Tempered cascades of crime

Key propositions

Crime cascades to more crime through the following common dynamics:

• Modelling (often conceived as emulation, diffusion).
• Commercial interests cascade particular forms of crime (for example, cocaine franchising) and particular kinds of soft targets for crime (for example, Facebook, Tinder users).
• The crimes of parents cascade to crime by their children; the crimes of children cascade to crime by their friends; differential association cascades.
• Hopelessness, loss of identity and closure of opportunities tend to cascade, particularly at hotspots of concentrated disadvantage in conditions of extreme inequality and policy failure in providing decent housing for all.
• War and pro-violence politics cascade to domination, anomie, hopelessness, closed opportunities and more crime; crime cascades to more war; war cascades recursively to more crime.
• War, crime and anomie are often entangled in mutually reinforcing cascades.
• War cascades to criminalisation of states and criminalisation of markets by armed groups or in pursuit of corruption by shadow states that support armed groups.
Crime prevention cascades when:

- Respected actors have the self-efficacy to transform cultures by modelling anti-crime norms; self-efficacy scales to collective efficacy through explicitly connecting evidence-based microcriminology to a macrocriminology of cultural transformation.
- Norms of civility and nondominating collective efficacy at one locale spread like ink spots that connect up, ink spot to ink spot, covering whole societies with norms of civility.
- Parents and schools mobilise collective efficacy to reject stigmatisation yet communicate to their children why violence and stealing are shameful.
- This enables redemption scripts for offenders to help themselves, and to grasp self-efficacy as wounded healers who cascade help to other offenders.
- An inclusive politics of hope, identity formation and opening of legitimate opportunities cascades to embrace formerly disadvantaged communities (collective efficacy becomes part of CHIME and helps constitute CHIME).
- Civil society obligations to pass on CHIME become an integral part of recovery and a structural way of cascading recovery.
- Institutionally embedded primary groups—families, schools, workgroups—that cascade nondominating collective efficacy alongside other forms of social capital can deliver prevention in the criminology of place; conversely, this prevention can depend on hotspot policing and peacekeeping that make streets safe for collective efficacy, and the planet safe for collective efficacy as ink spots of nondomination spread globally.

**Cascading crime and crime prevention**

Major institutional renovation to reduce domination is required to accomplish a world with less crime of the powerless and of the powerful. The final chapter draws on the thinking of Chantal Mouffe on the challenges of transforming cascades of hegemony around the globe that are sometimes neoliberal and sometimes authoritarian, and that make transformation a politically fraught project. This chapter lays theoretical
foundations that might open our eyes to seeing how both domination and nondomination can cascade, how hegemonic projects and counterhegemonic projects can cascade, through social movement politics.

It argues, for example, that feminist politics has helped to reduce gendered violence. This chapter contends that the anomie discussed in Chapter 3 is a cascade phenomenon, and so is normative order, whether the orders are hegemonic or counterhegemonic orders that cascade at critical junctures. Domination, and the hegemony that justifies it, can never be utterly conquered, but it can be tempered. This chapter lays a foundation for that wider political hope by plugging away at the more modest claims that crime is a cascade phenomenon and so is crime prevention. Crime prevention does not cascade as much as it could, however, with a more visionary institutionalisation of crime prevention.

Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) deployed mainly South Asian data to conclude that war tends to cascade across space and time to further war, crime to further crime, war to crime and crime to war. Braithwaite (2020a) built from that an analytical sketch of crime as a cascade phenomenon. This chapter draws heavily on both works. Examining crime through a cascade lens helps us to imagine how to more effectively cascade crime prevention. Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) show how peacemaking can cascade nonviolence, how it cascades nonviolent social movement politics, and vice versa. Seeing crime through the cascade lens opens up fertile ways of imagining macrocriminology. Self-efficacy and collective efficacy are hypothesised as catalysts of crime-prevention cascades in this macrocriminology. Australian successes with gun control and drink-driving point to the importance of explicitly connecting evidence-based microcriminology to a macrocriminology of cultural transformation. More structurally, building collective efficacy in families, schools and primary workgroups may cascade collective efficacy into neighbourhoods and vice versa. The microcriminology of hotspot policing might be elaborated into a macrocriminology of ink spots of collective efficacy that cascade and connect all forms of social and human capital.

1 In their update of the evidence on the effectiveness of peacekeeping, Walter et al. (2020) also reached this conclusion. In terms of cascading across space, Walter et al. (2020: 5–6) add value by explaining well how studies like that of Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) use geo-referenced conflict polygons to show that peacekeeping missions that deploy at least 1,000 peacekeepers can prevent violence from spreading from one locale to another within a country, as opposed to from hotspot to hotspot across the borders of countries, as other studies demonstrate through event history analyses. This becomes more strongly the case as the number of peacekeepers deployed increases.
Braithwaite and D’Costa’s data unfortunately also reveal that while violence tends to cascade fast, nonviolence cascades slowly. A politics of patience is needed for projects of peacebuilding and crime prevention because they require so many kinds of institutional architectures to be rebuilt.

**Criminology’s neglect of cascade explanations**

The assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963 was followed by a steep, sudden increase in violent crime (Berkowitz and Macaulay 1971). At the time, this seemed out of the ordinary. Yet, we might look back at the history of American violence since as a cumulative sequence of cascade shocks in which this assassination, that of Martin Luther King Jr, which sparked fires across America, and other acts of racial violence, *From Reverend King to Rodney King* (Gale 1996), counted among many important moments that were mostly more local triggers of cascades. The state violence deployed against civil rights and anti–Vietnam War activism formed perhaps other 1960s cascades in the early years of the US crime rise that stretched from the 1960s to 1992 (Chapter 3). It included unprecedented forms of violence such as the National Guard firing on protesting white college students, murdering them in cold blood. The 2020 cascade of violence after the police murder of George Floyd was different from the incidents in Watts or Detroit in the 1960s in a way that is theoretically central to the analysis of this chapter. A politics of violence on the streets was progressively overwhelmed by a politics of nonviolence as the days of protests turned into weeks across America (and globally). The cascade of nonviolent resistance to police violence was slower moving than the early days of escalating violence on the streets, but clearly became the more majoritarian and inclusive ethos of the politics triggered by the initial violence against George Floyd. The 2020 nonviolent movement may not have produced a leader as revered as Martin Luther King, but it produced a more diffused movement that had political consequences—locally in Minneapolis, nationally for the Trump administration and even globally for the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement. As weeks of protests turned into months, right-wing extremists raised the temperature of violence. They were encouraged in this by President Trump. He decided to take a page out of Richard Nixon’s successful law and order election campaign of 1968, using the violence to stoke a politics of white fear.
So many of the attempted arrests that ignited racial conflict during 2020 should never have been arrests, according to the analysis of Chapter 9. Criminologists must own some responsibility for contemporary excess in the use of arrest because of the overly charitable hearing we gave to broken-windows policing arguments that actually conduced to racist policing. The trajectory of the Arab Spring from 2011 has much in common with the Black Lives Matter trajectory of 2020, even though Black Lives Matter will not cascade to half a dozen civil wars that kill hundreds of thousands of people, as in Libya, Syria and across northern, then central, Africa and the Middle East. What is common between both is that the Arab Spring started with the arrest of an impoverished street vendor in Tunisia who should never have been arrested. His suicide by self-immolation sparked the cascade of nonviolent protest that was the Arab Spring. The nonviolence of the streets was corrupted, and then captured, by a politics of violence, promoted by arms funding by foreign provocateurs. This cascaded to civil wars that brought to power regimes that were even more authoritarian than those that existed before the uprising.

This section contemplates and challenges the limited interest of criminology in cascade explanations compared with other sciences. Then the chapter specifically puzzles over the limited interest in hotspot policing as a cascade phenomenon after it was found mostly not to displace crime to nearby communities. Brief consideration is then given to the analytic advantages of reframing gun violence as a cascade phenomenon, then drink-driving, drug dealing, burglary, intergenerational transmission of criminality, life-courses of crime, looting, rioting, corporate crime and war crimes.

This opens our eyes to crime-prevention cascades. Can we catalyse a criminological imagination for purposively nurturing cascades of crime prevention? Special note is taken of the US National Rifle Association’s mobilisation of cascades of information and political interests to promote gun culture. Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) analysed Islamic State’s exploitation of the stigmatisation and humiliation of Muslims with information cascades to promote murder. These activist imaginaries are interpreted as models for how crime prevention and nonviolence might also be cascaded. Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) is then diagnosed as a model because of the way its twelfth step involves volunteering to help others recover. AA was influenced by Christian ministry and volunteering for missions of macro-cultural transformation. Christianity was itself a globally massive cascade phenomenon after all. Its cascades—violent
and nonviolent—were often called ‘crusades’. From a crime-prevention perspective, however, the genius of the AA cascade is that it connects self-efficacy to collective efficacy.

What are cascades?

Cascades are defined as phenomena that spread to multiply instances of themselves or to spread related phenomena. These related phenomena that cascade might be objects like guns that spread simply as objects in markets rather than as social or biological contagions. The guns may cause an epidemic or a cascade of violence but not a contagion in the sense of something that spreads person to person (Fagan et al. 2007). All contagions are cascades and they are the most important kind of cascade. This book interprets cascades as the more general diffusion phenomenon. Cascade explanations are staples across the physical and biological sciences: the cascading of particles in particle physics; the cascading of particles called bacteria and viruses with infectious contagions; environmental cascades to climate change; and the cascading of liquids (lava, water) in the geological formation of planets (Kun et al. 2014). In the social sciences, cascade explanations have also been common. Examples are Rosenau (1990) in international relations, Sunstein’s (1997) norm cascades, Kuran’s (1998) repetitional cascades, Hale’s (2013) regime change cascades, Sikkink’s (2011) cascades of criminal enforcement for crimes against humanity and Gladwell’s (2000: 7) cascades past ‘the tipping point’ that spread ‘like viruses do’. Contagion in biology and cascades in the social sciences have a shared core of meaning: the existence of a phenomenon induces the diffusion of more phenomena of that type (or mutations of it). In both cases, an analytical shift is demanded from exogenous to endogenous explanation as a priority—to the reversal of cascades and the triggering of counter-cascades.

With crime, we have long known that people are more likely to cheat on their taxes if they perceive a lot of cheating among others (Sheffrin and Triest 1992; Frey and Torgler 2007) and if tax haven and tax shelter opportunities are cascading (Braithwaite 2005). It has long been known that contagion effects are particularly likely with crimes that have a high profile in the media such as hijacking, assassination, kidnapping and serial killing (Bandura 1973; Berkowitz 1973; Landes 1978). Hijacking took off in the 1970s, then virtually ceased in the two decades before 2001,
whence it cascaded to a more diverse multiplicity of terrorist scripts. Generations of developmental psychologists have been interested in how phenomena like aggressive disruptive events in classrooms can cascade to one life-course setback after another that spiral to leave young people in desperate situations (for example, Masten et al. 2005). Crane (1991) scales up this kind of microprocess to a macro-contagion model of ghetto formation, showing how cascading social problems pass ecological tipping points. Peer influence is Crane’s critical mediating mechanism for these cascading problems, which is also central in differential association theory in criminology alongside cultural cascades of normative meaning. These are also posited as key cascade mechanisms in the theory of collective efficacy in the analysis of this chapter.

Cascade mathematics

Non-criminologists have been more fascinated than criminologists by cascades. Mathematician Adolphe Quetelet (1842) was puzzled by the high statistical variance in crime across space and time. Economists Glaeser et al. (1996) puzzled further over why this variance is so huge compared with variables that are seen as candidates for explaining variation. This leads to the hypothesis that cascading on itself might provide a better explanation than exogenous change. This is illustrated by Miranda Forsyth’s (2018b) contemporary fieldwork on sorcery contagions in Papua New Guinea. A district that has never experienced sorcery-related violence suffers one accusation against one sorcerer and, in a short time, violence is being directed by many against many who are accused of sorcery. The history of sorcery-related violence in the United States and the United Kingdom has similarities, with most places and times having none and then sudden convulsions into cascades of violence that can be pondered in great art such as Arthur Miller’s *The Crucible*. Chapter 2 discussed the case of the Gebusi, among whom all violence, most of it sorcery-related, decreased many times more than a hundredfold for the period 1989–2017 compared with 1940–75 (Knauft and Malbrancke 2017).

