juggle competing activities such as employment, teaching, study, sporting, social and family commitments; why have so many people chosen to collaborate on such a challenging project?

- Because it is an opportunity to create something new in collaboration with a group of like-minded people.
- Because it is a chance for students to learn about the process of publication.
- Because it is an opportunity for an academic to work closely with an undergraduate student, a rarity in these days of increasingly large tutorial groups.
- Because it is a challenging, interesting way to learn vital research skills.
- Because it is a way of integrating a variety of university experiences into a tangible product.
- Because it is a way of creating an intellectual environment which nourishes learning and encourages meaningful interactions between staff and students.
- Because it is an immensely satisfying experience.

Two central roles of residential colleges are to provide students with a welcoming community and an environment that encourages and rewards learning. In the United States, the idea of residential colleges as 'residential learning communities' is gaining currency and this journal incorporates some of the features of the activities used to create learning communities in some American colleges; in particular, students and staff of the university are linked together by shared activities.

Cross-sections and its contributors, however, differ from the US experience in a key aspect: in the American schools, students and staff are linked through the course(s) in which the students are enrolled and

in which the staff teach. In Australia, the only common links are the meetings (author/reviewer; author/sub-editor; sub-editor/editor; editor/reviewer) together with the collection of work in the published volume. This creates a very diverse community of multiple disciplines, multiple year levels (from first years through to postgraduate students as well as academic staff) and different forms of creative output (including manuscripts and art work). None of the work is being subsequently assessed for credit in a course and this changes the dynamics of the interactions, particularly between the student-authors and the academic-reviewers. Instead of returning a piece of work with comments and a grade, the author and reviewer can sit together and examine the quality of an argument or the aptness of quotations and references, returning to re-examine the piece after re-writes until the piece is fit for publication. This is a much richer experience of learning than simply submitting a piece, along with several hundred other students, for assessment.

The contributors to this second volume of *Cross-sections* are to be congratulated, not only for the very fine work published here and for the diverse pieces submitted for publication, but also for the community they have created, which is represented in the pages within.

Dr Dierdre Pearce
Dean of Residents
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The Australian National University

EDITORIAL

Many have said that to write is human, but to edit is divine. If so, our path to divinity has taught us much. The editorial process requires many late nights, strong coffee, pizza and a sense of humour. It has been a hard taskmaster, teaching us many things: to be concise, to be diplomatic, to be organised, but above all, to be mean.

And yet, still with spirit and optimism, we bring to you Volume II of *Cross-sections*: The Bruce Hall Academic Journal.

It has been an experience both rewarding and interesting where we have found our own unique positions within the framework of the journal: Skye, the unexpected disciplinarian; Michelle, the logistical mastermind; and Charles, the eternal pedant (who, the night before final proof, was still firing off instructions from his hospital bed).

Being part of *Cross-sections*; another link in the chain, has been an honour. Last year's editors have passed on the torch to us, and we feel privileged to carry it forward to next year's editorial team. However, before we do so, there are many people who have accompanied us on this journey.

We would like to thank Dr Dierdre Pearce for supporting and pioneering such an admirable project. And once again, the Office of Vice Chancellor, and most particularly Dr Brok Glenn, for continuing to encourage student initiative and for his generous financial support for the project. Thank you also to our many academic referees, who donated time from otherwise extremely busy schedules to offer guidance to our contributors and to help shape the pieces included into fully realised academic works.

We owe a debt of gratitude to last year's Editors for paving the way and for establishing the framework of this journal. We would also like to especially thank our sub-editors for their unflagging efforts in helping to make this project a reality. And where would we be without our infallible Technical Editor, Sam Lewin, with his trusty laptop and

unwavering positive disposition? Also, the night before final proof, our proofreaders showed us an internal fortitude worthy of any great Tolkien character. Finally, without the contributors we would not have a journal. Their creative spark and academic endeavours have enriched this journal, and in turn, the wider learning community at Bruce Hall.

In this year's journal, we have a variety of pieces, with nearly all Colleges at the ANU being represented. The quality of submissions was excellent and a final selection was extremely difficult to make. However, we present 15 unique pieces in this volume of the journal, ranging from an exploration of quantum theory to the battle of Troy, and to an investigation of the rise of Western influence in the Middle East. The Bruce Hall community is also fortunate to have a wealth of artistic talent, and this year's selection spans a range of media, including photography, digital art and installation artwork.

Finally, as we succumb to our weariness and lay down our pens (or laptops), we step down from our editorial role with a *mimosa* in our hand, and a sense of satisfaction knowing that we were part of an amazing team. Enjoy!

Michelle Almirón, Charles Prestidge-King & Skye Roberts
The 2006 Editors of Cross-sections

COMPETING THEORIES, EMERGING EVIDENCE: THE METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF QUANTUM THEORY

*Melanie Bannister-Tyrrell**

Philosophy and physics combine in the interpretation of the universe through the lens of quantum theory. The advancement of quantum theory is dependent on a coherent interpretation of its metaphysical considerations. Two distinct schools have emerged that attempt to justify the state of the quantum universe: the Copenhagen Interpretation and the Many Worlds Interpretation. Until recently, experimental differentiation of the two models of the universe was inconceivable. This essay attempts to give an overview of the current debate, with reference to emerging ideas in quantum cosmology and the reconsideration of quantum non-locality. This essay also attempts to show that preliminary indications support the Many Worlds Interpretation as a definitive model of the Universe.

Quantum theory has revealed the microscopic world to be truly strange. It has shattered the foundation of two thousand years of progress in physics, and shown the pioneering work of Newton and even Einstein to be a limiting case of a much greater theory that shares little in common with its classical predecessor. Quantum theory has broken with the Laplacian deterministic model of the Universe, replacing it with intrinsic uncertainty and counterintuitive dualities. As a mathematical model of the Universe, quantum theory is immensely powerful: the statistical predictions of quantum theory have been tested to within one part in ten billion.¹ Quantum theory accurately explains phenomena such as electricity and nuclear reactions and is routinely used in computing and engineering applications.² Yet competing interpretations of quantum theory exist, most notably the Copenhagen

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¹ M Kaku, *Parallel world*, 1st edn, Doubleday, New York, 2005, p. 153.

² P Davies, 'The quantum factor', *God and the new physics*, Dent, London, 1983, p. 101.

Interpretation and the Many Worlds interpretation. This essay will focus on an examination of the two schools of thought and highlight recent theoretical developments that provide tentative support for the Many Worlds Interpretation.

Introduction to Quantum Theory

Wave-particle duality is defined by the de Broglie wave equation, which states that every particle has an associated wavelength. Light, for example, can be described in terms of discrete packets of energy (later called photons). The wavelength of a particle becomes significant when the mass of the particle is extremely small and thus is not observed in the macroscopic world. *Complementarity* describes the principle that ‘reality’ exists as conjugate variables that are linked through Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. Examples of conjugate variables include position-momentum and wave-particle duality. Any experiment designed to accurately measure one variable excludes the possibility of simultaneous measurement of its conjugate variable.³ The wave function of a particle is a probability function, and as such is a mathematical superposition of all possible quantum states of that particle. Mathematically, the wave function evolves in a deterministic way; however, the physical nature of the wave function is yet to be resolved. The metaphysical implications of distinct interpretations of the wave function have been a principal topic of debate since the inception of quantum theory.

The Copenhagen Interpretation and Many Worlds Interpretation offer the most rigorous formulations of the quantum universe. The Copenhagen Interpretation is an anti-realist explanation of the universe fundamentally dependent on the act of observation. It presents a ‘single history’ view of the world in which elementary particles exist as potentialities and are actualised through measurement.⁴ The various

³ J Faye, ‘Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics’, in EN Zalata (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2002 Edition).

⁴ D Page, ‘Can quantum cosmology give observational consequences of Many Worlds Quantum theory?’, in 8th Canadian Conference on General Relativity and Relativistic Astrophysics, *General relativity and relativistic astrophysics*, Montreal, 1999, pp. 225-232.

Many Worlds theories present a deterministic view of the Universe based on the realisation of all possible quantum outcomes of an experiment in distinct parallel worlds. The observer does not assume a privileged position within Many Worlds theories.⁵

Until recently, it was widely held by the international physics community that the differences between the Copenhagen and Many Worlds interpretations were purely metaphysical: no experiment could empirically distinguish between the two theories.⁶ However, a re-examination of Bell's Theorem and recent developments in quantum cosmology are providing speculative evidence in support of Many Worlds theories.

The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum theory proposes the collapse of the wave function as the mechanism by which reality springs into concrete existence.⁷ The wave function is collapsed by the act of observation.⁸ The state in which an elementary particle materialises depends on the nature of the observation. Bohr, Schrödinger, Heisenberg and Born championed this interpretation.⁹ Bohr postulated that the wave function was not physically real, and noted that the inclusion of imaginary quantities in the mathematical formalisation of quantum theory reduced the concept of the wave function to a symbolic representation for calculating the probability amplitude for the outcome of experiments.¹⁰ Prior to measurement, elementary particles exist as *ghosts* or potentialities, a superposition of complementary variables.¹¹ An observation forces the collapse of the wave function, resulting in the manifestation of the particle in a determinate form. The Copenhagen Interpretation posits the observer external to the quantum world such

⁵ Note that in this essay, references to the 'Many Worlds Interpretation' are referring to the Everett-De-Witt – Graham version and all subsequent modifications.

⁶ Page, *General relativity and relativistic astrophysics*, pp. 225-232.

⁷ Faye.

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ Kaku, pp. 151-52.

¹⁰ Faye.

¹¹ Davies, p. 103.

that the observer exists in the macroscopic world where classical physics essentially holds.¹²

The Many Worlds Interpretation was first proposed by Everett in 1957 and popularised in the Everett-DeWitt-Graham version¹³. The Many Worlds Interpretation assumes that the laws of quantum theory apply equally to the observed as well as the observer.¹⁴ The inevitable implication is that an observer can be considered as a quantum entity, and thus exists in a superposition of possible quantum states. The classical world does not exist even at the macroscopic level. In the Many Worlds Interpretation, the wave function is real but does not collapse as a result of observation. Every outcome of non-zero probability of a quantum interaction occurs, via decoherence of the probabilistic states of the elements involved into parallel worlds.¹⁵ Once separated, the worlds cannot interact. The state of existence of elementary particles thus depends on the world in which the observation occurs. In Many Worlds theories, the probability of a quantum event translates to a measure of the magnitude of the world in which the event in question occurs, the ‘measure of existence’.¹⁶ Steven Weinberg describes the Many Worlds Interpretation using the analogy of tuning in to a radio station.¹⁷ Despite the multitude of radio-frequency signals that pervade most space on Earth, only one frequency can be tuned in to at one time. Thus we can only ‘tune’ into one Universe of infinitely many within what has come to be known as the Multiverse.

¹² FJ Tipler, ‘Does quantum non-locality exist? Bell’s Theorem and the Many Worlds Interpretation’, *Quantum Physics, Abstracts*, arXiv:quant-ph/0003146, 2000.

¹³ Page, *General relativity and relativistic astrophysics*, pp. 225-232.

¹⁴ Tipler, arXiv:quant-ph/0003146.

¹⁵ V Lev, ‘Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics’ in EN Zalata (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition)*.

¹⁶ D Page, *General relativity and relativistic astrophysics*, pp. 225-232.

¹⁷ Kaku, p. 170.

Quantum Non-locality

The Copenhagen Interpretation

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox was formulated to challenge the Copenhagen doctrine that the physical properties of quantum particles are actualised through observation, and thus have no observer-independent reality.¹⁸ The *Gedanken* can be summarised as follows: assume that you have a coupled photon system with a net spin angular momentum of zero.¹⁹ The photons are decoupled and allowed to travel until they are a considerable distance apart. Let one photon be located in region A and the second in region B. The ingenuity of the experiment lies in the assumption that if you can measure the spin of the photon in region A, by conservation of spin angular momentum, the spin of photon in region B can be known instantaneously. Therefore, the principle of non-locality must be applied to the problem to obtain a consistent solution. The paradox is highly problematic for quantum theory, due in large part to the implication that information must have travelled faster than the speed of light, violating special relativity.²⁰ It also forces quantum mechanics to depart from the locality principle of classical physics, a principle assumed to be as fundamental as the Galilean relativity. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen assumed that 'action at a distance' was an absurd result and concluded that the photon in region B must have had definite spin independent of observation.²¹ Hence quantum mechanics provides an incomplete description of the deterministic physical world.

Einstein's solution was to postulate the existence of subquantum theory and invoke the notion of 'hidden variables' that interacted with microscopic particles.²² He believed that a developed hidden variables theory would provide statistical predictions identical to those of

¹⁸ ND Mermin, 'Is the moon there when nobody looks? Reality and the quantum theory', in R Boyd, P Gasper & JD Trout (eds), *The Philosophy of Science*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 501-16.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ Tipler, arXiv:quant-ph/0003146.

²¹ Mermin, p. 501.

²² Kaku, p. 175.

quantum mechanics but remove quantum uncertainty from the framework of physics. Bohr counters Einstein's conclusion by denying that the two particles are separated, arguing that until an observation is made that the two particles exist as a single potentiality and interact accordingly when the first measurement of spin occurs.²³

John Bell conceived of a decisive test in the 1960s to distinguish experimentally between the predictions of quantum mechanics and those of hidden variables theories.²⁴ Bell's discovery was that the level of correlation between the two spatially separated particles was limited by an upper bound if hidden variables existed. If quantum mechanics fully described the microscopic world, this upper bound did not exist²⁵. Bell's Theorem, or Bell's Inequality, became the most important theorem in quantum physics for the remainder of the 20th century.²⁶ Authoritative experimental testing of Bell's Theorem was conducted in the early 1980s.²⁷ Hidden variables theories were repeatedly discredited, leading to the inevitable conclusion that quantum non-locality was yet another bizarre aspect of the quantum world.

Many Worlds Interpretation

Quantum non-locality remains an uneasy aspect of quantum theory. However, it can be abolished if Bell's Theorem is reinterpreted within the definitions of the Many Worlds Interpretation. Tipler presents a mathematical argument that demonstrates that if two observers happen to record identical directions for the spin measurement of the separated photons, the observers will bifurcate into two worlds.²⁸ The mathematical formalism of Tipler's argument is beyond the scope of this essay, but it is suffice to say that, in each world, the observers will record opposite spin projections for each photon. Locality is hence preserved because all possible outcomes of the quantum experiment are

²³ Davies, p. 105.

²⁴ Mermin, p. 503.

²⁵ Davies, p. 105.

²⁶ G Zukav, *The dancing Wu-Li masters – An overview of the new physics*, Morrow, New York, 1979, p. 282; cited in Mermin, p. 504.

²⁷ Davies, p. 106.

²⁸ Tipler, arXiv:quant-ph/0003146.

actualised independently of the measurement of either photon. Furthermore, Tipler argues that a third measurement takes place within the Many Worlds Interpretation. The comparison of the two spin measurements after the measurement has occurred critically confirms the original splitting and thus the zero spin angular momentum final state in each parallel world. In Bell's original paper, the third measurement is not considered to be a quantum interaction as it takes place in the macroscopic (classical) world. Furthermore, Bell's theorem relies on the collapse of the wave function to derive the inequality. Thus quantum non-locality appears to apply only if the Universe has a unique, universal, single history, as the Copenhagen Interpretation holds.²⁹

Quantum Cosmological Models

Generally, quantum cosmologists advocate the Many Worlds Interpretation because it does not require an external observer to collapse the wave function of the Universe.³⁰ The Many Worlds Interpretation allows for the wave function of the Multiverse to represent the superposition of Universes that have diverged due to quantum interactions. The Many Worlds Interpretation may be empirically distinguishable from the Copenhagen Interpretation on this cosmological scale.³¹ Probability may ultimately determine which version is correct.³² In the Copenhagen or single history version; the probability of an event being observed is given by its quantum measure.³³ In Many Worlds models, the number of observations occurring in each world history additionally weights the probability of a random observation occurring. Thus the probabilities for a random observation occurring can vary according to the number of observers in each world. These probabilities are distinct from the probabilities

²⁹ Page, *General relativity and relativistic astrophysics*, pp. 225-232.

³⁰ Lev.

³¹ Page, *General relativity and relativistic astrophysics*, pp. 225-232.

³² D Page, 'Observational consequences of Many-Worlds quantum theory', *Quantum Physics, Abstracts*, arXiv:quant-ph/9904004, vol. 2, 1999.

³³ Page, *General relativity and relativistic astrophysics*, pp. 225-232.

calculated within the Copenhagen Interpretation. Don Page presents the following model of a Multiverse to illustrate such distinctions:³⁴

Quantum Cosmology Model I

World 1 has observers; probability of this observation is 10^{-100}

World 2 has no observers; probability of this observation is $1 - 10^{-100}$

A Copenhagen Interpretation of this model concludes that the probability of World 1 is so small that observing such a world would be evidence against the initial presumption that the Copenhagen Interpretation is valid. In a Many Worlds Interpretation, all possibilities of non-zero probability occur, thus the existence of World 1 is expected, however improbable.

Quantum Cosmology Model II

Quantum cosmology model II compares the probability of observing the universe in its expansion or collapse stage with the number of observers existing in each phase:

World A has 10^{10} observers during collapse, probability of collapse equal to $1 - 10^{-30}$.

World B has 10^{90} observers during expansion; probability of expansion equal to 10^{-30} .

In the Copenhagen Interpretation, the probability of observing an expanding universe is extremely small. In a Many Worlds Interpretation, the probability of observing an expanding universe is given by its quantum prediction multiplied by the number of observers. Thus the total number of observations of World B is expected to be 10^{60} , which is 10^{50} times greater than the expected number of observations of World A, given the same reasoning. Thus if the Many Worlds Interpretation is correct, a random observation of the universe is expected to occur within its expansionary phase rather than its collapse phase.

³⁴ *ibid.*

Whilst Page's model appears to be a useful analytical tool in establishing the veracity of competing quantum theories, it must also be emphasized that it is, thus far, purely hypothetical. It is not yet possible to calculate the quantum probabilities of the universe. Further problems arise: for instance, the model assumes a closed universe such that a collapse will occur, whereas evidence currently suggests that our universe is open and will continue to expand indefinitely.³⁵ Page does not claim to offer a comprehensive 'explanation' of the universe with his model; instead he acknowledges that the model simply outlines one feasible possibility to experimentally test the Copenhagen Interpretation against the Many Worlds Interpretation.

Despite promising developments in quantum cosmology and quantum non-locality, the nature of the reality of elementary particles remains ambiguous in quantum theory. The Copenhagen Interpretation is currently the dominant reading, though support for the Many Worlds model is growing.³⁶ Proponents of the Many Worlds Interpretation must accept that the model dictates an infinity of alternate selves coexisting but non-interacting in the Multiverse. Universes exist in which you were never born, and every observation you make of a quantum interaction forces you to split into two worlds, following lineages that continue to diverge. The Many Worlds Interpretation is immensely counterintuitive, but this by no means establishes that it is incorrect. Consider, for example, Richard Feynman's words: 'Every new idea takes a generation or two until it becomes obvious...'³⁷

³⁵ Kaku, p. 288.

³⁶ Lev.

³⁷ RP Feynman, *International Journal of Theoretical Physics*, vol. 21, 1982, p. 471; cited in Mermin, p. 515.

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TRUTH, FICTION, TRADITION: HOMER AND TROY

*Russell Buzby**

Unlike Patroklos, we cannot be so certain about many issues concerning, and related to, the Iliad and its composer, Homer. We cannot say with any certainty that the Trojan War even happened. We do not know how Homer knows about the Trojan War or whether his version of the war is accurate or not. We have little idea of what might have triggered such a war, or who it actually involved. Despite this significant dearth of evidence from the Late Bronze Age, making arguments ex silentio is unacceptable: there is enough extant evidence to support the claim that, towards the end of the Late Bronze Age, there was a Mycenaean attack against the city of Troy.

*'... put away in your heart this other thing that I tell you.
You yourself are not one who shall live long, but now already
death and powerful destiny are standing beside you,
to go down under the hands of Aikos' great son, Achilleus'.*

16.851-854

Introduction

Until the rediscovery of Troy by Heinrich Schliemann in 1870, the most pertinent issue in arguing the case for a Mycenaean attack on Troy was the dearth of archaeological evidence to lend weight to Homer's *Iliad*. Since then, archaeological excavations around Turkey and Greece have uncovered a wealth of evidence which lends weight to the argument that Mycenaeans *did* launch an attack against the city of Troy. This evidence – including Hittite treaties and letters in Bogazköy, as well as more recent work done at the site of Hisarlık – all tends to support the hypothesis that there was a Mycenaean attack on Troy in the Late Bronze Age. When coupled with evidence acquired from the *Iliad* itself,

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one can confidently argue the case for an attack by a combined force of the Mycenaeans against the Trojans and their allies. The evidence for this proposition can be divided into two main categories: literary evidence (from the Hittite documents and the *Iliad*) and the archaeological evidence (from excavations at Hisarlık and in Greece). This evidence can conclusively answer questions which have been disquieting historians since Troy was rediscovered in 1870, including: What does the evidence available to us prove about the Trojan War? What triggered the Trojan War? How can we dismiss the objections that many scholars have to the premise that the Trojan War was a real historical event? First, we must turn our attentions to the evidence available to us in the Hittite documents, before we examine the archaeological evidence from Troy itself, the archaeological evidence from mainland Greece and finally the evidence within the *Iliad*. Throughout this, the opposing arguments will, be discussed and rebuffed.

The most troubling issue for historians studying the *Iliad*, Troy and the historicity of the Trojan War has been the identification of the site of Hisarlık. Can we know if Hisarlık once was Troy? As the archaeological excavations at Hisarlık cannot deliver to us the town's ancient or original name, we must turn to external written evidence. For centuries all we had was the reminiscences of a blind poet who lived at least five centuries after the Trojan War was said to have happened. In other words

If neither the epic itself nor any other sources provide any indication that Troy may be identified with one of the settlements on the hill of Hisarlık, this means there is no evidence at all, since archaeology possesses absolutely no evidence. Furthermore, if the authenticity of the city of Troy and the Trojan War cannot be confirmed in the epic itself or on the basis of other evidence, this means that the question of the historical authenticity of the city and the war is a false one, since there is no possibility of proof from archaeology.¹

¹ R Hachmann; cited by J Latacz, *Troy and Homer*, (trans. by K Windle & R Ireland), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 18.

Unfortunately we can distil nothing from archaeology alone. Yet there is little else to help us. There are no Linear B documents, no cuneiform tablets, no stellae marked 'Troy'. The *Iliad*, 'combined with increasing precision in the evaluation of the archaeological results and thus a narrowing of the gap between these and the textual information'² pointed to Hisarlık being one and the same with Homer's Troy. However, there was still a severe lack of any precise proof regarding this. Short of finding a Trojan archive or library of clay tablets (inscribed with either cuneiform or even Linear B), we have no choice but to make-do with what evidence we have on hand: namely the *Iliad*, and the Hittite documents from Bogazköy.

Hittites and Mycenaeans

The first set of documents we shall examine is the collection of Hittite documents – consisting of letters and treaties – made by the Hittite kings to their contemporaries, and found in the archives of the Hittite capital, Bogazköy. The Hittites can provide a useful source of information on an historical Trojan War, as they flourished with the conjectured end of the Trojan civilisation. According to the archaeological evidence, the Hittite empire stretched from the headwaters of the Tigris in the east, to the Orontes and Syria in the south, and to the Aegean in the west. According to the Old Testament, Solomon exported goods to the Hittites, while the Israelites could call upon the Hittite and Egyptian kings as allies in times of war.³ The Hittites have also been identified in contemporary Egyptian documents, such as the account of the Battle of Kadesh, as well as diplomatic correspondences discovered in Tell el Amarna. Therefore, one would expect the Hittites to have had some contact, albeit limited, with the Mycenaeans, especially considering their influence, and perhaps

² *ibid.*

³ 2 Chronicles 1:17, *The Holy Bible NIV*, International Bible Society, Colorado Springs, 1984; 2 Kings 7:6, *The Holy Bible NIV*, International Bible Society, Colorado Springs, 1984.

conflict, on the western shores of Asia Minor.⁴ One would also expect that such a civilisation, based as it was on mainland Greece – and which could launch and orchestrate an attack against the heavily fortified city of Troy – would have been noticed by its neighbours. Considering these circumstances: that the Greeks were ‘trading in ports subject to Hittite rule, supplying friends and enemies of the Hittites, making new homes on the fringes of Hittite dominion [then] *surely there was a good hope that the Greeks might be found in ten thousand Hittite documents*’.⁵ But what were these Hittite documents? Thousands of clay tablets – marked with an unknown Indo-European language, written in a cuneiform script – discovered in the Hittite palace at Bogazköy are testament to the intricate international relations that the Hittite kingdom had with its neighbours. They were discovered between 1906 and 1908, by Hugo Winckler, and finally deciphered by Friedrich Hrozný in 1915. Shortly afterwards, in 1924, Emil Forrer announced that he had found mention of the Greeks in these Hittite tablets. The debate began in earnest, and continues still.

By translating the Hittite documents, scholars were able to discern possible mentions of the Greeks of the Late Bronze Age. Thus, they claimed, the Hittites corresponded with the Mycenaeans, and that they mentioned the likes of Atreus, Paris, the island of Lesbos, perhaps Troy, and possibly even the Trojan War itself.⁶ These references are derived from various toponyms detected in the Hittite documents, which have been attacked and debunked by many historians. These toponyms are claimed to be Greek words that have been ‘translated’ into Hittite (and vice versa) and in the process altered slightly. So that instead of Ilios, we find Wilusa; instead of Alexandros, we have Alaksandu, and instead of Achaia we have Ahhiyawa.⁷ This last elucidation derives from a

⁴ The Hittites were decidedly introverted and, being a continentally-centred empire, preferred to have little overseas contact; while the Mycenaeans were obviously a sea-faring civilisation: their remains have been found as far away as Crete and Troy.

⁵ DL Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1959, p. 2. My emphasis.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Emil Forrer was the first to propose the ‘toponym’ argument. It was later revised and consolidated by Fritz Schachermeyr in *Hethiter und Achäer*; for an examination of their theses, see pp. 2-6 and pp. 23-26.

particular Hittite document – a treaty for mutual protection made between Muwatalli II and the ruler of Wilusa – namely the Alaksandu Treaty.⁸ In it, Alaksandu, the ruler of the vassal state of Wilusa, is thereafter obliged to ‘march out on [Muwatalli’s] side with infantry and chariotry’ while in return the Hittite king promises to ‘not abandon [Alaksandu] ... if some enemy arises for you ... and I will kill the enemy on your behalf’.⁹ This treaty also names Alaksandu as the king of a small vassal state known to us only as Wilusa. Since 1924 this state has been equated with the Homeric alternative for Troy, Ilios.¹⁰ *Ilios* was simply a substitute to *Troia*, one which Homer used over a hundred times in the *Iliad*,¹¹ as well as obviously supplying the title of his epic poem. According to the rules of Greek phonetics, it has also been established that, in pre-Homeric Greek dialects, there was often a digamma or ‘w’ which was later dropped during the transition to Homeric Greek. Thus it is established ‘beyond dispute that the original toponym ... [used] before Homer, was “Wilios”’.¹² By the time that Homer composed his poem, the digamma had been discontinued in Greek; thus the name (W)Ilios predates Homer’s composition. Nonetheless, it seems attractive to equate Wilios with Wilusa, more so because the Hittite Alaksandu ‘unmistakably echoed the Greek *Aléxandros*, and Alexander (Paris) in the *Iliad* is the first-born prince of Troy’.¹³ Thus it is tempting to accept these linguistic equations: Wilusa = Ilios; Alaksandu = Alexandros; Ahhiyawa = Achaia; Millawanda = Miletos. However, on nothing more than this similarity, we cannot confidently claim that ‘we have surviving letters written to Agamemnon himself, and a treaty with the real Alexander of Ilios’.¹⁴

⁸ CTH 76, sec. 14, translated by F Starke, ‘Troia im Kontext des historisch-politischen und sprachlichen Umfeldes Kleinasiens im 2. Jahrtausend’, *Studia Troica*, p. 7 and p. 472; cited by Latacz, p. 75.

⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰ P Kretschmer, ‘Alakšanduš, König von Viluša’, *Glotta*, p. 13 205-13 213; cited by Latacz, p. 75.

¹¹ Latacz, p. 267. ‘Ilios’ is used 106 times, while ‘Troy’ is used merely 49.

¹² Latacz, p. 75.

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 76.

¹⁴ M Wood, *In Search of the Trojan War*, BBC Books, London, 2003, p. 169.

Ilios or Wilusa ... or *both*?

There is more to this argument, though, than the mere phonetic similarity between Wilusa and Ilios. Kretschmer's view has been supported by the discovery of additional Hittite documents which mention Wilusa. Scholars have thus far been reserved about wholly embracing his 'equations' hypothesis: Gurney wrote, on the one hand, that 'phonetically none of these equations is altogether impossible'.¹⁵ Yet we sense an overwhelming hesitation concerning the adoption of Kretschmer's hypothesis. This is mostly due simply to Hittite geography, or rather, our very sketchy map of the Hittite world. The Hittites mention a vast number of place-names, which may or may not be the names of towns, cities or vassal states. We are not given any indication of their location, direction or position, and 'so long as the greater problem of Hittite geography remains unsolved, the arguments for the location of Wilusa cannot be regarded as conclusive'.¹⁶ However, in the last decade of excavations and studies, 'this objection has lost its validity. We now know for certain that "Wilusa" and "Wilios" are one and the same'.¹⁷ This conclusion can be discerned from information couched in the diplomatic Alaksandu Treaty:

Formerly at one time the *labarna* (honorary title of the Hittite Great King), my ancestor, had made all of the land of Arzawa [and] *all of the land of Wilussa* (political) clients. Later the land of Arzawa waged war because of this; but since the event was long ago, I do not know from which king of the land of Hattusa the land of Wilusa defected. But (even) if the land of Wilussa defected from the land of Hattusa, they (the Royal Clan of Wilussa) remained on terms of friendship with the kings of the land of Hattusa from afar and regularly sent envoys to them.¹⁸

¹⁵ OR Gurney, *The Hittites*, Penguin Books, London, 1952, p. 57.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 58.

¹⁷ Latacz, p. 76.

¹⁸ CTH 76, sec. 14, translated by F Starke, 'Troia im Kontext des historisch-politischen und sprachlichen Umfeldes Kleinasiens im 2. Jahrtausend', *Studia Troica*, p. 7 and p. 472; cited by Latacz, p. 75. My emphasis.

One can conclude from this that Wilusa and Arzawa had some sort of alliance, or at least were associated in some sort of way, and at some point in the distant past rebelled against their Hittite overlords. It is also obvious, from this passage, and later references, that from the reign of Tudhaliya I (1420-1400 BC) until the time of writing, during the reign of Muwatalli II (1290-1272 BC), there existed a state of relative peace between the Hittites and the vassal state of Wilusa, over almost 150 years. Also noticeable is the nature of their relationship: it is one where Wilusa was subordinate to Bogazköy, instead of it being an equal power. Despite this, it is manifest that Wilusa remained independent and autonomous city, and maintained contact with the Hittite capital via 'envoys'. Finally, the treaty mentions the conquest of Wilusa and Arzawa by the eponymous ancestor of the Hittite kings, Anitta, known only by his epithet, '*labarna*'.¹⁹ One can conclude, therefore, that Wilusa and Arzawa were linked somehow in the eyes of the Hittites. But where were they? The Hittites either took their location for granted, or we have simply lost any listing which might hint at their locality. Garstang cogently put it forward that

The imperial archives of the Hittite kings include numerous records ... [which] even when lucidly translated from the Hittite idiom, remain for the most part unintelligible, or at least deprived of their essential value, for want of a reliable map whereby the setting and scale of the episodes described may be appreciated.²⁰

Ultimately, the greatest extent of knowledge in this area derives from lists of place-names and extremely vague ideas of their locales. Decades of effort, the use of toponyms and the discovery of new Hittite documents still left scholars with an unsatisfactory map of at least the west coast of Turkey. The Annals of Tudhaliya I provided a list of vassal states and petty kingdoms which lay to the west of the Hittite empire, listing them in order from south to north. The list concerns states that are part of the 'lands of Assuwa' which revolted against the Hittite king after his defeat of Arzawa. But where were these lands of Assuwa?

¹⁹ Latacz, p. 78.

²⁰ J Garstang & OR Gurney, *The Geography of the Hittite Empire*, p. vii; cited by Latacz, p. 79.

Some facts may elucidate an answer: (1) visible among the collaborators are the realms of Lukka and Karkisa, which are known to be near the south coast; (2) these lands must be extensive if they can oppose the Hittite king, *and* provide him with 10,000 infantry and 600 chariots as prisoners; (3) most of the names on the list were unknown to us at the time of the tablet's discovery, and the only bare expanse on the map lay in Asia Minor's north-western region, namely the Troad.²¹ The conclusion is that Assuwa lies to the north of Arzawa. The list of the petty kingdoms and vassal states that comprise Assuwa name these from south to north, beginning with some vassals which bordered Arzawa to the north, such as Sēha and Haballa, and moving north to our still yet unlocated setting for the *Iliad*, Wilusa. This located Wilusa in the Troad; that is, in the region in which Ilios is said to have been, and Hisarlık is today.

To continue this speculation of whether Ilios was Wilusa is pointless without being sure that Ilios is where we think it is. That is to say, the more pertinent question here is: Is Hisarlık the site of Ilios, the city of Troy, the city that formed the backdrop to the *Iliad*? In answer, 'is it possible that Hittite texts will yield the proof?'.²² And indeed they do. Any more definite 'identification of Wilusa with "Ilios" [and of course with Hisarlık], given our present state of knowledge, remains fraught with problems, from both a linguistic and a geographic perspective'.²³ That is, until Frank Starke proved convincingly that 'the pile of ruins on the Dardanelles, whose once-proud predecessor Homer calls by turns "Troy" and "Ilios", really was the remains of that centre of power in north-western Asia Minor', known to the Hittites as Wilusa.²⁴ Recently discovered documents, such as a bronze tablet from Bogazköy – which contained a treaty between Tudhaliya IV and his cousin that gave a very detailed exposition of geography in Asia Minor, especially in the west and north-west – as well as a letter from the king of Sēha to Muwatalli II

²¹ Page, p. 103f.

²² J Cobet, 'Gab es den Trojanischen Krieg?', *Antike Welt*, vol. 25, 1994, p. 12; cited by Latacz, p. 19.

²³ S Heinhold-Krahmer, *Arzawa: Untersuchungen zu seiner Geschichte nach den hethitischen Quellen*, p. 167; cited by Latacz, p. 81f.

²⁴ Latacz, p. 82.

concerning the adventures of the swashbuckling Piyamaradu, allowed Starke to make his hypothesis. The latter piece of evidence was that the island of Lazba was visible from both Wilusa *and* Sēha. Lazba has been identified as the island of Lesbos, which is still ‘plainly visible off the north coast of Asia Minor’.²⁵ It was this final piece of information that allowed us to come to the conclusion that had been eluding scholars ever since Hrozný deciphered Hittite: that the site in modern Turkey, known as Hisarlık, ‘was known in Hittite in the second millennium BC as *Wilusa* and in Greek as *Ilios*’.²⁶

Now that we can safely say that the site of Hisarlık was Troy we must ask ourselves: when did this Trojan War happen? We can safely assume that it occurred before Homer wrote the *Iliad*, but how much earlier? Troy was continuously settled from around 3600 BC – though the major urbanisation of Troy only began in 2500 BC with Troy II – and throughout its history, has undergone a number of resettlements, including a Classical Greek settlement, and a Roman settlement – New Ilium. The Troys that concern us, however, number from Troy II to Troy VII. Conventional dating, as well as archaeological records from around the Mediterranean, puts the destruction of the Troy that Homer writes of somewhere between 1250-1180 BC; that is, at some point during the Late Helladic IIIB period of the Late Bronze Age. Unfortunately, there are two Troys in this period which show signs of meeting a violent end, both destroyed by fire. We can thus discount earlier hypotheses that placed the Homeric Troy in Troy I or II as far too early (respectively 3000-2500 BC and 2500-2200 BC).²⁷ More recent studies have narrowed Homer’s Troy to either Troy VI or Troy VIIa. They were both destroyed at the end of LHIII, Troy VI in 1300 BC (the end of LHIIIB), and Troy VIIa only forty years later, in 1260 BC (the end of LHIIIB). Troy VI, discovered by Wilhelm Dörpfeld, was thought to have been Homer’s Troy: it had a great tower of Ilios,²⁸ next to a set of Skaian gates,²⁹ neither

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 83.