When we inspect homicide rates for different years and different countries, Quetelet’s (1842) pattern is still evident. There are annual rates recorded of more than 100 homicides per 100,000 population. Chapter 2 explained that El Salvador reached 142 per 100,000 in 1995 and the Gebusi many times higher than that. Then we find more than 50 countries that have had
rates of much less than 1 in recent decades. Domestically, we find census tracts with crime rates much more than 100 times the rates for the lowest tracts within a country. Some western societies also seem to have had hundredfold differences between peak and trough homicide rates across the past millennium; England recorded a rate of 100 in the mid-1300s and below 1 for much of the past century, for example (Eisner 2014: 80). Finally, I have concluded that the most dominating organisations, be they Big Pharma or Big Brother police, can kill a thousand times as many citizens as nondominating organisations. At the intersections of these hundred and thousandfold differences, macrocriminology seeks to learn from criminalisation of the worst spaces at the worst times, where 100 times 100 differences may sometimes exist. Why is it inside Democratic Republic of Congo at the beginning of this century that we find villages where a lot of the men and boys and most of the women and girls have been raped, often many times, and mostly gang raped? Why were there many towns and villages in Libya in 1911 where almost all the civilians were slaughtered, and why in Carthage 2,000 years earlier where every house was burnt to the ground and every man, woman and child murdered apart from the 50,000 sold into slavery by Roman legions?

Glaeser et al. (1996) argued that differences in crime rates are huge compared with differences in the variables most commonly used for explaining variation. This is true if we think for western societies about the comparatively modest percentage differences in demographic profiles, in average incomes or in the percentages of people unemployed between high and low areas, and indeed in more sociological variables like collective efficacy. As economists, Glaeser et al. reason that the variance in crime rates is too high to be explained by exogenous changes in rational incentives, by variation in the costs and benefits of crime. They find variance to be too high to be rationalised ‘as the outcome of independent decisions to engage in crime’ (Glaeser et al. 1996: 542). Criminologists can reasonably dismiss this concern as a consequence of economists being too narrowly focused on the rational calculation of absolute numbers. Yet perhaps criminologists should not be as dismissive when economists turn to the kind of absolute numbers that could explain huge variances. Glaeser et al. point out that interactions among people could cascade to explain the variance. If one crack-cocaine dealer interacts with five others to persuade them that becoming a dealer is smart, and each of them so persuades five others, and so on, simulations show this dynamic can multiply huge space-time variance between a point in space-time where
that process takes off and places and times where there has been no trigger of the cascade. On the downside of exit from the crack epidemic, Kennedy (2020) interprets the evidence of the spread of negative attitudes towards crack as a cascade of the shamefulness of crack use.

**Cascade criminologies**

Loftin (1986) is one criminologist who argued that in cities like Detroit in the 1960s fear from rising crime cascaded gun ownership, which in turn fed into the cascading of rapidly rising homicide rates (note also the cascades of fear, disorder and decay in Skogan 1990). Public health scholars used to connect rising crime in New York’s disadvantaged communities to an accelerating contagion of social disintegration up to 1992 (Wallace and Wallace 1990). Criminologists had tended not to theorise the reverse crime drop in New York after 1990 as a reversal downwards of that cascade when the city’s opportunity structures recovered, readjusted and took off again, recovering from the shocks of the era of deindustrialisation.

Then Fagan et al. (2007) articulated a cascade explanation of the great New York crime rise and fall that is consistent with what is known about these dynamics in a good number of other US cities. In many cities, the trends were not as steep as for New York. Their argument follows in the footsteps of William Julius Wilson’s (2012) *The Truly Disadvantaged*. Fagan et al. showed that there was nothing general about it. It was overwhelmingly about young African-American males in neighbourhoods devastated by the deindustrialisation that peaked in the 1980s:

As middle- and working class African American families moved away from the inner cities when their jobs left, there remained behind a disproportionate concentration of the most disadvantaged segments of the urban populations: poor female-headed households with children and chronically unemployed males with low job skills. The secondary effects of this exodus created conditions that were conducive to rising teenage violence: the weakness of mediating social institutions (e.g. churches, schools), and the absence of informal social controls. (Fagan et al. 2007: 702)

Deindustrialisation was not confined to New York, but was quite a general phenomenon in the West, as was the crime rise from 1960 (Chapter 3). Neither the particular chronology of this crime rise nor
the deindustrialisation was general beyond the West (not in developing countries that had not industrialised, and still have not, and not in the tiger economies to which the western factories initially fled). Economists now are on board Wilson’s evidentiary bandwagon that the shock of deindustrialisation disintegrated black families, driving up black male unemployment, loss of meaning, insecurity, unwed motherhood, single-parent families and many other social challenges (Autor et al. 2018). Fagan et al. interpreted the rise and fall of violent crime in New York since the 1960s as indicative of a nonlinear pattern in which the phenomenon spreads at a rate far beyond what would be predicted by exposure to some external factor and declines in a similar pattern in which the reduction from year to year exceeds what might be expected by linear regression trends. This leads to the second perspective: the factors leading to its spread are not exogenous factors, as in the case of contamination or disaster. Instead, the nonlinear increase and decline suggest that the phenomenon is endemic to the people and places where its occurrence is highest and that this behavior may be effectively passed from one person to another through some process of contact or interaction. (Fagan et al. 2007: 689)

At the macrolevel, the qualification is in order that the US national crime trends are steep but rather linear, both in the crime rise from 1960 to 1992 and in the drop since (Sampson 2019: Fig. 1). Fagan et al. (2007) covaried neighbourhood social and economic characteristics with temporal homicide trends. This identified gun homicides as the key contagious agent. Gun homicides were what ‘diffused across New York City neighborhoods, and gun homicides … [were what] retreated just as quickly’ (Fagan et al. 2007: 690). Fagan et al. interviewed young males active in gun violence. This showed qualitatively that diffusion arose in a dynamic process of social contagion. They connect the gun homicide cascades quantitatively and qualitatively to three sub-epidemics in retail drug markets: one of heroin that peaked in 1972; a second of powder cocaine, peaking in 1981; and third, crack cocaine, peaking in 1991. Golub and Johnson (1996) confirmed empirically that the crack cocaine epidemic was indeed a cascade phenomenon. It was a word-of-mouth diffusion of innovation that saw existing powder cocaine snorters move to crack in a huge surge between 1984 and 1986. Guns cumulatively became the basic tools of routine business activity in these booming drug markets. This in turn infected everyday disputes with an ‘ecology of danger’ (Fagan and Wilkinson 1998). Fagan et al. (2007) concluded that
guns were at first an exogenous factor in cascading violence but became an endogenous cascade within socially isolated neighbourhoods of the deeply disadvantaged.

Quantitatively, Fagan et al. (2007) discovered that the occurrence of at least one adolescent homicide in a census tract significantly increased the likelihood of adolescent homicide in surrounding neighbourhoods. It was actually only gun homicides (and not non-gun homicides) that were contagious in producing other gun homicides, controlling for neighbourhood characteristics. In the 1990s, the declining economic opportunities of 1960–92 gradually improved in the neighbourhoods that had driven the crime rise; disadvantage became somewhat less ecologically concentrated; and crack became much less appealing to young people, perhaps to the point where small initial reductions in gun homicides then accelerated to a cascading crime drop.

Mohler (2013) showed that contagion effects explained more than half of property and violent crimes in Chicago. Mohler concluded also that half of the increases in terrorist events in a Northern Ireland dataset could be explained by contagion. In Fallujah in Iraq and in Israel, the civilian terror and conflict death contagion effects were much smaller, explaining only 23 and 12 per cent of the violence, respectively (Mohler 2013). Papachristos et al. (2015) revealed gun-crime patterns in Chicago consistent with Fagan et al.’s (2007) New York cascade patterns; they found that 70 per cent of all nonfatal gunshot victims during the observation period could be located in co-offending networks that comprised less than 6 per cent of the population of the city. A 1 per cent increase in exposure to gunshot victims in one’s network increased the risk of becoming a victim oneself by 1.1 per cent, holding all else constant (Papachristos et al. 2015).

Mennis and Harris (2011) revealed spatial cascades, measured as the rate of recidivism for specific types of delinquency. Proximity to a youth offender’s residence increased the likelihood of a cascade to others innovating with that type of offending, with the cascading of neighbourhood delinquency specialisations being especially strong for drug offences. Their results support peer contagion in crime specialisation. Differential association theory always identified such patterns as contagiously causal, but there have always been critiques that challenge this with counter-dynamics of birds of a feather flocking together or shared third variables as explanations.
Information cascades in which people make decisions based on their observations of other people’s actions seem to be particularly attractive for explaining why criminal behaviours like looting or rioting are normally near zero but can multiply quickly once someone starts a stampede (Ellis and Fender 2011). Herding into illegal tax shelters is likewise an information cascade phenomenon (Braithwaite 2005b). As they sought an integrated explanation of crime–war clusters, Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) noted that more common kinds of crime also behave like wars in this regard. They point out that, in many countries, the best explanation of whether one’s house will be burgled in the next six months is whether it was burgled in the previous six months (Pease 1998); and likewise, the best explanation of whether one’s country will suffer a war this year may be whether it suffered a war in the past three years (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018). Likewise, coups predict more coups and genocides more genocides at the intercountry level of analysis.

When criminologists found that most crime could be concentrated at 3 per cent of the addresses in large cities (Sherman et al. 1989) and policing strategies concentrated at those hotspots could substantially reduce crime at them (Weisburd et al. 2011; Braga et al. 2014), the natural reaction of criminologists was cynical. How could simply ‘putting cops on the dots’ be effective? Cynicism steered criminologists to the hypothesis that criminals will respond by shifting their crime from old hotspots to nearby locales or by creating new hotspots. Subsequent research did not bear out this displacement hypothesis (Weisburd et al. 2011; Hinkle et al. 2020). Indeed, it showed that hotspot policing not only reduced crime at the hotspot, but also had positive spillovers in reducing crime to lesser degrees in surrounding areas (Weisburd et al. 2011). Recent research with a strong design in Bogotá, Colombia, shows more modest impacts of hotspot policing strategies (Blattman et al. 2018), and Nagin and Sampson (2019) raise important questions about how to correct for the effects of reduced policing at non-hotspots. But the issue that interests me is why did criminologists not proceed from more evidence for diffusion than for displacement with a sense of excitement at the surprise of having their expectations reversed? Why not explore and develop a converse theory that there may be cascade effects of crime-prevention success? Why not build the model of targeted hotspots into a model of ink spots of civility and reintegrative policing that spread? Criminologists tend not to respond to overturned cynicism with excitement. They do not jump at the opportunity to build dynamic theory on new inductive insights.
They prefer to move on to cynicism about something else that they can test with static methods. The tendency of criminology to discipline young minds with an exogeneity obsession is just an example of a wider pathology of recursiveness as something to be controlled rather than savoured and developed, and dynamic theory development as something to push aside in the rush to test first statements of static new theories. To be fair, medicine also had an exogeneity bias, clinging for centuries to beliefs that contagions were a result of the exposure of human populations to the same exogenous factors in the atmosphere.

**Modelling macro-cultural shifts**

What other cascade clues are evident in emergent patterns of criminality? What facts might be reinterpreted through a cascade lens? Consider the high level of mass shootings in the United States this century, compared with Australia. One way of seeing this, popularised by the American filmmaker Michael Moore, has been that this is a result of the contrasting response of Australia when it had a mass shooting in 1996. Australia toughened its gun laws and funded a national gun buyback in 1996. Australia has not had a mass shooting since 1996 and greatly reduced its rates of gun shootings, so this inference is reasonably warranted within the limits of a comparison of two countries (Chapman et al. 2018). Even if true, it is also true that Australia was galvanised by the shock of the 1996 Port Arthur massacre to cascade a transformational rejection of gun culture across society, whereas in the United States, this has not yet happened. The societal consensus behind the transformation was strong in Australia; it was led by the most conservative prime minister Australia had in half a century. No Member of Parliament voted against the new gun laws. That is, a cultural cascade might be the operative variable more than the gun buyback per se. And this might explain why the meta-analysis effects of gun buybacks alone are weak (Makarios and Pratt 2012).

American political elites have historically extended their hands to the National Rifle Association (NRA) to cascade ambivalence about gun culture. Albert Bandura (2000) draws together the criminological findings on collective efficacy with a variety of experimental studies to sustain the more general conclusion that groups with high perceived collective efficacy achieve higher motivational investment in their undertakings, stronger staying power in the face of setbacks and greater
accomplishments in collective search and pursuit of pathways to change. Bandura (2000: 75) conceives of collective efficacy as ‘shared beliefs in the power to produce effects through collective action’. Bandura’s insights about collective efficacy are relevant to the counter-hegemonic cascades against domination in the reflections on Chantal Mouffe in the next chapter. Across recent US history, the NRA has been effective in cascading a counternarrative of collective efficacy, partly through an information cascade on social media that insists society needs more guns to protect itself. Indeed, after mass shootings, gun sales often spike (Wallace 2015).

Is there also a cascade in the imaginaries of mass shooters—an emulation effect as one disturbed person takes the lead from other disturbed persons? Is this a diffusion of the idea that a way to resolve anger at their school or workplace is to start shooting? Towers et al. (2015) showed a substantial contagion effect in the United States, with each mass shooting estimated to incite 0.3 extra future incidents. We know high-profile celebrity suicides cascade to increased suicides by ordinary people (Stack 2005) and that media coverage of suicide generally contributes to cascades of suicide (Gould 1990). In China, suicides also temporally cluster in ways statistically associated with the prominence of media reporting of previous suicides in the cluster (Cheng et al. 2011). The fact that media reporting is a mediating mechanism increases the plausibility of the interpretation that a social cognitive cascade is in play rather than an exogenous factor simultaneously stressing contiguous actors. One reason indiscriminate shooting at a purported source of grievance has not gripped the imaginaries of disturbed young Australian men is that a cascade of this imaginary never gained momentum because of the macro-cultural character of the response to the 1996 mass shooting.

Since 2001, suicide bombing is another kind of purposive killing that has cascaded (Braithwaite and Li 2007). Part of the ‘strategy of savagery’, the ‘management of savage chaos’, of Islamic State in Naji’s (2004: 11) canonical ideological text is to appeal to mentally disturbed young people, among other targets, to become mass killers. Again, information reproduction on social media is an important part of the intentional strategy to cascade savagery, as is the collective efficacy that Muslims can transcend centuries of humiliation and tyranny by infidels to rebuild the Caliphate. With certain cascades that take off—such as suicide bombing and paedophilia-related violence—the problem might be that before the internet, these violent networks were insufficiently dense to cascade. Cyberspace perhaps delivered the density and the darknet the secrecy to
cascade furtively (Kennedy 2020). Racist hate speech is greatly enabled by internet amplification. These two cascade reframings go to why cascades of violence are rarely best understood as individualistic forms of human emulation. Whether it is gun culture promoted by the NRA or suicide bombing by Islamic State, we might best build our understanding by looking for purposive action by those with an interest in promoting the cascade. We see this with cascades from war to more war. When one country directs warlike action towards another, this creates opportunities for hawks to break out of the cages that mostly contain them in civilised societies. The hawks seize such moments to purposively use the warlike actions of the other to demand aggression in response. The search for the interests that lie behind cascades of violence has not been prominent in macrocriminology.

The hotspot policing finding that crime-prevention success can cascade violence reduction is evident in many places, including war zones, should criminologists care to see it through a cascade lens (Walter et al. 2020). Some criminologists have argued that the historical data on rates of domestic violence support the conclusion that feminism as a social movement has made a global contribution to cascading reductions of violence against women. Ahmed et al. (2001) and Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) argue that feminist social movement politics has constituted violence against women as shameful. Pinker (2011) and Broadhurst et al. (2015) put more emphasis on this happening through a feminist form of collective efficacy. For Pinker, there is purposiveness of political action at play in these cascades of violence reduction—the purposive collective efficacy of anti-domination feminist politics.

When levels of gun carrying in public places reduced in the ‘Wild West’ of the United States, when duelling cascaded downwards towards extinction a century earlier in the United Kingdom, there were purposive moral entrepreneurs of norm cascades behind the scenes. They were local sheriffs who mobilised community support to ban sidearms in saloons and push ordinances prohibiting concealed weapons in cow towns by the 1870s (Utter and True 2000). They were aristocrats who insisted that honour be redeemed in better ways than by challenge to a duel. An example was the way the eighteenth-century reign of Beau Nash at Bath banned the wearing of swords at balls and other social occasions in the aristocratic nightlife capital (Trevelyan 1985: 385). These sheriffs and aristocrats cascaded preventive collective efficacy.
Ross Homel’s (1988; Homel et al. 2017) research reveals a purposive campaign to cascade deterrence combined with a norm change. So far, it would seem to have saved more than 10,000 lives since the introduction of police random breath-testing for drink-driving in Australia. Rather like the Australian gun buyback example, Homel found that the effectiveness of the Australian introduction of random breath-testing was much more profound than reported from other countries in the wider evaluation literature. Homel did not interpret this as a pure deterrence effect. He struggled to understand why the introduction of random roadside breath-testing had such a large effect in reducing drink-driving in Australia.

Homel fingered the marriage of deterrence to the cultural purposiveness of the norm-building of the Australian campaign. Australian group-drinking norms had long supported drinking and driving. The combined deterrent and normative campaign persuaded drinkers to offer to drive friends home when they had had too much to drink and to save friends from having to do this for them by moderating their drinking and driving. Note that a cascade of self-efficacy is involved (you can make a difference to save your friend’s life) as well as a cascade of collective efficacy (a conscious strategy to make the helping behaviour of drinking groups more interventionist). We return to this theme. Deterrence was in the mix because one was being a friend not only to save the lives of friends, but also to prevent their arrest under the new random testing laws.

We baby boomers imbibed Australia’s heavy drinking culture. We were brought up to believe that drinking to excess on a night out and driving home with your mates were accepted, so we were amazed by the cultural transformation of our children, who became more responsible than ourselves, finding it unacceptable to do that and shocked that their parents had behaved in such an irresponsible way in their youth.

This illustrates how reframing crime as a cascade phenomenon opens new ways of seeing what can work in crime prevention. It had to be accomplished against political mobilisation by liquor industry interests. Mercenary interests in drug abuse can be reframed by a cascade lens on the history of illicit drug abuse. Since opium took off as a mass addiction for the first time in China in the second half of the nineteenth century, we have seen subsequent periods in the histories of many countries when opium or heroin became uncool among most young people. There were

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In the state of New South Wales alone (where Homel focused his research), alcohol-related traffic deaths were around 400 a year up to 1980 and, despite great growth in population and car ownership, have been far fewer than 100 per year every year in the current decade, hitting a low of 45 in 2015 (Centre for Road Safety 2018).
periods of impressive mobilisation against the opium trade in the West and India by the collective efficacy of women’s movements networked with the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade and the Women’s Anti-Opium Urgency Committee (Braithwaite and Drahos 2002). We saw an even greater transformation with the largest mass addiction event ever at the turn of the twentieth century in China. Neither opium use nor heroin use is cool for most young Chinese today, nor was it by the middle decades of the twentieth century. Heroin, which had cascaded to increasingly widespread levels of addiction and death across the West from the 1960s, also became more uncool there well before the turn of the twenty-first century. Those with a purposive interest in addiction fought back, however, in some countries, with reconfigured street marketing campaigns for heroin, but more commonly with new products of mass addiction such as crack cocaine, which initially was more appealing to the young; then, when cocaine’s appeal faded, ice and new generations of synthetic drugs were marketed as cool party drugs.

Markets in vice that cascade

MacCoun and Reuter (2001) surveyed the evidence on many drug policy experiments worldwide. One conclusion was that the legalisation of illicit drugs does not have a great effect in worsening drug abuse, at least not on its own. Legalisation is mostly associated with sharp increases in drug abuse only when it moves on to aggressive commercialisation. Allowing people to grow their own pot of marijuana and smoke it privately does little to cascade marijuana use. The existence of networks of retail outlets and street pushers linked to substantial commercial producers backed by sophisticated marketing, on the other hand, does cascade drug abuse. Purposive commercialisation of drugs of addiction has throughout history been necessary for genuine mass addiction events to break out, for cascades of vice to defeat the reproduction of virtue (Braithwaite 2005b). There was no evidence of opium being a drug of mass addiction for thousands of years of Egyptian, Mediterranean and Indian opium eating. Then the British East India Company, which was importing shiploads of Chinese goods, searched for something to return in empty ships to China. The company struck on the idea of research and development of how to market opium as a drug of mass appeal in the Chinese market. It improved the delivery system from eating to the more appealing method of smoking opium combined with
tobacco. It encouraged triads and other localised criminal entrepreneurs to establish opium dens across China and, later, globally, spreading to locales like the west coast of the United States, Vancouver, New York, London, French port cities and Australia. When China pushed back to protect its young from this commercially driven scourge by banning opium imports, the British state defended its opium interests by fighting China in two devastating Opium Wars. This was a classic case of a cascade of crime cascading to successive wars (in 1839–42 and 1856–60).

The opium mass addiction cascade resulted in Big Pharma (particularly Bayer) subsequently innovating into more efficient injectable opium. This was heroin as a market in vice (Braithwaite and Drahos 2002). Cocaine epidemics were likewise induced by pharmaceutical industry innovation in adding cocaine to cough medicines and other dangerous and ineffective patent medicines. These products were fraudulently promoted as safe and effective. Corporate food interests collaborated with the pharmaceutical industry to put cocaine into Coca-Cola, among countless other mass consumption fads. These were commercially purposive cascades of mass addiction. They were preceded historically by a worse commercial dynamic of mass addiction to tobacco. It is important to note how these cascades of addiction were arrested during the 1920s through a combination of women’s movement activism and incorporation of the 1912 International Opium Convention into the Treaty of Versailles peace agreement in 1919. This had the effect of driving Big Pharma out of the opiate, heroin and cocaine markets it had created. It was not prohibition that worked, but the uncoupling of drug marketing from corporate power and from Big Pharma research and development that dampened drug markets. McCoy (1972: 268) found global opium production fell from 41,600 tonnes in 1906 to 7,600 by 1934, to 1,000 in 1970, rising again to 4,200 tonnes by 1989 with renewed commercialisation by organised crime marketing. Heroin exports likewise collapsed in the 1920s. Yet the commercialisation dynamic in cascades of drug addiction continues to innovate and bounce back. There is today’s opioid epidemic, which has taken half a million lives, driven by wilful Big Pharma recklessness in the marketing of the pain medication Oxycodone, for which there have been some corporate criminal convictions, a US$8 billion Justice Department settlement in
2020 with Purdue Pharma and a Justice Department suit against Walmart for its alleged role in pushing drugs as a retailer of suspicious prescriptions (Quinones 2015; Humphreys 2017).³

American First Nations peoples had been using tobacco in a way that was regulated by ritual and moderation for centuries. When the French Ambassador to Portugal Jean Nicot first imported tobacco from the New World to the French Court in 1556, the beginnings of a commercialisation dynamic saw smoking become fashionable in the West. As with cocaine, the commercialisation of tobacco was fraudulently promoted as good for one’s health, to the point where schoolboys at Eton in the seventeenth century were flogged if they failed to smoke for the sake of their health (Walker 1980). As with the British East India Company’s research and development into a more commercially appealing delivery system than opium eating, the research and development of the Imperial Tobacco Corporation, which became the biggest corporation in the British Empire, and Duke’s American Tobacco Trust created the more appealing drug delivery system of the compact cigarette. In harness with European tobacco corporations, Duke was also a pioneer of mass marketing campaigns to portray smoking as suave, first for men, then for women seen smoking their sleek cigarettes in sophisticated locales like Monte Carlo in Peter Stuyvesant ads. Elegant women attracted the attention of jet-setting males lighting their smokes. Men were classically conditioned by campaigns like the Marlborough Man to associate smoking with a self-image of rugged masculinity. Simple micro-dynamics of classical conditioning were cascaded to scale by commercially purposive mobilisation of culture change.