²⁶ *ibid.*

²⁷ C Blegen, *Troy and the Trojans*, Thames & Hudson, London, 1966, p. 174.

²⁸ Homer, *The Iliad* (trans. By R Lattimore), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961.

²⁹ *Il.* 6.393.

of which would have been visible in Homer's lifetime.³⁰ Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the next settlement, Troy VIIa was the one involved in the Trojan War. Blegen argues that only Troy VIIa was destroyed by man;³¹ Troy VI was destroyed by earthquake, and hastily rebuilt.³² There was no evidence of fighting or fire in Troy VI, yet in Troy VIIa there was evidence of a great conflagration, as well as some small fragments of human remains, such as a body with a crushed skull, left in a street. Using Furumark's dating system from pottery, as Blegen does,³³ we can safely conclude that, within reasonable doubt, Troy VI ended at the transition between Mycenaean III A to III B (that is, 1300 BC), and that Troy VIIa ended not long after, in 1250 BC, if not earlier.³⁴ Whatever the date, there is little doubt that the settlement of Hisarlık, which was once known as Ilios, was destroyed violently by a marauding force, whom Homer calls the Achaians.

The Land of Ahhiyawa: Agamemnon's Kingdom?

Having conclusively proven that Hisarlık is Ilios is Wilusa, we must turn our attention towards the 'other side' of the Trojan War: the Achaians. Can we prove that Ahhiyawa was simply the Hittite term for Achaia, one of the three words that Homer uses to describe the attacking Greeks.³⁵ Again, the simple phonetic similarity is just not enough; again it will prove unacceptable to argue that Ahhiyawa was Achaia due to no more than their linguistic resemblance. By placing too much faith in these toponyms, an historian can be led down dangerous paths. Page plays devil's advocate with this issue: 'suppose the country in question had some quite different name ... nobody would then have looked for connections with the Greeks ... and we should not have found in the documents a single fact inconsistent with that opinion'.³⁶

³⁰ Wood, p. 143.

³¹ Blegen, p. 161.

³² *ibid.*, p 144.

³³ *ibid.*, p 160.

³⁴ Troy VIIa had many fragments of Mycenaean III A, but most of the finds were of III B. It also has Grey Minyan Ware, not dissimilar to that of Phase VIh. Blegen, p. 160.

³⁵ That is, Achaians, Danaans, and Argives.

³⁶ Page, p. 4, where he uses the argument from F Sommer, 'Ahhijavā und kein Ende?', *Indogermanische Forschungen*, vol. 55, 1937, p. 286f.

But where was this land of Ahhiyawa? Yet again, the Hittite documents will not prove to be conclusive or forthright in answering this. The word 'Ahhiyawa' is mentioned in only twenty texts – disappointingly few considering the number that we would expect if Ahhiyawa and Troy (or rather, Wilusa) were involved in a ten year siege.³⁷ In fact, the most common conclusion is discouraging for our hypothesis: nothing in the Hittite texts actually indicates that the Hittites

knew anything about the structure of Greece or about the details of Mycenaean politics. It is quite clear from the extensive diplomatic records of the Hittite kings that their active international negotiations never reached mainland Greece. *There is no mention of any place or people which can be safely connected with Greece ...*³⁸

An unexpected source will come to our aid in this matter: Homer's *Iliad*. Up to this point we have studiously avoided Homer, trying to prove the case for a Mycenaean attack against Troy solely using external evidence. Here, though, he will prove useful. As mentioned above, he uses three different and interchangeable terms for the combined forces of the Greeks attacking Troy: Achaians, Danaans and Argives.³⁹ The first we have already met; the other two we will shortly use to further our case. First, though, we must ask ourselves: Why does Homer use three terms for the Greeks that bear no relation to any words the Greeks called themselves,⁴⁰ and which had fallen out of general usage by Homer's time?⁴¹ The one logical conclusion which offers itself to us is that all three names have their origins in the historical background to the Trojan War, and were preserved as such in the oral tradition – from where they

³⁷ MI Finley, 'The Trojan War', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 84, 1964, p. 4.

³⁸ AE Samuel, *The Mycenaeans in History*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1966, p. 123. My emphasis.

³⁹ Cf. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (trans. by R Warner), Penguin Books, London, 1972, 1.3.

⁴⁰ Generally, the Greeks called themselves Hellenes. Nowhere in the *Iliad* is this used to describe the unified Greeks; it is used instead to describe the men from a part of Peleus' kingdom and under the command of Achilleus (*Il.*, 2.681-685).

⁴¹ Latacz, p. 121. Apparently 'it is highly likely that none [of these names] had ever existed [as collective terms for the Greeks] except in bardic poetry'.

reach us via Homer and the *Iliad*. This is similar to the fact that Homer has two interchangeable yet discrete and unrelated names for the besieged city; Troy and Ilios. As we have seen Ilios came to him from the historical pastiche of the Late Bronze Age, and was preserved for us by the Hittite documents. There was no conceivable motive for inventing any of these names, especially considering their historical milieu. Linguistically, it must be remembered that, during Mycenaean times, 'Achaia' would probably have been pronounced with a digamma, much the same as (W)Ilios; thus Homer's Achaia would have been Agamemnon's Achaiwia.⁴² Whilst equating Ahhiyawa with Achaia is now generally accepted, it must be noted that this acceptance is generally *linguistic* not *geographic*. That is, most scholars will recognise that Ahhiyawa was the Hittite word for a powerful land, later known as Achaia. This name was used by Homer, centuries later, to describe the combined attacking forces in the *Iliad*. The issue is that Homer and the Hittites were possibly referring to completely different places. While Ahhiyawa *might* have been Mycenaean, there is no telling whether it was located on the Greek mainland, or on an island closer to Asia Minor, such as Rhodes, or possibly even on the coast of Asia Minor itself, such as Miletos.⁴³ Thus the relationship between Ahhiyawa and Achaia must be based on more than mere similarity – for Ahhiyawa to actually *be* Achaia (that is, the Greek mainland and centre of Mycenaean power) it must be proven, using the Hittite description of Ahhiyawa, that it could only be mainland Greece.⁴⁴

The two main bases on which this hypothesis is founded are: (1) the Hittite king Tudhaliya IV cites the king of Ahhiyawa as a Great King, an equal amongst the kings of Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria; and (2) that the kingdom of Ahhiyawa is overseas.⁴⁵ Sommer set out to destroy this hypothesis by arguing that Ahhiyawa cannot be Greece.⁴⁶ He claims that nowhere do the Hittite documents say that Ahhiyawa is located

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ Recent archaeological finds have proven that it was certainly a candidate, being within the Mycenaean sphere of influence.

⁴⁴ Schachermeyr; cited in Page, p. 4.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p. 5

overseas. They may well say that Ahhiyawa had maritime contacts with Syria and Cyprus, and that it controlled parts of the coast of Asia Minor,⁴⁷ but this could be applicable to *any* of the small states which lined the coast of Asia Minor during the Bronze Age. This is a serious problem with our case for a Mycenaean attack against the city of Troy: it would appear that the only external evidence that we have, the Hittite documents, fail to mention Greece, which would be remiss considering the Greek states were allegedly powerful enough to launch a combined attack against Troy and her allies. Finley concludes that the Ahhiyawa ‘with whom the Hittite rulers were concerned was not across the Aegean on the [Greek] mainland but near at hand, an independent island or coastal state, most likely based on Rhodes and possessing some territory of its own in Asia Minor’.⁴⁸ Yet this simply ignores the evidence: in the Annals of Mursili II, he mentions a rebel, Uhaziti, who ‘joined the side of the King of Ahhiyawa’. When Mursili advanced on his position in the land of Arzawa (which we know is on the coast of Asia Minor) Uhaziti fled, and ‘went across the sea to the islands. And therein he stayed ...’. Furthermore, in the famous Tawagalawa letter, the Hittite king Hattusili III engages in lengthy negotiations with the ‘King of Ahhiyawa’ regarding the extradition of another rebel, this time the problematic Piyamaradu, and grandson of Uhaziti.⁴⁹ In it Hattusili vituperates the king of Ahhiyawa for harbouring this Piyamaradu in his lands, which at this time seem to include Millawanda. Hattusili is understandably upset, because ‘your land is affording him protection ... whenever I have prevented him [from raiding my land] he comes back into your territory’. The letter is peppered with expressions such as ‘crossing over’ or ‘by ship’, indicating that the land of Ahhiyawa must have been beyond the sea, and not part of Asia Minor. It also appeared that Piyamaradu was able to quickly move into and out of Ahhiyawa from Millawanda. Combining this with information garnered from an inscription near Izmir, known as the Karabel Inscription, scholars have concluded not only that Millawanda was Miletos (yet another of our toponyms solved), but that ‘there remains no place for this country

⁴⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴⁸ Finley, p. 4.

⁴⁹ Latacz, p. 124f.

[Ahhiyawa] on the Anatolian mainland'.⁵⁰ Quite simply, Ahhiyawa is no longer within the sphere of Anatolian studies: 'it is a Greek region outside Asia Minor, with bridgeheads – Miletos principal among them – on the coast of Asia Minor'.⁵¹ Put simply, 'the only sea power in the eastern Mediterranean was Greece'.⁵² It is now possible to rule out all previous proposals for the location of Ahhiyawa, except for the Greek mainland, including a larger area encompassing the Aegean islands and certain parts of the south-west coast of Asia Minor.⁵³

The Trojan War: *Wie Es Eigentlich Gewesen*

So far we have established that the Hittites knew of a city called Wilusa, which Homer knew as Ilios, and today we call Hisarlık. We also know that the oft-mentioned land of Ahhiyawa was, in fact, mainland Greece. This kingdom was powerful enough to be an equal of the Hittite kings, harbour Hittite rebels, and possibly launch an attack against the Anatolian mainland. Such an attack is mentioned in the *Iliad*. Could the Trojan War have an historical background in the diplomatic relations between the Hittites and Ahhiyawa during the Late Bronze Age? Is it possible that the Hittites even mentioned the Trojan War, which to them was not a ten year siege of epic proportions, but simply an insurgency in a rebellious vassal state, aided by a powerful foreign power which was taking advantage of the Hittites' relative weakness? The Tawagalawa letter hinted at the kingdoms of the Hittites and Ahhiyawa coming to blows over Wilusa, though the tablet is rather fragmented at this point: 'The King of Hatti and [the King of Ahhiyawa] – in that matter of [Wilusa] over which we were at enmity, he has converted me and we have made friends ... a war would not be right for us'. The dating of this letter, during the reign of Hattusili III (1272-1250 BC), brings us close to when the Trojan War is said to have happened. But the fact remains that the letter was fragmentary, and vague on the details of this 'enmity'. Later, the letter may have mentioned that Hatti

⁵⁰ JD Hawkins, 'Tarkasnawa King of Mira: 'Tarkondemos', Boğaz-köy Sealings and Karabel', *Anatolian Studies*, vol. 48, 2000, p. 2.

⁵¹ Latacz, p.125.

⁵² Samuel, p. 125.

⁵³ Latacz, p. 125.

and Ahhiyawa came to a settlement over the issue of Wilusa, over which they had previously fought.⁵⁴ The story, though, does not end there. In a letter to a Hittite king from Manapa-Dattas, king of the Sēha River land just south of Wilusa, we learn that the Hittite army has travelled to Asia Minor, and that someone attacked Wilusa. The Sēha River land has been overrun by Piyamaradu, who has also attacked Lazba. These were dark times indeed, reminiscent of the Linear B tablets from Pylos, which mention the movement of troops, hint at the approach of a nameless enemy, and give instructions for defending the coast. Anatolia was an equally disturbed place at the same time: the Hittite power was waning due to external factors, and the vassal states on its fringes were competing for the spoils. We later hear, in the Annals of Hattusili III (1265-1235 BC), that the Great King of Ahhiyawa himself is present on the coast of Asia Minor, leading a military force, no less. It reads;

The land of the Sēha River again transgressed. [*The people of the Sēha River land then said:*] “His Majesty’s grandfather did not conquer us with the sword. When he conquered the Arzawa lands [*the father of his Majesty*] he did not conquer us with the sword. We have [*no obligation?*] to him.” [*So the Sēha River land*] made war. And the King of Ahhiyawa withdrew. Now when he withdrew, I, the Great King, advanced.⁵⁵

This is surprisingly reminiscent of the tale of the *Iliad*, in which Agamemnon leads a combined *Achaian* force against the city of Troy. While there is little doubt that this proves that the Hittites, at least, knew of the King of Ahhiyawa’s presence in Asia Minor, the operative words translated by Wood as ‘withdrew’ can have several meanings, including ‘relied on’ or ‘take refuge with’.⁵⁶ This would change the entire meaning of the document, though Wood simply acknowledges this variance, and continues in his assumption that the ‘king of Ahhiyawa was present in western Anatolia, and ... that he was lending

⁵⁴ Wood, p. 205.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p. 206.

aid in war to a rebel against the Hittite king'.⁵⁷ Page's reconstruction is similar to that of Wood's, except for their divergence on this last point. For Page, the 'implication is – as we should expect – that the King of Ahhijawā depended on the Hittites to preserve the peace in western Asia Minor, and was attacked by the rebels as being friendly toward to Hittites'.⁵⁸ His complicated, and often confused, background to the Trojan War, is stymied by his faulty dating system, but his hypothesis remains valid: that in the vacuum left in Asia Minor by the retreating Hittites, the local kingdoms, freed from the yoke of being a Hittite vassal state, were vying for pre-eminence in this fertile region, and eventually coalesced into a league under the leadership of Assuwa. It would be logical that Ahhiyawa would soon become involved in such a struggle, realising the economic potential to, say, the city of Wilusa, located as it was near the Dardanelles.⁵⁹ It was in this context that Troy VIIa was destroyed. Finley, though, dismisses these allegations off-hand. He rightly points out that 'it is the *Iliad* which causes us trouble'.⁶⁰ For once, the evidence does not support Homer, but disagrees with him: 'there are large and obvious differences' between the Hittite documents, and the *Iliad*.⁶¹ Page points out that, at least in the *Iliad*, the league opposing the Achaians was led by the Trojans, rather than Assuwa, and that the attacking Achaians are not those from Ahhiyawa, who are familiar to the Hittites, but an expeditionary force from Greece itself.⁶² He acknowledges that these are only differences, not disagreements, though Finley would not agree. His reconstruction of the historical background to the Trojan War is based on the so-called Sea Peoples. At the end of the Late Bronze Age, at the turn of the 12th century BC, there were disturbances from Sicily and Libya in the west, to Babylonia and Assyria in the east. The Hittite empire had crumbled and the Egyptians were under attack. Finley blames this widespread disturbance on 'a massive penetration over a longish period by migrating invaders from the north'.⁶³ In *this* context, 'the most economical hypothesis' for the

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p. 205f.

⁵⁸ Page, p. 108.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, 109f.

⁶⁰ Finley, p. 4.

⁶¹ Page, p. 111.

⁶² *ibid.*

⁶³ Finley, p. 5.

destruction of Troy VIIa is to blame the Sea Peoples.⁶⁴ However, this is no less speculative than Page's hypothesis, and pays little heed to the Hittite documents which clearly state that Ahhiyawa was directly involved with the political and military situation of Asia Minor. The most reasonable conclusion is that, while we might not yet be able to prove that the Trojan War happened the way Homer said it did, we can prove that at least something like it could have happened, and in the same region of Asia Minor.⁶⁵ The Byzantine story left to us by the remains of the Hittite documents at least corroborates parts of the Greek legend; the *Iliad* supplements these documents, without either being mutually exclusive. But are we still left with fundamental differences between fact and fiction, history and tradition?⁶⁶ The answer lies in the Catalogue of Ships, the second half of Book Two of the *Iliad*.⁶⁷

The Catalogue of Ships

So far Homer has been a constant companion on our travels. He was silently lurking throughout our entire discussion on the evidence available to us from the Hittite documents, and he led us – and Schliemann – to Hisarlık. Now we must address him fully; we must pull Homer out of the shadows and into the spotlight of our argument, for no case that is arguing *for* a Mycenaean attack against Troy is complete without an examination of the most prominent evidence of the Trojan War available to us: the epic poem, the *Iliad*. It must first be noted, however, that not long after the Trojan War is said to have happened, at some point just after 1200 BC, the Mediterranean was plunged into what was, essentially, a five century long Dark Age. This was hinted at earlier, in Finley's discussion of the Sea Peoples. During this time much knowledge, civilisation and learning was lost: writing became non-existent and the Mycenaeans disappeared completely under pressure from migrating groups looking for fertile land and larger groups roaming from the north. The effects of this 'invasion' cannot be underestimated: the attacks 'initiated a great wave of migrations, which

⁶⁴ *ibid.*

⁶⁵ Wood, p. 206.

⁶⁶ Finley, p. 4.

⁶⁷ *Il.* 2.494-759.

repeopled most of the Greek peninsula and drove forth many of the previous inhabitants'.⁶⁸ Even Thucydides talks of this period in the introduction to his *History of the Peloponnesian War*: 'there was a series of migrations, as the various tribes, being under the constant pressure of invaders who were stronger than they were, were always prepared to abandon their own territory'.⁶⁹ These invaders, styled 'Dorians' by historians,

brought with them a horror of great darkness, and shakings of the world ... [during this time] there was an end of building great palaces and fortresses; an end of abundant commerce with the rich lands of the eastern Mediterranean. Precious metals and stones were no longer commonly worked; luxuries were no longer in demand; the wonderful arts of Mycenaean Greece were disused or debased ... So wide and profound is the gulf which divides us from the heroic past when we stand on the verge of History in the 8th century BC: the glory that was Mycenaean Greece lies buried under the dismal deposits of the impoverished and parochial Dorians.

All lies buried; all but a single voice, shining like the helm of Achilles,⁷⁰ and illuminating the Mycenaean for us: Homer.

But was Homer's account of the Trojan War, strictly speaking, Mycenaean in inspiration and in essence? We have already seen that the Homeric terms for the Greek aggressors, Achaeans, Danaans and Argives, are essentially historical: they were the words used in the Late Bronze Age by foreigners, such as the Hittites, to describe the Greek peoples. One would expect to find, in a poem dating from the 8th century BC, not these *historical* terms, but names that were current in Greece at the time, such as Aeolians, Ionians, or Boiotians. The point is that these Mycenaean terms for the Greeks are 'not only present [in the *Iliad*], but are even functioning elements of a metrical substitution

⁶⁸ NGL Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 BC*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977, p. 72.

⁶⁹ Thucydides, 1.2.

⁷⁰ *Il.* 19.381-2.

system'.⁷¹ This metrical system obviously derives from the days when the Achaeans existed in historical reality, that is, the Mycenaean age. That is not the only hint that Homer gives us. His names for the besieged city have also been shown to be historical in essence. The fact that he uses two, lends weight to their historicity. 'Troy' and 'Ilios' are simply Greek variants of Hittite names which we have already come across, 'Truwisa' and 'Wilusa'. Concentrating on the less contentious name, we find that the site which we have previously identified as Wilusa is in fact Hisarlık, where excavations show that it was abandoned from 950 BC onwards.⁷² Most scholars have argued that the name Ilios was preserved by local inhabitants for the five centuries until Homer's time. But why would the local, non-Greek, inhabitants preserve the Mycenaean name for their city, instead of their own. Thus, Ilios cannot be a sole 'survivor' of the Dark Ages: it survived *in situ* as part of an epic tradition which dates from Mycenaean times. Latacz goes to some length to prove this point, quite conclusively, by using the metrical evidence from the *Iliad*. Apparently, out of the 106 times 'Ilios' is used, 48 of them make metrical sense if and only if we supply the lost Mycenaean digamma. Actually, in only 11 of the occurrences would the metre of the line be destroyed if we reinserted the digamma. From this, Latacz concludes that Homer neither invented the scene of his poem, nor learnt of it from non-Greek inhabitants of the Troad; he could only have heard it from Greeks who used the dead digamma.⁷³ The most economical explanation for the survival of Mycenaean terms in Homer's poem is that 'they entered Greek hexameter verse in the Mycenaean age itself'.⁷⁴ Thus the world of the attackers in the *Iliad* is distinctly Mycenaean, yet we can adduce this further by examining the Catalogue of Ships.

The startling thing about the Catalogue of Ships is that it preserves the Mycenaean world as it existed before the Dorian invasion. It acts as a 'bedrock of fact, fit to serve as our foundation': the Catalogue of Ships

⁷¹ Latacz, p. 216.

⁷² *ibid.*

⁷³ *ibid.*, p. 217.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p. 218.

completely ignores the Dorian invasion.⁷⁵ The Greek world post-invasion was politically very different to that which came before. Yet Homer's Catalogue mentions real, historical places from Mycenaean Greece. He talks of Thebes, Mycenae, Argos, Tiryns, Orchomenos and sandy Pylos. Archaeological excavations at *all* of these sites have proven their existence during Mycenaean times. All of these cities were thriving centres of commerce and culture in the Late Bronze Age. What is more significant, for our case, is where Homer diverges from what we know today from archaeology, to what he knew of the Mycenaean civilisation in the 8th century BC. It is evident, therefore, that this Catalogue of Ships was the product of an earlier age, rather than a late, bardic, reconstruction, similar to the fact that *Ilios* is not the result of later restoration, but a relic from the Mycenaean age. Latacz proposes that this relic was in the form of a Mycenaean epic poem, called by him, the 'Tale of Troy'. The evidence for this Mycenaean poem lies, as we have already said, in the Catalogue of Ships. For a Catalogue of this sort seems out of place in the narrative of the *Iliad*, which is not actually the Tale of Troy, but the 'Tale of the Quarrel of Achilles'. By the last year of the war, the maritime nature of the expedition is irrelevant; a battle order for an assault against the walls of Troy which numbers the divisions of men by ship is both odd and unnecessary. At two points in the Catalogue, Homer mentions the commander of a contingent and, in the next breath, removes them from the narrative. The first of these is Protesilaos.

Those who held Phylake and Pyrasos of the flowers,
the precinct of Demeter, and Iton, mother of sheepflocks,
Antron by the sea-shore, and Pteleos deep in the meadows,
of these in turn fighting Protesilaos was leader
while he lived; but now the black earth had closed him under
...⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Page, p. 120.

⁷⁶ *Il.* 2.695-9.

We are reminded that Protesilaos died at the beginning of the Trojan War, just after the Achaians had landed, and was the first man to be killed by a Trojan. The next occurrence of this almost instantaneous obliteration of a character occurs just over a dozen lines later. This time it is the story of Philoktetes, who failed to reach Troy, after falling ill 'in Lemnos the sacrosanct, where the sons of Achaians had left him' after being bitten by a water snake.⁷⁷ To Kirk, this seemed to suggest that the Catalogue was part of a poem which concerned itself with a story larger than the Quarrel of Achilles. These two missing Achaians were part of the expeditionary force which left Aulis for Troy, yet never reached it,⁷⁸ and as such they would have been an integral part of this early epic tale, and had to be included in any poem related to Troy. Homer simply circumvents this awkwardness by promptly removing them from *his* tale. This Catalogue, therefore, cannot have been composed solely for the context it currently occupies. Thus a final and decisive proof that this Catalogue was, in essence, Mycenaean, would allow us, once and for all, to show that Homer was not merely using the resources passed down to him through the long centuries of the Dark Ages, but was actually utilising knowledge of the Mycenaean world, preserved in a Mycenaean oral poem. Page puts forward the claim that we can adduce this from the observation 'that many places named in the Catalogue could not be identified by the Greeks themselves in historical times: and that some of them were abandoned before the Dorian occupation and never resettled'.⁷⁹ It is unsurprising to learn that nearly one-quarter of the towns and settlements mentioned in the Catalogue have still never been identified.⁸⁰ From this, Page concludes that 'the names in the Catalogue afford proof positive and unrefuted that the Catalogue offers a truthful, though selective, description of Mycenaean Greece'.⁸¹ Hence we can deduce that (1) Homer's geographical description in the Catalogue derives from Mycenaean times; (2) the original catalogue, which Homer based his on, was compiled in the Mycenaean age; and (3)

⁷⁷ *Il.* 2.722-3.

⁷⁸ GS Kirk, *The Iliad: A commentary*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, vol. 1, 1985, p. 231.

⁷⁹ Page, p. 121.

⁸⁰ Finley, p. 8, seems to disagree with Page on principle, rather than offering an alternative view of Mycenaean geography.

⁸¹ Page, p. 122.

therefore the entire Tale of Troy – which would have had some such catalogue, due to its maritime nature – must have been composed during Mycenaean times.⁸² These deductions have been proven beyond reasonable doubt by a new piece of archaeological evidence discovered in Thebes. In 1994 a Linear B tablet was unearthed which listed four towns as part of Theban territory: Eleon, Hyle, Peteon and Eutresis. These four towns have not been identified, nor have any post-Mycenaean remains been discovered at any conjectured sites for these towns. The first three settlements are mentioned together as part of the Theban contingent in the Catalogue: ‘they who held Eleon and Hyle and Peteon’.⁸³ Just two lines later, Homer includes Eutresis in the roll-call of the Theban contingent. This, then, provides the *proof* that many settlements Homer mentions disappeared soon after 1200 BC, during or just after the Dorian invasions. Their knowledge was lost for the long centuries of the Dark Age, except for their survival in the Mycenaean Tale of Troy.

Conclusion

Slowly we see Homer coalescing before our eyes as a valid source for the Trojan War. No longer a mirage, the *Iliad* has become our oasis. We have shown Homer to have extensively used a Tale of Troy which dates from Mycenaean times. We have seen that Homer’s Troy must have been Troy VIIa, the only one which had a human destruction and dates from the time we would expect. Any later than around 1250 BC, and the Mycenaean centres were themselves falling prey to a group of migrating barbarians, known as Dorians. These Mycenaean were deeply involved with the Hittites concerning the territory of Asia Minor. We have identified Wilusa with Troy, as being one and the same as Hisarlık. The only conclusion possible is that there is a kernel of historical truth buried within the *Iliad*. And while we may not be able to conclude that such a thing as Homer’s Trojan War happened with the certainty of Patroklos’ knowledge that Hektor would meet Fate and cruel Destiny at the hands of Achilles, we do know that there was truth behind what Homer said. This historical truth concerned the destruction of a large

⁸² Latacz, p. 238.

⁸³ *Il.* 2.500.

and powerful trading city in the Troad by the King of Ahhiyawa himself. This may have been in retaliation for the reconquest of the Ahhiyawan Miletos by the Hittite king. Perhaps it was just an attack of opportunity on a powerful city, left weak by the withdrawal of its main ally, Hatti, during the tumultuous 13th century BC. Or perhaps a mighty coalition of Greeks sailed together across the Aegean and into history, in pursuit of the woman whose face launched a thousand ships.

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ARCHITECTURAL BOUNDARIES: LUDWIG MIES VAN DER ROHE AND PHILIP JOHNSON

*Lorna Clarke**

Architecture has undergone a rapid and revolutionary transformation in the modern era. Through the work of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, this essay attempts to chart the transition in architecture from nineteenth century Romanticism and Neoclassicism to High Modernism. Mies van der Rohe redefined architectural boundaries and emphasised the beauty of simple forms, the importance of functionality and the versatility of new materials such as glass, steel and marble. An analysis of the work of Philip Johnson reveals the development from High Modernism to Postmodernism, where playful and ironic decoration and humanist theories were reintroduced into what had become a 'cold' Modernist aesthetic. Both architects challenged and reorientated the direction of twentieth century architecture.†

Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Philip Johnson were seminal to the development of architecture in the twentieth century. Mies van der Rohe dramatically altered architectural boundaries by transforming the design of buildings from the ornate and decorative historicism of the nineteenth century, to the sleek and geometric shapes and styles characteristic of Modernist architecture. He designed innovative structures, such as the skyscraper, with an emphasis on functionality and simplicity of materials. Johnson's theories and exhibitions introduced the International Style to America and his buildings expanded and challenged Modernist tenets, reintroducing Classical and humorous motifs. Mies van der Rohe produced austere and elegant spaces and constructions, whereas Johnson created new Postmodern possibilities and reinvigorated High Modernism. He did this by

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† Images of *The Farnsworth House* (Ludwig Mies van der Rohe) and *Glass House* (Philip Johnson) are given on colour plate 7.

injecting self referential appropriation into architecture and allowed architects once again to use time honoured materials and designs.

To understand the transition of architecture from nineteenth century Romanticism and Neoclassicism to twentieth century Modernism and later a rejection and adaptation of Modernism in the form of Postmodernism, the role of Mies van der Rohe and Johnson in this process must be acknowledged. Architectural movements in the nineteenth century, such as the Classical and Gothic Revivals, the Empire Style and Neo-Baroque and Neo-Renaissance, were predominantly picturesque, ornate, sublime and extravagantly grand.¹ An emphasis on historicism ensured that structures were decorative, eclectic and lavish.² For example, the curves of the Grand Staircase at the *Paris Opera* designed by Charles Garnier (1861-74) are eerily suggestive of the staircase in Michelangelo's *Vestibule of the Laurentian Library* in Florence (1558-59).³ Also, the main entrance of this building is reminiscent of Lescot's Square Court in the *Louvre* in Paris (begun 1546).⁴

In contrast, Mies van der Rohe's constructions rejected nineteenth century architectural precedents, thus redefining architectural 'rules' and changing architectural design from historicism to Modernism. Modernist architecture was characterised by its cubic forms, 'clean' lines, pure functionality and contemporary materials. Many Bauhaus principles were invoked; form followed function and decoration was pointedly rejected. Phillip Johnson worked closely with Mies van der Rohe but diverged from purely Modernist principles later in his career, preferring to design playful and idiosyncratic Postmodern buildings which reintroduced some decorative styles and (in the opinion of Modernists) unnecessary forms. Johnson's works reinvented architecture once again, thus propelling 'cold' Modernism into the more aesthetically complex forms of Postmodernism.

¹ HW Janson & AF Janson, *History of art*, Thames and Hudson, London, 2001, pp. 696-700.

² *ibid.*

³ *ibid.*, p. 701.

⁴ *ibid.*

Mies van der Rohe and Modernism

Mies van der Rohe's buildings were structurally simple, functional and versatile.⁵ His mantra was 'less is more'.⁶ Whilst Bauhaus Director in Germany from 1930 to 1933, Mies van der Rohe developed his architectural theory based on five main issues: (1) the possibilities and limitations of structure, (2) the problem of space, (3) proportion as expression, (4) the expressive value of materials and (5) the relationship of painting and sculpture to architecture.⁷ Mies van der Rohe also believed that architecture had little to do with the 'invention of interesting forms... with personal inclinations' or with imitating Roman and Renaissance styles.⁸ Mies van der Rohe's theories consistently produced majestic skyscrapers and revolutionised the avant-garde architect's design processes and attitude toward materials.⁹ For example, he emphasised the use of small scale models for planning and design purposes.¹⁰ Unlike Johnson, Mies van der Rohe believed that city and regional planning could assist in creating harmony between nature, man and technics.¹¹ Thus new norms for architectural design were established; functionality, clean lines and open spaces without disorder were created through simple glass, marble and steel structures.

Mies van der Rohe's attitude toward and his innovative use of new materials shaped Modernist boundaries. Steel, glass, bricks and marble achieved the simplicity and 'clean' aesthetics which Mies van der Rohe's modernity required. As a result of his experiments, models and early buildings, these resources became the obligatory materials for all Modernist architects. Philip Johnson recorded that in 1925-9, Mies van der Rohe was the only architect using brick to build houses.¹² This was

⁵ W Blaser, *Mies van der Rohe continuing the Chicago School of Architecture*, Birkhauser Verlag, Basel, 1981, pp. 9-10.

⁶ PC Johnson, *Mies van der Rohe*, The Museum of Modern Art, New York, 1978, p. 49.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸ DL Johnson & D Langmead, *Makers of 20th Century modern architecture: A bio-critical sourcebook*, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, Chicago, 1997, p. 213.

⁹ J Speyer, *Mies van der Rohe*, The Art Institute of Chicago, USW, 1968, p. 10.

¹⁰ Blaser, p. 23.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 101.

¹² Johnson, p. 35.

quickly replaced by onyx, marble, coloured glass and velvet carpeting in the *German Pavilion* (1929, World Exhibition, Barcelona, Spain).¹³ The simplicity, abstraction and spatial dynamics of this particular building had an enduring impact upon the Modernist movement, reformulating architectural boundaries.¹⁴

When Mies van der Rohe migrated to America in 1938, his inventiveness with the latest materials became unrelenting. By contrasting steel columns and wooden cabinets in the *Farnsworth House* (1945-50, Plano, Illinois), Mies van der Rohe freed architects from the constraints of conventional nineteenth century design paradigms.¹⁵ The combination of charcoal black steel girders and walls of glass in the *ITT Crown Hall* (1950-6, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago) is another example of how he revolutionised architecture from the highly decorative and fussy buildings of the nineteenth century, to the stylish cubic shapes we recognise today.¹⁶ Windows were replaced with exterior glass surfaces and steel girders were used to remove internal supporting columns, thus opening interior space within the building.¹⁷ Low partitioned walls separated teaching classes in the *ITT Crown Hall* but facilitated communication between students and teachers.¹⁸ The building was extremely functional as it could be adapted to serve unanticipated purposes.¹⁹ New materials allowed Mies van der Rohe to dramatically alter the conventional boundaries of architecture.

One of Mies van der Rohe's greatest contributions to the architectural profession has been the innovative steel frame vernacular, which to this day dictates skyscraper design.²⁰ Derived from the International Style,²¹ this 'epoch-making' design technique was first applied to the *Promontory Apartments* (1946-49, Hyde Park, Chicago) with a concrete

¹³ Speyer, p. 11.

¹⁴ Johnson & Langmead, p. 214.

¹⁵ Speyer, p. 10.

¹⁶ Blaser, p. 156.

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ M Pawley, *Mies van der Rohe*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1970, p. 16.

²¹ Johnson, p. 43.

frame and brick infill.²² The use of steel and glass in this design, transformed the construction into an elegant, timeless and monumental structure, which was unique to twentieth century architecture.²³ Mies van der Rohe's greatest achievements, *860-880 Lake Shore Drive Apartments* (1948-51, Chicago) and the *Seagram Building* (1954-8, New York, New York) reveal how he was the first to 'exploit the reflective qualities of glass' and challenge traditional architectural boundaries.²⁴

While his skyscraper design was influential, Mies van der Rohe also focused the architectural profession on the importance of public spaces, an aspect of architecture which had often been neglected in the nineteenth century.²⁵ He achieved this by asymmetrically balancing groups of separate buildings, based on height, to give the impression of expanding space. An example of this arrangement based on height is the *Lafayette Park Development* (1955, Detroit).²⁶ Therefore Mies van der Rohe's buildings were seminal in reconfiguring Modernist boundaries in the discipline of architecture. Philip Johnson challenged these Modernist boundaries and propelled architecture towards Postmodernism.

Philip Johnson and the Transition from Modernism to Postmodernism

Philip Johnson commenced his career working within the Modernist tradition and moved into the Postmodern style. His theories and exhibitions introduced the International Style to America and thus contributed to the formation of the Modernist aesthetic. Johnson arranged for influential architects such as Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius and Mies van der Rohe to attend a variety of his exhibitions, which included: *The Birth of the American Skyscraper* (1933), *Rejected Architects, Objects 1900 and Today* (April 1933), and *Machine Art* (1934).²⁷ Charles Noble records how Johnson's exhibitions and book *The International*

²² Blaser, p. 162.

²³ Speyer, p. 12.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 88.

²⁶ *ibid.*

²⁷ C Noble, *Philip Johnson*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1972, p. 10.

Style: Architecture since 1922 had a seminal impact upon European architects and designers emigrating to America.²⁸ Johnson's exhibitions also defined the International Style in America, in which buildings 'depend[ed]... primarily on function....new principles of constructions and new materials'.²⁹ In particular, *Modern Architecture – International Exhibition* fundamentally changed architectural education in America.³⁰ Whilst Johnson was influential in developing Modernist architectural boundaries, it was his impact upon Postmodernist architecture which was decisive.

Unlike Mies van der Rohe, Johnson believed that architecture was historically cultural, contextual and individual. Postmodernist architects rejected some High Modernist principles, such as form following function and strict geometric forms. Yet Postmodernist architects did not resort again to extensive sculptural decoration.³¹ Instead they appropriated a hedonistic array of historical styles, in particular Classicism and Art Deco, all of which had equal authority in Postmodernist architecture.³² In aiming for originality, an eclectic assemblage of these styles tended to produce a historicism which parodied and mocked architectural clichés, whilst searching for a new and unique design or style.³³ Postmodernist architecture actively rejected the Modernist 'cube' and emphasis on functionality and encouraged the incorporation of playfulness, irony and wit into architecture.³⁴

An example of this playfulness in architecture is Johnson's unique 'Processional Theory', which was applied to his most successful building, *Glass House* (1949, New Canaan, Connecticut).³⁵ By designing a delayed and indirect view of the house and greeting visitors outside, rather than at the front door, Johnson emphasised the importance of

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ P Blake, *Philip Johnson*, Birkhauser Verlag, Basel, 1996, p. 15.