The difference between emulation and modelling, according to Bandura (1986), is that modelling is not mere habitual mimicry, but emulation with transformative cognitive content. It is emulation that cascades meaning and social identity for those who participate in the modelling.

³ The $8 billion payment by Purdue Pharma to victims of OxyContin incapacitated the company through bankruptcy, but an appeal by victim litigants succeeded with the argument that the Sackler family, who owns Purdue, had siphoned almost $11 billion out of the company before the bankruptcy, shifting much of it to off-shore tax havens. Now an appeal of that decision is on that will decide whether victims access any of the personal Sackler wealth as well. Unfortunately, OxyContin addiction became a gateway to a new wave of addiction to heroin or heroin laced with OxyContin, and then to a worse wave of fentanyl or OxyContin laced with fentanyl. Long before they created Purdue Pharma, the Sacklers had been the most aggressive advertisers, marketers and lobbyists for deregulation of marketing psychotropic drugs. This started from a 1960s wave of addiction for Librium and Valium. The paradigm-shifting brand appeal a Sackler business genius invented for Librium was decidedly republican—a hybrid of liberty and equilibrium.
Model mercenaries are commercial organisations with the entrepreneurial flair to cash in on these addictive substitutes for lost meaning and identity in modernity (Braithwaite 1994). Whether the model mercenary is a British trading empire, Chinese triads or their western organised crime successors, the NRA, gun manufacturers, Big Pharma, big tobacco or marketers of tax havens and tax shelters, cascades of commercial fraud are central to the dynamics of crime as a cascade problem. Scholars publishing in the top finance journals have shown greater interest than criminologists in financial fraud as a cascade phenomenon. They reveal fraud contagion effects at the corporate and geographical levels that are associated with the geographical concentration of political corruption (for example, Parsons et al. 2018). Individual offending contagion effects are also demonstrated—for example, mergers that heighten differential association with fraudulent advisors from merging firms increase advisor misconduct by 37 per cent (Dimmock et al. 2018). All this goes to the importance of a macrocriminology of how capitalism constitutes corporations with stunning levels of collective efficacy for good or ill. Corporate collective efficacy can cascade vices or virtues that remake the world.

**Intergenerational cascades of crime**

This chapter seeks to provoke criminologists to see macrocriminological patterns differently through a cascade lens. So, we shift from unfamiliar to utterly familiar ways of seeing among criminologists. Criminologists are taught, and generally accept, that children whose parents have serious criminal records are more likely to acquire criminal records themselves, as are children who have friends with criminal records. More specifically, children and adults who are exposed to violence, by witnessing it or being subjected to it, are more likely subsequently to engage in violence themselves (Widom 1989; Reitzel-Jaffe and Wolfe 2001; Ehrensaft et al. 2003; Guerra et al. 2003; Kokko et al. 2009; Roberts et al. 2010; Sharkey 2018). Theoretically, criminologists accept that Sutherland and Cressey’s (1984) differential association theory and Akers and Jensen’s (2011) social learning theory have explanatory value. A meta-analysis by Pratt et al. (2010) supports this. Criminologists argue endlessly, however, about whether to interpret these associations in terms of control theory or differential association.
For its theoretical purposes, this chapter interpolates a third theoretical possibility that this is a temporally and spatially concentrated cascading of criminality from one generation to the next and from child to child at specific locales. The cascade insight here reads as banal in the same way that critics of differential association theory say this theory is banal. What is argued in the concluding sections of this chapter, however, is that by reframing mainstream findings and theory through a macrocriminological cascade lens, through the mechanism of integrating micro self-efficacy with macro-cultural collective efficacy, more interesting insights might follow about how to cascade crime prevention. Chapter 12 takes this further to consider counter-hegemonic cascades of social movement politics, inspired by the writing of Chantal Mouffe (2013, 2018), to transform institutions of domination.

**Cascades of anomie and hopelessness**

Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) developed their analysis of violence as a cascade phenomenon from Peacebuilding Compared data on how crime cascaded in conditions of armed conflict. War, in particular, was found to unsettle the normative order; citizens did not know what the rules of the game were, nor who was in charge in a conflict zone (Braithwaite et al. 2010a). This was anomie in the classic sense of an absence of norms and of authority to set them. Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) concluded from their data that anomie cascades to war and war to anomie. The normative vacuum of anomie attracts the most tyrannous of forces, so domination also cascades. Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) found that as ordinary citizens become more dominated by warlords and the corrupt politicians in their pay, a sense of hopelessness and loss of identity tend to spread. Political corruption decimates economies in combination with the ravages of war itself so that legitimate economic opportunities are increasingly closed off to the poor. The poor resort to illegitimate opportunities to eke out survival (Cloward and Ohlin 1960). To summarise, not only do anomie and hopelessness come to cascade, but also domination, criminalisation of states, loss of identity and collapse of legitimate opportunities. This is how it is possible in a short space of years for a country like Democratic Republic of Congo to tumble from being second only to South Africa in African industrialisation, and richer than almost all countries in resources and future economic opportunities, to dead last in the world rankings of human development and GDP per capita (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018: Part I).
Most sociological variables do not cascade, but Braithwaite and D’Costa argue that crime, war, anomie, domination and concentrated disadvantage are critical variables that do. Even with variables like violence that do cascade in contexts like war, gang competition or ethnic competition, there are many contexts in which violence does not cascade. For example, Randall Collins (2008: 9–11) makes the point that, contrary to one-in-all-in barroom brawl scenes in Hollywood movies, where there is no antagonistic group identity under threat in a barroom altercation, the empirical evidence is that bystanders overwhelmingly tend to fearfully shy away from the fight. A huge resource for organisations whose mission is to cascade nonviolence, such as Nonviolent Peaceforce (Gray forthcoming), UN peacekeepers or violence interrupter programs, is the fact that most people in most conditions want to see violence de-escalate rather than escalate and they personally find violence hard to do, even when they are professional soldiers (Collins 2008: Ch. 3; Klusemann 2012).

The dynamics of cascades of armed conflict prevention are mirrored in less devastating ways in the communities of societies at peace identified in the research program of Robert Sampson and his co-authors. They found an association between crime and a collapse in collective efficacy, a more specific form of anomie and corroded social capital. Where collective efficacy was low, crime was high. Pratt and Cullen’s (2005) meta-analysis of more than 200 studies of neighbourhoods and crime rates found a mean effect of 0.3 for collective efficacy—results further reinforced by many subsequent studies from other continents.

In communities within wealthy western societies decimated by deindustrialisation, this research showed how cascades of unemployment and concentrated disadvantage cascaded hopelessness and loss of identity and this cascaded to lower levels of collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 2001; Odgers et al. 2009; Hipp and Wo 2015; but see Zhang et al. 2017). Again, this chapter just redescribes criminological findings in the dynamic language of cascades. Cascading collective efficacy prevents crime. Fagan et al. (2014) showed that collective efficacy also ameliorates the negative effects of exposure to violence on substance abuse and the perpetration of violence. There is even some evidence that neighbourhood collective efficacy and rejection of norms of non-intervention may help with the prevention of child abuse (McLeigh et al. 2018) and intimate partner violence through disclosure outside the
home to third parties in high collective efficacy neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{4} Aubrey Jackson (2016)—like most research in Footnote 1 in Chapter 12—found that neighbourhood collective efficacy reduces intimate partner violence, but only in neighbourhoods where women have at least a modicum of neighbourhood control over resources. This is a result that reinforces the case we make later for broadening the target beyond collective efficacy to the forms of social capital most relevant to the specificities of particular social problems. Jackson’s result that social support from families was the strongest protective factor against intimate partner violence also goes to a somewhat broader kind of social capital.

A theme of Cascades of Violence (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018) is the way anomie and war allow money politics and business corruption to flourish with little restraint. This happens because of the ways money power is connected to the military power needed for survival. Criminalised states and the business cultures thus engendered create few opportunities for the poor, entrenching hopelessness. Poor people who understand these realities of their domination sometimes use it to excuse seizing whatever illegitimate opportunities they can in their wartime struggle to eke out family and personal survival. Indigenous peoples who have their lands stolen by invaders not only struggle to regain the sense of identity that tends to be so connected to their land; they may also struggle to find fault with stealing something back from the occupying majority. That loss of identity for dispossessed first nations peoples is often transmitted intergenerationally. In various ways, cascade dynamics are therefore reinforced by tendencies for crime in the suites to cascade to crime in the streets (Braithwaite 1991). Farrall and Karstedt’s (2019) research shows how anomie in the middle-class heartland of societies spreads middle-class crime and anomie right across the social landscape.

**War–crime–war cascades**

Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) offer a sweeping but only partially systematic study of micro and macro dynamics from across one large region of the world of how armed conflict cascades to crime, crime cascades to further crime and further armed conflict, and how one war cascades to another. This is part of a more general phenomenon of one kind of violence

\textsuperscript{4} See Browning (2002) and Dekeseredy et al. (2003); though Capaldi et al. (2012) and Wright and Tillyer (2020) reviewed the evidence as mixed.
cascading to other forms of violence (Institute of Medicine and National Research Council 2013). This chapter will not retrace that South Asian evidence. The discussion simply skates through the quantitative evidence on these intertwined cascades of violence that are discussed in more detail in that book. Archer and Gartner (1984) were the first to demonstrate systematically an association between the involvement of a nation in war and the subsequent elevation of its homicide rate (results replicated by Stamatel and Romans 2018). Thorsten Sellin (1926), half a century earlier, discussed less systematic data consistent with this conclusion, and before that Bonger (1916: 518), in 1905, diagnosed war as legitimating violence and neutralising norms of nonviolence (see Gartner and Kennedy 2018).

Ghobarah et al. (2003) confirmed Archer and Gartner’s (1984) result cross-nationally for suicide as well as homicide increasing after war. They found that homicide also spikes after war for countries contiguous to the country that experienced civil war. Much of this domestic violence and self-violence cascade is perpetrated by the children of fighters as much as, or more than, by the fighters themselves. In addition to the negative effects on the sons of Australian Vietnam War veterans, their daughters also experienced sharply heightened risks of PTSD, depression, drug abuse and sexual assault (O’T oole et al. 2018). The extremely high rates of rape and sexual assault victimisation for daughters of Australian Vietnam veterans seem to hold a key as to why the contagion effects are stronger for the daughters than for the sons of Vietnam vets. For Israel and Palestine, there is a strong time-series association between spikes in conflict-related violence and spikes in homicide and other forms of violent crime (Landau and Pfeffermann 1988; Landau 1997, 2003; Huesmann et al. 2017). Clark et al. (2010) found an association between the exposure of Palestinians to conflict violence and domestic violence in their families, while Dubow et al. (2010), Landau et al. (2010) and Boxer et al. (2013) discovered an association between Israeli and Palestinian children's exposure to conflict violence and their subsequent PTSD symptoms and violence within their own community. Miguel et al. (2008) revealed an association between being a professional soccer player who suffered different degrees of exposure to civil war in their home country and the receipt of yellow cards for aggressive behaviour on the field. The Institute of Medicine and National Research Council (2013: 66) discussed the evidence for a link between African child soldiers’ experiences of violence and subsequent peacetime violence, though this effect was greatly ameliorated by good postconflict reintegration, family support and economic opportunities.
Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) argue that there is something of theoretically general importance about violence in all of this. As discussed in Chapter 3, violent death rates often go up after a war ‘ends’ in cases like Iraq, El Salvador and many in Africa (Boyle 2014: Ch. 8; Duffield 2001: 188), as can gender-based violence such as sorcery accusations (Forsyth 2018a).

Sambanis (2001, 2004) found that a country that has neighbouring states at war is more likely to experience a civil war itself, as did Gleditsch (2002, 2007), Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) and Ward and Gleditsch (2002), but not Hegre et al. (2001). Alex Braithwaite (2016) and Houweling and Siccama (1985, 1988) showed that interstate militarised conflicts cluster in both space and time to produce hotspots. Braithwaite and Li (2007) showed quantitatively that terrorist incidents cascade and cluster at and from geographical hotspots. Braithwaite and Johnson (2012) further found that within one country (Iraq), IED attacks were clustered in space and time and these hotspots behaved in a manner similar to that observed in the spread of disease and crime. Terrorism is also exacerbated by hotspots in the sense that the exit of foreign fighters from hotspots is associated with heightened terrorism at home (Braithwaite and Chu 2018). Similarly, the exit of state troops back to the homeland after foreign wars is associated with heightened homicide at home—much of it domestic violence. Wilkinson’s (2004: 44–45) Indian data show that Hindu–Muslim riots and casualties in them are predicted by the incidence of riots in that town in the previous five years. Finally, Chenoweth and Perkoski (2017) concluded that one of the best predictors of countries experiencing mass crimes against humanity was the experience of mass killings in their past, and Harff (2017) found that past genocide in a society increases the likelihood of a cascade to a future genocide. In civil wars, the number of civilian killings per month is a good predictor of the number of civilian killings in future months (Hultman et al. 2013: 887).

Tambiah (1996: 214) interprets the Indian evidence as showing that ‘intermittent ethnic riots form a series, with antecedent riots influencing the unfolding of subsequent ones’. This is also true of Braithwaite and D’Costa’s (2018) inferences about the cascading of nonviolence. Here, global imaginations of nonviolence and freedom from tyranny are important alongside local and national ones. Alex Braithwaite et al. (2015) showed statistically that nonviolence, like violence, is a contagion phenomenon reproduced globally by feeding on itself. In the Arab Spring, however, the global cascade of freedom and nonviolence was not the only global
imaginary in play. In all the Middle Eastern and Arab uprisings, from the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Egypt and Syria in 2011 to the ‘new Arab Spring’ in Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria and Iraq in 2019–20, tyrannical jihadist imaginaries of a caliphate imposed by force were competing toe to toe with peace-loving pluralists for leadership of a nonviolent revolution.

All this evidence about the way that war and other forms of violence cascade reveals similar dynamics to the way Sampson (2012) shows in Chicago that both crime and the preventive power of collective efficacy cascade across space (from neighbourhood to nearby neighbourhood) and time (from decade to decade across a century of Chicago crime data).

**Pondering how to cascade crime prevention**

**Respected actors model anti-crime norms**

The Australian campaign to transform drinking and driving norms illustrates the importance of respected friends cascading crime prevention by modelling anti-crime norms, perhaps combined with messaging in television advertising and school road safety campaigns. Feminist social movement politics led mothers to lead their sons and daughters to gradually cascade normative prevention of domestic violence. There have been many social movements that have cascaded crime prevention of macrocriminological importance. Since the publication of Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring*, the environmental movement has advocated for environmental crime enforcement and encouraged at least some respected business leaders to model pro-environment norms that take their industry through new ceilings of excellence in environmental compliance systems (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). In earlier periods of history, the trade union movement began to secure similar accomplishments for crimes against workers. Earlier still (in the eighteenth century) churches constituted the collective efficacy of the antislavery movement that globalised the criminalisation of slavery (a case study re-joined in the final chapter).

Sharkey’s (2018: 51) research on the great crime drop since 1992 shows the importance of a ‘wave of community mobilization that spread across US cities in the early 1990s, after decades in which community organizations
struggled for public support’. Community-based organisational mobilisation against violence was complemented by diffusion across the country of an ethic of responsibility to keep every member of a community safe. Sharkey et al. (2017) analysed longitudinal data (over 20 years across 264 cities) with an instrumental variable strategy to deal with endogeneity for the formation of community-based organisations to find that ‘every new organization formed to confront violence and build stronger neighbourhoods led to about a 1 percent drop in violent crime and murder’ (Sharkey 2018: 53). This was in the 1990s, when in some of the largest US cities thousands of new organisations of this kind were formed. A 9 per cent reduction in the murder rate was associated with 10 additional organisations focusing on crime and community life in a city of 100,000 people (Sharkey et al. 2017). While foundation funding and funding by multilevel governance for this kind of community-based mobilisation may be common exogenous factors here, rallying around them at the neighbourhood level may be more of a cascade phenomenon, and the spread of this funding priority among foundations may also involve emulation. As in the empirical literature on the cascading of jihadist imaginaries (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018), the cascading of the imaginary can be more resilient, resourceful, innovative and adaptive than the cascading of specific actions, such as specific forms of terrorism.

**Collective efficacy to cascade ink spots of civility that connect up**

Peacekeeping operations often confront a seemingly impossible enforcement swamping challenge of anomie and violence. One way they rise to this challenge to become effective in reducing postconflict violence (as documented in Chapter 6, Footnote 5) is to start wherever it is feasible by creating an ink spot of security and civility somewhere, then somewhere else. Once this process of intervention passes a tipping point, a self-sustaining cascade of peace and civility spreads; the ink spots connect, eventually merging into one another to pacify a society more holistically with norms of civility (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018). It is not exactly the reverse of a hotspot strategy in that the priorities for the first ink spots of pacification tend to be the most strategic sites for institutional stabilisation: areas around the parliament, courts, banks, hospitals and UN headquarters itself. The hottest hotspots of war tend to enter late into the cascade of pacification, though hotspots for atrocities against civilians behind the front lines are often deployment priorities to
maximise the protection of civilian lives. One dynamic that underpins this cascade is that neighbouring communities look across to the new peace zones to envy the greater progress they have made in renewal, trade and development, peacefully working together to rebuild schools and health centres. They decide they want this, too. Their neighbouring ink spot gives them AMP: Awareness of what they need to do to build local peace; Motivation to do it; and shows them a Pathway to become the next ink spot of civility (Honig et al. 2015). The Peacebuilding Compared team has documented this conscious ink spot strategy of peace operations in Timor-Leste (Braithwaite et al. 2012), Bougainville (Braithwaite et al. 2010b) and Democratic Republic of Congo (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018). Local actors may have the awareness and motivation needed to build peace in their community, but they may not mobilise their collective efficacy until peacekeepers secure a safe pathway to manifest that collective efficacy.

It is not just that (notwithstanding many case-specific failures) UN peacekeepers are statistically highly cost-effective in reducing the incidence of war (Chapter 6). It is also that UN police and military peacekeepers are more potent in crime prevention than western domestic police (Hultman et al. 2013).\(^5\) One reason for this potency might be that hotspots of civilian murder during civil wars tend to be extremely hot and comparatively small in number at any point in time, even though they may be large in number across the duration of the war as front lines move across wide swaths of territory. Each region of frontline action takes its turn to become a transiently anomic space.

Hotspot policing policies in western societies can build out their policy imagination for how to cascade hotspot successes. We might be optimistic that this could work with similar success to peacekeeping because, naturalistically, as discussed above, there are positive spillovers of hotspot policing successes in reducing crime in neighbouring locales. What seems to be required of the analysis here is to connect several separate policy ideas. One is to continue to deploy scarce police resources to patrol high-crime hotspots where they can make the biggest difference. The next

\(^5\) In the multivariate and matching analysis of Hultman et al. (2013) across all African armed conflicts between 1991 and 2008, the movement from zero to just 200 UN police in a peace operation, conditioned by controls on other variables, was associated with a reduction in the expected number of civilian killings from 96 per month to 14. Given this is a monthly estimate, and the average duration of deployments is 65 months, small contingents of police seem to save very large numbers of lives.
might be connected to the cascade literature and the collective efficacy literature. This connection is made in part on the simple basis that police patrols in high-crime areas can give residents the confidence to walk the streets to build collective efficacy (Kochel and Weisburd 2019). Collective efficacy scholars rightly say that citizens simply being on the street is not enough; dense street networks are not enough until the networks are mobilised to be active with preventive interventions. Citizens feeling safe to venture on to the streets of a hotspot can be interpreted as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for crime prevention.

Neighbourhood disorder (which reintegrative hotspot policing might dampen) also threatens other facets of social capital such as generalised trust (Intravia et al. 2016). It is not necessarily the police who will be effective in building collective efficacy, though it is a possibility (Weisburd et al. 2015) for which there is some evidence (Weisburd et al. 2012; Kochel et al. 2015). Support for groups like Moms UNITE for Health, which has a collective efficacy philosophy of offering help in walking groups around the neighbourhood with practical objectives like health education messaging, could be a more participatory and practical approach (Dlugonski et al. 2015), as could simple sociality like shared supervision of children and attractive conditions of access to shared community gardens (Teig et al. 2009; Comstock et al. 2010). Shur-Ofry and Malcai (2021) showed that community gardens are an institution for collective action (Ostrom 1990) that scales from a micro initiative to a macro transformation of a city as a social contagion without central regulatory direction. Quantitatively, they show that new gardens boost the increase in the spread of gardens, and the diffusion of gardens displays a fractal pattern\(^6\) and clustering. These three attributes are cascade features in self-organised complex systems. While gardens expand without top-down intervention, Shur-Ofry and Malcai (2021) suggest that municipalities can be bridging institutions that nudge and trigger self-amplifying processes. Sampson (2012: 350) likewise concludes that nonprofit organisations can weave a web of mundane routine activities that can lubricate collective life in an unplanned way as social capital formation in pursuit of some public good.

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\(^6\) Fractals are objects that manifest self-similarity. This means geometrical features of similar structures across a range of scales.
First, there is an empirical question. After hotspot policing succeeds in reducing local crime, we must understand whether and how collective efficacy grows naturally. Are there local initiatives or policy settings that help it grow faster? With that evidence in hand, criminology could be ready to change policy settings, not only to cascade hotspot policing, but also to cascade capacity-building outwards for collective efficacy in its wake. This can transform the hotspot into an expanding ink spot that will eventually connect to other expanding ink spots—ultimately to reduce crime across a whole city and then a society. Put another way, it becomes a good investment to intervene to accelerate small cascades of naturally occurring civility. The hope is to nudge cascades past the tipping point beyond which collective efficacy, security and civility continue to cascade to cover an entire society. Rauktis et al. (2010) show that a good predictor of the adoption of restorative child protection programs is whether such programs exist in neighbouring communities. Policy thinkers such as Gale Burford use this study to argue that the best way to scale up restorative programs and restorative capital is not to disperse pilots all over a country but to invest in quality programs in adjacent neighbourhoods so they might become nodes to diffuse ink spots of innovation out from a supportive cluster (Burford et al. 2019).

CompStat accountabilities of police leaders currently fail to nurture a cascade policy imagination. Police leaders are evaluated and rewarded in CompStat in terms of how well they perform in reducing crime in their own patch, so much so that when they succeed in cascading their success to another precinct, they may help that area’s patrol leader to promotion ahead of them! Combined with the incentives CompStat creates for the non-reporting of crimes in one’s own precinct, the potential for cascading benefits outside that precinct makes a case for a more nuanced and less statistical peer review of the performance of police leaders in how they leverage hotspot policing. They need to pile in support for their peers who are having success on the peer’s patch—success that is currently eluding them. The hope and the collective belief are that ink spots of success elsewhere will ultimately be encouraged to spread to their own patch and to every patch.