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 11.

³¹ Janson, pp. 911-912.

³² *ibid.*, p. 911.

³³ *ibid.*

³⁴ Janson, p. 912.

³⁵ Noble, p. 12.

using buildings and directing people through space and distance.³⁶ The application of this theory was a direct assault on the Modernist doctrine of form following function. The indirect paths leading to the house revealed an early desire to instil humanist and humorous principles into architecture. Thus Johnson's earlier public spaces and buildings were seminal in ensuring architecture remained purposeful and capable of being comprehended, during what was deemed to be a 'cold' Modernist era.

Johnson's later buildings, such as the *IDS Center* (1973, Minneapolis, Minnesota) where the Crystal Court joins elevated walkways and the roof design of the *PPG Headquarters* (1979-84 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) with its interest in a Neo-Gothic arcades and the Winter Garden are indicative of his Postmodern style and application of his 'Processional Theory'.³⁷ In particular, the *PPG Headquarters* is an example of how decoration and historicism was reintroduced into Modernist architecture, albeit in a less fussy way than in the nineteenth century. The pyramid shapes on the roof line deviate from Mies van der Rohe's Modernist boundaries but does not descend into the intensely ornate or flamboyant styles of the nineteenth century.

Philip Johnson also assisted with the transition from Modernism to Postmodernism by developing an awareness of the 'Seven Crutches' upon which architects relied.³⁸ Johnson believed that architects evaded their responsibilities by relying on: history, pretty drawings, utility, comfort, cheapness, serving the client and the critical relationship between the architect and technology.³⁹ This lampoon challenged the Modernist status quo and placed importance upon the fine arts rather than technical and structural triumphs which Modernism often showcased.⁴⁰ Johnson wrote in 1954 that 'history disproves the idea that architecture is anything but an art'⁴¹ and believed that architecture 'was

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 130 and p. 176.

³⁸ Noble, p. 13.

³⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 13-4.

⁴⁰ E Lum, 'Pollock's promise: Toward an abstract expressionist architecture', *Assemblage*, vol. 39, August 1999, p. 62.

⁴¹ Noble, p. 13.

not about simple functional utility' but only 'came into being through the superfluous, the surface embellishments that elevated it beyond a mere building'.⁴²

Philip Johnson widened the discipline by allowing an element of spirituality to enter 'what has been the rather cold style of architecture we call modern'.⁴³ This is seen explicitly in his *Kneses Tifereth Israel Synagogue* (1954-6, Port Chester, New York).⁴⁴ Although criticised as elitist and anti-Modern, Johnson used his extensive knowledge of the history of architecture to challenge what by the 1950s had arguably become a narrow Modernist perception of architecture.⁴⁵ In doing this, he 'opened up a great many doors to old as well as new ideas that had been closed by his more dogmatic predecessors' and contemporaries.⁴⁶ Johnson was significant to the architectural profession because he continually challenged the status quo and encouraged debate about what constituted contemporary architecture.

Philip Johnson used historical styles such as Classicism and traditional materials to create an emphasis on monumentality, notably expanding and altering the Modernist definition of architecture. Unlike in Mies van der Rohe's work, immense brick columns in Johnson's *Boissonnas House* (1956, New Canaan, Connecticut) recall Karl Friedrich Schinkel's *Potsdam Villas*.⁴⁷ Johnson's *University of St Thomas* (1957, Houston, Texas) was also based on the original campus designs of Thomas Jefferson for the University of Virginia.⁴⁸ Vitiating Classicism and Neoclassical norms were applied to the various buildings. These aspects of Johnson's works are evident in the indented ovals on the exterior of the *Sheldon Memorial Art Gallery* (1963, Lincoln, Nebraska) and the symmetry of the *Munson, Williams, Proctor Institute* (1960, Utica, New York).⁴⁹ These columns, arches and porches began a 'Pharaonic' propensity in American

⁴² Lum, p. 62.

⁴³ Blake, p. 65.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p. 242.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p. 243.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p. 62.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p. 70.

⁴⁹ Noble, pp. 121-123.

architecture and created an emphasis on monumentality.⁵⁰ Philip Johnson also rejected the Modernist preoccupation with new technologies and materials, instead, opting for wood on the internal structures of *The Glass House* (1949, New Canaan, Connecticut).⁵¹ Thus a return to 'tried and tested traditional materials' such as stone, lead and copper generated extensive debate amongst his contemporaries about the limits and boundaries of Modernist and Postmodernist architecture.⁵²

Johnson's early works used symmetry effectively and thus produced a resurgence of the Neoclassical style and preceded Johnson's progression into Postmodernist architecture. Peter Blake argues that the symmetrical composition of *The Glass House* (1949, New Canaan, Connecticut) and most of Johnson's buildings after the *Seagram Building* (1956, New York, New York) designed with Mies van der Rohe, contain inherent architectural contradictions which suggest that Johnson was 'not really a modern architect at all'.⁵³ Whilst Johnson is undeniably a Modernist architect, he departed from Modernist architectural boundaries and 'made symmetry respectable again' in Postmodernist architecture.⁵⁴

Philip Johnson's theories and their application to Modernist and Postmodernist buildings extended the practice of architecture beyond its conventional boundaries.⁵⁵ His return to 'aristocratic formalism'⁵⁶ was vital to fulfilling the ideal that architecture is a medium capable of transforming 'mere buildings into lasting, powerful agents of cultural change'.⁵⁷ John Jacobs argues that the controversial *AT&T Skyscraper* (1978-84, New York, New York) represents Johnson's transformation into Postmodernist architecture.⁵⁸ Yet it is arguable that Johnson's

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p. 18.

⁵¹ Blake, p. 38.

⁵² *ibid.*, pp. 182-184 and p. 245.

⁵³ *ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ CC Sullivan, 'Wanted: The next Philip Johnson' (Editorial), *Architecture*, vol. 93, no. 3, March 2005, p. 13.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p. 13.

⁵⁸ Johnson & Langmead, p. 157.

Postmodernist flair was already present but unrecognised, even in his earliest works. This is evidenced by a continued reference to historical styles and designs, an awareness of contextualism and historic preservation, as seen in his additions and restorations to the *Boston Public Library* (1964-73, Boston, Massachusetts).⁵⁹ These buildings had a significant impact upon Postmodernist architects such as Frank Gehry, Robert Stern, Michael Graves and Robert Venturi.⁶⁰ In addition, Johnson's work has had an impact upon Deconstructivist architects such as Bernhard Tschumi and Peter Eisenman. Johnson also actively assisted the Deconstructivist movement through his exhibition *Deconstructivist Architecture Show* (1988) which declared Modernist architecture dead.⁶¹

Conclusion

Mies van der Rohe established and redefined the Modernist boundaries of contemporary architecture, whereas Johnson's theories of architecture and designs directly challenged Modernist tenets and broadened architectural boundaries, creating Postmodern possibilities. Mies van der Rohe instituted Modernist rules by focusing the discipline on structure, functionality and precise planning. His brave use of materials such as steel and glass established a new type of building: the skyscraper. Although Johnson's early work, exhibitions and theories consolidated Modernist principles in America, in particular transplanting the International Style from Europe, his impact upon Postmodernism was more influential. His contextualism, decorative and Neoclassical appropriations transformed architecture from Modernism to Postmodernism and allowed architects to continue experimenting with materials and styles. Mies van der Rohe established Modernist boundaries, unleashing architecture from the constraints of nineteenth century historicism, whilst Philip Johnson liberated Modernism from its limitations and developed Postmodernism by reintegrating some historical designs. Both redefined the boundaries of twentieth century architecture.

⁵⁹ Blake, p. 134 and p. 136.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p. 19.

⁶¹ *ibid.*

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DRACULA AND THE NEW WOMAN: THE UNDERLYING THREAT IN BRAM STOKER'S CLASSIC

Suzanne Dixon *

Bram Stoker, the creator of one of our most loved and feared horror stories, Dracula, composed the tale against a background of social insecurities: both the British Empire and societal values were in flux, the old ways crumbling before the Victorians' eyes. One of the most important upheavals in this time of turmoil concerned feminism and the role of women in Victorian society, with the terrifying spectre of the 'New Woman' solidifying rapidly into a real threat, a much freer modern woman who might take control in assembly, home or bedroom. This paper explores how Dracula incorporated these pervasive fears, and even derived much of its potent horror from implicit parallels between the licentious female vampires, so easily 'infected' by Dracula with independence, lust, and immorality, and the menacing nature of the modern woman.

The original vampire tale, Bram Stoker's 1897 classic *Dracula*, recounts the story of the Wallachian Count Dracula, an evil yet refined creature of darkness who travels to London in search of new blood, but is ultimately beaten back to Transylvania by a small band of dedicated vampire hunters who confront and slay the Count. While many have taken this to be a simple gothic fantasy and its pure horror has inspired countless film interpretations and spin-off novels over the century since it was written, there are a myriad of other thematic threads running through the work, one of the most significant being the treatment of women and sexuality. *Dracula* was written in a context of political and social upheaval, with anxieties not just about the security of the empire, but the stability of its society's traditional identities. As Showalter points out, '[i]n periods of cultural insecurity, when there are fears of regression and degeneration, the longing for strict border controls

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around the definition of gender ... becomes especially intense'.¹ This was the era of the confronting 'New Woman', who strove to be emancipated both politically and sexually, a concept which much of Britain at the time found highly seditious and unsettling. The two-sex model of the nineteenth century had no room for this new creature, who blurred boundaries between the traditional gender roles of the domestic, docile female and the active, assertive male. This anxiety is expressed in several ways in the novel: firstly, most of *Dracula* is a struggle between the many aspects of the virgin/whore 'dichotomy'² concerning what women 'ought' to be and what men feared they were becoming, which is part of the order/chaos tension that lends the novel its suspense and power;³ secondly, through the clear gender inversions undergone by both sexes in the foreign presence, which are deeply confronting to the existing status quo; and thirdly, through the logical extrapolation of its significance for the race as a whole in the face of foreign threat. This essay will examine the representations of the three women, or sets of women, in *Dracula*: Mina Murray/Harker, Lucy Westenra, and the unholy trio of vampiric brides in Castle Dracula (addressed here as one person). These three different women oscillate between the pious, pure and docile women they 'ought' to be, and the rapacious, voluptuous sirens they become under the Count's influence. Their transformations represent womans dangerous weakness faced with Dracula's seductive power, and Stoker's novel thus addresses the contemporary concerns of society with the immorality of the New Woman and the gender confusion she caused, and the associated degeneration and dilution of the race.

These three important types of women are presented early on in *Dracula*, and the contrast between the uncorrupted and the vampirised gives us an immediate image of the danger society faces from this Eastern menace. The significance of the women and Stoker's

¹ E Showalter, *Sexual anarchy: Gender and culture at the fin de siècle*, Viking, New York, 1990, p. 4.

² LM Wyman & GN Dionisopoulos, 'Transcending the virgin/whore dichotomy: Telling Mina's story in *Bram Stoker's Dracula*', *Women's Studies in Communication*, vol. 23, no. 2, 2000, pp. 209-237.

³ S Schaffrath, 'Order-versus-chaos dichotomy in *Bram Stoker's Dracula*', *Extrapolation*, vol. 43, no. 1, 2002, pp. 98-112.

preoccupation with female sexuality is attested to by the fact that they actually come to dominate the story, with the vampire hunters mainly concerned not with Dracula himself but with his effect on their beloved companions: 'though he is the object of pursuit, Lucy, and then the vampirized Mina, are the objects of attention'.⁴ This is because he works through women (they are his only true conquests in the novel), and the results of his seductions are even more terrible than himself because of the stark contrasts they evoke. We are first introduced to Mina, the perfect woman, through a reminder in Jonathan's journal to obtain a recipe for his fiancée,⁵ and this domestic association remains her role throughout the novel. She is praised for her feminine qualities – chiefly fidelity, prudence, and practicality – that make her a perfect wife and secretary. While she sometimes acts as the quiet organiser of the men, she is generally meek and servile to their wishes. To a certain extent she is becoming a modern woman, demonstrating self-sufficiency, intelligence, and a willingness to learn to use modern technologies and machines; nevertheless, throughout the novel the men treat her as if she were a fragile object to be protected,⁶ Morris even affectionately calling her 'little girl'.⁷ Through Mina particularly, Stoker also emphasises the differences between male and female brains, with the latter expected to be emotional and irrational: most of the men are clearly surprised when they discover she can think, Van Helsing reiterating condescendingly, 'Oh, you so clever woman!'.⁸ He later comments that '[s]he has man's brain ... and woman's heart'.⁹ She, and every woman, is also meant to be the epitome of honesty and compassion: 'good women tell all their lives, and by day and by hour and by minute, such things that angels can read'.¹⁰

⁴ N Auerbach, 'Magi and maidens: The romance of the Victorian Freud', *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1981, pp. 281-300 at p. 290.

⁵ B Stoker, *Dracula*, Wordsworth Editions Ltd., Ware, 2003, p. 3.

⁶ C Corbin & RA Campbell, 'Postmodern iconography and perspective in Coppola's *Bram Stoker's Dracula*', *Journal of Popular Film and Television*, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 40-48 at p. 45.

⁷ Stoker, p. 192.

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 152.

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 195.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 153.

Lucy is initially depicted as being a little more frivolous and naïve, but pure and always 'sweet' (an epithet found repeatedly throughout). It is also significant that three of the friends wanted to marry her, consistent with the notion that women were merely inert sexual (or marriageable) objects. Neither of these two women is allowed any agency; even through their 'infidelities', they play the passive role, Lucy asleep while blood is pumped from each man into her, and Mina's seduction described in terms of 'forcing a kitten's nose into a saucer of milk to compel it to drink'.¹¹ (In fact, even the men's ultimate rescue of the women is about male possession, as the men discuss which of them can most justifiably claim the right to do so). These two protagonists represent the two acceptable ideals for Victorian women: Lucy as the mostly-innocent giggly girl on the verge of womanhood and Mina as the more mature wife who has grown into her domestic duties, but both pious and pure.

These two become the narrative's benchmark for femininity, so when the next type of woman is introduced, the Victorian reader is horrified to see her take on many of man's traditional roles and characteristics. The three mesmerising female vampires found in *Castle Dracula* are voluptuous, voracious, and utterly deadly: they immediately attempt to penetrate and possess Jonathan by drinking his blood, something he longs for with 'an agony of delightful anticipation'.¹² That they have usurped Dracula's spotlight is evident when the victim remarks that 'of all the foul things that lurk in this hateful place the Count is the least dreadful to me'.¹³ The significance of these female depictions is that the corrupted threesome have discarded their feminine passivity and innocence, and have become sexualised and thoroughly immoral. This fate lies in store for Mina and Lucy, too, who go from being sweet and pure to being 'languorous[ly] voluptuous' and 'carnal and unspiritual'¹⁴ (although Mina's transformation is never complete). This is precisely the perceived danger represented by the New Woman. The ideal had its origins in the 1880s and centred around women who were politically,

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 234.

¹² *ibid.*, p. 33.

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 176 and p. 178.

intellectually, and sexually emancipated, who could make their own decisions and presume to be equal to men; these women expected to have more power in both private (romantic and family) and public (political) spheres.¹⁵ This posed a direct threat to upper middle-class heterosexual Protestant men, as it necessitated a reduction in their control over society and an upheaval in their nicely ordered world, symbolically sucking the life (or blood) out of them. Also, it caused a reduction in their control over themselves,¹⁶ something British gentlemen could not abide: sexually assertive vampiric women aroused men, causing 'a wicked, burning desire that they would kiss ... with those red lips'¹⁷ and literally and metaphorically inducing 'sperm [to drop] in white patches'.¹⁸

Thus what the New Woman signified was a *blurring* of the boundaries between genders; the two-sex model had previously pigeonholed behaviours based purely on anatomy, but the modern woman of the time held herself somewhere in between the old 'Man' and old 'Woman'.¹⁹ She was assertive, creative, independent in means and thought, and above all politically and socially active: in other words, she caused a re-ordering of gender roles. In the novel, Count Dracula similarly causes a notable gender inversion. Not only do his female victims become more masculine, through their forwardness, violence, and sexual appetite, but the male characters also become more effeminate, helpless, or even hysterical (a typically feminine 'illness'). As Williams points out, Jonathan even initially takes the place of the story's gothic heroine: he is sexually vulnerable, trapped in a sinister stone castle, and pining for his lover!²⁰ This effect is distressing to Victorian readers and male characters because the new individuals

¹⁵ See Showalter, pp. 38-58.

¹⁶ C Craft, "'Kiss me with those red lips'": Gender and inversion in Bram Stoker's *Dracula*, *Representations*, no. 8, 1984, pp. 107-133 at p. 108.

¹⁷ Stoker, p. 33.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 163.

¹⁹ C Hendershot, 'Vampire and replicant: The one-sex body in a two-sex world', *Science-Fiction Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3, 1995, pp. 373-399 at p. 377; cited in Schaffrath, p. 99. See also Showalter, pp. 38-42 and p. 169.

²⁰ A Williams, 'Dracula: Si(g)ns of the Fathers', *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 445-463 at p. 448; also see Schaffrath, p. 104 or Craft, p. 109.

created do not fit into the two-sex model well-established at that time; effectively vampirism serves to blur boundaries between the sexes just like the New Woman. While Montville cites the need to distinguish between the female vampire and the female victim,²¹ this essay asserts that they are merely different loci on the same spectrum, and the interplay of the two roles should be recognised: Lucy and Mina make part or all of the transition from Victorian woman (female victim) to New Woman (female vampire), and then are transformed back to 'sweetness and purity',²² while the three Transylvanian brides are also ultimately returned to 'repose' and 'gladness'.²³ In fact, a vampire plays an intersex role, being poised between two opposites: not only are they neither dead nor alive, but they are also neither exclusively male nor female (nor indeed androgynous).²⁴ A vampire oscillates between masculinity, femininity, and bisexuality,²⁵ desiring everyone, a state that threw nineteenth-century Britain into dismay and confusion. Similarly, the New Woman posits the existence of not just an intersex role, but a whole new grey-scale (or multicoloured) spectrum. Victorian man's 'duty' here is clear: the vampire hunters still think they are white knights, with a duty to rescue their women and return them to holiness. They pursue Dracula more to restore the gender status quo and return their ladies to their asexuality,²⁶ than to rid the world of an awful monster. The horror can only be reversed by the male returning the female to her rightful place and re-establishing proper roles, by a violent 'staking', 'driving deeper and deeper'²⁷ into her a long object (after which Lucy's 'owner' collapses, sweating and breathing 'in broken gasps'²⁸). This metaphorical rape, repeated by Van Helsing with the three Transylvanian vampires, 'reestablishes normative models of both

²¹ J Montville, 'Dracula in the dark: The Dracula film adaptations' (review of book by JC Holte), *Extrapolation*, vol. 39, no. 2, 1998, pp. 172-174 at p. 173.

²² Stoker, p. 180.

²³ *ibid.*, p. 309.

²⁴ Schaffrath, p. 100.

²⁵ Showalter, p. 179.

²⁶ Wyman & Dionisopoulos, p. 217; Williams, pp. 449-450.

²⁷ Stoker, p. 179.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 180.

gender and history', imposing male reason on female sexuality, with the women 'grateful and passive toward their brave male deliverer'.²⁹

The New Woman anxiety was also driven partly by a fear of homosexuality,³⁰ another concept that played havoc with traditional stereotypes. *Dracula* has been interpreted, notably by Schaffer, as an exploration of repressed same-sex desire.³¹ Stoker was a closeted homosexual, initially penning the novel a mere month after his rival and sometime-friend Oscar Wilde was publicly convicted of sodomy. This created an inner tension which ensured that '*Dracula* takes place on that ambiguous threshold between the known and the unknown',³² order and chaos: between West and East, domestic and foreign, wife and vampire, heterosexual and homosexual, or even male and female. Like vampires, homosexuals were also considered neither male nor female,³³ a gendered no-man's land. In addition, Stoker and Wilde were accustomed to viewing women as mere conduits for male interaction,³⁴ prizes to be won or lost: Dracula boasts, 'Your girls that you all love are mine already; and through them you and others shall yet be mine'.³⁵ In this reading, the women, though an apparent focus of the novel, only serve the males' interests: Lucy, for instance, a woman 'in whose empty veins male fluids can mingle ... gets sacrificed to promote homosocial bonding',³⁶ and Mina, in an example of 'ritual sharing of women',³⁷ is convinced to name her baby after all the vampire hunters, procreatively linking the males.

²⁹ T Schaffer, "'A Wilde desire took me": The homoerotic history of *Dracula*', *English Literary History*, vol. 61, no. 2, 1994, pp. 381-425 at p. 412.

³⁰ Showalter, pp. 169-175.

³¹ Schaffer.

³² *ibid.*, p. 382.

³³ *ibid.*, p. 398.

³⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 391-392. For some years the expression of Wilde's rivalry with Stoker took the form of romantic attention to the woman they were both in love with, Florence Balcombe (Stoker's wife).

³⁵ Stoker, p. 255.

³⁶ Schaffer, p. 410.

³⁷ G McMillan, 'Somebody stole my gal: Word cluster analysis of exogamy fears in Stoker's *Dracula*', *Extrapolation*, vol. 43, no. 3, 2002, pp. 330-341 at p. 335.

Yet even without the temptation of the New Woman ideal, the inherent danger of woman is ever-present: she is constantly poised between order and chaos, with the possibility of treasonous reversion to the archetypal female, Mother Nature, at any moment. The female vampires are closely associated with the natural and sensual world, which the era's repressive sexuality made anathema to the average Victorian.³⁸ Thus the novel's fear of the vampiric world is really a fear of the sensual forces of nature.³⁹ Women represent the 'frontier between men and chaos, [inhabiting] a mysterious and frightening wild zone outside patriarchal culture',⁴⁰ comparable to those savage regions outside of the Empire. This innate threat is symbolised in Lucy's very name (and therefore being): she is a 'feminized Lucifer (Lucy) in the Western world (Westenra)'.⁴¹ Dracula's greatest power is to 'catalyze the awesome changes potential in womanhood',⁴² bringing out the latent Lucifer in Lucy.

The significance of this stems from the constant fear that woman will betray the race, allowing her purity to be compromised by becoming a vessel for racial impurities and degeneration. This obviously harks back to Biblical times with the stubborn notion of original sin, but there was a far more concrete application of this concept at the turn of the nineteenth century, with anxieties not just about the security of the Empire but about the decline of British male vigour and vitality.⁴³ These processes were all connected: the immorality of the society was corroding it from within, while foreign forces more virile and robust than puny British troops corroded from without. Fears of 'race degeneration' were widespread at the time, and an almost religious zeal for keeping the race 'pure' spread like wildfire throughout the Empire, affecting policies in colonies such as Australia and Canada. Naturally women were to blame for declining male potency. Also, the dread that

³⁸ Schaffrath, p. 100.

³⁹ *ibid.*, p. 104.

⁴⁰ C Smith-Rosenberg, 'Sexual anarchy: Gender and culture at the fin de siècle' (review of book by E Showalter), *The American Historical Review*, vol. 97, no. 2, 1992, pp. 545-546 at p. 545.

⁴¹ Corbin & Campbell, p. 43.

⁴² Auerbach, p. 291.

⁴³ See, for example, Showalter, p. 10 or Schaffrath, p. 102.

they might be possessed by foreign males and disloyally bear foreign babies was very tangible.⁴⁴ This was a twofold threat to the future of Britain: firstly it diluted true British blood, introducing terrible impurities and undoing the race from within; secondly it allowed foreign enemies from without to assist the crumbling of the Empire. This explains the vampire hunters' worry that Dracula might become 'the father ... of a new order of beings'.⁴⁵ Anxieties about the stability of their domain have existed at the high points of all modern empires, and it is significant that this is when many of the greatest vampire incarnations have been written or directed.

The tensions of Stoker's novel clearly extend far beyond a simple fear of dark fiends; the crucial issue concerns what the monsters threaten and what this represents for society. For the story to be truly terrifying it must threaten the very core of what British society stands for. Thus fears surrounding marginalised 'Others', most notably women, is what drives the suspense and horror of the story: these are the most likely 'envoys of chaos, servants to the forces that threaten to destroy Victorian order'.⁴⁶ The horror is in the order/chaos tension between the existing gender order and these New Women, represented in the novel by vampires of both sexes, because any change in the existing gender status quo was a threat to society, both from within, through moral corruption, and without, via racial dilution and defeat.

⁴⁴ McMillan, p. 333; Schaffrath, p. 102.

⁴⁵ Stoker, p. 251.

⁴⁶ Schaffrath, p. 105.

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GLOBAL CITIZENS OR THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BECOMING MEMBERS OF A SINGLE UNIVERSAL TRIBE

*Gilberto Estrada Harris**

The core of the global debate is whether we as human beings are universally morally bounded to everyone as 'citizens of the world,' as Diogenes said, or whether 'our common humanity will never make us members of a single universal tribe' as Michael Walzer argues. Arguing about the universality of human rights, or the right to intervene in other nations for humanitarian reasons, or the acceptance of the non-identical identities throughout the globe, this is, the importance that must be given to the recognition of difference and diversity, or the moral importance of political communities' boundaries is explored in this essay through two ontological and normative approaches of the world: cosmopolitanism and communitarianism.

*Our sins are obstinate, our repentance is faint;
We exact a high price for our confessions,
And we gaily return to the miry path,
Believing that base tears wash away all our stains.*

Charles Baudelaire

Morality, as Robert Jackson says, is an inherent and inescapable element of international relations.¹ Morality can be simply defined as the right conduct, the way we ought to behave.² Ethics in its pure essence (from the Greek *ethos*) is the first philosophical reflection on how human

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¹ R Jackson, *The global covenant: Human conduct in a world of states*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000 p. 8.

² JDB Miller, 'Morality, interests and rationalisation' in R Pettman (ed.), *Moral claims on world affairs*, Australian National University Press, Great Britain, 1979, p. 36.

beings ought to and should treat each other.³ Moral (from the Latin *mores*) is the second reflection that seeks to incorporate ethics into actual, practical human behaviour. In international relations, however, from Thucydides to Morgenthau and all the realist theorists, the idea that 'universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation,' one of famous Morgenthau's *Six Principles of Political Realism* has dominated political history, practice and theory.⁴

This 'moral scepticism' holds that 'moral judgements are appropriate only within sovereign political communities'⁵ defined as rational, self-interested fearful actors. In relations between them, in the name of national interest defined as power (or security according to neorealists), utilitarian prudence is the norm. Uncertainty and fear are predominant features of this world of chaos where there is little room for cooperation. The state in order to defend and promote its national interest will act under no moral restriction or this will be subordinated according to its interests. The national interest is 'the one guiding star, one standard of thought, one rule of action'.⁶

However, there are two perspectives that reject this international moral scepticism: the 'communitarian' and 'cosmopolitan'. They both argue that morality in international relations is indeed important. Morality is what binds them together against the dominant realist scepticism; nevertheless morality is also what drives them apart, for the former believes in the moral sanctity of relations between political communities defined as sovereign states and the latter is concerned with the moral relation between individual members of a universal community in which state boundaries are morally irrelevant:

³ There are many ethics approaches: virtue ethics, natural law ethics, rights-based ethics, deontological and consequentialist-utilitarian ethics, just to name a few. R Jackson, 'The situational ethics of statecraft', in CJ Nolan (ed.), *Ethics and statecraft: The moral dimension of international affairs*, Greenwood Press, United States of America, 1995, pp. 21-35.

⁴ HJ Morgenthau, *Politics among nations*, 6th edn, McGraw Hill, New York, 1985, pp. 3-17.

⁵ CR Beitz, 'Bounded morality: Justice and the state in world politics', *International Organization*, vol. 33, no. 3, 1979, p. 406.

⁶ TL Pangle & PJ Ahrens Dorf, *Justice among nations*, Lawrence University Press, USA, 1999, p. 234.

The effect of shifting from a statist to a cosmopolitan point of view is to open up the state to external moral assessment (and, perhaps, political interference) and to understand persons, rather than states, as the ultimate subjects of international morality.⁷

This is the core of the debate: whether we as human beings are universally morally bounded to everyone as ‘citizens of the world’ as Diogenes said, or whether ‘our common humanity will never make us members of a single universal tribe’.⁸

The theoretical debate

Communitarianism standpoint

*‘Imperious, choleric, irascible, extreme in everything,
with a dissolute imagination the like of which
has never been seen, atheistic to the point of fanaticism,
there you have me in a nutshell, and kill me again
or take me as I am, for I shall not change.’*

Marquis de Sade

The morality of states’ main concern is the belief of an existing international moral code that regulates relationships among states based on the idea that one of the very few, if not the only true universal principles governing international relations under the absence of a global central authority, what is most referred to as international anarchy, is state sovereignty and the right to self-determination. The right of the state to territory derives then from the individual right to property.⁹ In this sense, at the international level, states and not

⁷ Beitz, *International Organization*, p. 409.

⁸ M Walzer, *Thick and thin. Moral argument at home and abroad*, University of Notre Dame Press, United States of America, 1994, p. 83.

⁹ This may be one of the reasons why Charles Beitz characterizes the morality of states as ‘the international analogue of nineteenth-century liberalism’ See Beitz, *International Organization*, p. 409. It is also one of the reasons why communitarianism critique of liberalism which is associated with cosmopolitanism often turns out to be difficult to

individuals, but like individuals within the state, are the subjects of international morality.

This is important to consider because the communitarians do not take the state for granted but believe each of these political communities are the product of a social process explained by social contract theorists, where a given association of men and women bonded together through some sort of historical, social, cultural, geographical, and mystical symbols create a feeling of identity, loyalty and responsibility that makes them give up their liberty in exchange for the protection that this community (in the form of the state) will guarantee them. Protection not only of their individual lives, freedom and liberties, but of their independent community they have created as well, the significant relationships according to Charles Taylor, that 'shape freedom within local community contexts'.¹⁰ The existence of this shared history and values creates a strong sense of the 'we,' the 'us' versus the 'they,' the 'others'. This leads the members to view one another as 'bonded' members of this particular (and sometimes exclusive) group with intense feelings of common identification and obligation. For Michael Sandel, this feeling even goes beyond the obligations:

I voluntarily incur and the "natural duties" I owe to human beings as such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but instead in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments and commitments which taken together partly define the person I am.¹¹

'To the extent that people have a need for a community and a sense of independence, then to that extent the achievement

grasp. See P Neal & D Paris, 'Liberalism and the communitarian critique: A guide to the perplexed', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 23, no. 3, 1990, pp. 419-439.

¹⁰ Cited in G Lehman, 'Globalization and the authentic self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor's Communitarianism', *Global Society*, vol. 16, no. 4, 2002, p. 424.

¹¹ M Sandel, *Liberalism and the limits of justice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, p. 179.

and maintenance of *sovereignty for their nation* [serves] important human longings'.¹²

'Borders, together with the institution of citizenship, designate both inclusion and exclusion and define the sociopolitical community both in terms of "who we are" as well as "who we are not"'.¹³

Individual members develop a plural or intersubjective self through 'essentially shared relations'.¹⁴ In this respect, John Stuart Mill was clear about the importance of self-determination and non-intervention, probably one of the most radical expressions of communitarianism:

The members of a political community must seek their own freedom, just as the individual must cultivate his own virtue. They cannot be set free, as he cannot be made virtuous, by any external force. [...] Self-determination, then, is the right of a people "to become free by their own efforts" if they can, and non-intervention is the principle guaranteeing that their success will not be impeded or their failure prevented by the intrusions of an alien power.¹⁵

It is this process of community creation that communitarians value the most (hence *communitarians*), for 'societies are necessarily particular because they have members and memories, members *with* memories not only of their own but also of their common life.' Humanity in contrast,

¹² James Rosenau cited in C Rudolph, 'Sovereignty and territorial borders in a global age', *International Studies Review*, vol. 7, 2005, p. 13.

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁴ As opposed to 'contingently shared relations' Conceptions of essentially and contingently shared relations are conceptions of how the self is defined and understood, hence how deep or superficial relations are shared. Neal & Paris, pp. 425-430, especially p. 428.

¹⁵ Cited in M Walzer, *Just and unjust Wars. A moral argument with historical Illustrations*, 3rd edn, Basic Books, United States of America, 2000, pp. 87-88. Endre Begby makes an interesting analysis on Mill's non-intervention indicating that even though Mill devoted little space to it, he indeed suggests the possibility of intervening in grave cases of human rights violations. E Begby, 'Liberty, statehood and sovereignty: Walzer on Mill on non-intervention', *Journal of Military Ethics*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2003, pp. 46-62.

Walzer continues, 'has members but no memory, and so it has no history and no culture, no customary practices, no familiar life-ways, no festivals, no shared understanding of social goods'.¹⁶ For a society to be a community, Sandel writes, 'community must be constitutive of the shared self-understanding of the participants and embodied in their institutional arrangements'.¹⁷ Hence the fundamental difference between this moral dualism: universal because it is human but particular because it is culturally bounded. It is thin because it is universal and it is thick because it comes with 'qualification, compromise, complexity, and disagreement'. 'Morality is thick from the beginning, culturally integrated, fully resonant, and it reveals itself thinly only on special occasions, when moral language is turned to specific purposes'.¹⁸

Politics is about the community coming together in a defined space, agreeing to pursue certain social goals and accepting the risks needed to achieve them. The globe itself, as Brian Orend remarks, 'does not yet form such a community'.¹⁹

Cosmopolitanism standpoint

I is Another
Arthur Rimbaud

The idea of cosmopolitanism, in contrast, comes from *cosmo-polis*, a world/universal community where all people are equal citizens.²⁰ Cosmopolitanism is associated with the Stoic's tradition that considered the individual as a 'world citizen,' and for whom the idea of a 'cosmic city' was central to explain how the universal community was united not by institutions and legal precepts, 'but by a metaphysical system at the centre of which lay *codes of ethical practice* which aimed to secure the

¹⁶ Walzer, *Thick and thin*, p. 11.

¹⁷ Sandel, p. 173.

¹⁸ Walzer, *Thick and thin*, p. 4, p. 6 and p. 8.

¹⁹ B Orend, *Michael Walzer on war and justice*, University of Wales Press, Great Britain, 2000, p. 156.

²⁰ M Maxwell, *Morality among nations. An evolutionary view*, State University Press, United States of America, 1990, p. 33.

virtue of the human agent'.²¹ This means that the world citizens for the Stoics were by virtue literally connected with the *cosmos*, the order of all. Cosmopolitanism then, is important to international political theory because it brings the individual back in, placing at the centre of international relations 'the primacy of individual human beings as political agents'.²²

Contemporary cosmopolitanism, according to Beitz, comes from the Kantian idea to characterise the law of a possible universal community of nations.²³ And this fundamental idea, we believe, is importantly underestimated, maybe on purpose, by contemporary cosmopolitans, for they often tend to overlook the fact that Kant himself insisted on the internal sovereignty of nations constituted as 'republics' as a condition for preserving the freedom of each nation-state and therefore, nothing more and nothing less, achieve such dreamed 'perpetual peace'. The universal imperatives that rationality imposes remain the same for states and individuals. In *Perpetual Peace* Kant affirms the non-intervention principle as a preliminary article based on respect for the internal procedures of individual state governance in the interest of preventing hostilities. Only under a federation of republics (inherently peaceful) where the right to the earth's surface belongs in common to the totality of men 'a transgression of rights in *one* place is felt *everywhere*',²⁴

²¹ D Jones, 'The origins of the global city: Ethics and morality in contemporary cosmopolitanism', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 5, no. 1, 2003, p. 55.

²² D Held, 'Law of states, law of peoples: Three models of sovereignty', *Legal Theory*, vol. 8, 2002, p. 1.

²³ CR Beitz, *Political theory and international relations*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1979, pp. 181-182. Although Beitz cites Kant's 1797 *The metaphysical elements of justice* to support his theoretical-conceptual conception of cosmopolitanism, it is important to note that Kant had already developed the idea of '*ius cosmopoliticum*' in his emblematic 1795 *Perpetual Peace*, in the second section 'Which contains the definitive articles for perpetual peace among nations', footnote number two and 'Third definitive article: Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality,' I Kant, 'To perpetual peace: A philosophical sketch', in I Kant, *Perpetual peace and other essays*, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1964, p. 112, pp. 118-119 and p. 138.

²⁴ *ibid.*, p. 119. Three guiding concepts unlock Kant's entire approach: the view of the state as a moral person; the original, communal ownership of the earth and its resources by all persons; and the demand to strive for perpetual peace. See T Donaldson, 'Kant's global

For if good fortune should so dispose matters that a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic [...] it will provide a focal point for a federal association among other nations that will join it in order to guarantee a state of peace among nations that is in accord with the idea of the right of nations, and through several associations of this sort such a federation can extend further and further.²⁵

Beitz, in fact, recognises two striking elements of the morality of states derived from this idea which are fundamental for the development of his cosmopolitan theory: the explicit 'principle of sovereignty' and the 'implicit principle of international distributive justice'.²⁶ According to him, the communitarian argues that 'states in international society are to be treated as autonomous sources of ends, morally immune from external interference, and morally free to arrange their internal affairs as their government sees fit'. In a world of increasing economic interdependence, this seems deeply anachronistic. This leads directly to the communitarian wrongful assumption that 'each state is assumed to have an initial right to the wealth of its territory and is not subject to any restrictions in subsequent market transactions'.²⁷

Cosmopolitans criticise the first argument against the non-intervention sovereignty principle asking 'why a principle that defends a state's ability to pursue an immoral end is to count as a moral principle imposing a requirement of justice on other states?'²⁸ Andrew Linklater, as an authority in cosmopolitanism, takes a less radical stance than Beitz and in fact recognises that three or four hundred years ago the defence of state sovereignty and 'the claim that the state is entitled to decide how far it should be concerned with the welfare of outsiders, may have seemed plausible'.²⁹ However, he argues that nowadays 'the moral

rationalism', in T Nardin & DR Mapel (eds), *Traditions of international ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1992, p. 145.

²⁵ Kant, p. 117.

²⁶ Beitz, *International Organization*, pp. 408-409.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 409.

²⁸ Beitz, *Political theory*, p. 135.

²⁹ A Linklater, 'The evolving spheres of international justice', *International Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 3, 1999, p. 478.

significance of boundaries cannot simply be postulated as a vital element of the political theory of the state'.³⁰ Based on Kantian ideals, Linklater suggests that all humanity is bonded through one true universal obligation, namely not to cause harm to others.³¹ Cosmopolitan is defined *per se* by its strong 'commitment to universal standards, human rights and democratic values that apply, in principle, "to each and all"'.³² There are, according to Thomas Pogge, three main principles recognised by most cosmopolitans as the basic pillar of any cosmopolitan theory: a) individualism, equal individual worth and dignity; b) universality, everyone equally; and c) generality, inclusion for everyone.³³

Cosmopolitanism is defined by the moral duty to engage the 'systematically excluded' through 'enlarg[ing] the moral boundaries of the political community'.³⁴ 'The problem with the sovereign state therefore is that as a "limited moral community" it promotes exclusion, generating estrangement, injustice, insecurity and violent conflict between self-regarding states by imposing rigid boundaries between "us" and "them"'.³⁵ So in order to replace the actual exclusionary system of sovereign states and move towards more cosmopolitan structures of global governance and the achievement of global citizenship, a transformation process affecting the political community's *status quo* must open the way to dismantle this particularistic bond, thick in Walzer's terms, between sovereignty, territory, citizenship, and nationalism.³⁶

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 477.

³¹ *ibid.*, p. 478.

³² Held, p. 24.

³³ A Dobson, 'Thick cosmopolitanism', *Political Studies*, vol. 54, 2006, p. 167. David Held gives a descriptive account of seven cosmopolitan principles, mentioning: 1. equal worth and dignity; 2. active agency; 3. personal responsibility and accountability; 4. consent; 5. reflexive deliberation and collective decision-making through voting procedures; 6. inclusiveness and subsidiarity; and 7. avoidance of serious harm and the amelioration of urgent need. See Held, pp. 24-31.

³⁴ A Linklater, *The transformation of political community*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 7.

³⁵ R Cox & A Linklater cited in R Devetak, 'Critical theory', in S Burchil, A Linklater, R Devetak, J Donnelly, M Paterson, C Reus-Smit, & J True, *Theories of international relations*, 3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, China, 2005, p. 148.

³⁶ Devetak discusses Linklater's 'triple transformation' tendencies concerning: 'A progressive recognition that moral, political and legal principles ought to be

Following these lines, and probably influenced by Walzer's thin and thick morality, Linklater and Richard Shapcott develop the idea that a 'thin cosmopolitanism' would promote universal claims while doing justice to difference.³⁷ Thin cosmopolitanism is about the expansion and multiplication of types and levels of political communities, where there are no absolute loyalties to sovereign states and no moral hierarchies, but rather privileges the ideals of dialogue and consent.³⁸ This idea of thin cosmopolitanism is taken from Jürgen Habermas' 'discourse ethics' where democratic, inclusionary and moral-practical reasoning guided by a procedural fairness 'promotes a cosmopolitan ideal where the political organization of humanity is decided by a process of unconstrained and unrestricted dialogue'.³⁹

Thin cosmopolitanism is about levelling traditional international actors, such as the state and intergovernmental organisations with non traditional ones, the ones often excluded and marginalised such as social movements, non governmental organisations (NGOs), and indigenous peoples, the 'vagabonds' in Zygmunt Bauman's terms,⁴⁰ where the *status quo* structural power would be radically altered by incorporating the old voiceless voices into the main debate and articulating their ideas into the creation of new principles and institutional arrangements, and in this way, overriding sovereign exclusionary politics.⁴¹

Cosmopolitans hold that we owe obligations of justice to one another as a function of our moral status as human beings, regardless of our thick or thin social bond that unites us. O'Neill demands an interpretation of sovereignty that does not constitute an arbitrary limit to the scope of

universalized, an insistence that material inequality ought to be reduced and greater demands for deeper respect for cultural, ethnic and gender differences'. *ibid.*, p. 154.

³⁷ Shapcott; cited in Devetak, p. 156.

³⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹ *ibid.*, p. 159.

⁴⁰ 'The vagabonds are the waste of the world which has dedicated itself to the tourist services.' Z Bauman, *Globalization: The human consequences*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 92.

⁴¹ Andrew Dobson takes this 'thin cosmopolitanism' a bit further and instead proposes what he calls 'thick cosmopolitanism,' a view in which material ties binding humanity prompt obligations of global justice through what he calls 'action-at-a-distance.'

justice. 'Only a world without state boundaries could be a just world'.⁴² Once again, Beitz argues that '[i]t is difficult to defend the view that state boundaries set the limits of distributive justice because it is difficult to say why differences in citizenship should count as morally relevant differences'.⁴³

On Globalisation and the 'universal particularities' of human rights

It is better to build bridges than walls.
Swahili proverb (East Africa)

It is hard not to situate the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate in our contemporary world heavily influenced by neoliberal globalisation: the strong promotion of liberal free-market economies and democratic political systems that will guarantee, in theory, the stability of a 'borderless' world. No doubt Beitz did not have at hand the concept of globalisation as we have it today back in 1979 when his paradigmatic *Political Theory and International Relations* first appeared, and it might be no coincidence either that his theory resembles Robert Keohane's Neoliberal Institutionalism theory and 'interdependence' concepts as well, developed both in the seventies and eighties.

Interdependence theory does question the traditional realist statist paradigm in the sense that it recognises the increasing influence that non-state actors such as corporations and the development of transnational networks of individuals have in world politics, made possible by the development of technology and faster and cheaper communications systems. These transnational relations not controlled by the state indeed erode the sovereign borders of the classic state and challenge its power.⁴⁴ One of the most famous and best studies of this transnationalisation of politics by non-state actors and their impacts on

⁴² Cited in C Brown, 'Borders and identity in international political theory', in M Albert, D Jacobson, & Y Lapid (eds), *Identities, borders, orders. Rethinking international relations theory*, University of Minnesota Press, United States of America, 2001, p. 122.

⁴³ Beitz, *International Organization*, p. 417.

⁴⁴ RO Keohane & JS Nye Jr., 'Power and interdependence revisited', *International Organization*, vol. 41, no. 4, 1987, pp 731-740.

state politics is analysed by Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in their book *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*.⁴⁵ But this transnationalisation cannot be conceived in a particular geographical space, so they include neither the whole territory (national, regional or global) nor the whole population.

Although Beitz recognises that interdependence (today understood as globalisation) might lead to increasing international distributive and political inequalities, he still believes that interdependence in trade and investment has led to the development of a 'global regulative structure' that 'produces substantial aggregate economic benefits in the form of a higher global rate of economic growth as well as greater productive efficiency'.⁴⁶ But one important concept that Beitz fails to recognise is that these interdependent relations 'regulated' by what Keohane and others label as 'international regimes'⁴⁷ are asymmetrical.

This has important consequences for his theoretical conception of global distributive justice when it has been proven that these asymmetric differences in political and economic power enable those most powerful, or least dependent, to take advantage of the dependency of the others. Therefore Beitz supposition that the 'social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are... to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged',⁴⁸ John Rawls's 'difference principle' is in serious hypothetical doubt. Indeed, Beitz himself later acknowledges the fact that the powerful states and corporations avoid internal and international regulations by taking advantage of the benefits offered by the weak local communities.⁴⁹ A quick tour through the empirical world

⁴⁵ For a quick overview of their main arguments, see ME Keck & K Sikkink, 'Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics', *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 51, no. 159, 1999, pp. 89-101.

⁴⁶ Beitz, *Political theory*, p. 145.

⁴⁷ For a critique of 'international regimes,' see S Strange, 'Cave! Hic Dragones: A critique of regime analysis', *International Organization*, vol 36, no. 2, 1982, pp. 337-354; JM Grieco, 'Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism', in CW Kegley Jr., *Controversies in international relations theory. Realism and the neoliberal challenge*, St. Martins Press, New York, 1999, pp. 151-171.

⁴⁸ Beitz, *Political theory*, p. 151.

⁴⁹ CR Beitz, 'Social and cosmopolitan liberalism', *International Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 3, 1999, pp. 515-529.

can prove this: extreme inequality between countries and within countries has deeply grown and is one of the main barriers to development; of a total population of 6 billion, 3 billion live under two dollars a day and 1.3 billion live in extreme poverty. The richest 20% people in 1960 had 30 times the income of the poorest 20%; in 1997 they had 74% times as much. One billion people in the industrialised North hold 80% of the world's GDP while the remaining 20% is shared among the 5 billion people in the underdeveloped South.⁵⁰

One interesting and dramatic aspect of the global distributive inequalities that furthers the empirical argument against cosmopolitanism and which many of them often neglect can be appreciated regarding the basic question of gender equality and the 'other' fifty per cent of humanity. As Charles Taylor points out '[i]t is astonishing how recently the franchise was extended to women'.⁵¹ Almost 70% of the poor, 75% of the illiterate, 80% of the refugees and 60% of the informal workers are women. The income gap between men and women is outstanding: 0.33 in Middle East and North Africa; 0.43 in Latin America and the Caribbean; 0.57 in Europe and 0.63 in North America and Central Asia.⁵² Sub-Saharan African women farmers, as a concrete example, produce 80% of Africa's food, do 90% of the work to process it, 80% of the transportation and storage, 60% of its marketing and provide 90% of the water, wood and fuel to their households. Despite this workload, they own less than 1% of the land, receive only 7% of farm extension services, receive less than 10% of the credit given to small-scale farmers and above all, are undernourished, illiterate and excluded from the decision-making positions.⁵³

⁵⁰ World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2005*, viewed 27 May 2006, <http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2005/wditext/Section1_1_1.htm>; United Nations, *The World Social Situation: The Inequality Predicament*, 2005, <<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/media%2005/cd-docs/fullreport05.htm>>.

⁵¹ C Taylor, 'Comment on Jürgen Habermas. "From Kant to Hegel and back again"', *European Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 162; cited in Lehman, p. 419.

⁵² United Nations.

⁵³ The Hunger Project, *African Women Food Farmers*, viewed 27 May 2006, <<http://www.thp.org>>.

Two different but intimately linked issues come to mind when arguing about the moral relevance of boundaries at the international level: those concerned with the universality against the particularity of human rights and the subsequent Westphalian non-intervention principle based on the self-determination communitarian argument. If something transcends any political community, it is argued, it is the belief that all human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights. The communitarians have no trouble in defining the particularistic character of human rights since 'politics follows nationality.' They have been seriously criticised for their antiquated 'cultural relativism' stance, sometimes interpreted as 'radical cultural relativism,' because for them, culture is the sole source of the validity of a moral right or rule. In contrast, the universalists, multiculturalists or pluralists, some of them also characterised as radical universalists, hold that cultural boundaries are irrelevant to the validity of moral rights and rules, which are universally valid.⁵⁴

Kantian cosmopolitanism affirms the existence of a cross-cultural moral truth and stands opposed to cultural relativism that denies that moral concepts have any international purchase. Cultural relativism thus appears to defend tolerance and condemn imperialism while condemning attempts to elevate local morality to the status of universal morality. For Kant, international morality must be based not on any empirical fact or probability, but simply on the authority of the categorical imperative, the demand of practical reason that informs the activity of all rational agents. 'Whether or not globalism, moral consensus, or global cooperation actually emerges, Kant would defend the existence of global obligations, and their corollaries, global human rights'.⁵⁵

O'Neill questions whether international problems can be handled exclusively through a doctrine of rights, as appears to be the tendency of many contemporary theorists, or whether they submit more easily to a morally purged-of-rights talk, one that substitutes duties for rights. O'Neill recommends, as a good cosmopolitan, a focus on a more duty-

⁵⁴ J Donnelly, 'Cultural relativism and universal human rights', *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 4, 1984, pp. 400-419.

⁵⁵ Donaldson, p. 144.

based approach, following Kant's deontological ethics, and even more Stoic and Aristotelian virtue ethics, rather than a rights-based legalist perspective which is precisely what Beitz and others seem to promote. This might also be supported by the fact that although Beitz legitimates his theoretical concept on Kantian cosmopolitanism, he cites much more of Rawls' utilitarianism than he does of Kant's deontology. In fact, O'Neill's criticism very much resembles MacIntyre's insistence that 'we should attend to the virtues in the first place in order to understand the function and authority of the rules'.⁵⁶

Communitarian's world-view recognises a plurality of values, cultures and interests expressed by a plurality of states, but this is sustained by the principle of non-intervention. They fear that a violation of this norm would destabilise the inter-national order and would unleash self-interested states against each other into what could lead to some kind of 'slippery slope of forcible interference'.⁵⁷ Therefore, even in the case of grave human rights violations states should not interfere or intervene in the domestic concerns of another state. The principle of non-intervention needs to be maintained in order to protect smaller, less powerful states.

Humanitarian intervention is traditionally and simply defined as the use of force by states to protect human rights.⁵⁸ However, we found that Walzer himself, as the years went by and after all the communitarian artillery he fired against cosmopolitans, started little by little to recognise that humanitarian intervention is indeed not only permissible, but morally necessary. Orend makes it clear that for Walzer, the only kind of armed humanitarian intervention justified is that designed to rescue endangered citizens.⁵⁹ It 'belongs in the realm not of law but of

⁵⁶ A MacIntyre, *After virtue*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1984, p. 119.

⁵⁷ AJ Semb, 'The new practice of UN-authorized interventions: A slippery slope of forcible interference?', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no. 4, 2000, pp. 469-488.

⁵⁸ This is, 'the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.' T Nardin, 'The moral basis for humanitarian intervention', in AF Lang Jr. (ed.), *Just intervention*, Georgetown University Press, USA, 2003, pp. 11-27, especially p. 21.

⁵⁹ Orend, p. 116.

moral choice, which nations, like individuals must sometimes make...'⁶⁰ 'Where massive human rights abuses occur, the burden of evidence will have shifted: it is now non-intervention, rather than intervention, that stands in need of justification'.⁶¹

According to Walzer's arguments, humanitarian intervention in conflicts where crimes against humanity like genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rapes, massacres, torture and widespread mutilation occur is justified as a response to 'acts "that shock the moral conscience of humankind"'.⁶² The military defeat of the people who commit such atrocities is morally necessary. In these cases, violation of the rules of sovereignty might well be praised because the rights and individual and collective liberty threatened to be exterminated are much more important than sovereignty, which happens to be just an expression of them in itself. The big question is whether humanitarian intervention is legal, morally necessary, and, to extend the argument further, if it is even a duty that everybody, or every state as comprised of human beings has. Walzer finally says that '[a]ny state capable of stopping the slaughter has a right, at least, to try to do so'.⁶³

Every humanitarian intervention represents costs and risks that many countries are not willing to pay or do not have the resources to pay them with. As Walzer puts it 'perhaps there is a right to intervene but also a right to refuse the risks'.⁶⁴ This is a case that philosophers like to call an 'imperfect duty',⁶⁵ when someone should stop the grave abuses but there is no one (no country) to point the finger at, especially when the sovereignty, non-intervention, and self-determination principles are so protected. For those arguing the end of the Westphalian sovereign state, the fact that in the nineteenth century a new sovereign state was created at an average rate of every four years, every eighteen months

⁶⁰ TM Franck & NS Rodley, 'After Bangladesh: The law of humanitarian intervention by military force', *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 67, no. 193, p. 304; cited in Walzer, *Just and unjust*, p. 106.

⁶¹ Begby, p. 61.

⁶² Walzer, *Just and unjust*, p. 107.

⁶³ *ibid.*, p. 108.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p. 32.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*.

during the first half of the twentieth century and every five months during the second half of it,⁶⁶ is not very supportive.

But as it turns out, what is becoming more interesting is the fact that Third World states that have historically favoured and promoted a strong communitarian defence of sovereignty, non-intervention and self-determination *vis à vis* the great powers in order to guarantee (at least in spirit) the idea of international equality,⁶⁷ are now the ones that have not just signed but ratified first the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.⁶⁸ The ICC is the ultimate symbol of intervening in the internal affairs of states, and persecution of and application of universal justice against individuals and not states. The ICC is the greatest international instrument ever created to prosecute crimes of aggression (although not yet defined), war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide through universal jurisdiction.⁶⁹ '[U]nfortunately, most of the countries that cry out for intervention are not the objects of imperial ambition'.⁷⁰ As Simon Chesterman says: 'the problem is not the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention but the overwhelming prevalence of inhumanitarian nonintervention'.⁷¹

These two trends – the one showing Walzer losing grip of his communitarian defence and the undeniable expression of the universalisation of justice at the individual level and strong defence of

⁶⁶ D Smith & M Fixdal, 'Humanitarian intervention and just war', *International Studies Review*, vol. 42, 1998, p. 289.

⁶⁷ C Thomas, 'The pragmatic case against intervention', in I Forbes & M Hoffman (eds), *Political theory, international relations and the ethics of intervention*, St. Martin's Press, Southampton, 1993, p. 95.

⁶⁸ United Nations Statute of the International Criminal Court, <<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp>>.

⁶⁹ CE Philipp, 'The International Criminal Court – A brief introduction', in A von Bogdandy & R Wolfrum (eds), *Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law*, vol. 7, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2003; M Wagner, 'The ICC and its jurisdiction – myths, misperceptions and realities', in A von Bogdandy & R Wolfrum (eds), *Max Planck yearbook of United Nations Law*, vol. 7, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2003.

⁷⁰ Walzer, *Just and unjust*, p. xvi.

⁷¹ S Chesterman, 'Hard cases make bad law: Law, ethics, and politics in humanitarian intervention', in AF Lang Jr. (ed.), *Just intervention*, Georgetown University Press, USA, 2003, p. 54.

human rights through international and regional human rights regimes (although some more effective and serious than others, as Donnelly points out), and the other showing strong transnational advocacy networks in defence of human rights is a clear indication that the international structure is indeed, as Linklater shows, moving towards not just a cosmopolitan ideal, but towards a concrete blurring of state boundaries as morally relevant, developing 'cosmopolitan harm conventions'⁷² that are eroding the essence of domestic sovereign jurisdictions while at the same time promoting moral duties. The ancient communitarian doctrine based on self-determination and non-intervention is now being increasingly challenged by the equally ancient doctrine of human dignity; humanitarian interventions are not only a right, but may become a duty, an imperfect duty, not only out of necessity, but of moral necessity.

Some concluding remarks

*As humanist, I accept to defend the internationalization of the world.
But as long as the world treats me as a Brazilian,
I will fight to keep Amazonia ours.*
Cristovam Buarque

A post-exclusionary form of political community would, according to Linklater, be post-sovereign or post-Westphalian. 'It would abandon the idea that power, authority, territory and loyalty must be focused around a single community or monopolized by a single site of governance'.⁷³ But this statement is not critic-free, for this same idea of creating a global 'Big Brother' is what most communitarians fear and their reaction can be sensed against the possibility of creating a 'totalising project' that could easily become a global tyranny. For a communitarian, pluralism is a reaction against the very doctrine of sovereignty, and the idea of '*one state, many peoples* - is possible only under tyrannical regimes'.⁷⁴ In words of O'Neill,

⁷² A Linklater, 'Citizenship, humanity and cosmopolitan harm conventions', *International Political Science Review*, vol. 22, no. 3, 2001, pp. 261-277.

⁷³ Devetak, p. 155.

⁷⁴ Walzer, *Mimeo*, p. 141.

such a world – a world state – might concentrate so much power that it risked or instituted much injustice. The common reasons given fearing world government and its colossal concentrations of powers seem to me serious reasons. The reasons for thinking that justice is helped by bonds of sentiment between citizens, and can be destroyed by lack of all such bonds, are also strong. The evidence that those bonds are easier to forge when a sense of identity is shared is also considerable.⁷⁵

Both cosmopolitanism and communitarianism are ontological rather than ideological approaches of the study of international relations, and at the end of the debate, it is ‘human dignity’ that is at stake and the respect for the ‘particular’ that has become the most sensitive issue. Acceptance of the *non-identical identities* throughout the globe without imposing neither from the top nor from the bottom a universal truth: this is the importance that must be given to recognition of difference and diversity. As expressed by Luis González de Souza, ‘trying to make everyone in the globe a neoliberal Western-like representative democracy by force is the most undemocratic democracy’.⁷⁶

Cosmopolitans fail to recognise the importance that people assign to their deep-rooted thick local values, tangible and intangible, especially to those vulnerable political communities that feel threatened by the tendency of globalisation to detach them from their social, cultural and natural environments. Charles Taylor, as a communitarian, rejects cosmopolitanism as too atomistic. The individual is not a self sufficient entity; it arises out of a particular social community. The crucial commonality of the human race is particularism, Walzer says, ‘we participate, all of us, in thick cultures that are our own’.⁷⁷ ‘The distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure. If this distinctiveness is a value, as most people seem to believe, then closure

⁷⁵ O’Neill; cited in Brow, p. 122.

⁷⁶ L. González Souza, National Coordinator of *Causa Ciudadana Agrupación Política*, interview by Gilberto Estrada Harris, 7 August 2001, Mexico City, Mexico.

⁷⁷ Walzer, *Thick and thin*, p. 83.

must be permitted somewhere. At some level of political organization, something like the sovereign state must take shape'.⁷⁸

But communitarians fail to understand the implications that globalisation produces on the erosion of the traditional concept of 'political community,' and the importance of transnational relationships, networks and communities that are now more than ever undermining the significant morality of state boundaries. Linklater argues that the 'steady weakening of the old bonds linking citizens to the state creates unprecedented opportunities for new forms of political community attuned to the principles of cosmopolitan democracy and transnational citizenship'.⁷⁹ Hence, Kant's categorical imperative stands as a clear alternative to relativism and extreme realism. It is, in a word, a 'cosmopolitan' doctrine that treats all humans, by virtue of their shared rationality, as citizens of a single moral order.⁸⁰ For this world to be a just world, we would have to 'imagine a system of states that would be just provided that each state was just',⁸¹ O'Neill cynically remarks. Until that happens and everything is in reality for everyone like Kant said, paraphrasing Cristovam Buarque, 'as humanist, I accept to defend the internationalization of the world. But as long as the world treats me as a Mexican, I will fight to keep *Cerro de San Pedro*, the *Huasteca* and the *Lacandona Jungle* ours',⁸² for we believe that another world is indeed possible, a world in which many worlds could fit in.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*, p. 39.

⁷⁹ Cited in Rudolph, p. 13.

⁸⁰ Donaldson, p. 142.

⁸¹ O'Neill, 'Bounded and cosmopolitan justice', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 26, 2000, p. 46.

⁸² Originally he said 'as humanist, I accept to defend the internationalization of the world. But as long as the world treats me as a Brazilian, I will fight to keep Amazonia ours.' C Buarque, 'O Mundo para Todos', *O Globo*, October 23, 2000, <http://www.brazilianlist.com/22summer02/22_amazonia.html>.

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EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN CORPORATE ACCOUNTING: AN OVERVIEW

*Alexandra Fong**

Earnings management is the manipulation of accounts and financial reports by a firm's management in order to present a view of the company which does not accurately reflect its financial position or performance. It is often referred to as 'creative accounting', and is blamed for the downfall of companies such as Enron and Worldcom, yet earnings management techniques may range from being deliberately conservative in nature, to blatant violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Practices and fraud. This paper critically analyses the earnings management literature to date, in particular, the various possible motivations for earnings management, the evidence supporting or contradicting each motivation theory, and the detection of earnings management.

Introduction

In order for financial reports to convey more useful and valuable information to users, managers must be permitted some degree of judgement in selecting reporting methods, estimates and disclosures appropriate to the underlying business economics of the firm.¹ However, neither accounting nor auditing is an exact science. As it is the firm's management which decides how information contained in financial reports is to be presented, there is a risk of earnings management, whereby managers select estimates and reporting methods which do not accurately reflect the firm's underlying

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¹ PM Healy & JM Wahlen, 'A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting', *Accounting Horizons*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1999, pp. 365-383 at p. 366.

economics.² This can adversely affect the judgement of users relying on the information provided in the reports. Such manipulation of accounts and financial reports has been blamed in the well-known, recent corporate failures of Enron and WorldCom, amongst others, making earnings management an important and timeless issue in the field of accounting.

This paper critically analyses the earnings management literature to date; in particular, the various possible motivations for earnings management, the evidence supporting or contradicting each motivation theory, and the detection of earnings management.

Definitions of earnings management

There appears to be no one universally accepted definition of the term 'earnings management', probably due in chief to the fact that it is considered a difficult concept to define and measure.³ The general concept of earnings management is understood to refer to the process by which financial information is manipulated to present the financial position and performance of the company in a way which does not reflect its true position and performance. It may include accounting treatments which are fraudulent, violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), or deliberately aggressive or conservative accounting treatments within GAAP, such as attempts at income smoothing through the manipulation of provisions for doubtful debts and depreciation.⁴

The differences in the definitions employed by different researchers and academics, however, often reflect their own hypotheses as to the forms of, and motivations behind, earnings management, as well as their own

² LE DeAngelo, 'Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders', *The Accounting Review*, vol. 61, no. 3, 1986, pp. 400-420 at p. 401.

³ B Vinciguerra & M O'Reilly-Allen, 'An examination of factors influencing managers' and auditors' assessments of the appropriateness of an accounting treatment and earnings management intentions', *American Business Review*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2004, pp. 78-87 at p. 79.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 79-80.

perceptions regarding the extent of such behaviour. One oft-cited definition is that of Healy & Wahlen:

Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.⁵

This definition proposes two main objectives of earnings management: firstly, to mislead stakeholders about the economic performance of the company; secondly, to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting figures. Hence, it can be seen that *stakeholders* and *contractual outcomes* form the basis for Healy & Wahlen's argument – views which are shared and have been expanded upon by other academics in this field.

While this definition has been widely accepted by other writers in the field, it has been noted to focus on the managerial intent behind the process of earnings management, which, while descriptive, cannot be observed.⁶ This therefore creates some problems for the study and measurement of earnings management. Moreover, it has been observed that earnings management, encompassing a range of behaviours from 'conservative accounting' to 'fraudulent accounting', may sometimes be within GAAP, despite some manifestations such as 'fraudulent accounting' violating GAAP. As 'fraudulent accounting' is clearly an extreme form of earnings management with extremely adverse consequences which are treated seriously by the law, it must be noted that the definition of earnings management and the behaviours encompassed by it is therefore quite important.⁷

⁵ Healy & Wahlen, p. 368.

⁶ PM Dechow & DJ Skinner, 'Earnings management: Reconciling the views of accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators', *Accounting Horizons*, vol. 14, no. 2, 2000, pp. 235-250 at p. 238.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 239.




Figure 1. Examples of earnings management and their relationship with GAAP⁸

⁸ Adapted from Dechow & Skinner, p. 239.

Motivations for Earnings Management

Capital market motivations

The usage of accounting information contained in financial reports has led some academics to hypothesise that managers use earnings management with the goal of influencing the firm's short-term stock price. A number of studies have been undertaken in this area, examining the practice of earnings management in various situations.⁹

One of the most significant motivations for earnings management for capital market reasons is to encourage investment in a firm, through offerings of stock. It has been found that firms report positive unexpected accruals which increase income before initial public offers,¹⁰ seasoned equity offers,¹¹ and stock-financed acquisitions.¹² Teoh, Wong & Rao conclude that firms undertaking an initial public offer are more likely than firms not doing so to have income-increasing depreciation policies and bad debt allowances in the year of the offering and for many years later.¹³ It can thus be deduced that earnings management is used in these situations to increase income and therefore show the firm to be more profitable, in order to make investors more willing to invest money in the firm by buying its stock. An Australian study also supports this conclusion indirectly, finding that lower institutional ownership, which implies short-term oriented investment and an

⁹ M Erickson & S-W Wang, 'Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for stock mergers', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 27, 1999, pp. 149-176; SH Teoh, I Welch & TJ Wong, 'Earnings management and the post-issue performance of seasoned equity offerings', *Journal of Financial Economics*, vol. 50, 1998, pp. 63-99; SH Teoh, TJ Wong & G Rao, 'Are accruals during initial public offerings opportunistic?', *Review of Accounting Studies*, vol. 3, 1999, pp. 175-208; all cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 371.

¹⁰ Teoh, Welch & Wong, *Journal of Financial Economics*; Teoh, Wong & Rao; both cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 371.

¹¹ SH Teoh, I Welch & TJ Wong, 'Earnings management and the long-term market performance of initial public offerings', *Journal of Finance*, vol. 53, 1998, pp. 1935-1974; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 371.

¹² M Erickson & S-W Wang; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 371

¹³ Teoh, Wong & Rao; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 371.

emphasis on stock prices over long-term profits, is correlated with increased earnings management in the form of positive accruals.¹⁴

Conversely, other studies show that there is an incentive to understate earnings prior to management buyouts.¹⁵ This hypothesis is supported in a study by Perry & Williams, which indicates that unexpected accruals are negative – income-decreasing – prior to a management buyout.¹⁶ DeAngelo, however, does not find much evidence supporting this theory.¹⁷ The theory, whether there is evidence supporting it or not, seems plausible, stating that the incentive to manage earnings downwards is to make the buyout easier and cheaper, allowing the firm's management to offer a price which appears to be reasonably above the market price yet which is still below what the firm is actually worth, since the market price would not accurately reflect the firm's underlying economics.¹⁸

Another significant capital market reason for earnings management is to present the firm's earnings as meeting the expectations of financial analysts or management.¹⁹ A number of studies have noted that there are an unusually large number of cases where analyst forecasts are exactly met or just surpassed, while there is an unusually low rate of near misses.²⁰ Kasznik also found that unexpected accruals were used by firms who would otherwise fall short of a management earnings

¹⁴ P-S Koh, 'On the association between institutional ownership and aggressive corporate earnings management in Australia', *The British Accounting Review*, vol. 35, 2003, pp. 105-128 at p. 124.

¹⁵ LE DeAngelo, 'Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance: The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 10, 1988, pp. 3-36; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 371.

¹⁶ S Perry & T Williams, 'Earnings management preceding management buyout offers', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 18, 1994, pp. 157-179; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 371.

¹⁷ DeAngelo, *Journal of Accounting and Economics*; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 371.

¹⁸ DeAngelo, p. 401.

¹⁹ D Burgstahler & M Eames, 'Management of earnings and analyst forecasts', Working paper, University of Washington, 1998; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 371.

²⁰ *ibid.*; LD Brown, 'Managerial behaviour and the bias in analysts' earnings forecasts', Working paper, Georgia State University, 1998; cited in Dechow & Skinner, pp. 242-243.

forecast to manage earnings upward, presumably so as to meet the forecast.²¹

Apart from meeting the expectations of analysts and management, DeGeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser find that it is also important for firms not to make losses and to achieve consistent earnings growth.²² The latter goal is found to result in the smoothing of reported earnings.²³ Such smoothing has been found to improve the persistence and predictability of earnings,²⁴ thus giving firms even more of an incentive to engage in such behaviour. Additionally, Barth, Elliott & Finn concluded that the reporting of continuous annual earnings growth is directly proportional to the pricing of a firm's premium, providing support for this hypothesis.²⁵

The last type of capital market based earnings management is used to influence the expectations of specific types of investors.²⁶ For example, it has been found that firms with a high percentage of ownership by institutions with momentum trading strategies and high portfolio turnover cut research and development spending in order to manage earnings upwards.²⁷ This would suggest that earnings management is used to make the firm appear more profitable and keep these kinds of investors satisfied.

²¹ R Kasznik, 'On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management', *Journal of Accounting Research*, vol. 37, 1999, pp. 57-82; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 371.

²² F DeGeorge, J Patel & R Zeckhauser, 'Earnings management to exceed thresholds', *Journal of Business*, vol. 72, 1999, pp. 1-33; cited in Dechow & Skinner, p. 243.

²³ LA Myers & DJ Skinner, 'Earnings momentum and earnings management', Working paper, University of Michigan, 2000; cited in Dechow & Skinner, p. 243.

²⁴ KR Subramanyam, 'The pricing of discretionary accruals', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 22, no. 1-3, 1996, pp. 249-281; cited in H Stlowy & G Breton, 'Accounts manipulation: A literature review and proposed conceptual framework', *Review of Accounting & Finance*, vol. 3, no. 1, 2004, pp. 5-66 at p. 16.

²⁵ ME Barth, JA Elliott & MW Finn, 'Market rewards associated with patterns of increased earnings', *Journal of Accounting Research*, vol. 37, 1999, pp. 387-413; cited in Dechow & Skinner, p. 244.

²⁶ Healy & Wahlen, p. 372

²⁷ B Bushee, 'The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior', *The Accounting Review*, vol. 73, no. 3, 1998, pp. 305-333; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 372.

Management compensation contract motivations

The management compensation theory, also known as the bonus plan hypothesis,²⁸ contends that managers are motivated to use earnings management to improve their compensation, as management bonuses are often tied to the firm's earnings. It is thus expected that earnings management is used to increase income; however, early testing of this hypothesis did not yield conclusive results.²⁹

This was explained by Healy as being due to the limits placed on such bonus plans: managers, he found, were more likely to choose to report accruals that defer income when the cap on bonus awards were reached, as they had no more to gain from extra earnings and would be better off increasing income for the following year at that point.³⁰ This ties in with the 'big bath' hypothesis, which suggests that if managers are unable to manipulate earnings to reach a particular target, they will have the incentive to use earnings management to decrease current earnings in favour of future earnings and, therefore, future bonuses.³¹

Other evidence supporting the management compensation theory can be found in the research of Dechow & Sloan, who find that managers decrease research and development expenditure in the final year of their terms in order to increase earnings and thus their payout upon leaving the company.³²

²⁸ RL Watts & JL Zimmerman, *Positive Accounting Theory*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1986; cited in Y Xiong, 'Earnings management and its measurement: A theoretical perspective', *Journal of American Academy of Business*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2006, pp. 214-219 at p. 215.

²⁹ Xiong, p. 215.

³⁰ PM Healy, 'The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 7, 1985, pp. 85-107; cited in Xiong, p. 215.

³¹ Chao et al., 'Evidence of earnings management from the measurement of the deferred tax allowance account', *The Engineering Economist*, vol. 49, no. 1, 2004, pp. 63-93 at p. 70.

³² PM Dechow & RG Sloan, 'Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical investigation', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 14, 1991, pp. 51-89; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 377.

Lending contracts motivations

Another major hypothesis is the debt covenant hypothesis.³³ This theory is based on the fact that creditors often impose restrictions on the payment of dividends, share buybacks and the issuing of additional debt in terms of reported accounting figures and ratios, in order to ensure the repayment of the firm's borrowings. Hence, the hypothesis is that firms who have a lot of debt have an incentive to manage earnings so that they do not breach their debt covenants.³⁴

Studies have produced mixed results in this area. Holthausen,³⁵ Healy & Palepu,³⁶ and DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Skinner³⁷ investigated whether firms close to breaching their lending covenants changed accounting methods, such as the accounting of depreciation, accounting estimates, or made other transactions in order to avoid breaching their covenant. They concluded, however, that there was little evidence of earnings management by these firms; rather, they were more likely to reduce dividend payments or restructure their operations and contractual obligations.