Linking these three ideas—hotspot policing, collective efficacy and cascades—is only illustrative of a more general cascade policy imagination. Focused deterrence is another policy idea shown to work well on focused places and problems, such as gun crime by gangs in a particular city (Braga et al. 2018). Once success is secured in persuading a gang that operates
in one area to desist from gun crime, what are the new policy levers to cascade this success to other forms of crime committed by that gang? Restorative and responsive policing have a raise-the-bar strategy as one possible answer to this question (as discussed in Chapter 9).

This raise-the-bar strategy has also been applied to reversing stampedes into tax havens and other financially engineered shelters (Braithwaite 2005b), causing cautious corporations to cascade out of shelters. Far from Wall Street, in Yangon, in 2016 Peacebuilding Compared fieldwork, I was intrigued to see the Milken Foundation providing helpful assistance with regard to how Myanmar’s fragile financial system might avoid a systemic crisis. This was redemptive work of the ex-prisoner Michael Milken, portrayed by the Michael Douglas ‘greed is good’ character in the film *Wall Street*. In this work, there were shades of the stellar contribution of Watergate criminal Charles Colson to the restorative justice movement through his establishment of Prison Fellowship International after his release from prison. Crime prevention can go corporate with this kind of Wall Street collective efficacy, conceiving of the deepest harms in society as no longer matters of individual action but matters of corporate action. Corporate compliance systems and cultures of corporate social responsibility sometimes do cascade social licences for integrity and justice. They are a path to crime prevention insufficiently discussed as an option for a better future.

**Cascading redemption; cascading self-efficacy**

How might crime-prevention policy respond to the phenomenon that the crimes of parents cascade to crime by their children; and the crimes of children cascade to crime by their friends? Reintegrative shaming theory (as revised in Ahmed et al. 2001) offers one possible approach. It picks up the insight from Albert Cohen (1955) that if the justice system stigmatises a family, a peer group, a gang, a school, an ethnic or religious group, a corporation in corporate crime enforcement or, one might add, a jihadist group, this can foster the formation of criminal subcultures. Stigmatisation motivates humans to reject their rejectors. Once this subculture formation sets in, it cascades because a law-abiding value promoted by my rejectors will be rejected and reversed. Doing so is a subculturally reinforced way of rejecting my rejectors. Cohen might suggest today that cascades of mass
shootings in schools can be understood as young people being rejected by a school that rejects violence, and then rejecting the values of their rejectors through turning mass violence against the school community.

A remedy, according to reintegrative shaming theory, is schools that suppress stigmatisation by hating violence and loving perpetrators of violence. This sounds vague and platitudinous, yet the social movement for restorative justice prioritises schools over the justice system and has worked through detailed, practical reintegrative programs with which there is now vast experience and some encouraging evidence of effectiveness (Hopkins 2003; Morrison 2007; Augustine et al. 2018; Open Society Institute 2020). McCold’s (2008) study of 1,636 children with behavioural problems sent to a restorative school program found a 58 per cent reduction in reoffending, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Shadd Maruna’s (2001) research emphasises the importance of redemption scripts in restorative dynamics and desistence from crime more broadly. Serious offenders who made good had to find a new way of making sense of their lives—a theme also taken up by Giordano et al. (2002). Desisting offenders re-storied their life histories. They defined a new ethical identity for themselves that meant they were able to look back at their former criminal selves and believe they were ‘not like that anymore’ (Maruna 2001: 7). They found appeal in the Jesse Jackson ethos: ‘You are not responsible for being down, but you are responsible for getting up’ (Maruna 2001: 148). Those in Maruna’s persistent reoffender sample, in contrast, were locked into ‘condemnation scripts’; they saw themselves as irrevocably condemned to their criminal self-story. Maruna’s desisting offenders had re-storied themselves to believe that their formerly criminal self ‘was not me’. The self that did it was, in William James’s terms, not the I (the self-as-subject, who acts), nor the Me (the self-as-object, who is acted on), but what Petrunk and Shearing (1988) called the It, an alien source of action (Maruna 2001: 93). Restorative justice might therefore help wrongdoers to write their It out of the story of their ‘true’ ethical identity. Maruna (2001: 13) concluded that communal processes he called ‘redemption rituals’ were important in this sense-making because desisting offenders often narrated the way their deviance had been decertified by important others such as family members who said Johnny was now his old self. Zehr (2000: 10) makes the point that whether we have victimised or been victimised, we need social support in the journey ‘to re-narrate our stories so that they are no longer just about shame and humiliation.
but ultimately about dignity and triumph’. This is therefore a self-efficacy effect that complements at an individual level the collective efficacy effect demonstrated by Sampson et al. (1997).

Another feature of Maruna’s (2001) ‘generative scripts’ that characterised desisting offenders was their desire to help others as part of defining a renewed positive identity for themselves. LeBel et al. (2015) assessed more recent progress with implementing this ‘wounded healer’ strategy. An impressive body of evaluations is yet to accumulate, though there is encouraging research (Perrin et al. 2017). Heidemann et al.’s (2016) mixed-methods study of desisting wounded healers among formerly incarcerated women is encouraging. Another study, by Lee et al. (2017), of drug offenders, found that two ‘spiritual virtues’—service to others and the spiritual experience of love—contributed to reduced recidivism and did so through greater humility. Defiance, in contrast, ‘was associated with higher incarceration, while the combination of service and love predicted lower incarceration and mediated the impact of defiance’ (Lee et al. 2017: 161). Lee et al.’s (2017: 168) results were interpreted as support for the claim of the co-founder of Alcoholics Anonymous that AA’s 12-step process boiled down to two core principles: love and service. The twelfth step of AA recovery explicitly involves helping to heal the suffering of fellow alcoholics. The evidence from systematic reviews of the effectiveness of AA’s 12 steps as a package is encouraging on accomplishing abstinence (Kaskutas 2009; Humphreys et al. 2014; Kelly 2017). While this is contested, the lesson I draw here from AA is not so much about its evidence base as about its strategy for scaling up collective efficacy from self-efficacy. AA may be effective, but not as effective as holistic multisystemic family therapies (Spas et al. 2012) that engage and empower whole family systems with evidence on effective approaches for multiple risk factors. This is because such therapies have that multidimensionality of holistic peacekeeping, problem-oriented policing, restorative justice, responsive regulation, motivational interviewing and positive deviance approaches to human development, as discussed throughout this book.

White (2014) expresses this as ‘recovery is contagious and recovery is spread by recovery carriers’—a multiplicative networked dynamic of the shift from ‘I story’ to ‘We story’ (White 2015). The cascade point here is that if each healed addicted person sought to pass on their healing to help multiple others, there might be a multiplicative cascade of prevention. If each recovering criminal offender imbibed self-efficacy and joined in the collective efficacy to seek to help a number of troubled youths
in the neighbourhood where their history gives them street credibility, where they will not be rejected as rejectors, there is the prospect of a multiplicative cascade of freedom-building crime prevention. This only becomes true if wounded healers mobilise widely and if the evidence continues to be encouraging that they, and those whom they help, experience reduced offending. To date, the interest of policymakers in mobilising wounded-healer cascades of freedom and prevention has been modest. So, we must await further evidence that such a virtuous cascade could scale up. AA has institutionalised the scaling up of wounded healing with flare for alcoholism. Some 106,000 AA groups exist in 150 countries and countless hybrids of AA with distinctive brands have proliferated (White and Kurtz 2008). AA is a massively scaled up NGO that cascades collective efficacy overwhelmingly into the hands of volunteers inspired by its twelfth step of helping others to recover. Wounded healers do not have to be wounded by addiction or crime to be interpreted as wounded healers by their community. Sharkey’s (2018: 174–79) discussion of Noongar night patrols in Australia valorises the preventive work of Aboriginal people wounded by colonial dispossession and the stripping of their identity. Identity is retrieved in part through a Noongar approach, relying on embedded cultural authority, walking the streets to prevent and de-escalate community conflicts before they escalate to violence. Harry Blagg’s estimate that there are 130 such First Nations night-patrol programs in Australia is now a considerable underestimate and there is a rich tradition of research by Aboriginal scholars on the hybridity between First Nations night patrols and state policing that emphasises the criticality of fluency in local Indigenous languages, cultural knowledge and skills and cultural respect to persuade without domination (Langton 1992; Porter 2016, 2018; Blagg and Anthony 2019).

The hypothesis advanced here is that both self-efficacy and collective efficacy can be helped to cascade through well-known strategies. The contours of these strategies are conceptualised in the recovery capital literature (Best and Laudet 2010; Best et al. 2015, 2018; Best 2017; Hall et al. 2018) that defines CHIME (Connectedness, Hope, Identity, Meaning and Empowerment) as an intertwined cluster of social relationships and social beliefs that constitute recovery capital (Chapter 7). Recovery capital and CHIME are hopeful candidates for cascade effects because they have a key characteristic that they share with collective efficacy, social capital, human capital and recovery capital. Unlike financial capital, recovery capital, social capital and human capital are not depleted through use. When you manifest collective efficacy by helping someone, you do not
reduce help because helping behaviour is contagious. People do pass on acts of kindness (Tsvetkova and Macy 2014); experimentally, cooperation reproduces itself (Fowler and Christakis 2010).

Institutionalised contagions of collective efficacy

There are more deeply institutionalised sites than AA programs that can cascade collective efficacy. These are called families, schools and primary workgroups inside organisations. Good families, schools and workplaces do encourage their members to pass on acts of kindness, to pay forward trust and collective efficacy, to help others recover from problems from which they themselves have recovered, to be wounded healers who multiply their own healing, especially as they grow into family and organisational leaders, and to intervene when they see an opportunity to prevent predation. There is much that we can do to further educate, motivate and show pathways to these benefits for people inside these institutions. A macrosociological imagination requires that we ask whether these institutions might provide the most effective ways to cascade collective efficacy because they are more institutionally embedded primary groups than neighbourhood groups. This is not to cast doubt on the importance of place in inscribing disadvantage and anomie that was so convincingly revealed by Sampson (2012), Shaw and McKay (1942) and other urban ecologists. Yet families, schools and workgroups might provide more fertile soil for the spread of the social roots of collective efficacy across geographical places than places themselves because of their more institutionalised character and the multiple levers they can mobilise.

Community that is liberated from place—indeed, that connects communities across very long distances—is important in the internet age. The rising creative class that Richard Florida (2014) contends is the engine of twenty-first-century growth is concentrated through sites in cyberspace as well as at physical locales like Silicon Valley and Manhattan. The other side of the coin is that digital divides concentrate disadvantage just as do neighbourhood and international divides. The internet can connect the collective efficacy of grandparents as well as parents into school communities to help with children’s journeys of learning; it can connect up families increasingly separated by geographical mobility. Combined with the installation of solar panels in the remotest villages of rural Africa currently without electricity, the internet can help connect the nodes of concentrated disadvantage on the planet to educational opportunities.
Australian work in the social capital literature shows that trust in government and voluntary taxpaying mostly spread out from primary group trust in families and workgroups, more so than from civil society (as in the theories of Putnam 2000; and Skocpol 2013) (Job and Reinhart 2003). The dynamics emphasised by Putnam and Skocpol are shown in this empirical work to be important in Australia, but less important than the rippling out of social capital from primary groups. Primary-group social capital (which includes, but is a more general concept than, collective efficacy) can be a platform for cascading collective efficacy and other benefits of social capital such as improved health and education outcomes, which in turn also help reduce crime, with the crime reduction then further improving health, education and employment outcomes. This is because exposure to horrific violence can derail learning and wellbeing for years (Sharkey 2018: 93–94, 111).