On the other hand, DeFond & Jiambalvo found that firms who violated their debt covenants used accruals to increase income the year before the violation, thus concluding that firms use earnings management to defer violation of debt covenants for as long as possible.³⁸

³³ Watts & Zimmerman, *Positive Accounting Theory*; cited in Xiong, p. 215.

³⁴ Xiong, p. 215.

³⁵ RW Holthausen, 'Evidence on the effect of bond covenants and management compensation contracts on the choice of accounting techniques: The case of the depreciation switch-back', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 3, 1981, pp. 73-109; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 376.

³⁶ PM Healy & KG Palepu, 'Effectiveness of accounting-based dividend covenants', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 12, 1990, pp. 97-124; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 376.

³⁷ E DeAngelo, H DeAngelo & D Skinner, 'Accounting choices of troubled companies', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 17, 1994, pp. 113-143; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 376.

³⁸ ML DeFond & J Jiambalvo, 'Debt convent effects and the manipulation of accruals', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 17, 1994, pp. 145-176; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 376.

Regulatory motivations

Some industries, in particular the banking, insurance and utility industries are monitored for compliance with regulations linked to accounting figures and ratios.³⁹ Banks and insurance firms especially are often subject to requirements that they have enough capital or assets to meet their liabilities, while utilities are often only permitted to earn a normal return on their investments, thus leading to the theory that such regulations give managers incentives to use earnings management.

Research has shown that banks which are close to minimum capital requirements use earnings management techniques such as overstating loan loss provisions, understating loan write-offs and recognising abnormal realised gains on their investment portfolios, presumably so as not to breach the regulatory requirements.⁴⁰ Collins, Shackelford & Wahlen also found that almost half the study sample banks employed at least five out of seven methods of managing regulatory capital,⁴¹ thus indicating a high frequency of earnings management by banks.

Other studies also provide evidence that insurers which are struggling financially engage in earnings management through the understating of claim loss reserves and reinsurance transactions.⁴²

³⁹ Healy & Wahlen, p. 377.

⁴⁰ S Moyer, 'Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in commercial banks', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 13, 1990, pp. 123-154; M Scholes, GP Wilson & M Wolfson, 'Tax planning, regulatory capital planning, and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks', *Review of Financial Studies*, vol. 3, 1990, pp. 625-650; J Collins, D Shackelford & J Wahlen, 'Bank differences in the coordination of regulatory capital, earnings and taxes', *Journal of Accounting Research*, vol. 33, no. 2, 1995, pp. 263-291; all cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 378.

⁴¹ Collins, Shackelford & Wahlen; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 378.

⁴² KR Petroni, 'Optimistic reporting in the property casualty insurance industry', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 15, 1992, pp. 485-508; R Adiel, 'Reinsurance and the management of regulatory ratios and taxes in the property-casualty insurance industry', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, vol. 22, no. 1-3, 1996, pp. 207-240; both cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 378.

Political cost motivations

Finally, Watts & Zimmerman propose the political cost hypothesis,⁴³ which is also similar to the anti-trust and other regulatory motivations propounded by Healy & Wahlen.⁴⁴ The political cost hypothesis states that political pressure to reduce prices or face the penalties which may result from the investigation of firms which are suspected of breaching anti-trust rules or otherwise taking advantage of the general public may create incentives for firms to manage earnings. Firms are expected to manage their earnings so as to seem less profitable in order to lower their political risk.⁴⁵ Han & Wong, for example, found that firms who expected to profit from the price increases during the 1990 Gulf War managed their accruals so as to reduce earnings and avoid political scrutiny.⁴⁶ In a similar vein, Jones reported that firms in industries campaigning for import tariffs and restrictions had a tendency to defer income-increasing accruals.⁴⁷

Detecting earnings management

There are a number of empirical methods by which earnings management can be detected and measured. The most common of these is the discretionary accruals method. It assumes that managers rely on their ability to use discretion regarding certain accruals and thus requires discretionary and non-discretionary components of accruals to be separated, so that the discretionary accruals can be used as proxy to test for earnings management.⁴⁸

⁴³ Watts & Zimmerman, *Positive Accounting Theory*; cited in Xiong, p. 215.

⁴⁴ Healy & Wahlen, p. 378.

⁴⁵ RL Watts & JL Zimmerman, 'Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards', *The Accounting Review*, vol. 53, 1978, pp. 112-134; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 378.

⁴⁶ JCY Han & S Wong, 'Political costs and earnings management of oil companies during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis', *The Accounting Review*, vol. 73, 1998, pp. 103-117; cited in Xiong, p. 215.

⁴⁷ JJ Jones, 'Earnings management during import relief investigations', *Journal of Accounting Research*, vol. 29, 1991, pp. 193-228; cited in Xiong, p. 215.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p. 216.

The discretionary accruals method may be divided into two types. The first is the discretionary total accruals method. Total accruals are divided into discretionary and non-discretionary, usually using either the Jones model⁴⁹ or the modified Jones model.⁵⁰ Under the Jones model, it is assumed that the level of unmanaged accruals is accounted for by gross property, plant, and equipment, and changes in revenues. The former determines the depreciation expense while the latter determines the changes in working capital. These two variables are used for regression, the residuals of which are considered the managed accruals. The modified Jones model (below) assumes that credit sales could be a source of earnings management, and thus adjusts the changes in revenues by subtracting the same amount in receivables.⁵¹

$$\frac{TAC_{it}}{TA_{it-1}} = a_{0j} \left(\frac{1}{TA_{it-1}} \right) + a_{1j} \left(\frac{\Delta REV_{it} - \Delta REC_{it}}{TA_{it-1}} \right) + a_{2j} \left(\frac{PPE_{it}}{TA_{it-1}} \right) + e_{it}$$

Where:

TAC_{it} is the total accruals (net income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations) in year t for the i^{th} control firm;

TA_{it} is the total assets in year t for the i^{th} control firm;

ΔREV_{it} is the change in revenues from year $t-1$ to year t for the i^{th} control firm;

ΔREC_{it} is the change in receivables from year $t-1$ to year t for the i^{th} control firm;

PPE_{it} is the gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for the i^{th} control firm;

e_{it} is the regression error term, assumed to be cross-sectionally uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero.⁵²

The estimated coefficients from the control firm regression above are then used to estimate the level of managed accruals for each sample firm as below:

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ PM Dechow, RG Sloan & AP Sweeney, 'Detecting earnings management', *The Accounting Review*, vol. 70, 1995, pp. 193-225; cited in Xiong, p. 216.

⁵¹ Xiong, p. 217.

⁵² *Ibid.*

$$TAEM_{j,t} = \frac{TAC_{jt}}{TA_{jt-1}} - a_{oj} \left(\frac{1}{TA_{jt-1}} \right) - a_{ij} \left(\frac{\Delta RAV_{jt} - \Delta REC_{jt}}{TA_{jt-1}} \right) - a_{2j} \left(\frac{PPE_{jt}}{TA_{jt-1}} \right)$$

Where $TAEM_{j,t}$ is the managed component of total accruals for sample firm j in year t , which is equal to discretionary total accruals.⁵³

Both the Jones model and the modified Jones model have been criticised as the proxy can be ‘noisy’, detecting factors other than earnings management during testing; however, discretionary accruals are generally the most effective proxies in measuring earnings management.⁵⁴

An alternative method known as the single accrual method also exists, whereby only one kind of accrual, for example, bad debt provisions, depreciation estimates or deferred tax valuation allowances, is used.⁵⁵ This method is not as effective as the total accruals method, as it is difficult to identify one unique accrual used to manage earnings, and the result may not be large enough to be statistically significant.⁵⁶ In addition, a single accrual may be affected by other variables.

The distribution method is another way of testing for earnings management where reporting losses is being avoided. The distribution of reported earnings is tested to determine whether there is any evidence of earnings management.⁵⁷ The advantages of this method are that no estimation of potentially ‘noisy’ accruals is required, and that it includes earnings management which relates to cash flows, such as

⁵³ *ibid.*

⁵⁴ Teoh, Wong & Rao; cited in Xiong, p. 218.

⁵⁵ M McNichols & P Wilson, ‘Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad debts’, *Journal of Accounting Research*, vol. 26 (supplement), 1988, pp. 1-31; Teoh, Wong & Rao; both cited in Xiong, p. 218.

⁵⁶ Xiong, p. 218.

⁵⁷ D Burgstahler & I Dichev, ‘Incentives to manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses: Evidence from quarterly earnings’, Working paper, University of Washington, 1998; cited in Healy & Wahlen, p. 379.

reduced expenditure for research and development, or advertising.⁵⁸ However, it cannot indicate the specific accruals used or the extent of earnings management.⁵⁹

Conclusion

Many different studies have been conducted on the range of motivations that managers have for engaging in earnings management and the various behaviours falling within the general concept of earnings management. Earnings management affects many different areas of business and, in particular, third parties outside the company, such as shareholders and creditors who may be adversely affected by relying on reports subjected to earnings management. Therefore, even though some forms of earnings management lie within GAAP, it is still an important issue within accounting and auditing. Finally, despite having a noisy proxy, the total accrual method is generally the most effective measure of earnings management. It is difficult to measure the extent of earnings management, due partly to imperfect measurement models and partly to the sensitive nature of the research involved.

⁵⁸ Healy & Wahlen, p. 379.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

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WESTERN PENETRATION OF THE PERSIAN GULF OIL RESERVES

*James Newton**

In the first half of the twentieth century, the United States (US), Great Britain and – to a lesser extent – Russia, endeavoured to extend their influence over Iran and Saudi Arabia in order to obtain access to and control of their oil resources. This essay examines the increasing importance of oil as a source of fuel, a strategic and economic commodity and how control over resources was intensified by new technologies and international politics.

In May 1907, the Shah of Persia and William Knox D'Arcy signed a sixty year oil concession which became the precedent and trigger for the commencement of Western participation in the oil industry of the Middle East.¹ From this point on, foreign owned oil companies commenced the drilling and export of the region's most valuable commodity, due to the influence and control Western governments came to have. Following the signing of oil concessions, key Western countries gained control of the petroleum trade within many of these countries and thus immense influence in the region. This essay will argue that oil was the prime reason for Western penetration of the Persian Gulf. With some exceptions, the various situations and concerns of predominant Western countries led to government support for the exploits of petroleum companies. This is demonstrated through the involvement of Great Britain, Russia and the United States of America (US) in the politics and petroleum industries of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Initially Britain and later the US were responsible for the conquest and development of their previously untapped resources. An examination of themes familiar to Iran and Saudi Arabia will reveal the origins and motives of Western involvement. The concessions were crucial

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¹ L Mosley, *Power play: The tumultuous world of Middle East oil 1890-1973*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1973, pp. 8-9.

accomplishments for the US and Britain which, were it not for the presence of oil, would most likely not have had reasonable grounds to penetrate the Gulf, to such an extent, at that time.

The transition from coal to oil as a fuel source for Western naval vessels provides a key reason for the penetration of Persian Gulf reserves. Against the backdrop of an Anglo-German naval race, the British parliament faced the important decision of whether to convert from coal to oil as a fuel source for the new dreadnoughts and, progressively, to all new ships.² At first this received violent opposition due to a safe and constant supply of fuel from Welsh coal mines, as opposed to a distant and less reliable oil supply from abroad.³ A change in fuel supply could also have had a potentially adverse effect on the economy. However, oil was shown to be a better option following an enthusiastic campaign led by Admiral 'Jackie' Fischer and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. The Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines reported the 'overwhelming advantages in favour of oil fuel' in 1912 and, with the knowledge of a German oil contract for the same purpose, the proposal was adopted.⁴ The British government was able to secure the support of the Burmah Oil Company and through acquisition of shares in the Anglo-Persian Petroleum Company, obtained a source of fuel and influence in the Persian, later Iranian, petroleum industry. The US Navy faced similar issues with the evolution of naval technology which can be viewed as a motive for its interest in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the 1930s. Given that Britain had no oil supply on its mainland and the US supply was considered to be inadequate, the Persian Gulf became a sound option. Hence the concerted efforts of Western governments to secure a fuel source for their respective navies can be viewed as an initial reason for penetration of the Gulf.

Another motivation for Western activities in the Persian Gulf stems back to colonialism, with minimal bearing on oil itself. Nevertheless, a British imperial presence in the Middle East set the framework for

² *ibid.*, p. 11.

³ D Yergin, *The prize: The epic quest for oil, money and power*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991, p. 12.

⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 154-157.

future petroleum exploitation.⁵ From a British perspective, Russia's perceived expansionism, focusing on Persian tensions, was viewed as 'a direct threat to India and routes thereto'.⁶ The British government placed a great deal of importance in maintaining lines of communication and access to the rest of its empire, namely India, and the Persian Gulf was crucial for this.⁷ The Middle East formed a land bridge over three continents and gave Britain control of sea routes to the rest of its empire.⁸ The potential Russian and German military threats to Iran opposed British colonial interests.

In 1919 the Anglo-Persian Treaty was signed, provoking concern in the US and France regarding the continued expansion of British imperialism.⁹ The treaty insured ultimate British administrative and economic control of its 'protectorate', but was not ratified amid US and Russian opposition.¹⁰ Despite this opposition, Britain did establish itself in the Persian Gulf and served as a precursor for other Western nations which soon followed its lead. The Allied Western nations came to support the British presence on account of the imminent Communist threat, following the rise of the Bolsheviks, which was eased by the signing of defensive treaties with Iran's Middle Eastern neighbours.¹¹ Britain looked to protect its vested interests and later an opposition to Communism. Thus we can identify the consequences of an outside threat to British colonialism as a reason for Western penetration. Although from this view oil has a minimal part in reasoning, it soon came to play a central role and was intrinsically involved in most thought as the early US and Russian opposition showed.

⁵ DA Rustow, *Oil and turmoil: America faces OPEC and the Middle East*, 1st edn, Norton, New York, 1982, p. 91.

⁶ Yergin, p. 136.

⁷ IH Anderson, *Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A study of the dynamics of foreign oil policy, 1933-1950*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981, p. 11.

⁸ S Marsh, *Anglo-American relations and Cold War oil: Crisis in Iran*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, p. 22.

⁹ NR Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and results of revolution*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2003, p. 76.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 76-79.

¹¹ Marsh, p. 22.

British colonialism was closely involved in the historical British-Russian situation regarding influence in Persia in which Lord Curzon exemplified Persia as one of 'the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the domination of the world'.¹² British-Russian tensions existed due to Iran being 'within the geographical perimeters of Russian security and aspirations as well as on the margin of British colonial expansion'.¹³ Hence this rivalry derived from colonial expansion to the sub-continent.¹⁴ It was promoted further with the announcement that Russia wanted to create an oil pipeline from the Baku to the Persian Gulf which the British strongly opposed and had barred.¹⁵ This tension led to the mutual creation of a buffer zone as the country was divided into spheres of influence. Russia had influence over the north, Britain the south and Tehran the central region. Despite the signing of a pre-war treaty for the re-division of Iran, with Britain controlling the neutral oil rich zone, Russia withdrew its presence in 1917. This followed the Bolshevik revolution and the loss of respect and apparent power it had recently sustained which allowed Britain the opportunity to consolidate its rule.¹⁶ Iran became a 'bastion' of post-war power to Britain and remained an important oil source.¹⁷ Through gaining an oil concession in Iran, Britain secured its imperial position and gained a strategic upper hand in the contentious state of affairs with Russia. On one hand, Western penetration was due to a concern for security, though oil was certainly not far removed from British thinking.

It has been suggested that US and British reasoning for coming to the Gulf was oil driven, yet concessions and an invitation were required for this to eventuate. Therefore part of the resolution must have been instigated by the respective Gulf nations. At the outset, the Arabian Peninsula had been under British influence for some years, through the Baghdad High Commission. One of its rulers, Ibn Saud received

¹² Yergin, p. 136.

¹³ A Saikal, *The rise and fall of the Shah*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980, p. 11.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ Yergin, p. 137.

¹⁶ Keddie, pp. 74-75.

¹⁷ Marsh, p. 30.

payment for this compliance. Even though the British managed to insult Ibn Saud, when seeking an assurance of its friendly relationship, Major Frank Holmes was able to secure oil concessions for a London syndicate in 1922.¹⁸ This was done under the direct pressure of the British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, who threatened to cut Ibn Saud's payments, arguing it had a conflicting interest with that of the British government.¹⁹ The threat was ignored which was greatly due to the influence of Ameen Rihani who had accrued great trust from the future Saudi ruler and genuinely had the country's best interests in mind.²⁰ In time however, the concession was allowed to lapse. Were it not for the influence of Rihani and the concession obtained by Holmes, Western penetration would not have occurred at this time and there would have been no grounds for efforts in the future. Oil was the prime reason for Western penetration of the Persian Gulf and this began with initial approval.

Within five years of the lapse of the Holmes concession, the British mistake had been realised. They had let the US penetrate a British sphere of influence and lost control of one of the regions richest oilfields.²¹ The 1929-1933 global economic crisis hit the government of Saudi Arabia hard and by then it was an estimated £300,000-£400,000 in debt.²² This followed expenditures on new radio stations, the improvement of Jidda's water supply and a huge loss of income resulting from decreasing numbers of pilgrims to the holy cities.²³ A similar case existed in Iran, the reason provided by the Prime Minister being 'the Shah's prodigality': essentially the maintenance of his harem.²⁴ Ibn Saud was persuaded to meet the US philanthropist Charles Crane, whose geologist, Karl Twitchell, reported the presence of oil. This followed previously obtained geographical evidence regarding the country's convincing similarity to Bahrain.²⁵ Combined with British

¹⁸ Mosley, pp. 35-36.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

²⁰ *ibid.*, p. 32.

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 53.

²² AM Vasil'ev, *The history of Saudi Arabia*, Saqi Books, London, 2000, p. 312.

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ Yergin, p. 134.

²⁵ Vasil'ev, p. 314.

disinterest and Saudi suspicion of the British, this saw the signing of an oil concession to the US based company Standard Oil of California in 1933.²⁶ Again we see that the Western penetration of the Gulf is at the behest of Gulf states. Saudi Arabia needed an investment to boost the economy, and accordingly the US was essentially invited due to Saudi interests, as the British were twenty-five years earlier. Still, the reasoning for US penetration was first and foremost Saudi oil, an advantage they received, fortuitously, from a British oversight.

In the first half of the twentieth century, oil was increasingly being used as an alternative fuel source and a steady supply for increasing demand was sought by Western countries. Prior to the outbreak of war, oil was being introduced to Western navies and at the same time the meteoric rise of the automobile began. Between 1900 and 1912, the number of automobile registrations in the US rose from 8,000 to 902,000 as the automobile exceeded the horse and cart as a means of transport and became increasingly familiar.²⁷ Oil was also widely used by factories and trains to power boilers and a new supply was needed for these rapidly expanding markets and uses.²⁸ US supplies were inadequate and British non-existent. Oil was becoming the fuel source of the future with the expansion of uses for the internal combustion engine, and a steady supply was required by Western countries, most of which did not possess it. Oil became the predominant source of fuel from the twentieth century onwards and consequently the Persian Gulf reserves became an important target for Western penetration as the need was identified.

Both World War One (WWI) and World War Two (WWII) highlighted the importance of oil in a global context and showed that 'oil will remain the strategic commodity, critical to national strategies and international politics'.²⁹ A secure source of oil was essential in the wars and armed conflicts of the future. WWI brought the addition of a petroleum fuelled navy; tanks, trucks and aircraft were also reliant

²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 315; Mosley, p. 53.

²⁷ Yergin, p. 80.

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 14.

upon oil. Control of oilfields was essential to all Western powers to sustain their armed forces; and those of Iran were crucial, as the British Government's concern regarding the acquisition of Anglo-Persian shares suggests. Given the precedent of WWI, oil supply throughout WWII was again crucial. It is significant that 'America's predominance in oil proved decisive, and by the end of the war German and Japanese fuel tanks were empty'.³⁰ Certainly this renewed interest in the Persian Gulf came as 'Saudi Arabia first entered the American consciousness as a place of strategic importance in 1943, in the midst of World War II'.³¹ Thus the penetration of a Persian Gulf oil reserve proved crucial in this instance as both the US and Britain sought to acquire fuel for its armed forces which proved to their advantage.

The emergence of oil as a potential global economic market incited Western penetration of the Persian Gulf oil resources in the first half of the twentieth century. We can view the British and US interests in this light. Vasil'ev writes that, as early as 1920, 'The main reason [for US penetration] was the fear of being debarred from the exploitation of cheap oil deposits, located close to the major international markets'.³² This fear of missing out on control of Persian Gulf oil to the British was also recognised by US Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and echoed through the 'State Department defence of equality of commercial opportunity in independent territories'.³³ It is also important to note the huge costs involved in the exploration and extraction of oil. In considering the size and nature of Middle Eastern economies, it is only really plausible that a Western company could afford the huge risk involved in such operations.³⁴ Along with the US need for an increased supply of oil, the economic benefits of establishing oil exporting companies, as other Western nations already possessed, was also a prominent reason for their involvement in the Gulf. For this reason the US insisted upon an 'Open Door' principle.³⁵ Western penetration of the Persian Gulf was to

³⁰ Vasil'ev, p. 13.

³¹ Anderson, p. 2.

³² Vasil'ev, p. 313.

³³ *ibid.*, Anderson, p. 13.

³⁴ Rustow, p. 92.

³⁵ Yergin, p. 195.

obtain oil, yet the economic advantages were fundamentally linked and motivating factors.

In conjunction with the rationale for the establishment of an oil exporting enterprise, control over the governmental affairs of Persian Gulf states could be identified as an appealing factor. The result of the division of Iran was that the central Iranian government was seriously weakened while Britain and Russia acquired control over their zones of influence. They effectively employed a divide and rule strategy whereby the British gained economic and some political control over their designated region.³⁶ The British-run Anglo Iranian Oil Company was 'seen as a major cause and channel for British influence and control over Iran'.³⁷ Despite the Anglo-Persian Treaty not being ratified, Western influence over Iran was still identifiable. Given the strategic position of Iran, Western penetration extended in WWII when Iran identified as a Nazi sympathiser and remained neutral. Allied pressure resulted in the country's occupation throughout the war and forced the abdication of the Shah.³⁸ Thus we can identify the prospect of gaining some political control of a Gulf state as another explanation for Western penetration of the Gulf.

From 1920 onwards, the government of Iran encouraged the US to assist with the development of its infrastructure and this intervention was intrinsically engaged in the oil industry. In the same year, Iran formally requested US advisors and sent a diplomatic party to Washington to discuss options. Iran required new technologies, loans and investment for modernisation in return for which they were willing to discuss oil and transport concessions.³⁹ As part of the deal, Dr Arthur Millspaugh was given full control of the economy. The arrangement was ratified in November 1921 allowing the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey concessions on oil in northern Iran. This drew British and Russian protests, resulting in a 50/50 share of profits with Britain.⁴⁰ Following

³⁶ Saikal, p. 15.

³⁷ Keddie, p. 123.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p. 105.

³⁹ *ibid.*, p. 83.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

WWII and the occupation of Iran by the Allies, the government again asked for US economic assistance. Millspaugh was called upon once more and recounts that the US State Department advised him to go about his business with the knowledge that the US 'was to play a large role in that region with respect to oil, commerce and air transport'.⁴¹ Conversely, Marsh believes the US 'wanted to court Iranian friendship without accepting responsibility for the country'.⁴² What these events show us is one Western power penetrating Iran in an economic sense. This 'courting' of Iran was due to US interests with a view to the future. Pre-WWII, it shows Britain was protective of its interests in Iran through oil concession negotiations. Following the war the US tried to extend its influence in the Gulf diplomatically. Hence the West had reason to penetrate the Persian Gulf, with a mind to international relations, yet this was also linked to the issue of oil.

Western penetration of the Persian Gulf in the first half of the twentieth century occurred primarily due to its oil reserves. With reference to Iran and Saudi Arabia, it has been shown that oil supplies have lied at the heart of most incursions by Western powers, namely the US and Britain - with Russia an important participant. Initially oil was of importance to Western naval powers and soon became the predominant world fuel source. It was of vital practical and strategic importance in both world wars and was intrinsically linked to colonialism and historic Anglo-Russian tensions. In time, the economic benefit of oil was realised and it became an important resource with regard to international politics. In some instances, Persian Gulf countries have invited forms of Western influence. On this basis, Western powers became involved with the Persian Gulf states for their own economic and political interests and until the latter half of the twentieth century, were in a position to exploit the weaker states, as is the case with Iran and Saudi Arabia.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p. 106.

⁴² Marsh, p. 30.

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ARTWORK DETAILS

...FROM THE SAME TREE, 2005

Gaurav Bhatnagar*

Digital Photograph

2592 x 1952 pixels

* * *

TWO ROOMS: SIMULACRA, AND THE PASSAGE BETWEEN THE REAL, 2006

Catherine Brownscombe†

Fabric, thread, wood, metal, plastic, polyester fibre fill

Dimensions variable

* * *

HOUSE OF CARDS, 2006

Chris Cook‡

Digital image

2480 x 3508 pixels

* Gaurav Bhatnagar is in his fourth year of a Bachelor of Engineering (Honours) degree at the Australian National University, and is a current resident of Bruce Hall.

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‡ Chris Cook is in his fourth year of a Bachelor of Arts (Digital Arts) degree at the Australian National University, and is a former resident of Bruce Hall.

EXQUISITE FORMS, 2006

Jack Fong§

Digital Photograph

2000 x 2000 pixels

* * *

LINKS, 2006

Samuel Lewin‡

Digital Image

2560 x 1920 pixels

* * *

DRAGON, 2006

Ru Gway Wu°

Beading wire

40cm x 10cm

* * *

CAN YOU HEAR ME?: 4, 2006

Katie Ryan^

Digital Image

9000 x 5400 pixels

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THE FARNSWORTH HOUSE, built 1951

Ludwig Mies van der Rohe

Plano, Illinois, USA

* * *

GLASS HOUSE, built 1949

Philip Johnson

New Canaan, Connecticut, USA

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STILL FROM CHINATOWN, 1974

Directed by Roman Polanski

Paramount/The Kobal Collection

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
THE AMERICAN EMPIRE PRESENTS:

HOUSE OF CARDS

IN 2003 WE WENT TO WAR.
BASED ON INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS INCORRECT.
NOW AN EMPIRE IS BEING BUILT ON THESE FOUNDATIONS.
A HOUSE OF CARDS.




FENG-SHUI
PRODUCTIONS





do people ever
see
the thoughts
behind
my
eyes?

Our thoughts all
twist and twine
but never
connect





Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, *The Farnsworth House*

Photography: Jon Miller, Hedrich Blessing

Reproduced with permission from Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois

<www.farnsworthhouse.org>



Philip Johnson, *Glass House*

Photography: Kazys Varnelis

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THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN SUPPORT OR OPPOSITION TO THE INDONESIAN OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR (1975-1999)

*Daniel Pascoe**

It has been widely perceived in the West that the Catholic Church in East Timor officially opposed the Indonesian occupation. This perception has been enhanced by the efforts of the first two indigenous leaders of the Catholic Church in East Timor, Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes and Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, who sought to internationally publicise the atrocities and suffering endured by the East Timorese over the course of Indonesian rule. This essay will describe how reality differs from this perception; the leadership of the Catholic Church has always sought to espouse an officially neutral view towards the Indonesian occupation, a position which only allowed for implicit support of the Timorese resistance movement.

Introduction

During the Indonesian occupation, until East Timor was opened to visitors in 1989, the Catholic Church was the only societal institution in place to have contact with the outside world.¹ It was no coincidence then that Church figures were in a position to play a key role in publicising the suffering of East Timor's people under the yoke of Indonesian rule. However, not all of the Church shared the same view. Until the appointment of Martinho da Costa Lopes as the first indigenous leader of the Catholic Church in East Timor, the clergy maintained a position of official and unofficial neutrality. Later, transmigration and the importation of Indonesian priests also split the

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¹ J Pilger, 'East Timor: A land of crosses', *New Internationalist*, vol. 253, 1994; Catholic Institute for International Relations, *East Timor: The continuing betrayal*, Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, 1996, p. 15.

Church over this issue.² Despite the increasing Indonesian influence within the Church since its occupation, the Church was able to show sympathy to the struggle against integration in both an explicit and implicit manner under Bishop Carlos Belo.

Defining 'Opposition' to the Indonesian Regime

As will be discussed in further detail, the official position of the Church in the relation to the Indonesian occupation was one of neutrality.³ However, an *official* stance of neutrality, along with the promotion of human rights within a Catholic pastoral setting (e.g. in offering refuge to the injured and persecuted), did not necessarily preclude a majority of the Church hierarchy supporting anti-integration sentiments in East Timor. Perhaps the best way of looking at this issue is from the perspective of the Indonesian government or those East Timorese of pro-integrationist sentiment. For instance, the detailed outlining of human rights abuses in diocesan publications or the delivery of Church services in Tetum rather than Bahasa Indonesia (since 1981)⁴ may not *prima facie* constitute a show of force to the Indonesian occupation. But the fact remains that such actions can be regarded as *implicit* forms of resistance.⁵ Integration supporters have reacted with the same measure of distaste against such Church-sponsored initiatives as if those actions by parishioners constituted direct assistance to Fretilin guerrilla fighters.⁶

² GJ Aditjondro, *In the shadow of Mount Ramelau: The impact of the occupation of East Timor*, Indonesian Documentation and Information Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands, 1994, p. 69.

³ R Lennox, *Fighting spirit of East Timor: The life of Martinho da Costa Lopes*, Pluto Press, Sydney, 2000, p. 168; *Suara Kaum Tak Bersuara*, in F Sihol Siagian & P Tukan (eds), Penerbit Obor, Jakarta, 1997, p. vii.

⁴ See Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation on the role of the Catholic Church in East Timor, 1976-1995*, Master of Arts Thesis, Northern Territory University, 1996, pp. 80-81.

⁵ For example, see *Suara Kaum Tak Bersuara*, pp. 6-7, on the use of Tetum in the delivery of mass.

⁶ For example, see E Guterres, *Melintas Badai Politik Indonesia*, K Jasmi (narr.), Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 2002, Chapter 28.

This essay will not purport to claim that religion was the *only* reason for the rise in nationalistic fervour during the 1980s and 90s in East Timor;⁷ however, the contribution made by the Church in opposing integration with Indonesia is undeniable. In the words of Bishop Belo:

Conscious or not, willingly or not, explicitly or implicitly, the Catholic Church is keeping alive the expectation that other 'forms' of government in Timor are possible.⁸

As will be demonstrated below, this 'spirituality of resistance' took many forms under the guidance of different Church leaders during the Indonesian occupation.

Background to the Role of the Catholic Church in East Timor

It is by briefly comparing the role of the Church in the final stages of Portuguese colonial rule to that under the Indonesian occupation that we may see its changing function and increasingly progressive outlook. Prior to the Indonesian occupation, the Church operated under a power structure that divorced many East Timorese from organised religion.⁹ The Church occupied a key role in the Portuguese colonial social structure, and was the vanguard of the educated East Timorese elite.¹⁰ Additionally, the Church's significant landholdings were the subject of criticism from nationalist groups espousing a co-operative-based land reform agenda, which originally included the Fretilin party.¹¹ In response, the conservative pro-Portugal clergy were mostly critical of

⁷ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 85, cites the increasing identification with Portuguese symbols and language during the 1990s as another example of the growing resistance movement at the time.

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 95.

⁹ Pilger.

¹⁰ C Pinto & M Jardine, *East Timor's unfinished struggle: Inside the Timorese resistance*, South End Press, Boston, 1997, pp. 9-11.

¹¹ B Nicol, *Timor: A nation reborn*, Equinox Publishers, Jakarta, 2002, p. 117; by the time of the Indonesian invasion however, Fretilin had become a Catholic nationalist-based party, being 'mostly socialist-oriented, but in terms of developing world perspectives, rather than doctrinaire Marxism' in J Dunn, *East Timor: A rough passage to independence*, Longueville, Sydney, 2003, p. 180.

Fretilin, whom they saw as promoting a Marxist-nationalist based independence struggle.¹²

It is against this background that it appears so incredulous that the Church would have played such a prominent role in supporting the resistance movement. However, within the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church, Church leaders play a significant role in determining its political direction. The key tonic for the anti-integration movement was the appointment of two indigenous East Timorese leaders at the head of the Church in 1977 and 1983: Monsignor Lopes and latterly Bishop Belo.¹³ The fact that the diocese of Dili at the time traversed East Timor in its entirety means that Church policy could be determined to a significant extent by these two men alone.¹⁴ Although, like any institution, the Catholic Church contains within it a variety of different political outlooks, it is this hierarchical structure that has resulted in the Church's position being perceived as more or less uniform.¹⁵

Post-Integration: The Leadership of Bishop Ribeiro – 1975-1977

In the aftermath of *Operasi Komodo* and the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975,¹⁶ the clergy adopted a key role, not so much in protesting against the invasion, but in trying to limit the damage and suffering caused to the East Timorese people. Churches, convents, and the houses of priests became havens from the fighting.¹⁷ In fact, in the early days, the Portuguese-born head of the Church, Bishop Ribeiro, and his clergy were very cautious in making political pronouncements about the

¹² Pinto & Jardine, p. 238.

¹³ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 67.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶ *Operasi Komodo* was the codename for the Indonesian campaign of destabilisation which eventually led to the land invasion of East Timor on the 7th of December 1975. in GJ Lloyd, 'The diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations and the international community', in DB Soares & JJ Fox (eds), *Out of the ashes: Destruction and reconstruction of East Timor*, ANU E-Press, Canberra, 2003, p. 76. In November 1976, the clergy estimated that over 60,000 East Timorese had been killed as a direct and indirect result of the invasion, see Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 64.

¹⁷ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, pp. 62-63.

Indonesian invasion. In accordance with Vatican stipulations,¹⁸ the Church maintained an officially neutral position towards Indonesia.¹⁹

However, from the point of view of the Indonesian military, even a neutral Church attempting to constitute a 'buffer' between the East Timorese people and ABRI²⁰ was regarded as an obstacle. This is because Indonesian operations assumed that every person and institution in East Timor fitted into either the pro- or the anti-integration 'camps'.²¹ Further, any information that Church officials managed to smuggle out of East Timor to the West, such as estimates of the number of dead and injured civilians, served to damage Indonesian interests.²² Ironically, it was the Indonesian state's own ideology, *Pancasila* (guaranteeing freedom of religion), which prevented the military from crushing the Church altogether.²³

The serious human rights violations perpetrated by the Indonesian military caused a split within the Catholic Church hierarchy. Some members of the clergy maintained their support for the Indonesian occupation despite the resultant death and destruction, and even held positions within the Indonesian-installed interim government.²⁴ A majority of the clergy, however, privately turned against the military forces for their serious human rights breaches, which did not even spare Church personnel and buildings.²⁵ Even Bishop Ribeiro's prior joy at the ousting of the perceived communist threat posed by Fretilin was

¹⁸ As the precise international status of East Timor was still in dispute at the time, the Vatican took direct responsibility for the Church in East Timor. Crowe, p. 63 and p. 69.

¹⁹ J Dunn, *Timor: A people betrayed*, ABC Books, Sydney, 1994, p. 304.

²⁰ During Suharto's *Orde Baru* (New Order) regime, the Indonesian armed forces were referred to as ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*) in Crouch, p. 141, note 1.

²¹ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, pp. 63-64; Lennox, p. 168.

²² Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 64; see also note 16 (above).

²³ *ibid.*, p. 96; Dunn, *Timor: A people betrayed*, p. 304.

²⁴ The office holders in the new government were Father Apolinario, head of the Department of Spiritual Matters, and Father Jose Antonio da Costa, head of the Department of Education and Culture in Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 66.

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 65.

quickly displaced.²⁶ However, unlike what was to come under future Church administrations, most negative sentiment towards the Indonesian occupation was kept within the private sphere. Bishop Ribeiro retired in 1977²⁷ exhausted from war, paving the way for a more progressive successor.

The Leadership of Monsignor Lopes: 1977-1983

From 1977, Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes was the first indigenous Timorese leader of the Catholic Church in East Timor.²⁸ After inheriting the protective mantle of Bishop Ribeiro in relation to persecuted members of the local population,²⁹ he also became the first Church leader to publicly advocate against the human rights abuses perpetrated by Indonesian troops,³⁰ and to propose a plebiscite as an exercise of East Timorese self-determination.³¹ His prior political background, as an East Timorese representative on the National Assembly in Lisbon, meant that unlike Bishop Ribeiro, he was reluctant to confine himself to purely religious issues, considering the suffering that his people were undergoing.³² However, until 1982, Lopes' attempts to document and cease human rights abuses by the military consisted mainly of cautious attempts to conduct dialogue with Indonesian military commanders.

At a religious rally, held on 13 October 1982, Lopes first spoke out publicly against the practices of the Indonesian military, inviting worshippers to 'take and drink the body and blood of Jesus Christ, horribly outraged by ungrateful men. Repair their crimes and console

²⁶ Dunn, *Timor: A people betrayed*, p. 143; Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, pp. 64-65; she quotes Boavida's claim that the initial reaction of the Bishop to the invasion was 'one of outright joy' due to the perceived threat of a communist takeover of East Timor by Fretilin.

²⁷ Dunn, *Timor: A people betrayed*, p. 304.

²⁸ Pluto Press Australia. 'Fighting spirit of East Timor', viewed 15 November 2005, <<http://www.plutoaustralia.com/p1/default.asp?pageld=307>>.

²⁹ Catholic Institute for International Relations, pp. 15-16.

³⁰ Pluto Press Australia; Lennox, p. 170.

³¹ Lennox, pp. 162-163.

³² Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 69.

your God'.³³ He then set about publicising in detail a number of human rights abuses committed by the military in his speech. As Lopes later explained:

Each time I went to the commander and complained; for years I did this. Maybe it helped for a short while, but really nothing, the military treated us with contempt, so after five years I started to speak out.³⁴

After this speech by Lopes, it was first publicly perceived both in East Timor and in the West that the Church held a 'position' on the question of integration.³⁵ Although the East Timorese clergy shared a common experience of war, famine and genocide with the Falintil fighters in the mountains,³⁶ this was the first time that an 'official' stand had been taken.

Thereafter, separation between Church and State increased and Monsignor Lopes and his clergy felt more able to express the wishes of the Timorese people, who were flocking to the Church in great numbers in search of protection and hope.³⁷ As the membership of the Church increased exponentially, the pronouncements of the clergy gained more authority.³⁸ One such statement that reached the West and is still quoted today is Lopes' estimation in 1983 that 200,000 people, or a third of the pre-invasion population, had died since the Indonesian occupation.³⁹

In 1983, Lopes resigned from his position under Indonesian-induced pressure from the Vatican. However, he continued to travel and speak in support of his people until his death in Portugal in 1991.⁴⁰

³³ Lennox, p. 171.

³⁴ M Turner, *Telling: East Timor, personal testimonies 1942-1992*, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 1992, pp. 165-167; see also Lennox, p. 169.

³⁵ Lennox, p. 173.

³⁶ *ibid.*, p. 169. Lennox notes here that Monsignor Lopes knew Xanana Gusmao quite well, and was personally sympathetic to his struggle.

³⁷ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 77.

³⁸ See note 64 (below).

³⁹ Pilger.

⁴⁰ Pluto Press Australia.

The Leadership of Bishop Belo: 1983-1999

Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, a previously unknown figure, was installed as Monsignor Lopes' successor in 1983. The Indonesian establishment expected that he would be more sympathetic to their position, considering he had previously studied abroad for thirteen years and had not witnessed the worst atrocities committed during and after the Indonesian invasion.⁴¹ This proved a fallacy, and Bishop Belo went onto become the most important Church figure in bringing the East Timor issue to international attention, first through the international networks of the Catholic Church⁴², and then in the broader political sphere.

Bishop Belo, like Monsignor Lopes before him, adopted a cautious approach towards the military in the initial months of his appointment. However, he heavily criticised the Indonesian military's *Operasi Persatuan* during a homily⁴³ delivered five months into his tenure, and following this, began to make important pronouncements against the Indonesian policy.

His most well-known statements and actions called for an end to human-rights abuses and the continuation of a meaningful dialogue between Indonesia and the East Timorese people.⁴⁴ These statements and actions included his letter penned to the United Nations Secretary General in 1989 calling for an exercise of self-determination by the East Timorese,⁴⁵ his mediating role in the Intra-Timorese dialogue in June

⁴¹ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 70; Catholic Institute for International Relations, p. 16.

⁴² *Suara Kaum Tak Bersuara*, p. 53.

⁴³ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 71; Dunn, *Timor: A people betrayed*, p. 304. *Operasi Persatuan* was the codename for the Indonesian military's latest search-and-destroy campaign, launched in 1984, designed to crush the remaining resistance fighters. Dunn, *Timor: A people betrayed*, p. 296.

⁴⁴ L Crowe, 'East Timor twenty years later', *The Cardoner*, viewed 15 November 2005, <<http://home.vicnet.net.au/~cardoner/uniya?un5su01.html>>; Universal Rights Network, 'Heroes: Bishop Belo', viewed 15 November 2005, <<http://www.universalrights.net/heroes/bishop.htm>>.

⁴⁵ Pilger; Belo's letter to UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar in 1989 contained the famous line 'We are dying as a people and as a Nation'. Although Belo received no reply, once the letter became public its contents were both heavily criticised by the Indonesian

1995,⁴⁶ and his role in establishing the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in 1994 to publicise human rights abuses.⁴⁷ Along with Jose Ramos Horta, Belo's receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 was the single-most important event drawing attention to the plight of the East Timorese.⁴⁸

As with his predecessor, much of Bishop Belo's work could be regarded as an *implicit* form of resistance to the Indonesian occupation. During his leadership of the Church, Belo attempted to distance himself from partisan groups and discouraged the use of religious ceremonies and places of worship for the furtherance of political ends.⁴⁹ He urged the youth of East Timor to abstain from violent protest against the Indonesian military,⁵⁰ but was willing to grant refuge to the persecuted within his own home.⁵¹ As Belo saw the role of the Church during the occupation:

If the faithful see the Church as too close to the government, they would dub it a 'Government Church'. If the Church is too vocal in voicing people's aspirations, the government would immediately accuse it of getting involved in practical politics ... the Church is prompted to overcome the dilemma by

government, and also embraced by those East Timorese advocates of self-determination. Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 72; Universal Rights Network.

⁴⁶ Crowe, *The Cardoner*; *Suara Kaum Tak Bersuara*, pp. 49-53.

⁴⁷ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 115; the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace was established in opposition to the Indonesian government's Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM), created in 1993, which had been perceived as lacking in power and political independence to criticise the actions of the Indonesian military.

⁴⁸ Universal Rights Network; *Suara Kaum Tak Bersuara*, p. viii.

⁴⁹ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 74; *Suara Kaum Tak Bersuara*, p. 11 and p. 50; for example, Crowe at p. 75, quotes Belo describing in 1993 that 'The [Indonesian] soldiers continue to accuse me of promoting demonstration and the young people accuse me of having sold out to Indonesia, because I do not allow them to have a demonstration at my residence...'.

⁵⁰ Crowe, *The Cardoner*, specifically quotes the example of a pastoral letter of 13 September 1995.

⁵¹ Pinto & Jardine, p. 111.

declaring it takes the side of the people without opposing the government.⁵²

'Taking the side of the people' meant many different forms of support. With the backing of Pope John Paul II under Vatican II's social justice agenda,⁵³ Bishop Belo was able to advocate for the conservation of East Timorese cultural, religious,⁵⁴ linguistic⁵⁵, and ethnic identity⁵⁶ in the face of Indonesian homogenisation through transmigration programs and also family planning restrictions.⁵⁷ Additionally, in making direct pronouncements on the issue of the Indonesian occupation, Belo was able to frame his statements in terms of the universal human right of self-determination, rather than merely being anti-integrationist.⁵⁸ This more cautious approach employed by Belo enabled him to hold onto his position as the head of the Catholic Church for such a lengthy period. The agendas of the Belo-led Church and the clandestine resistance movement significantly overlapped in terms of human rights, self-determination and cultural preservation. However, Belo was careful to avoid advocacy of violent resistance, or engage in criticism of the

⁵² Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 95; emphasis added.

⁵³ *ibid.*, p. 87.

⁵⁴ For example, Bishop Belo and a majority of the East Timorese clergy opposed ecclesiastical integration with the Indonesian Catholic Church on the grounds that this would appear to legitimise *political* integration with Indonesia; this was a continuation of the policy employed by Monsignor Lopes during his leadership of the Church, in Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 77; Lennox, p. 145.

⁵⁵ *Suara Kaum Tak Bersuara*, pp. 6-7; as mentioned above, since the early 1980s masses have been conducted in Tetum, not Bahasa Indonesia.

⁵⁶ Crowe, *The Cardoner*.

⁵⁷ Dunn, *Timor: A people betrayed*, p. 304; Aditjondro, pp. 74-75; Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 112; such actions included a 7 July 1985 letter urging all priests and religious figures in East Timor to boycott government-run courses on *Pancasila*, the state ideology, together with a 1986 Pastoral letter criticising the Suharto government's birth control agenda in Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 71.

⁵⁸ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 95; for example, at a conference of the Catholic Bishops of Indonesia, Belo made the following statement, before presenting a list of atrocities committed by the Indonesian military: 'Indonesian invasion and military occupation of Timor has denied the possibility of the Timorese people to express their feelings and this, perse, is an abuse of human rights contrary to the UN Charter'. Universal Rights Network.

Indonesian government that would place his position in jeopardy, and hence the Church's *implicit* opposition to Indonesian policies.⁵⁹

Not all members of the clergy shared the same progressive and inspired view of Bishop Belo. With the Suharto government's transmigration programs of the 1970s and 80s, a number of Indonesian priests also began arriving in East Timor.⁶⁰ The Indonesian priests saw the relationship of Church and State quite differently from Bishop Belo's East Timorese colleagues. Although as Catholic priests the Indonesian clergy must of course be concerned for the wellbeing of their congregations in the face of human rights violations, a more cautious stand as against the Indonesian government and military evinced their pro-integration views.⁶¹ For example, a 1995 delegation from the Indonesian Bishops Conference, when discussing the East Timor issue with President Suharto, made reference to the 'many deep wounds and traumatic experiences' of the East Timorese people, and called for a greater focus to be given to *socio-cultural problems*.⁶² This was obviously a more cautious stand than that latterly taken by Bishop Belo. However, the membership of the Church grew exponentially during the 1980s⁶³, and East Timorese from many different cultural, educational and socio-economic backgrounds came together under the banner of faith against the oppressive Indonesian rule. As a result, it would be accurate to say that the voices of the anti-integrationist clergy, while mostly diplomatic in their criticism of the Indonesian military, represented the outlook of the majority of the population.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 73.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p. 105; Aditjondro, p. 69.

⁶¹ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, pp. 104-105; some Indonesian clergy were also suspected of acting as spies for the military.

⁶² Crowe, *The Cardoner*; Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 106, also quotes Father Bratasudarma, the former Rector of the University of East Timor, who was opposed to the violent and excessive tactics used by the military to suppress protests.

⁶³ G Gunn, *Timor Loro Sae: 500 years*, Macau, Livros Do Oriente, 1999, p. 280; Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, pp. 78-79, notes the increase in membership of the Church from one third of the populace in 1975 to over 90 percent in 1992.

⁶⁴ Catholic Institute for International Relations, p. 14.

Finally, during the leadership of Bishop Belo, the 1980s saw the expansion in broader Church infrastructure to help challenge the government's 'Indonisation' agenda since occupation.⁶⁵ Parish networks, Church-run schools, hospitals and polyclinics attracted East Timorese dissatisfied with government-funded facilities.⁶⁶ Moreover, the Church was able to profoundly influence public opinion through its dissemination of information within educational institutions and religious orders, and by way of pastoral letters and the diocesan newsletter *SEARA*, where government censorship had otherwise restricted the flow of information.⁶⁷

Conclusion

The Catholic Church was the only institution that was able to criticise Indonesian policies during the occupation of East Timor, as it was answerable only to the Vatican.⁶⁸ Although some clergy members may have held personal opinions at odds with the resistance movement, the hierarchical structure of the Church under its two indigenous East Timorese leaders after 1977 meant that the Church came to be recognised as a body symbolising opposition to the occupation. The East Timorese Church's stability, with only one change in leadership over a twenty-year period (as against many changes in military leadership), has contributed significantly to this phenomenon.⁶⁹ Monsignor Lopes and Bishop Belo were careful not to explicitly denounce integration. However, they helped shift the focus of international attention onto the human-rights abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian military in East Timor, thereby implicitly giving voice to the resistance movement.

⁶⁵ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 108 and p. 146.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p. 81 and p. 111.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, p. 89; Gunn, p. 264.

⁶⁸ Dunn, *East Timor: a rough passage to independence*, p. 287; Catholic Institute for International Relations, p. 15.

⁶⁹ Crowe, *The impact of the Indonesian annexation*, p. 69.

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RE-ALTERING THE CONSTELLATION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHTS ON HISTORICITY

*Charles Prestidge-King**

Typical Western conceptions of the nature of human existence have tended to work from 'point-based' or universalist assumptions. In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger attempted to challenge this view by emphasising the importance of history in understanding the proper ontological structure of human existence. With reference to both Heidegger and earlier thinkers on the subject, this essay attempts to show the relevance of Heidegger's historical-ontological thinking to his overall philosophical project, and to give some indication of its implications in historical theory, ontology, and metaphysics.

Wann aber *sind wir?*' (But when *are we?*)

R.M. Rilke, *Sonnets to Orpheus*

And what we see is certainly a star, a gleaming and glorious star interposing itself, the constellation (of life and history) really has been altered – *by science, by the demand that history should be a science.*

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*

Historicity, as presented in *Being and Time*, is an important area of Heidegger's thought for a number of reasons. The radical characterisation of human existence as fundamentally constituted by historicity in its ontological structure opens up new areas of thought about many issues within Western philosophy. As this essay highlights, Heidegger's characterisation of human existence as constituted by historicity, or the property of being historical, has a broad and deep effect upon three major areas: metaphysics, Heidegger's own foundational ontology, and perhaps most pressingly, the study of history and the status of historical knowledge. Heidegger's personal historical situation cannot be ignored, and his contribution to the

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discourse surrounding the issue of historicity will be placed in relation to 19th century German thought, particularly Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians.

Before beginning, though, a thorough definition of terms is needed. The very term in question is easily misunderstood, and to establish what historicity, or *Geschichtlichkeit*,¹ actually *is* to Heidegger, it should first be differentiated from what it is not. The difficulties surrounding the complete and accurate translation of German philosophical terms into English is well-known, and this difficulty is compounded in this situation by the simple fact that Heidegger uses ordinary language in extraordinary ways. History [*Geschichte*], for instance can be differentiated from historical science [*Historie*] which can in turn be differentiated from historicity [*Geschichtlichkeit*] (the property of being historical; Heidegger does not wish to use it in the sense of historical legitimacy). *Geschichte* can mean ‘story’, but also commonly denotes ‘facts’, or the actual course of events – that is, things in the past – whereas *Historie* refers to the knowledge or pattern of enquiry into these events.² However, for Heidegger, history [*Geschichte*] ‘signifies a happening which we ourselves are and in which we are involved’.³ Historical science, on the other hand [*Historie*] denotes ‘knowledge of certain happenings’, or an interested and peculiar pre-ontological study. The specificity of these terms is again confused by the terms in English that refer to similar concepts within philosophy, which despite sharing a similar etymology are philosophically distinct. Alongside those already mentioned lie historiography, or the self-reflexive study of history, as well as historicism, which can refer to any number of things – for instance, Karl Popper uses it to refer to historical prediction, or

¹ I will mention the original German word when the concept it denotes is particularly important, or it can in some way be differentiated from the ordinary English use of the term. Heidegger translation is still disputed in many areas.

² The first division is in Latin: *res gestae*, or past events (or things) can be differentiated from *historia rerum gestarum*, or an account of those things. GWF Hegel, *Introduction to the philosophy of history*, (trans. by L Rauch), Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1988, p. 64.

³ M Heidegger, *Supplements*, J van Buren (ed.), State University of New York Press, Albany, 2002, p. 173.

satirically, the 'Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny'⁴ – as well as to historicity itself.

Heidegger's push towards the historicity of human existence is not entirely original: the concept both develops and responds to an existing philosophical debate. The most important influence in Heidegger's approach to historicity is the anti-traditionalistic hermeneutics of 19th-century German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey. Typically, hermeneutics is practiced with regards to the exegesis of classical works, but the broadly structuralist concerns of conventional hermeneutics (grammar, syntax, style, and so on)⁵ are overshadowed for Dilthey by the psychological or human aspects of such texts. It is from within this that the emphasis of Dilthey's *Fragestellung* arises: that of lived historical experience, rather than formal structuralism.⁶ It is also in Dilthey that we see most clearly the tension between the boundaries of lived historical experience or 'consciousness', and the movement towards universal laws in the sciences – of which the study of history is a part. Nietzsche, in turn, characterised this tension within the study of history as a sort of internal dialectic between 'the historical sense' and 'the scientific sense'.⁷

⁴ K Popper, *The poverty of historicism*, Routledge, London, 1969. This phrase forms part of the dedication. When referring to historicism, Popper refers concretely to both the National Socialist belief in historical destiny and also to the concept in a wider sense.

⁵ C Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the crisis of historicism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995, p. 163.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 164. This differentiation is important when viewed in the context of Dilthey's most significant scholarly concern, namely Friedrich Schleiermacher.

⁷ F Nietzsche, *Untimely meditations* [*Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, 1874-1876], (trans. by RJ Hollingdale), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. Ultimately, the question that Heidegger addresses arises in the thought of Giambattista Vico: because God knows the world of natural phenomena, natural sciences can only have 'so much' knowledge. However, as history has been created by man, it is apprehensible by human investigation. This is the beginning of what would later become the split between *Naturwissenschaft* (natural science) and *Geistwissenschaft* (human, or 'moral science', in the parlance of JS Mill). G Vico, 'The New Science', in P Gardner (ed.), *Theories of history*, The Free Press, New York, 1959, pp. 12-21.

Yet not all in 19th-century German philosophy wished to wholeheartedly embrace this notion of consciousness. The Neo-Kantian movement, epitomised in the account of historical science by Windelband and Rickert, aimed to secure a logical and objective starting point for historical inquiry: that is, to maintain the 'Cartesian-Kantian presupposition about absolute time; the single-point perspective of the cogito, the commitment to scientific rationality; the belief in rigorously methodological access to truth'.⁸ Rickert, for instance, argued that we are only interested in historical figures (Caesar, for instance) because of the values that they represent, and from this position posited a universally valid, transcendent set of values that render an individual 'historical'.

Such a universalist account is, for Dilthey, untenable. His claim instead is that knowledge, or more specifically, understanding (*Verstehen*), is constituted by a recognition of historical consciousness and selfhood rather than through objective inquiry. Yet it cannot be said that Dilthey tried to posit a boundless historical relativism, as he believes that it works towards 'dissolution, scepticism and impotent subjectivity'.⁹ Dilthey intends to posit an objective account, but it is one rooted in consciousness, rather than in apodictic systems of values. Dilthey also argues against false distinctions that seem to plague a great deal of modern philosophy of history.¹⁰ He does not feel it necessary to side with either Heraclitus or Parmenides, but sees merit in both. Most importantly, it is with Dilthey that the 'sense of the historical as a feature of human existence'¹¹ becomes more tangible. Whilst Dilthey, to Heidegger, does not go far enough – he believes that Dilthey '*too little emphasizes the generic difference between the ontic and the historical*'¹² – it is this tangibility that leads us to Heidegger's thought. How does

⁸ Bambach, p. 14.

⁹ Dilthey, cited in Bambach, p. 204.

¹⁰ The 'Western' propensity for distinction and contrast more generally is well-documented and stems partly from the Ancient Greek intellectual tradition, where contrast is vital in any proper understanding and subsequently affects a great deal of Greek exposition.

¹¹ C Schrag, 'Heidegger on repetition and historical understanding', from *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 20, 1970, p. 288.

¹² Yorck, as quoted in *BT*, p. 364.

Heidegger construe history? Whilst his thought can be linked to Dilthey, Heidegger extends the argument to a point that entails a great deal more than Dilthey's relatively modest claims.

As Heidegger would point out in *Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview*, Dilthey neglects to consider the full implications of his emphasis upon consciousness. That is, he emphasised that the fundamental character of life is historical being, but 'merely left it at that and neglected to ask *what historical being is*'.¹³ This task is left to Heidegger, who characterises his own foundational ontology in a Diltheyan way, considering it the 'hermeneutics of *Da-sein*'.¹⁴ To properly establish what Heidegger actually means when he asserts that the human way of being¹⁵ is fundamentally historical ('the occurrence of historicity is the occurrence of *being-in-the-world*'¹⁶), we should first look to his ideas on temporality.

This will take some unpacking. To begin with, Heidegger claims that *Da-sein* should be characterised above all as a fundamentally 'temporal-historical happening',¹⁷ which can be characterised in three temporal moments, or *Augenblicke*: the past is understood as the particular way of 'having been'; the present is understood as a 'waiting-toward'; and the future must be understood as a 'coming-toward'. This can be further elucidated through the concepts of existence, facticity, and falling. Firstly, *Da-sein*'s presentness or *thrownness* shows it to be already-in-the-world; its projectedness shows our aim to realise existential possibilities; and its fallen-ness shows it to be primarily preoccupied with the world itself.¹⁸ What does this entail? In this seemingly disparate mass of elements, Heidegger believes that this tripartite definition reveals, or

¹³ *Supplements*, J van Buren (ed.), p. 173.

¹⁴ H Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, p. 218.

¹⁵ Or, in his words, *Da-sein*. *Da-sein* is often translated as 'being-there', yet Heidegger maintained that this was inadequate, claiming that it was closer to existence, or as I have rendered it, the human way of being. Importantly, *Da-sein* should be distinguished from the Cartesian-Kantian sense of *subject*.

¹⁶ *BT*, p. 355.

¹⁷ Bambach, p. 15.

¹⁸ S Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, Routledge, New York, London, 1996, p. 110.

brings forth, *Da-sein's* unity through the concept of care [*Sorge*].¹⁹ Care is a central theme in Heidegger's works, and refers roughly to our interaction with things in the world in our particular state of existence. It is through the concept of care, Heidegger claims, that we can understand the self as a unity over time.²⁰

For Heidegger, the past is also given meaning by the concept of repetition [*Wiederholung*], which begins at least in a formalised sense Kierkegaard's concept of repetition as Parousia.²¹ For Heidegger, though, repetition constitutes a 'handing-over and appropriation – that is to say, a going back to the possibilities of *Da-sein* that has-been-there'.²² The concept of projection enters at this point, and repetition in its specific conception as Heidegger's *Wiederholung* becomes inclined towards the future possibilities of *Da-sein*. That is, the inclination or 'forward-looking' of *Da-sein* gives the past meaning, and the ontological structure 'liberates the past for the future, and it is then that the past gains force and becomes productive.'²³ Thus, our past is only really meaningful when interpreted in light of the future.

How, then, does Heidegger characterise this previously uninvestigated concept of historical awareness, or being? Heidegger himself answers this in *Being and Time*: 'the interpretation of the historicity of *Da-sein* turns out to be basically just a more concrete development of temporality'.²⁴ Thus, repetition is not simply the remembered past, but rather a reopening or redredging. As Schrag points out, 'repetition hands over the past as a past with a *meaning* or *sense*.'²⁵ It gives the past a specific relation to *Da-sein* in its present form, and so it is only from

¹⁹ And ultimately, it is also the name for the 'being of *Dasein*'. W Blattner, 'Temporality', in H Dreyfus & M Wrathall, *A Companion to Heidegger*, Blackwell, Malden, 2005, p. 312.

²⁰ Although not as a totality; see *BT* sections 46-53 for more on death and the idea of a finished life.

²¹ S Kierkegaard, *Either/Or* [1843], (trans. by LF Swenson and DF Swenson), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1946. The term Parousia, in Pauline Christianity, most commonly refers to Christ's Second Coming.

²² Cited in Schrag, p. 291.

²³ *Supplements*, J van Buren, (ed.), p. 175.

²⁴ *BT*, p. 350.

²⁵ Schrag, p. 289.

the greatest force of the present that one may interpret the past. This past is of a certain kind: taken at a 'primordial level', it is made present and given meaning by the futural focus of *Da-sein*: put more simply, the past is relevant and 'gains force' according to what it means in relation to *Da-sein*'s future and the comprehension of Death that we have at the present. Our future projects – or, as Heidegger would more broadly characterise our mode of being – our *self-project*, is grounded and given meaning by the future: its meaning is the future. Heidegger's conclusion, we may be so bold to say, is that Being or existence itself is given meaning by temporality, which is what is implied by the very title of *Being and Time*.²⁶

The significance of such a characterisation, particularly with regards to its intermingling of history and existence, is felt throughout all areas of Heidegger's thought, but is particularly important to history and, in a broader sense, to metaphysics.

In the first place, Heidegger believes that the conventional sense of history does not give *Da-sein* the absolute primacy which is required for any proper study. As he puts it,

the thesis that "*Da-sein* is historical" not only means the ontic fact that human being presents an "atom" in the business of world history, and remains the plaything of circumstances and events, but poses the problem *why and on the basis of what ontological conditions, does historicity belong to the subjectivity of the "historical" subject as its essential constitution?*²⁷

History then cannot possibly be construed as a simple development, nor can it be a particular mode of questioning aimed at scientifically observing history: it must be intertwined with the very fact that we are existing. If we cannot extricate ourselves from the very thing we are studying, then how are we to achieve the necessary position required for an objective survey? The question, in turn, becomes a vital one: how

²⁶ Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, p. 145.

²⁷ M Heidegger, *BT*, p. 350.

can we treat history as an objective science (or *Historie*) when we ourselves are historical?

If we agree with Heidegger's critique of Western historical thinking, then our mode of historical questioning must be rethought. The most obvious change is the intermingling of ontology with history. As Heidegger puts it, 'the question of historical inquiry in philosophy is referred back to the fundamental question of being itself'.²⁸ This, in turn, raises a challenge to the privileged, objective, view of history, or as Schrag puts it, the '*primacy* of the metaphysical inquiry-standpoint with respect to history'.²⁹ If we are inherently historical, how can we remove ourselves from the events of history to such an extent as to make the claims of the Neo-Kantians? The standpoint required to make such claims is, for Heidegger, untenable,³⁰ and so too is historical accuracy in the sense of objective statements.

Yet if we are to take this credo to its logical extents, it begins to seem problematic and even self-defeating. Heidegger's particular interpretation of the history of philosophy, for instance, seems to be undermined and – whilst Heidegger would not, perhaps, have a problem with a lack of 'accuracy' – so too are his particularly insistent interpretations with regards to other philosophical concepts. It seems also that we would necessarily have many difficulties if we make of history what we will.

For all its newness, Heidegger's thought does not reject every aspect of previous thought. For instance, whilst Heidegger has no interest in the philosophy of history in a traditional sense, that is, 'formulating a speculative view on the origin and goal of the historical process, the nature of its development, and the unified meaning of its cultural

²⁸ M Heidegger, 'Wilhelm Dilthey's research and the struggle for a historical worldview', from *Supplements*, J van Buren, p. 176.

²⁹ Schrag, p. 293.

³⁰ Nietzsche had enounced a similar sentiment with regards to Niebuhr's attempt to secure a *suprahistorical* vantage point. Mulhall, *Untimely meditations*, [*Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, 1874-1876], (trans. by R.J. Hollingdale), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 65.

concepts'³¹ (*pace* Hegel, Marx, Spengler, or Fukuyama), he is more than happy to say that the origin or goal of history 'springs from and must go back to the becoming sense of being'. Heidegger also wishes to deny the historicist claim that we are constituted by and subject to the possibilities given to us by our historical situation, and our historical situation alone. The Hegelian-Marxist view, for instance, suggests that historical circumstances alone determine the possibilities of existence. Heidegger, instead, claims that possibilities are determined by our relationship to Being, and that these are fundamentally unlimited.

With regards to Heidegger's particular ontological project, historicity acts as a unifier and as a direct response to the Neo-Kantians, should be read as an attack on assumed Cartesian standpoints. Moreover, human existence over time cannot be considered as somehow removed from our present existence. The removal of a 'point' conception of time and the emphasis upon the past as meaningful *only* when viewed in a particular existential light is itself significant. Likewise, Heidegger's thought, in its emphasis upon the *present* and its rejection of a chronologically simple past, present, and future, does not adhere to a typical Western conception of time. Heidegger, in fact, slides closer to Eastern thought on time and goes some way towards breaking down the apparent dichotomisation between the two. As Adamczewski notes, it is possible to 'imagine Heidegger's version of history as both cyclical and linear: spiral'.³² And while metaphysical truth is, ostensibly, not the main goal of Heidegger's thought in this regard, his approach to historicity must also be viewed as something of a rejection of it, fitting into Heidegger's broader attempt to undermine, or destroy, conventional Western metaphysics.

As an overarching characterisation of human existence, the implications of Heidegger's approach are felt in many areas: in history, in ontology, and in Heidegger's broader metaphysical project itself. The intermingling of history with life, rather than with science, is a necessary step for both any thorough phenomenological or existential

³¹ Schrag, pp. 287-295.

³² Z Adamczewski, 'Commentary on Calvin O. Schrag's "Heidegger on repetition and historical understanding"', in *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 20, 1970, pp. 297-301.

analysis of human existence and any attempt to existentially describe history. In turn, despite its awkward and even self-vitiating nature, Heidegger's account of historicity gives the past force and serves as a useful tool for questioning the nature of Western metaphysics with relation to its loftiest topics – as Heidegger himself labelled them – being and time.

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A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION: WHY THE US VIEW SHOULD NOT BE THE ONLY UNDERSTANDING ON NORTHEAST ASIA

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The United States, acknowledged as a world superpower, wields much influence in determining perceptions in the Western world. The growing economic and political region of Northeast Asia demands much attention from countries in the Western world due to issues such as international trade and bilateral affairs. Given that the United States exercises dominant and fairly non-holistic perceptions of the Northeast Asian region, it is imperative for leaders worldwide to consider the uniqueness of governance, demography and social fabric of this region. This essay contests the assumptions made by the United States in a quest to consider alternative perceptions of countries in the Northeast Asian region. By specifically focusing on security threats and perceptions, this essay seeks to answer commonly asked questions about why threats to Northeast Asian values and interests should be deemed less serious by comparison.

In the current era of turbulent foreign relations and potential international conflicts, it is the United States of America that influences the perceptions of much of the Western World. Northeast Asia is a region of increasing importance on the world stage, both economically and politically. It is therefore also of increasing importance for those nations with ties to the region, including Australia, to better understand the opinions, policies and agendas of the states of the region. To merely accept the United States' (US) dominant understanding of Northeast Asia is limiting and potentially damaging to future relations. That is not to assume the US' views are any less valid than those of states in

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Northeast Asia, in fact, the US's distance from the region could be considered a positive factor if it ensured a neutral perception of the region. This essay suggests, however, that to achieve a holistic and well-rounded view of Northeast Asia one must also look to the governments and populations of said states to fully comprehend their unique histories, relationships and observations.

Dominant views regarding threats to the peace and stability in Northeast Asia should be challenged. To only understand situations and events from the standpoint of a prevailing power is constricting. To do so leaves little room for a deeper understanding or acceptance of alternative perceptions. This is a dangerous predicament; to accept no variance upon commonly held ideas reduces the efficiency of diplomacy and peaceful manoeuvring to resolve possible conflicts. Currently, the United States of America is the acknowledged superior military force in Northeast Asia.¹ As such, its views dominate concerns regarding threats to Northeast Asian peace and stability. Given its present authority (or hegemony), few contrasting views of regional security have much currency. This essay will attempt to convince the reader to broaden their own perceptions of the region; the broader their understandings of the region, the greater the possibility for interaction and peaceful and productive co-existence. To do so, this essay will present the dominant US view on security threats to Northeast Asia, best demonstrated by their analysis of issues prevalent in North Korea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. It will then challenge the validity of these views by presenting some of the conflicting opinions towards such situations of regional nations.²

This essay will contest the assumptions surrounding this topic, including *who* perceives, what the nature of a threat actually is, and the attainability of an ideal peace and/or stability. To cast further doubt upon the legitimacy of US hegemony when it comes to threat perception, this essay will analyse how the US is regarded by Northeast

¹ TJ Christensen, 'China, the US – Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia', *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 52–54.

² D van Vranken Hickey, *Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan and the Koreans*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2001, p. 5.

Asian states, with some specific focus given to China's perspective due to the growing consideration in the US of China being a future rival. Focusing specifically on traditional security threats, or those of a military nature, this essay intends to prove that the dominant US view of Northeast Asian security is but one of many; that within the US various conflicting points of view exist regarding Northeast Asian security, and that furthermore, Northeast Asian security perspectives differ greatly from that of the US. However, the dominant US view is one that is given much weight and is therefore deemed by both the Western World and Northeast Asian states as the most serious. Different nation states may perceive different threats according to their own idiosyncratic strategic geo-political positioning and ideology. This essay questions why threats to their values and interests should be deemed less serious by comparison.

The extent and significance of a threat is determined by who perceives it: what is a threat to one nation might be beneficial to another. The nature of a threat itself is highly contested. In its most basic form a threat is the perception of one actor of another's objective to mete out injury, harm, or other hostile action. Therefore, all threats are perceived; they are constructed to suit cultural, ideological or military assumptions regarding an external being and may differ greatly.

The US' undeniable military domination and political influence over the region since the end of WWII has greatly shaped the security and diplomatic aims and trends of Northeast Asian nation-states. Acknowledged as the superior military force in the region, the US is often seen as an outside arbiter that can police potential tensions.³ The US also holds a strong monopoly over the intellectual view of Northeast Asia, benefiting many prominent higher education facilities and think-tanks and far-reaching media outlets. The US' viewpoint on Northeast Asian threats is therefore clearly the dominant one and as such, generally unchallenged. Five key dangers were identified by the first Bush administration as continuing threats to peace and stability in the region:

³ Christensen, pp. 52-54.

- North Korea;
- Potential domestic instability in Northeast Asian nations;
- The rise of China as a 'regional power';
- Territorial disputes;
- Proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.⁴

These perceived threats are therefore those that dominate international relations theory for Northeast Asia. However, they are extremely Western-centric. To gain an accurate understanding of the region's security issues, the perspective of all nations' most serious perceived threats should therefore be examined.

When one examines certain case studies, it is clear that the nature of peace and stability in Northeast Asia is hotly contested, and is of great consequence. Just as the nature of a threat in this region is sometimes dominated by the concerns of the US, so to is the very idea of peace and stability – that is, peace and stability mean different things to different nations. In the dominant US scenario, any formation of lasting peace and stability in the region would have to be that designed in accordance with its hegemony.⁵ Looking at the US' major concerns in the region illustrates this.

One current viewpoint of US foreign officials sees a very real possibility of North Korea attacking South Korea, a strategic ally of the US. It also sees the likelihood of North Korea possessing weapons of mass destruction that can be used against the US (and its allies in conflict), as one of the biggest threats to peace and stability in the region.⁶ In his 2002 State of the Union address US President George W. Bush identified

⁴ D Shambaugh, 'The American role in Asia', in L Palmer (ed.), *Détente in Asia*, Macmillan Press, London, 1992, p. 8.

⁵ JG Ikenberry & M Mastanduno, *International relations theory and the Asia-Pacific*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003, p. 7.

⁶ KE Calder, 'US Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia', in SS Kim, *International relations of Northeast Asia*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2004, p. 230.

North Korea as a member of the 'axis of evil'.⁷ The axis, including Iran and the recently conquered Iraq, is believed to 'pose a grave and growing danger' to the world – the US' 'world'.⁸ Recent North Korean confirmation of its growing nuclear capability has further exacerbated the situation.⁹ However, at present the US is unlikely to pursue further conflict on the Korean Peninsula due to its commitment of military resources in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Even so, as evidenced by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the US is willing and capable of engaging in conflict with North Korea should the need arise.¹⁰ To ensure this, the US continues to maintain a significant contingent of troops in the region including the Seventh Fleet, Eighth Army, III Marine Expeditionary Force, 5th, 7th and 13th Air Force, and the 1st Battalion of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne).¹¹ The US' military perspective on the threat however, varies greatly from that of the growing economic powers of Northeast Asia.

Despite the US' determination to be militarily prepared for conflict with North Korea, any such encounter would be unwelcome by nations such as Japan, South Korea and China because of the threat it poses to their own stability and economies. While both South Korea and Japan acknowledge the present threat of North Korea, any change to the status quo would likely increase the danger currently felt by these two countries. For example, Japan is obligated under *The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation* to bilaterally coordinate and cooperate militarily for 'situations' arising in Japan's region.¹² As such, should the US

⁷ George W Bush, 'President Delivers State of the Union Address' *The White House*, 29 January 2002, viewed 15 May 2005, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html>>.