Reconfigured hotspot policing might have most impact when it cascades macrosociological effects and when they pacify dangerous spaces to the point where citizens are enabled to return to the streets to spread collective efficacy. Yet the healthy effect sizes of strengthened collective efficacy on organisations attaining their objectives,7 and the strong effects with achieving educational outcomes and reducing educational disadvantage in schools (Eells 2011; Leithwood and Sun 2012), suggest that places are not necessarily the only or the most fertile sites for planting the seeds of self-efficacy and collective efficacy. Then there was Lackey’s (2016) result that neighbourhood collective efficacy in Ohio’s rural neighbourhoods had a strongly significant effect on self-reported delinquency, but school collective efficacy had an even stronger coefficient when added to her model and caused the neighbourhood collective efficacy effect to fall below significance.

The collective belief of teachers that by working together they can deliver better educational outcomes may even be the strongest school-level predictor of those outcomes, ahead of predictors that most of us might have expected to be stronger, such as socioeconomic status, parental involvement, prior achievement, motivation and teacher–student relationships (Hattie 2009, 2012; Donohoo 2017). The collective efficacy of students encouraging one another not to give up on solving mathematical problems can also have strong impacts on improving the

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7 These include Stajkovic et al.’s (2009) and Gully et al.’s (2002) meta-analysis effects of 0.35 and 0.41, respectively.
outcomes for difficult skills (Katz and Stupel 2015). Goddard et al. (2017) likewise found that teacher collective efficacy strongly improved student mathematics and reduced the mathematics achievement gaps suffered by African-American students by 50 per cent. Bryk and Schneider’s (2002) more Putnamesque study of social capital in schools showed that schools with high levels of ‘relational trust’ delivered reduced truancy and improved learning outcomes. Finally, Tian et al. (2017), in a wonderful Chinese study, showed that classroom collective efficacy helped students to become more active and effective learners, better at self-regulating their self-efficacy. The combination of high classroom collective efficacy and small class sizes delivered collaborative, relational learning that simultaneously produced improved learning and reduced delinquency and aggression (Tian et al. 2017).

Therefore, the best solutions to crime problems may not be found in either place or criminal justice system variables. The best paths to crime prevention may maximise benefit–cost ratios because they cascade broader forms of social capital than collective efficacy; these broader social capital cascades help explain collective efficacy and help solve other deep social problems through the impacts of collective efficacy on many of the problems that concentrate disadvantage—like health disadvantage (Ahern and Galea 2011; Gilbert et al. 2013), suicide (Maimon et al. 2010), obesity (Cohen et al. 2006) and even environmental collapse (Jugert et al. 2016; Thaker et al. 2016). People need to believe in their collective capability to make a difference to the environment before they will make a difference. Other facets of social capital beyond collective efficacy may be more effective in delivering other public goods like mental health that in turn contribute to crime prevention. Hardyns et al. (2016) found that social support—whether from families, schools, workplaces, neighbourhoods or beyond—was the facet of social capital most important to sustaining mental health, while neighbourhood levels of social trust, disorder and collective efficacy had negligible effects.

A broad macrosociological policy imagination for expanding social capital might also have a wider array of benefits than collective efficacy. Collective efficacy has the strength of being a form of social capital attuned to direct crime prevention. Yet trust, reciprocity, collaborative skills, social support skills and hope might all be forms of social capital that nourish one another and support collective efficacy. On the other hand, however effective are families, schools, workgroups and other primary groups as seed beds of social capital, self-efficacy and collective efficacy,
if citizens dare not venture on to the streets to manifest collective efficacy at dangerous hotspots, that macrosociological potential can be cut off. Policing at places might be important in this way, even though places may be relationally thinner sites for building collective efficacy than primary institutions that enjoy thicker institutional fabrics for relationality. And we discussed earlier that there is evidence that both police in high-crime neighbourhoods and peacekeepers in war zones make it safe for community leaders to venture on to the streets so they can build collective efficacy. When cascades of collective efficacy enabled by hotspot policing that is not racist complement more holistic, multidimensional strategies for cascading social capital and tackling concentrated disadvantage, micro-policing policies might connect to a macro-strategy that not only reduces crime, but also improves health, homelessness, educational and employment outcomes, workforce productivity and an array of other forms of social wellbeing. If all this is true, narrowly micro criminal justice policies are never likely to be as attractive in cost–benefit terms as macrosocial ideas that are liberated from policy silos like the criminology of place.

A puzzle for criminology is why collective efficacy is such a central variable in the criminology of place, but less so in life-course criminology, especially when Robert Sampson (2012) himself has always emphasised these links and is a towering figure of both fields. Arguably, the more foundational institutional building of cultural habits of collective efficacy in families and schools is more important than building collective efficacy in workgroups. Yet in western economies it is business that has seen the biggest macro-cultural shifts towards collective efficacy. This started well before World War II with Elton Mayo’s relational school of organisational studies, with its critiques of machine bureaucracies and Fordist production lines. The transformation greatly accelerated in the 1970s, and more strongly in the 1980s, with American business soul-searching that Japanese business productivity was outperforming that of US corporations. Japanese quality circles delivered collective efficacy for improving quality; they were then widely emulated in the West. Half a century ago, US corporations applied lessons drawn from Japan and from the successes of autonomous workgroups in Swedish companies like Volvo that broke out of the top-down discipline of Fordist production systems. Business energised transformative leadership for change. This was powerfully demonstrated by Jung and Sosik’s (2002) finding from 47 South Korean workgroups that transformational leadership could
empower members, build cohesiveness and collective efficacy and thereby improve workgroup effectiveness in achieving business goals. A meta-analysis shows that trust in the local work team is a particularly critical variable across 112 studies, improving performance substantially over and above trust in leaders, past performance and other key controls, moderators and mediators (de Jong et al. 2016). This could be the most important domain where markets in virtue have contributed more to domination reduction than virtuous states or virtuous civil society actors.

Arguably, the United States, better than any society, translated these lessons into the challenge of collective efficacy for innovation in the new information economy. The evidence is strong from US business that ‘transformational leadership’ works when it persuades semi-autonomous workgroups that they can work together and the collective efficacy to discover, innovate and learn. Systematic reviews conclude that training programs to improve teamwork and helping behaviour do improve teamwork and team performance (McEwan et al. 2017). Western schools and families have not shifted to transformational leadership for collective efficacy to the same degree. Paradoxically, they remain more rooted in individualistic philosophies than do business institutions. Schools and families tend to be more focused on building the self-efficacy of individual children as the path to their success in life. ‘The child can do it’ remains a more important trope than the idea that ‘the classroom can do it’ or ‘the family can do it’. Only in explicitly collective activities such as performances by choirs or bands, or team performances in sport, do most schools fully emphasise collective efficacy. Professional development for teachers tends to be individual professional development rather than professional development that builds the collective efficacy of teaching teams.

Restorative justice in schools and families is one movement that seeks to transform this. Restorative group decision-making in nuclear and extended families and in school classrooms often starts with building out from strengths by asking a family to list their greatest strengths as a family, a classroom to list their greatest strengths as a class. The facilitator then writes them up for the group on a flipchart. Then a family group is enabled to continually return to the theme that instead of focusing on their children’s many problems, these problems might begin to fall away if they will only believe in, and build out from, the strengths their family supports can deliver.
Hence, the hypothesis of this section is that visionary policy shifts that drive all major institutions in the society to educate themselves in the importance of social capital formation will make it easier for hotspot policing to make a big difference in preventing crime as it applies lessons from the criminology of place. These will also be collective efficacy policies with higher benefit–cost ratios because there is evidence of their relevance to improved educational outcomes, improved employment, more rewarding work lives, heightened productivity, improved health, reduced alcoholism, smoking, obesity and suicide, and collective efficacy in transforming environmental impacts (Muller et al. 2018). The macro-policy imagination involves holistically strengthening both the recovery capital that enables the rehabilitation of offenders through CHIME and the social capital that prevents crime before it occurs. It is about building social capital in the intermediate civil society institutions such as bowling leagues, choirs and clubs that so impressed Putnam (2000) and in the encompassing civil society organisations that once had millions of members that so impressed Skocpol (2013), such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and lodges with millions of members. But most importantly, it means holistically building social capital in the primary groups of the institutions with the deepest cultural roots: families, schools and workgroups in business and government. And, yes, neighbourhoods as well.

Kirk (2009) made the important contribution of showing that school-based, family-based and neighbourhood-based collective efficacy, when combined, substantially reduce juvenile arrests and student suspensions from school. Simons et al. (2005) delivered the equally profound contribution of showing that neighbourhood collective efficacy encouraged authoritative parenting among African-American caregivers. Authoritative parenting is warm and supportive but insists that boundaries are not crossed; it is distinguished from authoritarian and laissez-faire parenting. The evidence has long been overwhelming that authoritative parenting is a key to crime prevention (Wright and Cullen 2001). So, it is an inspiration for a holistic vision of cascading social capital formation to understand Simons et al.’s (2005) finding that the collective efficacy

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8 Fortunately, some of these mass participation organisations still exist in which most members take their turn to be president of their little local branch. An example in Australia is the Country Women’s Association (CWA), which, when I led the Consumers’ Federation of Australia, was its most effective member in campaigns to hold corporate Australia to account. At that time, in the 1980s, the CWA still had 2 million members.
of a community amplifies the benefits of authoritative parenting for delinquency reduction. The result is profound because the effect sizes of authoritative parenting on delinquency reduction are generally stronger than those of collective efficacy, even though the latter also tend to be strong (for example, Simons et al. 2005: 1019). All of this is just another way of describing how a macrocriminological imagination shifts the focus away from criminological silos and towards cultural and structural transformation that is multidimensional in its cascading of complex, often mutually reinforcing, processes of social capital formation.

Social capital or collective efficacy?

The more transformative shifts towards the collective efficacy of business compared with social institutions also illustrate the dilemma that caused Robert Sampson to sharpen the focus of social capital on to collective efficacy. US business has done brilliantly in unleashing the collective efficacy of its information-age technology corporations to solve so many previously unsolvable challenges. Yet the collective efficacy of tech giants like Facebook has also been mobilised to abuse the privacy rights of its customers and to collaborate with the authoritarian security services of many states to threaten freedom. More broadly, all forms of corporate malfeasance and crime are difficult to hold together, as revealed by another Chicago School empirical literature on how hard it is to hold business cartels together. Criminalised cartel discipline requires highly developed forms of collective efficacy. At the same time, the managerial self-efficacy of leaders that is grounded in the collective efficacy of their organisation is central to efforts by organisations to control corporate crime (Jenkins 1994; Braithwaite et al. 2007). So, we should applaud mention by Sampson (2012: Ch. 15, fn. 21) of the hypothesis that the crimes of Wall Street during the Global Financial Crisis might have been prevented by a combination of transcending legal cynicism towards financial laws and building collective efficacy to regulate and self-regulate in respect of those laws. Sampson is tuned in to this kind of dilemma. He worried that sometimes in the urban ecologies he studied, the strong communities with strong social capital were white communities that mobilised social capital to exclude black entry to their neighbourhoods—in the worst cases, even by violence or firebombing their new homes. Sampson is alert to the work of William Foote Whyte (1943) and Suttles (1968) showing that criminogenic organisations such as youth gangs often mobilise their
collective efficacy to prevent ‘young hotheads’ from needlessly bringing heat on the gang. Street leaders regulate the criminal adventurism of younger gang members. We see the dilemma sharply in the public health literature: in communities where norms are tolerant of smoking, collective efficacy increases smoking; in communities where norms are intolerant of smoking, collective efficacy reduces smoking (Ahern et al. 2009). When policymakers disperse slums, they disperse both some positive and some negative collective efficacy dynamics (Skogan 1990).