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ D MacIntyre, 'See no evil: North Korea's nuclear ambitions have the world rattled, but South Koreans don't seem too worried', *Time*, 16 May 2005, viewed 17 May 2005, <<http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501050523-1061555,00.html>>.

¹⁰ B Sammon, 'Rice warns North Korea of American might', *The Washington Times*, 3 May 2005, viewed 15 May 2005, <<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050503-122313-6438r.htm>>.

¹¹ Hickey, p. 9.

¹² 'The guidelines for Japan-US defense cooperation', *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>>.

confront North Korea, Japan would be required to provide military and logistical assistance, increasing its involvement and therefore the chances of North Korea attacking it. Furthermore, South Korea does not want conflict because of the destabilising effects a nearby conflict would have on both its economy and society.¹³ Nor does the prospect of a forced reunification appeal to South Korea – a gradual, peaceful transition is the only means of ensuring continual South Korean economic success. Therefore, the US' view on the perceived threat of North Korea is but one example of how the perceptions of one nation differ from those of another.

Of all threats currently perceived by the US in Northeast Asia, the potential for conflict over Taiwanese independence is possibly the most confrontational.¹⁴ In the worst-case scenario for the US, this threat could escalate into a long-term, large-scale war with China. In recent years, all three key actors involved in the tensions – the US, Taiwan and China – have toughened their stances on the situation, thus escalating hostilities. The 1979 *Taiwan Relations Act* is still law in the US, the Act dictating the US should 'resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social and economic system, of the people on Taiwan.'¹⁵ Nationalist sentiment in Taiwan is growing - President Chen Shui-bian was narrowly re-elected in 2004 based on his support for Taiwanese independence.¹⁶ China's recent *Anti-Secession Law* stipulates that in case of Taiwanese independence, China 'shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.'¹⁷ The Bush administration has clearly stated it wishes to maintain the status quo, but that Taiwan

¹³ MacIntyre.

¹⁴ R Halloran, 'Taiwan', *Parameters*, Spring 2003, p. 22.

¹⁵ 'Taiwan Relations Act', *US Department of State*, viewed 14 May 2005, <http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_Relations_Act.html 1 January 1979>.

¹⁶ Author unknown, 'Chen survives again', *Economist.com*, 23 March 2004, viewed 15 May 2005,

<http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory/cfm?story_id=2516204>.

¹⁷ 'Anti-Secession Law', *People's Daily Online*, viewed 13 May 2005,

<http://english.people.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html 13 March 2005>.

should be granted the right of choice.¹⁸ This ambiguity confuses the situation and promotes uncertainty and apprehension. A very fragile balance of power therefore exists, and the US is rightly worried about the implications should just one regional actor push its case.

Unlike the ambiguous nature of the US' policy towards Taiwan, China has maintained a strict, explicit policy refuting Taiwan's right to independence. As such, any US interference in China's dealings with Taiwan is seen as aggressive and threatening. Under the new *Anti-Secession Law*, Taiwan is declared a domestic matter; any intervention by the US is an assault against China's sovereignty and as such requires retaliation. Chinese officials claim the situation will remain calm if the US abides by the regulations placed on it by the 'Three Joint Communiqués'.¹⁹ This includes a reduction of US arms sales to Taiwan, and an acknowledged 'respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs'.²⁰ It is highly unlikely China will soften its approach on Taiwan; its recovery is a matter of national pride.²¹ Therefore, both the US and China can view, if they so desire, any moves by the other as a threat to either their own or their allies' interests.

This raises questions about the nature of threats, and their perception. Neither the US nor China can legitimately claim to be the party solely threatened. Furthermore, because both the US and China see their actions as promoting the peace and stability of Northeast Asia, peace and stability itself becomes an essentially-contested concept. Is the peace and stability the US is determined to protect, the same as China?

¹⁸ EJR Revere, 'The Bush Administration's second-term foreign policy toward East Asia', *US Department of State*, viewed 18 May 2005, <<http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/46420.htm> 17 May 2005>.

¹⁹ D Arase, 'Japan's Post-Cold War Policy toward China', in S Sharma (ed.), *Asia-Pacific in the new millennium: Geopolitics, security, and foreign policy*, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley, 2000, p. 67.

²⁰ 'Joint Communiqué between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America' (China-US August 17 Communiqué), *People's Daily Online*, 17 August 1982, viewed 13 May 2005.

<<http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26244.htm>>

²¹ R Lim, *The geopolitics of East Asia: The search for equilibrium*, Routledge, London, 2003, p. 170.

If so, protecting peace and stability no longer provides a genuine motivation for conflict as the concept has no clear definition and can be manipulated to serve the nation's own purposes. If not, peace and stability holds different meaning to different parties, and can no longer be legitimately employed as rationale for tensions. Peace and stability as concepts therefore are fashioned and created to suit a purpose. Their use within international relations rhetoric cannot be justifiably used without some measure of scepticism.

This manipulation of ideas is further evidenced in the US' viewing Chinese incursions into the South China Sea as a major threat.²² In an area 'through which passes half the world's shipping' China is none-too-subtly claiming islands for military and economic benefit.²³ These claims for the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, as well as Senkakus Island in the East China Sea, are not a direct threat towards the US security. However, because they limit economic movement in the region, hamper access to natural resources and breach the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone, the US considers it action against the peace and stability of Northeast Asia.²⁴ Militarily, the possession of these islands extends China's power-projection capability. Should the feared conflict over Taiwan arise between the US and China, these territorial gains would assist in both Chinese defence and its offensive capacities. This, of course, is not in the interests of the US. Therefore, the South China Sea is an obvious example of how threat perception in Northeast Asia is clouded by national assessments of the situation – the US fears China's naval incursion into the region because of the military and economic threat it presents to their allies, while China views the infiltration as merely protecting its present rights, while establishing defensive mechanisms for future conflict.

Indicative of the US' growing concern over security situations in Taiwan and the South China Sea is an emerging class of thought that perceives China as *the* dominating threat towards the US and Northeast Asia.²⁵

²² Hickey, p. 5.

²³ Halloran, p. 23.

²⁴ Lim, p. 153.

²⁵ Ikenberry & Mastanduno, p. 433.

Known as the 'Blue Team' and best encapsulated by Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro's *The Coming Conflict with China*, the 'China Threat' ideology claims China is an economic, military and security threat to the US.²⁶ Economically, it is claimed China is developing too quickly and could soon rival the US. Militarily, the recent increase in Chinese defence spending is believed to have intensified its aggression towards the previously mentioned hotspots of Taiwan and South China Sea. Furthermore, 'China Threat' advocates declare China's arms sales in the region are destabilising the fragile balance of power. Followers of the 'China Threat' principles believe China's 'quick ascent has made it an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia'.²⁷ While not fully adopting the main beliefs of the 'China Threat' doctrine, Bush does label China as a 'strategic competitor' instead of 'strategic partner' as called by former US President Bill Clinton.²⁸ This is a further example of how the US' perceptions are divergent from those in Northeast Asia, and how views within the US itself diverge according to political alignment or public service department – China of course does not see these issues as threats, nor does it view its rise as a threat to regional hegemony, other Northeast Asia states' perspectives differ yet again.

US perceptions of Northeast Asian threats are of course but one way of viewing situations within the region. To further demonstrate this, when examining the perceived threats of other Northeast Asian nations - in this case China - entirely different threats and fears are identified. China sees the US, and more importantly its strategic alliance with Japan, as the greatest threat to both its interests and the peace and stability of the region.²⁹ For example, 1997 amendments to the *Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation* and 'Japan's new security assertiveness' have increased Chinese fears of a remilitarised Japan – the memories of World War II remain.³⁰ Additionally, Japan's cooperation with the US

²⁶ Arase, p. 72.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 73.

²⁸ Author unknown, 'Pentagon report: China an emerging rival', *China Daily*, 25 May 2005, viewed 25 May 2005,

<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/25/content_445561.htm>.

²⁹ Christensen, pp. 50-51.

³⁰ Shambaugh, p. 9.

planned Theatre Missile Defence further exacerbates China's apprehension. Also, the US' continual interference in Chinese human rights abuses is perceived as a threat to Chinese state sovereignty; it is further evidence that unfortunately the US cannot be trusted to remain aloof from domestic political issues of Northeast Asian states. As such, China's greatest perceived threat to peace and stability is interference by the US in matters China considers to be the sole interest and responsibility of Northeast Asia. This of course, is in direct defiance of the US that views the interference as its duty and responsibility to the region.

US views currently seem to dominate the evaluation of threats to Northeast Asian peace and stability. Given its much lauded hegemony, few contrasting views of regional security are taken seriously in the Western World. This essay has attempted to show that the US view on security threats in Northeast Asia, best demonstrated by North Korea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, differs greatly from those of Northeast Asian nations themselves. It did so by questioning the very nature of threats and the preconceived understanding of threats by nation-states. Although this essay has focused on military threats, its examination of 'who has the power to speak' on such issues demonstrates that other strategic concerns such as health, religion, and the economy should also be looked at with a high level of scrutiny. The dominant US view of Northeast Asian security is one of many; the domestic, political and historical factors of each state determine what it views as a threat to the region. As such, US views should be questioned; the US has a vested interest in the region that will always have bias. However, the views of states within the Northeast Asian region can not be considered more valid. More so than even the US, China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea have highly subjective views of Northeast Asian security and are unlikely to develop balanced opinions in the near future. Only by fully appreciating all perspectives of the region will observers and Northeast Asian states gain a holistic appreciation of the complexities and concerns of the region. While the US is acknowledged as the superior military power of the region, for any outside observer or internal participant to only view current situations and events from the standpoint of the prevailing power imparts a

highly narrow, prejudiced and confined perspective. It is of the utmost importance therefore that both external powers and states of the region engage in wide-ranging intellectual research, open debate and extensive discussion to better understand opposing, as well as their own, security perspectives. To do otherwise, is to the detriment of Northeast Asia because it reduces the capacity of diplomacy, not military force, to peacefully resolve future conflicts.

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THE CIRCLING, SHADES AND SHADOWS OF POLANSKI'S *CHINATOWN*

*Katie Ryan**

This essay is an analysis of a certain 7 minute, 22 second sequence in the detective/film noir Chinatown. It depicts a crucial part nearing the climax where Gittes, the freelance private eye, makes a series of discoveries that lead him (and us) to wrongly suspect the heroine of murder, striking off a chain reaction to her death. This analysis argues that this sequence is crucial for the overall structure and themes of circular doom to be comprehended by the audience, discussing various elements such as sound, lighting, character development, dialogue and setting.[†]

When Gittes steps into the shattered house of the fake Mrs Mulray, and makes a series of discoveries from the dead actress to the glasses in Evelyn's pond, this sequence encapsulates the circulatory, ambiguous nature of Polanski's *Chinatown*. It also features *Chinatown*'s unsettling juxtaposition of extreme, outdoor light with the interior shadows of corruption and violence that line every face in this unclear world.

As if revising the film's establishing shot, we are once again placed in a room streaked with low-key lights and shadows. The semi-monochrome colouring of the film accentuates this confused division of black and white, acting as a potent metaphor for the mixture of truth and misdirection that makes up the narrative and dialogue of characters like Evelyn. This reminder of the beginning also brings Gittes' character progression into focus. While the film's opening shot presents Gittes as a representative of the 'hard boiled detective' convention of the film noir, coolly smoking in a white suit and clearly in control, by this sequence his suit is grey, implying both a loss of 'innocent' non-involvement, and of certainty and control as he wades deeper into the

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[†] A still from Roman Polanski's *Chinatown* is provided on colour plate 8.

mystery. This is highlighted by the quick cut between the actress's agonised face, bathed in light, and a high angle shot of Gittes with *his* face shrouded in darkness – uncertain as to the direct source of the evil, however stark and plain the evidence of it is.

As a whole, *Chinatown's* atmosphere is created greatly through an eerie and watery harp motif, implying we are not on firm ground. One striking sound element in this sequence however is a non-diegetic rhythmic clanging on a low, gruff piano key. Adding to the sense of unease, which builds to a head (literally) as the camera slowly pans up Ida's body, it also strongly resembles knocking on a hollow water pipe. The first instance of this sound occurs while Gittes explores the dry riverbed, just after the discovery of Mulray's corpse, and through this repetitive sound, both murders are implied to be connected through the water plot. The pipe clanging begins just as Gittes begins 'tapping' on the water mystery. This is reinforced in the scene outside Galeburton's office, when the camera pauses over the photo of Mulray and Cross clapping shoulders in the centre of a huge water pipe. Their relationship is a pivotal centre to the mystery, yet many 'tappings' are needed for Gittes to get any information, such as the irritated secretary's final burst, "Yes, they were partners!"

These ominous thuds repeatedly signal the tension of a new revelation, yet perhaps at a terrible price. This is seen earlier with the water pipe bursting out to nearly drown Gittes, and his snooping quickly earning him a sliced nose. The 'tapping' noise also backdrops Gittes finding the glasses, increasing at a crazy pace as he makes his tragic error about Evelyn's guilt. The wild banging continues in the final sequence, as the jerky camera swings between the confusing black of night and Chinatown's neon lights, sounding as though the heavy feet of the figure inside the mystery is running, bursting out – but just like the water, Noah Cross is too powerful: overwhelming Gittes, "owning" the police and dragging a distraught Catherine away.

Another audible inducement of tension in this sequence is the rhythmic drip of water, echoing both the theme of the water mystery, and that of time ticking away to the inevitable. Highlighted by Gittes standing

before a clock in the darkened room, this sequence is when the clock truly starts accelerating – Lou giving him two hours to hand over Evelyn, and Gittes' mistrust putting in motion the events leading to her death. It is no accident that this ticking is also present throughout the intimate bed scene when Evelyn and Gittes are framed in a two-shot, shoulder to shoulder, yet rarely looking each other as they speak guardedly of their pasts. This unwillingness to trust is a fatal flaw in their relationship, and as Gittes reveals he lost a woman in Chinatown, the clock – circular by nature – is counting down from repetition to repetition: black/white photos flicking, an investigation gone awry, a woman dead.

When Gittes opens the door to receive a sudden flashlight in the face by the police, it directly resembles the gangsters catching him by the water, with little difference in the sense of threat. As a further parallel, the snide comment on Gittes's sliced nose demonstrates how 'sorting through other people's dirty laundry' endangers him on both sides of the law. Gittes's antagonistic rebuttal that the policeman's wife 'crossed her legs a little too quick' subtly underscores a patriarchal image of women as weapons, intrinsic to the film noir, which Lou Escobar certainly implies in his accusations of Evelyn.

The characterisations of the squinty-eyed lieutenant and his 'minions' let us know immediately that the police aren't to be trusted in this world, as aside from the initial shock of seeing Ida's body, she is given little attention and casually stepped over once the light has turned on. In callous mimicry of the detectives selfishly competing in accusations, the camera does not dip below again to view the evil that the two should rightfully be banding together to fight. But the overall emphasis of this film *is* of something seriously wrong - the institutions designed to protect society destroying Evelyn and standing idly by as Noah triumphs. However, Gittes' position of outsider individualism is just as dangerous, for by playing in the shadows between the law and the underworld, not aligning himself with either, and refusing to trust anyone or any law (the embodiment of the public search for justice) he only endangers himself and the woman he begins to love. Just as Jake isn't the one to turn on the light and radically change the atmosphere in

Ida's room, he isn't a bringer of justice or reason, as Lou, despite his faults, clearly strives to be.

From the moment the light is switched on, with Lou and Gittes taking dominant places on the screen, there is always another policeman covering a door, embodying the stranglehold of both time and powers inside and outside the law hemming Gittes in.

This careful arrangement of the *mise-en-scène* holds much of the story's meaning, such as when a crucial character is in the foreground, people who form their coterie are nearly always positioned behind. A clear example is in the opening scenes, with Gittes's 'associates' continually in the background. This practice of placing two or three in a shot becomes menacingly ironic as the film progresses to this sequence, with bullies from both sides of the law repeatedly placed around Gittes as they too become inescapable parts of his existence.

Other careful positions include placing an object symbolising social status between two characters. While Gittes crouches by the water pond, a garden spade sits between him and the gardener, fracturing the frame into social divisions that are forever fixed between them. Equally, the fracture between the status of Cross and Gittes is indicated by a servant standing between them while they dine, his white clothing resembling the white pillars that make up Cross's self-made mansion.

Polanski's overall use of formal, aesthetic positioning – the rule of thirds and clear background/middle ground/foreground – all serve to juxtapose the terrible and confusing events of *Chinatown*, such as the beautiful architecture leading to the shattered mess where Ida's corpse is found.

Another circling reference to the opening of the film is the close-up on shuffled black and white photos, repeating the themes of voyeurism and blindness that are linked to Gittes from the outset. This blindness is ironic because of his earlier claim of possessing 'A certain amount of finesse' after discarding images the audience knows to be significant, simply by their appearance on the screen. It is interesting that while we often see him with binoculars and a camera, we cannot hear what the

figures he spies on are truly saying. His career as a 'private eye' places the emphasis on sight, not hearing, and Polanski chooses to limit us to the 'bubble' of experience that is Gittes' point of view, serving to demonstrate how limiting and dangerous one point of view can be. This is seen when Gittes takes those same snapshots of Mr Mulray and Catherine while on their roof. A close-up on Gittes' camera reveals the figures' reflections, although not in reverse but still positioned as he perceives them – the 'objective' photo image stained by his misinformed subjectivity. That these very photos are present in the dead actress's room brings the danger of misconceptions back into sharp focus. These photos also extend the shifting shades of uncertainty in this narrative – demonstrating the deception of appearances, and that while they do reveal information, never telling the whole story.

The detective genre, according to Michael Eaton¹, is at heart optimistic in the triumph of human reason, being both 'the story of a crime and the story of the solution of the crime'.² But *Chinatown's* undercutting of this genre is clearly seen in the lack of justice ever brought to Ida Session's killer. It is also seen in the parody of the convention of a detective retracing his steps, with Gittes taking Lou to the dripping pipe, and then returning to Evelyn's mansion, increasingly powerless and frustrated. It is a preview of the final scene, when the genre is bitinglly satirized by a PI who finally knows all, but can do nothing.

In a world of so many darks and greys, the pure white of Evelyn's mansion (and costumes in earlier scenes) is a striking indication of purity and fragility. But white is also a deathly colour, and the sheets spread out over her possessions in the deserted mansion indicate what is to come.

As an over-shoulder shot follows Gittes's frustrated walk to the pond, the sudden emptiness of music echoes the lack of clues on regarding Evelyn, and the circular nature of the setting is highlighted by his mocking repetition 'Yeah, yeah. Bad for glass'. In the earlier matching shot, the glass had twinkled in the pond, yet he was too distracted by

¹ M Eaton, *BFI Film Classics – Chinatown*, British Film Institute, London, 1997.

² *ibid.*, p 40.

Evelyn's approach to investigate further – an indication of his later faults, missing the evil in Cross by focusing on Evelyn. This could also condemn Evelyn, with her fatal flaw of attracting attention yet rarely speaking the truth. Gittes mocking the servant's statement is ironic in that it points to the central clue in Mulray's murder, and yet he misses it – truth and misunderstanding combined yet again. The salt water is 'bad for glass' in many ways: glasses are functionally and symbolically for sight, yet the fact of salt water in the pond correspondingly with the salt water in Mulray's lungs, clouds Gittes' vision to the real truth and criminal. It does the same to the viewer, as a sudden pause of the camera on Gittes' back also causes us to pause, and come to the same conclusion. In making Lou's predicted femme fatale scenario vivid, this sequence sets our expectations up to be radically twisted.

The shot of the servant fishing out the glasses is filmed continuously in one long landscape take, fitting in with the overall style of framing Gittes before wide panoramas. The impression is ambiguous, for while Jake takes the stance of an individual making his way through the world, it constantly reminds us that he is only a small part in a grand conspiracy which 'half the city's trying to cover up'. This and the sequence ending with Jake gazing beyond the frame, focusing his and the viewer's thoughts on another character, demonstrate that although clearly the main character, Gittes does not hold the central conflict of this narrative.

Overall, this sequence effectively creates the sense of circulatory failure, deceit and mistrust which so poignantly characterises *Chinatown's* dark review of the crime and detective genres of the 1930's and 40's. Through using repetitive images, symbols and sounds, this sequence ties the narrative together like a winding clock, inducing a countdown to its tragic end.

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AN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE

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The Australian Constitution has been labelled at various times unsatisfactory, frustrating and ineffective. Australia's experience with Constitutionalism rests, principally, on two foundations: Judicial review and Federalism, both entrenched in a written document. With reference to both the illusory notion of a supreme Parliament and the existence of limitations on legislative power pre-Federation, this paper argues that a constitutionally protected Federation affords some protection to citizens, while judicial review ensures that Parliaments of the day do not step over the grant of authority given to them by their agents, the people. It is the conclusion of this paper that, far from being an unsatisfactory document, Australia's Constitution provides sufficient powers to ensure effective democratic government while protecting the rights of the Courts, Parliament and People. Australia's Constitution is a continuation of the historical progression from arbitrary and unlimited rule, to a system where the rule of law controls the exercise of power.

Introduction

For many, the Australian Constitution is an unsatisfactory document. Those who seek explicit protection for minority rights or grand statements of popular sovereignty are frustrated by the perfunctory nature of the Constitution. At a glance the Australian Constitution seems to consist of mainly procedural and transitional provisions – far removed from the passionate declarations of independence found in the Constitutions of other nations. Similarly, those wishing to exercise unrestrained legislative influence confront a Federal division of power and a High Court exercising judicial review. This frustration of Parliament's power is legitimised by theories of Constitutionalism which, in the Australian context, underpins the creation of a bicameral

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legislature operating under an entrenched, written Constitution, within a Federation of States. Representative democracy is tempered by the limits imposed by a document whose source has, over the course of the twentieth century, shifted from the British Houses of Parliament, to the Australian public. Nonetheless, it is of little surprise that politicians, judges and citizens have seen the Australian Constitution as 'deficient as an instrument of government' which stifles moves towards a centralisation of power.¹

This paper will argue that much criticism of Australia's Constitution, and the 'Washminster' system of government created under it,² fails to examine the historical processes which led to its formation and to appreciate the perception of the Constitution in the years since the *Australia Acts*.³ Australia's Constitutionalism is shaped by the power of the Judiciary to review legislation and declare it invalid where it is in conflict with the Constitution and the Federal separation of power. Detractors of Federalism decry the division of powers in Australia and argue that the continued existence of State governments is extravagant, wasteful and antithetical to theories of Parliamentary supremacy. However, this paper points to the continued influence exercised by the Imperial Parliament's paramount legislation to demonstrate that parliaments in the colonies were never supreme and were bound by Acts of a foreign legislature. Moreover, the tensions, which exist in the Australian system, are not aberrations resulting from a defective document. Instead these dilemmas, arising from Parliament's wish to legislate and competing interests of the Judiciary, can be found in the development of England's and the United States' Constitutions.⁴ Finally, while there is ambiguity over the limits of Parliament's power and the

¹ Sir Anthony Mason, 'The role of a constitutional court in a federation', *Federal Law Review*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1986.

² Washminster is a term used to describe Australia's hybrid system of government with elements taken from the British Westminster system and the Federal Republicanism present in the United States of America.

³ *Australia Act 1986 (Cth)*; *Australia Act 1986 (UK)*.

⁴ While England's Constitutional law is made up of conventions, Acts of Parliament and common law precedents it is examined here as a single foundational law, which has been relied upon by litigants as a superior law throughout history – with varying degrees of success.

extent to which judges should engage in 'law-making', through the practice of judicial review this uncertainty is arguably positive as it 'begets a cautious forbearance' from both the Court and Parliament.⁵ Though frustrating to seekers of unfettered democratic authority, such caution is advantageous to citizens as it provides a brake on any overly zealous legislature.

The British Experience and Australia's Constitutionalism

Some critics of Australia's federal system blame the adoption of elements of the United States Constitution for limiting Parliamentary Supremacy. Relying on A.V. Dicey's idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty – where parliament can 'make and unmake any law whatever' – it is often argued that the separation of power and judicial review are intolerable interferences upon the duly elected parliament of the day.⁶ However, that Britain had a supreme Parliament was more the result of historical and political circumstances than consistent and theoretical development.⁷ Many political theorists point to England's 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688 as the moment where Parliament became the superior law making body of that country. Yet this fails to acknowledge the terrible decade of civil war, which raged throughout England, Scotland and Ireland in the 1640s. It is arguable that the execution of King Charles I was a bolder assertion of Parliament's power than the *Act of Settlement*. Similarly, a tradition of common law restrictions on the Crown existed from the *Magna Carta* and indeed this has been relied upon by modern litigants as providing fundamental guarantees which curtail a 'supreme' Parliament's powers.⁸

⁵ Justice EW Thomas, 'The relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A tentative thought or two for the new millennium', Speech delivered at the Centennial Lecture, Victoria University of Wellington, 30 June 1999, *Victoria University of Wellington Law Review*, vol. 31, no. 5, 2000.

⁶ AV Dicey, *Introduction to the study of the law of the Constitution*, 10th edn, Macmillan, London, 1959, p. 39.

⁷ Thomas, *passim*.

⁸ Mr Shaw, a resident of New Zealand, challenged a section of the *Income Tax Act 1976* (NZ) as a breach of fundamental rights protected under the *Magna Carta*. The Court refused to enter into the debate. *ibid*.

In England Chief Justice Coke, a staunch defender of the common law protection of personal liberties, argued that an act of Parliament or action of the Executive could be held invalid if it violated inalienable rights.⁹ Had Coke delivered his *Dr Bonham's* decision during the mid-1640s it would have provoked a lethal response from the House of Commons, whose Members were then engaged in a physical and ideological struggle to assert the dominance of Parliament over the Crown and its Courts.¹⁰ Consequently, the notion that Britain ever enjoyed a Parliament able to make or unmake any law is illusory. To maintain a fantasy of total dominance, Britain's Parliament had to imprison and execute judges, Kings, fellow Members of Parliament and fight a bloody war. Clearly, the tensions between the British Crown's prerogatives and the rights of Parliament were unsatisfactory in the extreme. While the Monarch has extensive reserve powers – formally exercised through the Governor-General – the Australian experience has been very different from its parent's. An acceptance of Constitutionalism and limitations imposed on the legislature, judiciary and executive have spared us the ultimate failure of legitimacy – civil war.

Constitutionalism and the 'Supreme' Parliament

Tensions arising from Constitutionalism and Parliamentary Supremacy have always been present in Australia. A Parliament, able to make and unmake any law, has never existed upon the Australian continent. Colonial legislatures, though founded upon flexible Constitutions were, on many issues, constrained by higher paramount legislation; their laws potentially disallowed as repugnant to British law. While the *Colonial Laws Validity Act (CLVA)* clarified the limits of repugnancy,¹¹ it still constrained the legislative powers of the colonies. Although there were no entrenched constitutional limits on the Parliaments, with the exception of 'manner and form' provisions, the *CLVA* acted as a supreme law in a similar fashion to a Constitution.¹² Moreover, the

⁹ *Dr Bonham's Case* (1610) 77 ER 638.

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ *Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865* (Imp) 28 & 29 Vict c 63. Cited in text as '*CLVA*'.

¹² *Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865* (Imp) 28 & 29 Vict c 63, s 5.

Colonies were not empowered to legislate on certain Imperial issues, such as foreign affairs or trade.

Following the inception of the Australian Commonwealth, the powers of the Colonies were transferred, under the new Constitution, to the Federal Parliament and thus the new States were further limited in their powers.¹³ On a Federal level, the Commonwealth Parliament has always been restricted by an entrenched constitutional document and so has never enjoyed the freedoms of the British Parliament. That this situation is unsatisfactory, though, is highly questionable and those who answer in the affirmative often express a desire to weaken Constitutionalism and centralise power to the subsequent detriment of Federalism.

Underlying the theory of Constitutionalism is the presumption that Parliaments can only act within the scope of their authority. Thus the Federal Parliament, while restricted in its powers, is master of its sphere.¹⁴ Section 109 of the Australian Constitution cements the authority of the Commonwealth Parliament, within the limits, *inter alia*, of Section 51, and renders invalid any inconsistent State law.¹⁵ Although politicians have often called for an expansion of powers in order to create a more effective national government, it is in the interests of the individual for a division to exist between State and Federal governments.

Importantly, the division of responsibilities entrenched in the Constitution has the benefit of protecting, indirectly, the rights of the citizen. England, though not possessing a supreme Parliament, was still a unitary system and the laws of London applied equally in Edinburgh and Dublin.¹⁶ Federalism, however, may allow a citizen to escape the impositions of one State's laws without resorting to fleeing the country. The law of Victoria may, for example, prohibit the writing of

¹³ *Australian Constitution* ss 51, 52. There is insufficient space in this paper to examine the impact of the *Statute of Westminster* and *The Balfour Declaration* on the powers of the States.

¹⁴ See Marshall CJ in *McCulloch v Maryland* (1819) 17 US 316.

¹⁵ State Laws are rendered invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.

¹⁶ Recently there has been some devolution of power away from London to Scotland, Wales and, occasionally, Northern Ireland.

blasphemous material but a resident can move to New South Wales, which has no such law, to continue their work. However, were the Commonwealth to possess the power to legislate ‘with regards to publications’ and enacted an equivalent of Victoria’s law there would be no escape for the individual. This is precisely the situation, which the Commonwealth Parliament faced when it attempted to outlaw Communism in the 1950s. Its legislation was struck down by the High Court on the grounds that it exceeded the Commonwealth’s authority under Section 51(vi) – the defence power. As a result of the decision in the *Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth* the Menzies’ government sought to grant the Federal Parliament power to legislate ‘with regard to communists and communism’ through a referendum.¹⁷ In this way, a constitutional limiting of the powers of the Federal Parliament served to protect a minority group. Additionally, if the Court determines that a Parliament or Constitution draws its authority from the citizens of a country it may afford protection against government excesses.

Where are the People?

Notions of Parliamentary Sovereignty rest upon theories of democracy, direct or representative. While the Australian democratic experience is similar to that of the United States and Britain, insofar as it developed into a representative form, the source of Australia’s democratic institutions came about through very different means. America’s Constitution was, to fall to clichés, written with the blood of insurrectionists; the Union cleaved from the British motherland. More than a legal document, it represents an ideal about the functions and powers of government and provides an explicit rejection of arbitrary rule and Parliamentary Supremacy. From its initial drafting the United States’ Constitution derived its legitimacy from ‘the people’, however, Australia’s highest law found force as an Act of the Imperial Parliament.¹⁸ For the majority of the twentieth century the High Court held that the authority by which the Commonwealth Parliament drafted

¹⁷ *Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth* (1951) 83 CLR 1.

¹⁸ The body of the Australian Constitution is found in section 9 of *Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900* (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12.

laws was legitimate because the Constitution was valid legislation – duly passed by the Imperial Parliament.¹⁹ Despite the draft Constitution being ratified by the Australian people at referenda it required British legislative force to establish the Commonwealth. Although there were claims to the contrary,²⁰ it was not until the passage of the *Australia Acts* that Britain formally renounced all sovereignty over Australia.²¹ Since 1986, a notion of Popular Sovereignty has emerged within Australia and the High Court of the 1990s determined that the words ‘subject to this Constitution’ limited the Parliament of Australia in its legislative powers and protected certain implied rights of the granters of state authority – namely the people of Australia.²² Popular Sovereignty, whereby the authority behind the Constitution is vested in the populace, is the force which legitimates Australian Constitutionalism. For so long as the Constitution, in either its current or amended form, is supported, or acquiesced to, by the majority of the population, the Federal division of responsibilities and the power of judicial review remain relevant.

Ultimately, the best evidence of Popular Sovereignty in the Australian Constitution is the manner and form provision in Section 128 specifying how the Constitution is to be amended. By requiring Parliament to ‘go back to the people’, the document implies that acceptance for the Constitution must reside in the people. Were there to be a serious enough breach of this assumption the legitimacy of the federation would be thrown into doubt.

Judicial review, especially from an activist Court, can ease the tensions between Parliamentary Supremacy and Constitutionalism, although the balance of power has not shifted consistently in favour of one or the

¹⁹ *Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No. 1)* (1985) 159 CLR 351.

²⁰ Murphy J dissenting in *Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No. 1)* (1985) 159 CLR 351 at 383 stated: ‘On the inauguration of the Commonwealth on 1 January 1901, British hegemony over the Australian colonies ended ... the British Parliament had no legislative authority over Australia...[and] the authority for the Australian Constitution ... is its acceptance by the Australian people.’

²¹ See Mason CJ in *Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (No. 2)* (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 138.

²² See Deane and Toohey JJ in *Leeth v Commonwealth* (1992) 174 CLR 455 at 483.

other. By determining the limits of a legislature's power the High Court is the ultimate defender of the Federal compact and the enforcer of Constitutional principles – principles which are often contrary to Parliamentary Supremacy. At the same time, however, the decisions in *McKinlay* and *McGinty* demonstrate that the Court is not always willing to discover guarantees of Popular Sovereignty.²³ Nonetheless, it is evident that judicial review has been the principal avenue through which Australia has sought to resolve the tensions enshrined in its Constitution as the more democratic mechanism, a referendum, has been infrequently used and rarely successfully. Whether this reality is satisfactory when confronted with a serious conflict between Parliamentary Supremacy and Constitutionalism remains to be tested but the failure of Constitutional amendments, which would have entrenched a 'one vote, one value' provision suggest that the public is willing, for the moment anyway, to follow the Court's interpretation.²⁴

Judicial Review

Perhaps the greatest challenge to the Commonwealth Parliament's dominance is judicial review. While the English Parliamentary forces resolved this issue in their favour during the seventeenth century, by declaring war upon the Courts – as functionaries of the Crown. This dominance of Parliament has since been usurped by Britain's commitments to carrying out the directives of the European Union. British Courts are now empowered, albeit by an Act of the British Parliament, to strike down legislation which is contrary to EU statutes.²⁵ In the United States, the Supreme Court's powers extend to Federal legislation and Bill of Rights issues, with the Court often asked to adjudicate on the constitutional validity of Federal and State laws. Both

²³ *A-G (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth* (1975) 135 CLR 1 and *McGinty v State of Western Australia* (1996) 186 CLR 140. See also: *R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka* (1983) 152 CLR 254. These cases were generally concerned with the nature of Australia's representative democracy and, specifically, with the notion of 'one vote, one value'.

²⁴ *Constitutional Alteration (Fair Elections) Act 1988* (Cth) (expired) and *Constitutional Alteration (Democratic Elections) Act 1974* (Cth) (expired).

²⁵ This matter was adjudicated upon by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in: *The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others* (C-213/89) [1990] (19 June 1990).

the High Court and Supreme Court assert their power to invalidate those State and Federal laws which are unconstitutional.²⁶ That this power is not specifically enumerated in either nation's Constitution has been the source of much debate.²⁷ Indeed, for an unelected body to overrule the wishes of the popularly elected body seems to contradict the spirit of a democratic Constitutionalism. In the case of the Supreme Court, this power to invalidate has been declared 'a remarkable delegation for politicians...given the electorates long-standing commitment to policy making... by those accountable [to the electorate]'.²⁸ In Australia, the judicial review power is considered, by the High Court, to be a 'logical and necessary adjunct of the judicial function'.²⁹

Australian commentators aghast at the Courts' assumption of a power of review neglect the fact that, while perhaps anti-democratic, the Courts have been established under a democratic Constitution which maintains the support of the population. Therefore, the High Court, and its power to invalidate unconstitutional legislation fits within the framework of Australian Constitutionalism. Additionally, the Courts provide an independent adjudicator for private grievances and, more importantly, serve to resolve disputes between States or between the Federal and State organs of Government which, without a legitimate decision, could result in a breakdown in the Constitution. This is far from an unsatisfactory result. While it may frustrate Parliaments and Governments as they attempt to execute their reform programs, they serve an indispensable function as protectors of individual rights and checks upon the power of the State.

²⁶ *Marbury v Madison* (1803) 5 US 137.

²⁷ R Bowie & C Friedrich (eds), *Studies in Federalism*, Little Brown, Boston, 1954, p. 130 and p. 167.

²⁸ Michael Perry cited in Raoul Berger, *Federalism, The founders' design*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1987, p. 12.

²⁹ Bowie & Friedrich, p. 130.

Conclusion

While a tension does exist within Australia between theories of Parliamentary Supremacy and Constitutionalism, this is not unique to Australia and can be found in other Federations and Constitutional nations. Though Australia did inherit much of its political philosophy from the British, it must not be forgotten that the British experience was shaped by civil war and regicide – events Australia has fortunately avoided. Despite the belief that Britain had a supreme Parliament, both the British Government and Crown had limits imposed upon them throughout history by different groups and so tensions have continually arisen. Similarly, while Australia adopted many of the elements of a Federal United States that nation, like Australia, has a long history of compromise between the States, Federal Parliament and the judicial branch of government.

By acknowledging that the Constitution's authority is grounded in popular acceptance, explicit or tacit, theories of Constitutionalism will function alongside concepts of Popular Sovereignty to adapt to the dynamic realities of the world and, through judicial review, to protect the individual from the tyranny of the majority.

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MOTIVATION VIA LOSS: WORDSWORTH AND MODERNITY

*Andrew Willcocks**

William Wordsworth's poetry is often confounded by a sense of chaos, in which the author loses his sense of self to the disorder of the industrial revolution and the social effects of modernity. Several of Wordsworth's works –including The Prelude– reflect this modern chaos and loss of identity through the literary phantasmagoria of early 19th century London. This essay argues that rather than allowing the modern chaos to trump his sense of self, Wordsworth instead calls into play past memories of ordered natural environs, transposing them onto industrial landscapes and the swirling crowds of modernity with a view to affirming a sense of natural order within chaos.

William Wordsworth's greatest poetry arguably uses a sense of loss to attribute a value to the phenomenon of subliminal recollection, as contrasted with the uncertainty and danger of uncharted realms. Rather than settle with the directionless – the lost – Wordsworth prefers to restore natural order to the often chaotic and uncertain landscapes that his greatest poetry describes. In recognising and celebrating the miracle of natural order, Wordsworth retreats into the (frequently glorious) shelter of heterogeneous categorisation, where he can control his thoughts and perceptions – away from the whirling images and melting pot of modern life that, to Wordsworth, hold superficial meaning and threatening disorder. Several of Wordsworth's poems are motivated by humanity's chaotic failings and subsequent losses – a motivation that might reveal its source in the changes brought about by the industrial revolution and the French revolution at the time of his writing. These revelations, while worth considering, often produce an incomplete picture of Wordsworth's ever-hopeful verse, and are probably more accurately applied to the work of his contemporaries. Much of

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Wordsworth's poetry is not inspired by a sense of loss, but rather uses loss as a motivation to produce a thoughtful and natural order in response to imminent chaos.

In order to demonstrate Wordsworth's valuing of subliminal recollection, one might look at two key works: *I wandered lonely as a cloud* and *Lines composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey*. Both poems describe the inherent value of the ability to retreat to real and ordered images, regardless of their chaotic comprehension at the time of experience. *I wandered lonely as a cloud* famously describes a sea of swaying daffodils in four simple yet highly emotive stanzas. It is in the last stanza of the poem that Wordsworth attributes a valuing of having that ordered memory: 'They flash upon that inward eye / which is the bliss of solitude / And then my heart with pleasure fills'.¹ It is interesting to note that the crowds of daffodils – as ordered in nature – convey no threat or disorder to Wordsworth, unlike the milling humanity of London in Book VII of *The Prelude*.² The valuing of recollection in the face of the lugubrious is found in more detailed terms in *Tintern Abbey*, in which Wordsworth describes the glory and beauty of the area around the river Wye, and the pleasure with which – when difficult circumstances arose – he recalled his memory of the form and frame of the landscape. Most important in identifying his subliminal recollection are the lines: 'And I have felt / a presence that disturbs me with the joy / of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime / of something far more deeply interfused / whose dwelling is the light of setting suns...and in the mind of man'.³

Using Wordsworth's valuation of the recollection of subliminal order, one might begin to read his poetry with that reference, and find that in numerous poems Wordsworth defends himself against a negative prospect – often a philosophical loss of direction or meaning – with the weapons of pleasurable memories past. In many ways, one can see that Wordsworth's philosophical wanderings may have pre-empted literary

¹ W Wordsworth, 'I wandered lonely as a cloud', in M Abrams & S Greenblatt et al. (eds), *The Norton Anthology of English Literature*, 7th edn, vol. 2, Norton, New York, 2000, p. 285.

² W Wordsworth, 'The Prelude,' in *ibid.*, p. 348.

³ W Wordsworth, 'Tintern Abbey,' in *ibid.*, p. 237.

works that focused on streams of consciousness, such as Virginia Woolf's *The Mark on the Wall*.⁴ In the poem *Resolution and Independence* Wordsworth describes a chance meeting with an elderly leech-gatherer: a human who is described as blending with nature, and who is integral to the landscape on which he stands. The poem ultimately conveys Wordsworth's resolution that his personal sadness has made him lose sight of the influence of natural order – that which governs the leech-gatherer – on his own life. The resolution to recall affirmative meaning in the leech-gatherer's existence in times of sadness or loneliness is announced in the last line of the poem: 'I'll think of the Leech-gatherer on the lonely moor!'.⁵ In most of his poems, Wordsworth describes an adverse situation of the mind or society, and then provides the reader with his affirmative cure through recollection of natural order.

Wordsworth's constant fear of chaos and disorder is probably reflective of the growing effects of the industrial revolution and the events of the French revolution, which he witnessed first hand. In early October of 1793 he visited Paris, where he witnessed the execution of Gorsas, the first Girondist to be guillotined. Particular to Wordsworth's fears were mobs of angry and passionate people – again, a feature of the French landscape during the early 1790's. The fear of the unleashed animosity of humanity is apparent throughout Wordsworth's *The Prelude*, particularly in Book VII, where the disarray of Bartholomew Square is portrayed in numerous, quick and distinct lines.⁶ Although this chapter on the outrageous and intense fair is described at length, it is appropriate here to focus on several summary lines (VII.686-7): 'What a shock for eyes and ears! what anarchy and din / Barbarian and infernal – a phantasma'.⁷ Here Wordsworth describes the crowd's loss of order as appalling and confusing, indicating that they appear to him like the disordered thoughts of a damaged mind. The words 'barbarian' and 'infernal' describe the spectacle as base and animal, and Wordsworth compares the crowd to (VII. 725-6) a 'perpetual whirl / Of trivial

⁴ S Dick, *The complete shorter fiction of Virginia Woolf*, Hogarth Press, London, 1985, p. 83.

⁵ W Wordsworth, 'Resolution and Independence,' in Abrams & Greenblatt et al. (eds), p. 284.

⁶ W Wordsworth, 'The Prelude,' in *ibid.*, p. 350.

⁷ *ibid.*

objects'.⁸ The loss of definable human order in London makes Wordsworth fear the type of passionate rebellion that the French revolution entailed, hence his questioning (VII.671-3): 'What say you then...when half the city shall break out / Full of one passion, vengeance, rage or fear?'.⁹

Wordsworth's fears of the riotous mob are lightly contrasted with the opening of Book VII, in which he focuses his poetic attention on a beggar wearing a sign that describes the beggar's plight. Just as he did with the leech-gatherer in *Resolution and Independence*, Wordsworth stops the temporal progression of the moment, and addresses the natural order of the particular situation. The vision of the beggar makes an impression on the narrator, and it becomes apparent to the reader that, in the midst of the chaos, order is not lost – the reader finds the erratic images suddenly subdued, as Wordsworth describes the city standing still at night (VII.660-2): 'The blended calmness of the heavens and earth / moonlight, and stars, and empty streets, and sounds / Unfrequent as in deserts'.¹⁰ The natural order of the quiet night time city has an immediate effect on the pace of the poem. It is evident that the beggar has inspired a reality of nature that holds true even in a surreal London, only if for a fleeting instant. Several lines later the reader is again quickly swept along with the descriptive body of Bartholomew Square.

The crowds of London not only provide a riotous threat to Wordsworth in *The Prelude*, they also provide a threat to his subjectivity and self-definition. In Book VII, Wordsworth describes how, when walking through London, he is almost consumed by it – for a moment nearly accepting anonymity and loss of self (VII.632-3): 'Until the shapes before my eyes became / a second sight procession'.¹¹ This loss of definition against the background of the incomprehensible crowd is largely addressed by Wordsworth's recollection of the beggar, but even this would not seem enough to combat the din and constancy of the images

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 351.

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 350.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 349.

¹¹ *ibid.*

of the crowds. After considering the beggar, and the animosity of the spectacle of Bartholomew Square, Wordsworth delivers his ultimatum that recovers his ordered self in the concluding lines of Book VII (767-72): 'The Spirit of Nature was upon me there; / the Soul of Beauty and enduring life...diffused,/ through meagre lines and colours...composure, and ennobling harmony'.¹² Essentially, Wordsworth uses the order of nature – and his recollections ('inspirations') of it – to create an overriding order of the drama and chaos that threaten to rob him of his self definition and subjectivity in the crowd, whose sheer size and depth he cannot comprehend.

In conclusion, it is arguable that Wordsworth's poetry is affirmative in nature, and instead of settling for a sense of loss, it looks to situations in which loss and despair give way to delight in the order and harmony of the natural world. In many of Wordsworth's poems, and especially Book VII of *The Prelude*, the human animal is capable – indeed, likely – to interpret disorder as a form of loss. This tendency, however, is subsumed within a broader and more optimistic world view that revels in the human senses, one of which is the ability to recall and recognise the miracle of the natural order of things. In the face of the disordered world of Britain during the industrial revolution and with the recent French revolution threatening, Wordsworth points to natural order – which he often subliminally recollects from past memories– to provide a vantage point from which to repair and make sense of the modern world.

¹² *ibid.*, p. 351.

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IS LEFT-HANDEDNESS A RESULT OF NEGATIVE FREQUENCY SELECTION?

*Laurence Wilson**

It has long been disputed whether handedness is determined by environmental factors or by genes and if it is determined by genes, what drives the natural selection of these genes? After examining the evidence for genetic selection, this paper attempts to explain both the reasons for a majority of right-handers and the main driving force behind the natural selection. Namely, this paper attempts to argue that human handedness is a result of negative-frequency-dependent selection.

Natural selection is the process by which certain traits which have a genetic basis are favoured and spread throughout the population. Every trait of this kind is coded for by a gene or genes and there are many possible variations of each gene called alleles. If an allele is beneficial to the organism than it will be favoured and the allele will spread through the population; if the allele is detrimental than it will be selected against and subsequently be removed from the population. Negative-frequency-dependency is defined as 'selection where the fitness of a specific genotype is increased if it is rare relative to other genotypes within a population'.¹ This type of natural selection is present in almost all populations. An advantage gained from this type of selection is access to a less exploited environmental niche. If fewer individuals have access to that niche then there will be more resources available for the few who can. As the allele becomes less common, its associated advantages increase.

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
¹ E Lawrence, *Henderson's Dictionary of Biology*, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, 2005, p. 242.



One simple example of negative-frequency-dependent selection is the scale eating Cichlid fish. This fish feeds on the scales of other fish and is unique in the way its mouth is placed so that it points to either the left or right. This means that a fish whose mouth points to the right attacks its prey from the left and vice versa. In a population of these fish where the majority have their mouth oriented to the left, the prey becomes accustomed to being attacked from the right and arrange their defences appropriately.² This means that a fish whose mouth is pointing to the right, allowing it to attack from the left, is at an advantage because the prey is not expecting attacks from that direction. This gives the fish attacking from the right an advantage and as such, they flourish and spread the 'left-mouth' allele throughout the population.

Once the majority of population has the 'left-mouth' allele, the advantage is lost as the most common fish is now the fish attacking from the right so the prey will adjust their defences. The advantage is then transferred to the fish that attack from the left and the cycle begins again (see graph 1). If there are no other factors present then the frequencies will continue to oscillate back and forth at a constant rate, each achieving the same frequency before beginning to decrease.

If there are extra selection pressures against one of the alleles, one of two possibilities can occur. Firstly, the oscillation can continue to occur if added selection pressures against a certain allele remain, with the further disadvantaged allele reaching a lower frequency than if the inherent disadvantages and advantages remained in tandem. Moreover, the disadvantages associated with becoming the more common of the two alleles will quickly overcome any advantages. The other allele will continue



² L. Stevens, 'Selection: Frequency-dependent', *Encyclopedia of life sciences*, 2001, <<http://els.wiley.com/els/subscriber/home>>.

to reach the maximum frequency. It will not, however, ever reach as low a frequency as the disadvantaged allele, resulting in a somewhat dampened oscillation (see graph 2).

The second outcome is that if there are enough selection pressures against the allele it will continue to decrease in frequency until the advantages associated with being the least common are strong enough to counterbalance the inherent disadvantages. This will result in an equilibrium frequency. The lower the equilibrium frequency, the stronger the selection pressure against that allele type (see graph 3).

It has been documented that mankind, throughout history, has been predominantly right-handed.³ There have been a number of theories proposed outlining possible reasons behind such an occurrence and the prevailing one is that 'handedness' is genetic and there is an advantage to being right handed resulting in natural selection favouring the 'right-hand' allele.⁴ There have been studies demonstrating that the marriage of two left-handed parents usually results in left-handed offspring.⁵ It has also been demonstrated in studies that there are varying degrees of handedness.⁶ A purely right-handed person is someone who uses their right hand exclusively for all tasks. It was found that people used their hands interchangeably for different tasks, such as writing letters or using a broom. Carter-Saltzman conducted a study where he compared the degree of handedness of adopted children to the degree of handedness of their foster parents and the handedness of their biological parents. He found that the majority of the adopted children showed hand-preference closer to that of their biological parents rather than their foster parents, preferring to use the same hand as their biological parents for the same task.⁷ This study gave evidence suggesting that handedness is governed by genes – that is, by nature and not by nurture. Marian Annett developed a model in 1997 which

³ M Annett, *Left, right, hand and brain: The right shift theory*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd, London, 1985, p. 40.

⁴ A Onion, 'The Left Hand Advantage', 2005, <<http://www.abcnews.go.com>>.

⁵ Annett, p. 53.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 184.

⁷ L Carter-Saltzman, 'Biological and sociocultural effects on handedness: Comparisons between biological and adoptive families', *Science*, vol. 209, 1980, pp. 1263-1265.

predicted the handedness through three generation with a high degree of accuracy based on genetics.⁸ Further evidence for genetic bases of handedness was given by a study conducted by H. D. Chamberlin in 1928. Both of these studies gave strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that handedness is genetic by studying families with both parents right-handers, both parents left-handers and a mixture. Chamberlin found that the offspring of two left-handed parents gave a higher percentage of left-handed children than right-handed, the offspring of two right-handed parents gave a higher percentage of right-handed children and the offspring of a left-handed and a right-handed parent gave a mixture.⁹

However, more recent studies have shown that environmental factors can also affect handedness. A study by McKeever (2000) found that factors which can affect handedness include siblings, health and mental capacity. Both the health and mental capacity of the individual directly affects their handedness but McKeever found that handedness could also be affected by imitation of siblings. This suggests that nurture may play a significant role in defining the individual's handedness.¹⁰ It is now becoming more generally accepted that both environmental factors and genetics play an integral role in determining handedness. A theory proposed by Provins in 1997 suggests that genetics code for an innate preference for handedness but this preference can be overcome through environmental factors.¹¹ While environmental factors have been shown to affect individuals' handedness, it must be realised that the genetic aspect of handedness also subjects it to natural selection. If there were no advantages or disadvantages associated with being right- or left-handed, the only factor governing the percentage of left- and right-handers would be chance and, accordingly, the proportion of right- to

⁸ Annett.

⁹ HD Chamberlin, 'The inheritance of left handedness', *Journal of Heredity*, vol. 19, 1928, pp. 557-559.

¹⁰ WF McKeever, J Cerone, PJ Suter & SM Wu, 'Family size, miscarriage proneness and handedness: Test of the hypothesis of the developmental instability theory of handedness', *Laterality*, vol. 5, 2000, pp. 111-120.

¹¹ KA Provins, 'Handedness and speech: A critical reappraisal of the role of genetic and environmental factors in the cerebral laterization of function', *Psychological review*, vol. 104, 1997, pp. 554-571.

left-handers would be much closer to being equal. This, however, is not the case, and there exists evidence to show that the proportion of left-handers to right-handers has not changed significantly throughout the years.¹² This gives rise to three possible theories for a basis to selection: either a) being right-handed has advantages, b) being left-handed has disadvantages, or c) some combination of the two.

Throughout history, left-handedness has often been associated with evil. In some Christian and Catholic societies in the past, being left-handed was thought to be associated with the devil and left-handed people were thought to be 'marked by the devil'.¹³ The result of this was that left-handed people were either ostracised by society or were executed, which would have resulted in a very strong selection-pressure against left-handedness. Despite the absence of these extreme pressures for approximately 30 generations, there does not appear to have been a significant change in the proportion of left-handers to right-handers.

The abovementioned suggests that other selective pressures are at work, and that being left-handed has some sort of physical or mental disadvantage. A study conducted by Coren in 1992 provided evidence that left-handers were more likely to be alcoholic, suicidal and epileptic.¹⁴ These mental disadvantages would have reduced the fitness of left-handed individuals and resulted in a strong selection-pressure against left-handed individuals. As a result, throughout history it has probably been beneficial to be right-handed. According to natural selection, the presence of selection pressures against being left-handed should have resulted in the 'left-hand' allele being removed from the population. This obviously has not occurred suggesting that there are advantages associated with being left handed which are sufficient enough to counter the disadvantages. Because left-handers are in the


¹² Annett, p. 40.

¹³ D Wolman, 'Credible or clumsy?', 2005, <http://www.david-wolman.com/index.php?pr=Tour_Journal>.

¹⁴ N Bradley, 'British survey of the Left', *The Graphologist*, vol. 10, no. 4, iss. 37, winter 1992, pp. 176-182.

minority, it has been suggested that these advantages arise from negative-frequency-dependant selection.

A number of studies have found that a majority of successful athletes in sports involving one-on-one confrontations (such as fencing and boxing) are left-handed. Because these 'confrontation' sports are similar in many ways to fights, it was proposed that left-handers have an advantage in fights due to their minority.¹⁵ Consider a society which is predominantly right-handed, and in which one-on-one fights play an integral part in the fitness of a specific person (ie. the more successful one is at fighting, the more likely one is to survive and reproduce and the more attractive they may be to potential mates). Since everyone is accustomed to fighting right-handers, this results in a distinct advantage for left-handed fighters because, as in the example of the scale eating Cichlid fish, a person used to fighting a right-hander would arrange their defences accordingly and as a result be unprepared when fighting a left-hander.



Graph from Faurie, C. & Raymond, M. 2005. Handedness, homicide and negative frequency-dependent selection.

¹⁵ Onion, *passim*.

This hypothesis was tested in 2005 by Charlotte Faurie and Michel Raymond. They studied societies where homicide rates were abnormally high and compared it to the proportion of left-handers and compared the percentage of left-handers in 'pacifist' and 'aggressive' groups. The study found that the proportion of left-handers ranged from 3% in the 'pacifist' societies to 24% in the more violent societies. It was proposed that the high homicide rates would result in more confrontations in which the advantage of being left-handed would be accented. There results showed that there was a significantly high correlation between societies where there was a high homicide rate and the proportion of left-hand preference to right-hand preference.¹⁶ This study provided strong evidence supporting the theory that left-handers have an advantage in fights due to their minority group status. However, the study did not prove that because someone was more likely to win a confrontation, they would be more reproductively successful. Likewise, this link is more difficult to prove due to the changing norms of society: fights are no longer directly related to reproductive success. However, this study does raise the question of why there are not significantly higher proportions of left-handers in violent societies with very high homicide rates, such as the modern United States. Part of the answer may lie in the limited time there has been for natural selection to work and in the nature of the confrontation: the confrontations in the study were all face-to-face confrontations while the confrontations in other societies involve guns and other long range weapons which are not affected by hand preference.

Another theory was that because left-handers live in a predominantly right-handed society, they are forced to conform to the norm and use their right hand.¹⁷ The result of this is that the person in question becomes skilled in using both their left and right hands. This ambidexterity would provide a distinct advantage over individuals who were only skilled in the use of one hand. This would have been significant in earlier centuries, such as during the period of the Roman

¹⁶ C Faurie & M Raymond, 'Handedness, homicide and negative frequency-dependent selection', *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences*, vol. 272, 2005, pp. 25-28.

¹⁷ CJ Brackenridge, 'Secular cariation in handedness over ninety years', *Neuropsychologia*, vol. 19, 1981, pp. 459-462.

Empire. In the Roman army soldiers were forced to use their right arm, their left arm being strapped to their side if they favoured it.¹⁸ Another instance of this was during recent times (1800s to early 1900s) where children were forced to learn to write with their right hand if they were left-handed. However, it is difficult to test this theory as there are no longer any significant instances where left-handed individuals are forced to use their right hand.

The previous two advantages of being left-handed have been significantly reduced in the modern era. New technology has changed the way individuals fight through the introduction of long-range weapons which are operated equally well by left- and right-handed individuals. The Modern day society is also more 'civil' and fights are no longer of great importance to the fitness of an individual. Despite society being predominantly designed for right-handers, modifications have been made allowing left-handers to function comfortably within society. Being left-handed is also no longer considered socially 'improper' or censurable.

Whilst the advantages of being left-handed have been made somewhat redundant in this current age, they were influential in the past and may have resulted in the current proportion of left-handers to right-handers. As mentioned before, evidence exists to support the claim that this proportion has not changed significantly for some time. This lack of change in proportion is at odds with what normally happens with negative-frequency-dependent selection. As explained in the Cichlid fish example, normally when a genotype has an advantage because it is rare, it increases in frequency until it is the more common genotype. The advantage is then transferred to the second genotype which is now the rarer of the two. This has obviously not happened with left-handedness.

Many of these disadvantages have been lessened in modern times. New medication and technology allows mental conditions to be treated more successfully and left-handers are no longer persecuted to the extent of social segregation or execution. To balance this though, the advantages

¹⁸ V Fritsch, *Left and right in science and life*, Barrie Books Ltd, London, 1968, p. 134.

have been lessened. As mentioned before, fights no longer play an integral role in society and the advantages of being ambidextrous may have been lessened. This change in the advantages and disadvantages may result in a change in the selection pressures. If the advantages have lessened, it may result in a new equilibrium frequency forming or a dampened oscillation. If the disadvantages have been removed entirely then the only disadvantages remaining would be those associated with the frequency of the allele and the normal negative-frequency-dependant selection oscillation may be observed in future generations.

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THE RATE OF TYROSINASE REACTION AND ITS ACTIVITY IN POTATO AND BANANA

*Karen J. Zhang**

Tyrosinase is the enzyme that catalyses the biosynthesis of melanin, a pigment involved in the browning of fruits and vegetables. The study of tyrosinase has both economic significance in the food industry, and research interest due to its possible role in the plant defence system. In the present study, the reaction rate and enzymatic activity of tyrosinase were investigated with fresh banana and potato extracts. The enzyme was assayed by adding dihydroxyphenylalanine as the substrate into solutions containing different quantities of diluted extracts.

Enzyme activity was quantified by the amount of the coloured intermediate dopachrome, the concentration of which was determined by using a spectrophotometer. The results from both group and class data revealed that the rate of tyrosinase reaction was dependent on the reaction time and the concentration of the enzyme. In addition, the enzyme activity was shown to be higher in banana (1.10 $\mu\text{mol/min/g}$ in group data, 2.41 $\mu\text{mol/min/g}$ in class data) than that in potato (0.41 $\mu\text{mol/min/g}$), which was consistent with previous studies.

Introduction

The browning of fruits and vegetables has been of interest to research for years¹, partially due to its possible role in the plants' defence mechanisms², as well as the economic concerns of the food industry

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¹ A Mayer & E Harel, 'Polyphenol oxidases in plants', *Phytochemistry*, vol. 18, 1979, pp. 193-215.

² M Friedman, 'Chemistry, biochemistry, and dietary role of potato polyphenols', *Journal of Agriculture and Food Chemistry*, vol. 45, 1997, pp. 1523-1540.

resulting from the discolouration and loss of nutritional content³. The process of browning involves the enzyme-catalysed synthesis of a dark pigment named melanin⁴. The enzyme that plays a crucial role in the formation of melanin is tyrosinase, or polyphenol oxidase, a copper-containing enzyme that catalyses the hydroxylation and oxidation of monophenols to quinones⁵. During melanin formation, tyrosinase catalyses the first two reactions: the conversion of tyrosine to dihydroxyphenylalanine (dopa), and the oxidation of dopa to *o*-dopaquinone^{6,7,8} (Figure 1).




Figure 1. The melanin synthesis pathway originally proposed by Raper⁹, modified by Cánovas *et al.*¹⁰. Intermediates are *o*-dopaquinone- H^+ , *o*-dopaquinone, leukodopachrome and dopachrome.

³ A Rescigno, F Sollai, B Pisu, A Rinaldi & E Sanjust, 'Tyrosinase inhibition: general and applied aspects', *Journal of Enzyme Inhibition and Medicinal Chemistry*, vol. 17, no. 4, 2002, pp. 207-218.

⁴ TC Tan & Y Chen, 'Enzymic oxidation of dopamine by polyphenol oxidase', *International Journal of Chemical Kinetics*, vol. 24, 1992, pp. 1023-1034.

⁵ LM Mirica, M Vance, DJ Rudd, B Hedman, KO Hodgeson, EI Solomon & TDP Stack, 'Tyrosinase reactivity in a model complex: An alternative hydroxylation mechanism', *Science*, vol. 308, 2005, pp. 1890-1892.

⁶ HS Raper, 'The aerobic oxidase', *Physiological Reviews*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1928, pp. 245-282.

⁷ HS Mason, 'The chemistry of melanin: III. Mechanism of the oxidation of dihydroxyphenylalanine by tyrosinase', *The Journal of Biological Chemistry*, vol. 172, no. 1, 1948, pp. 83-99.

⁸ FG Cánovas, F García-Carmona, JV Sánchez, JLI Pastor & JAL Teruel, 'The role of pH in the melanin biosynthesis pathway', *The Journal of Biological Chemistry*, vol. 257, no. 15, 1982, pp. 8738-8744.

⁹ Raper, pp. 245-282.

¹⁰ Cánovas, pp. 83-99.

The more molecules of enzyme that are present in a reaction, the more substrate binding sites will be available and hence the faster the reaction can proceed. However, enzyme activity may vary in different organisms or tissues, which can be exemplified by the fact that bananas, for example, generally have a relatively high tyrosinase activity¹¹. Enzyme activity can also be influenced by several chemical factors. Most enzymes need a specific pH environment to maintain the shape of their binding sites; this is especially the case for the melanin biosynthesis pathway¹². Changes in temperature may also have a great impact on enzyme activities¹³. In fact, an important reason for storing potatoes at a low temperature is to reduce the tyrosinase activity¹⁴.

Several previous attempts have been made to investigate factors affecting tyrosinase activity.^{15,16,17} In the present study, the spectrophotometric method was adopted to follow the enzyme activity. Dopachrome, one of the intermediates in the melanin biosynthesis pathway, is red in colour and its concentration can be determined by measuring its absorbance at the wavelength of maximum absorption of 475 nm¹⁸. This can be used as a measure of tyrosinase activity. The aim of this experiment was to determine the rate of tyrosinase reaction, and to determine and compare the tyrosinase activity in banana and potato. Also, two factors – time and enzyme concentration – were expected to

¹¹ MEM Almeida & JN Nogueira, 'The control of polyphenol oxidase activity in fruits and vegetables: A study of the interactions between the chemical compounds used and heat treatment', *Plant Foods for Human Nutrition*, vol. 47, 1995, pp. 254-256.

¹² Cánovas, pp. 83-99.

¹³ G Rapeanu, AV Loey, C Smout & M Hendrickx, 'Thermal and high-pressure inactivation kinetics of polyphenol oxidase in Victoria grape must', *Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry*, vol. 53, 2005, pp. 2988-2994.

¹⁴ Friedman, pp. 1523-1540.

¹⁵ L MacDonald & C Schaschke, 'Combined effect of high pressure, temperature and holding time on polyphenoloxidase and peroxidase activity in banana (*Musa acuminata*)', *Journal of Agriculture and Food Chemistry*, vol. 80, no. 6, 2000, pp. 719-724.

¹⁶ E Matuschek & U Svanberg, 'The effect of fruit extracts with polyphenol oxidase (PPO) activity on the in vitro accessibility of iron in high-tannin sorghum', *Food Chemistry*, vol. 90, 2005, pp. 765-771.

¹⁷ M Doğan, O Arslan & S Doğan, 'Substrate specificity, heat inactivation and inhibition of polyphenol oxidase from different aubergine cultivars', *International Journal of Food Science and Technology*, vol. 37, 2002, pp. 415-423.

¹⁸ Mason, pp. 83-99.

influence the tyrosinase activity. It was hypothesised that the rate of tyrosine reaction would increase with time and the increase in enzyme concentration. It was also hypothesised that tyrosinase activity would differ for banana and potato.

Experimental

Enzyme Extract Preparation

To obtain the banana extract, 2.0 g of fresh banana was firstly crushed with a glass rod. 2.0 ml of 0.1 M phosphate buffer (pH = 7.2) was added before further crushing until a pasty texture was obtained. The mixture was centrifuged at $2164 \times g$ for 5 min. To 1.0 ml of the supernatant fluid was diluted with 3.0 ml of 0.1 M phosphate buffer (pH = 7.2). The diluted banana extract was stored in ice for a short time before the tyrosinase assay. The potato extract was prepared in the same way. All other procedures were done at room temperature.

Tyrosinase Assay

Tyrosinase activity was determined by the method of Lerch and Ettlinger¹⁹. The enzyme solution was prepared by mixing 0.10 ml – 0.40 ml of diluted banana or potato extract with various amounts of 0.1 M phosphate buffer (pH = 6.0) to make a final volume of 1.5 ml (see Table 1 for details). A blank control with 1.5 ml buffer only was also prepared. The reaction was started by adding 0.5 ml of L-DOPA (0.02 M) immediately before the initial reading was taken at 475 nm in a Shimadzu UV-mini 1240 spectrophotometer. The assay was allowed to proceed for 5 min at room temperature with readings taken every min. The extinction coefficient for dopachrome is $3.6 \text{ L mmol}^{-1} \text{ cm}^{-1}$ ²⁰.

¹⁹ K Lerch & L Ettlinger, 'Purification and characterisation of a tyrosinase from *Streptomyces glaucescens*', *European Journal of Biochemistry*, vol. 31, 1972, pp. 427-437.

²⁰ Mason, pp. 83-99.

Table 1. Test tube preparations for the assay of tyrosinase.

<i>Tube</i>	<i>Diluted banana extract (ml)</i>	<i>0.1 M phosphate buffer pH (ml)</i>
1	0.10	1.4
2	0.15	1.35
3	0.20	1.3
4	0.30	1.2
5	0.40	1.1
6	0	1.5

Measurement of Rate of Tyrosinase Reaction

The rate of tyrosinase reaction was determined as the rate of change in dopachrome absorbance at 475 nm. This was measured as the slope of the least square regression line in the plot of absorbance versus time. The values of slope were presented as the x coefficient in the least square regression line equation.

Measurement of Tyrosinase Activity

One unit of the enzyme activity was standardised as the amount of extract used to catalyse the oxidation of 1 μmol of L-DOPA per min^{21} . In the present experiment, the enzyme activity was determined as the slope of the linear relationship of the rate of reaction ($\mu\text{mol}/\text{min}$) and the amount of enzyme in the extract (g), such that the value was given as the x coefficient of the linear equation. To obtain the rate of reaction in $\mu\text{mol}/\text{min}$, the absorbance was first converted to the concentration of dopachrome according to the Beer-Lambert Law. The amount of L-DOPA oxidised was calculated from the volume of each reaction and the concentration of dopachrome. With respect to the amount of enzyme used in the oxidation process, it was assumed that extraction was complete and all of the tyrosinase was removed from the sample into the supernatant. Therefore the extract had a concentration of 1 g/ml with a dilution factor of 4, from which the amount of enzyme used could be estimated from the various volumes added.

²¹ Lerch, pp. 427-437.

Results

Rate of Tyrosinase Reaction

Group data of tyrosinase reaction of banana and potato are shown in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. The plot of absorbance versus time shows that the amount of dopachrome produced increased with time. During the first two or three minutes, the rate of reaction increased at a steady rate, roughly in a linear relationship. However, for banana and potato, the longer the reaction proceeded, the more likely that the linear relationship was to shift to a plateau; that is, the rate of reaction gradually decreased. The plateau was more obvious for the reactions at higher concentrations of tyrosinase.

Similar trends were observed in the plot of class data (Figure 4), except that the rate of reaction in the mean class results was higher than that of the group data. In particular, the reaction with 0.4mL banana extract proceeded so quickly that a plateau was achieved after 2 minutes.




Figure 2. Plot of absorbance at 475nm of banana extract of different concentrations over a period of five minutes. (Group Data)




Figure 3. Plot of absorbance at 475nm of potato extract of different concentration over a period of five minutes. (Group Data)




Figure 4. Plot of absorbance at 475nm of banana extract of different concentration over a period of five minutes. (Class Data by Man Xu and Jin Jin)




Figure 5. Effect of extract concentration on the rate of tyrosinase reaction for banana and potato.

Activity of Tyrosinase

A plot of the rate of tyrosinase versus concentrations of banana and potato extract is shown in Figure 5. The activity of tyrosinase of each set of data is indicated by the slope, that is, the coefficient of x in the equation of the least square regression line. Each set of data shows a strong linear relationship. The tyrosinase activity was different among samples. Within the same experimental group, tyrosinase in potato was less active ($0.41 \mu\text{mol/min/g}$) than in banana ($1.10 \mu\text{mol/min/g}$). However, the tyrosinase in class banana was more active ($2.41 \mu\text{mol/min/g}$) than that in the group banana.

Discussion

The rate of tyrosinase reaction was determined and the hypotheses were supported in this experiment. Three factors that affected rate of reactions are discussed below. Firstly, over the same period, all samples, although containing various amounts of tyrosinase, showed a linear increase in the rate of reaction during the first few minutes and then slowed down. Considering that every sample had the same amount of substrates, the declining rate of reaction is likely to be due to the

gradual consumption of substrate over time. Thus, the longer the reaction proceeded, the less substrate would be available for further reaction, leading to a decline in the reaction rate. Secondly, the rate of reaction was positively associated with the enzyme concentration when the amount of substrate was controlled. This can be attributed to the fact that the higher the enzyme concentration, the more substrate binding sites would be available; hence more reactions would take place at a given time. Thirdly, the degree to which the rate of tyrosinase reaction decreased during later periods differed among samples with different enzyme concentrations. This can be explained by the greater rate of conversion of substrate at higher enzyme concentrations, resulting in more rapid depletion of substrate.

When comparing tyrosinase activity between banana and potato within the same experimental group, the hypothesis was supported and results were consistent with previous studies, in which tyrosinase in banana showed a much higher activity than many other plants²². It has been suggested such a difference in enzyme activity could be an adaptation to different pathogen susceptibilities of plants of different species in their specific environments²³. Hence, the difference might also be due to the choice of the specific potato sample, since even within the same potato, enzymes are unevenly distributed, with 50% of tyrosinase located in the peel and adjacent tissues²⁴. On the other hand, distinct differences in tyrosinase activity in banana were observed when comparing class and group data, which could possibly be ascribed to the fact that enzyme activity may vary during different stages of development to protect the banana from infection by increasing pathogens as the fruit ripens.²⁵ In addition, tyrosinase in banana will be more active at higher temperatures.²⁶ Hence the relative difference between class and group banana may also be due to different treatments in the ice-storage step during the experiment.

²² Matuschek, pp. 765-771.

²³ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Enzymatic Browning in Fruits, Vegetables and Seafoods*, 2000, viewed 27 August 2006, <<http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/agsi/ENZYMFINAL/Enzymatic%20Browning.html>>.

²⁴ Friedman, pp. 1523-1540.

²⁵ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

²⁶ Friedman, pp. 1523-1540.

The major limitation in this experiment was the number of repetitions. Each sample was treated under similar conditions only once, thus no further statistics were obtained, leaving no indication of how each sample represented its population. Moreover, limited factors were used to investigate factors influencing the rate of tyrosinase reaction. Further investigation of factors such as pH, pressure, temperature, or the combinations would be desirable. Therefore, future experiments should be devoted to the investigation of these factors, since the prevention of browning is of great significance, especially in the food industry. Many aspects of melanin formation are still not fully understood, including its clear role in the plants' pathological defence mechanisms and the complete reaction sequence of melanin biosynthesis.

In conclusion, the rate of tyrosinase reaction was determined in this experiment, in which time and enzyme concentration were found to be positively correlated. The activity of tyrosinase was calculated and analysed and differences were observed among different species as well as among different cultivars of the same species.

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