This is one reason Sampson's theoretical move is to specify his definition of collective efficacy to a focus on social cohesion combined with the willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good (Sampson et al. 1997: 918). His measures follow this specification with its biggest cluster of four items being about helping behaviour oriented to youth crime prevention. These are expectations that neighbours would act if: 1) children skip school and hang out on a street corner; 2) children spraypaint graffiti; 3) children show disrespect to an adult; and 4) a fight breaks out in front of their house. There are several other items that are about the social cohesion part of collective efficacy in the composite concept. These include items with a classic social capital character in the Putnam sense, such as: ‘People in this neighbourhood can be trusted’; ‘People around here are willing to help their neighbours’; and ‘This is a close-knit neighbourhood’ (Sampson 2012). All this in turn is highly correlated with the density of civil society associations. With such a composite index we can never rule out the interpretation that the impacts of the ‘willingness to intervene to prevent’ items are proxies for the causal effects of more general social capital and social cohesion variables (as in Bursik 1999; Lederman et al. 2002) or vice versa.

The extant literature never puts Sampson's conception of collective efficacy in competition with Bandura’s. Bandura’s conception is both more general and more specific than Sampson’s. On the one hand, Bandura’s collective efficacy is more general in that it is not narrowed to the willingness to intervene in ways relevant to crime prevention. Bandura’s collective efficacy goes more generally to the belief of groups that they can act together with effectiveness to solve a problem conjointly, be it crime, helping children to learn or hurting people who are whistleblowers against organisational malfeasance. Bandura’s collective belief within disadvantaged school communities that all students can be helped to grow, learn and flourish may be more relevant to defeating disadvantage there than Sampson’s collective efficacy as a willingness to intervene to prevent bad behaviour.
On the other hand, Bandura’s collective efficacy is more narrowly a social cognitive belief of groups; it does not combine cognitions shared in groups with the preventive actions taken by groups (or expectations of preventive action as a proxy for preventive action) in the way Sampson’s conception does. The strength of Sampson’s conception is its focus on ties strongly tethered to collective actions, contrasted with the wide range of other forms of ties that are weakly tethered to action that prevents crime.

We might say that Sampson’s move is helpful in specifying that the activities of the Ku Klux Klan or the NRA are not collective efficacy. On the other hand, there can be no guarantee that in a world in which the collectivism of the social cohesion facet of his measure is high, the collective efforts of authoritarian groups will not also be structurally strengthened. Alongside the efforts of community groups that do by Sampson’s lights promote the public good, the collective capabilities of the Ku Klux Klan and the NRA might also be strengthened. It may be that collective efficacy is vital to hold together drug cartels and the communities that tolerate them and that paramilitary cartels build community and regulate low-level criminality as part of their strategy for enabling higher-level criminality, or violence may be exogenous to the formation of gangs for protection. These may be reasons for Cerda and Morenoff (2009) finding the counter-theoretical result in Medellín, Colombia, that neighbourhoods high in collective efficacy have higher concentrated disadvantage and higher rates of homicide and perceived violence.

We see this dilemma in systematic studies at the cross-national level of analysis that Sampson does not consider. Societies whose citizens score high on collectivism in their social values have higher levels of violence (Karstedt 2006, 2015). Karstedt is not measuring collective efficacy here but a collectivism scale that has been replicated as stable. This can be interpreted as the risk that highly collectivist societies can be more prone to stigmatising outgroups (and more dominated by an honour culture for ingroups), thus enabling violence against outgroups at times of social stress. Honour cultures—not only in collectivist societies, but also among gangs and paramilitary groups inside individualistic societies—have strong but short bonds that cut off the embrace of outgroups, according to Karstedt. Collectivism, as understood in Karstedt’s research, emphasises bonding to the exclusion of bridging, cutting off Granovetter’s (1973) strength of weak ties because people’s obligations, alignment and honour reside with their own group.
At times of great societal stress, extremists can take charge and enrol collective efficacy to projects of exclusionary violence. There is also a great deal of qualitative evidence in the armed conflict literature for Karstedt’s view that there can be a recursive loop between extreme violence and collectivism. When a society is afflicted with extreme violence, people seek shelter in loyalty to collectives that embrace protective duties towards them and that cut off outreach to perceived enemies (Karstedt 2011a). This is what Karstedt means by cutting off the strength of weak ties. We saw this danger with the way President George W. Bush could mobilise the formidable (if not sustained) collective efficacy the United States has been able to mobilise at times of war, especially the collective efficacy of all media barons in 2001, but also embracing the opposition Democratic Party, in a way that was easy to understand after the shock of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. This collectivism and collective efficacy at a time of threat, in a society that is not normally highly collectivist, justified the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq that in the opinion of many international lawyers were crimes of aggression (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018). We saw it with the formidable collective efficacy of the Tutsi leadership of Rwanda in a counter-genocide against Hutus inside Congo in the aftermath of the 1994 Hutu genocide against Tutsis inside Rwanda (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018).

For the above reasons, I do not think Sampson can be fully convincing that specifying collective efficacy as a combination of social cohesion and intervention to promote a liberal Rawlsian public good resolves the challenges. Yet this is not the only theoretical move Sampson makes to help with these challenges. His other move is to integrate legal cynicism into his empirical and normative analyses. He finds that the spatial concentration of collective inefficacy and legal cynicism together explains crime (Sampson 2012: Ch. 9). In other words, if societies promote a world with equally strong collective efficacy and respect for laws (that include the human rights of outgroups), collective efficacy is more likely to be a force for good. By my lights, this is the more promising of his two theoretical moves to counter the problem of the Ku Klux Klan as a historical instantiation of American collective efficacy. Naturally, I would say that because it is kindred to the moves in the theory of shame and reintegration (Ahmed et al. 2001). This theory specifies bad shame as not only stigmatisation as opposed to reintegrative shaming, but also shame that mobilises disapproval of those who seek to break away from or blow the whistle on criminal groups or criminal subcultures. Good shame
is reintegrative shaming that prevents domination and reinforces the values of just criminal laws that protect against domination. Those anti-domination criminal law values help prevent collective and individual actors from participating in criminal subcultures.

Likewise, we should read Sampson’s theory as steering us towards seeing good collective efficacy as that which motivates individuals and collectives to prevent crime and respect the rights of others. My inclination is to theorise this as nondomminating collective efficacy. Collective efficacy, in contrast, that motivates the abuse of rule-of-law values such as human rights is bad collective efficacy. Or, as I would theorise it, cultures and structures of collective efficacy against domination are phenomena that social activism should seek to cascade. Those cascades should only be encouraged, however, when that mobilisation is checked and balanced by cultures of reintegrative disapproval of collective efficacy that dominate others. More structurally still, until we have clearer evidence of how highly specified forms of collective efficacy do good, we do better to be scholars who point to the likely virtues of strengthening all forms of social capital in all kinds of places and institutions, but in combination with struggle against the politics of domination. Whether the domination takes the form of criminal domination of others or domination through concentrations of disadvantage, the struggle against it must be advanced through cascading many forms of social capital. At the end of Sampson’s journey, I read this as the most important essence of his theoretical destination (and also Bandura’s). Republican freedom as nondomination requires much more than this. It requires mutual checking and balancing among strong individuals (with self-efficacy), strong communities (with collective efficacy), strong states, strong markets, strong international institutions and strong legal institutions (all of which draw on collective efficacy).

**Conclusion**

A criminology that neglects cascades seems as silly as a medicine that is uninterested in containing contagion. Macrocriminological explanation must come to terms with deeply institutionally structured endogeneity of crime and crime prevention. Reframing crime as a cascade phenomenon implies a shift from research on individual offenders to macrocriminology. The contribution of this chapter is just a sketch of options for catalysing cascades of crime prevention. Developing a well-formed theory of crime
cascades, let alone marshalling the evidence for such a theory, is a future project; it is not an accomplishment of this chapter. Braithwaite and D’Costa’s (2018) study of cascades of violence across South Asia was a considerable empirical undertaking that could be submitted as a proof of concept—but no more than that. The 10 propositions of that book about cascade mechanisms towards war and peace are more important than those about crime, particularly in showing what can be done with the insight that the best way of protecting ourselves from future wars is to stop getting into current ones. Yet a neglected reason for the importance of that policy work is that war and crime cascade into each other so profoundly. If we follow a cascade analysis, a strong United Nations can be seen as an institutional path towards lower long-run crime in our neighbourhood. Below is a recap of starting hypotheses for a reconfiguration of criminology based on the way this chapter has built on D’Costa’s and my earlier book.

Crime cascades to more crime through the following common dynamics:

- Modelling.
- Commercial interests cascade particular forms of crime and particular kinds of soft targets for crime.
- Differential association cascades.
- Hopelessness, loss of identity and closure of opportunities tend to cascade, particularly at hotspots of concentrated disadvantage in conditions of extreme inequality and policy failure in providing decent housing for all.
- War and pro-violence politics cascade to domination, anomie, hopelessness, closed opportunities and more crime; crime cascades to more war; war cascades recursively to more crime.
- War, crime and anomie are often entangled in mutually reinforcing cascades.
- War cascades to the criminalisation of states and the criminalisation of markets by armed groups and the growth of shadow states.

Then it was argued that crime prevention cascades when:

- Respected actors have the self-efficacy to transform cultures by modelling anti-crime norms; self-efficacy scales to collective efficacy through explicitly connecting evidence-based microcriminology to a macrocriminology of cultural transformation (the lessons from Australian gun and drink-driving control).
• Norms of civility and nondominating collective efficacy at one locale spread like ink spots that connect ink spot to ink spot, covering whole societies with norms of civility.
• Parents and schools mobilise collective efficacy to reject stigmatisation yet communicate to their children why violence and stealing are shameful.
• This enables redemption scripts for offenders to help themselves, and to grasp the self-efficacy to cascade help as wounded healers to other offenders.
• An inclusive politics of hope, identity formation and the opening of legitimate opportunities cascade to embrace formerly disadvantaged communities with CHIME.
• Institutions of civil society, following the model of Alcoholics Anonymous, institutionalise obligations to pass on CHIME as an integral part of recovery and as a structural way of cascading recovery.
• Institutionally embedded primary groups—families, schools, workgroups—that cascade nondominating collective efficacy alongside other forms of social capital can deliver prevention effects in the criminology of place; conversely, these prevention effects can depend on reintegrative hotspot policing and peacekeeping that render streets safe for collective efficacy.
• Awareness of these possibilities for prevention is complemented by Motivation and efficacious Pathways that actors can see. AMP is imperative for preventing cascades of crime.

Braithwaite and D’Costa’s (2018) cascade of norms of nonviolence provides a ninth explanation of when and why crime prevention cascades. Specific antiwar norms that can be encouraged by social movement politics also cascade, such as the global norms against torture, against the use of chemical weapons, against wars of aggression and the anti-mercenary norm. Braithwaite and D’Costa argue for universities to collectively organise a preventive diplomacy wiki for sharpening diagnostic capabilities in conditions of local and global complexity. If Braithwaite and D’Costa are right that war cascades to more war and more crime, war-prevention cascades might cascade to crime prevention. They advocate a macrocriminology of how to ride this tiger.
Apparent contagion effects may in fact be contiguous actors being exposed to the same exogenous factor at the same time. This discussion has not grappled with the best methodologies for separating such exogenous causation from cascades. These are methodological challenges in which sciences like medicine are more advanced than criminology, and challenges which this author would not tackle impressively. An implication of the analysis is that criminology must become methodologically stronger in that regard. Like medicine, criminology can learn to temper its hang-up with exogeneity to see the importance of research for understanding how to dampen contagions, even when it does not yet understand the micro-mechanisms that drive their spread.

The foregoing dot points are suggested as a framework for the kind of macrocriminological reframing that might make a good fist of big patterns in the evolution of crime. These include:

- Explaining why western societies have less violent crime than they had centuries ago (Eisner 2014).
- Explaining why so many Latin American societies have so much more criminal violence than other regions and have not experienced the post-1992 crime drop of their northern neighbours (Nivette 2011).
- Explaining why East Asian societies have continuously experienced dramatic reductions in violence since the onset of the steep crime rise in many western countries from 1960.
- Explaining why in the same period the United States has had higher crime and war-participation rates than other western societies.

The cascade analysis of this chapter therefore directly connects to the analysis of how these patterns are shaped by shifting normative orders in Chapter 3. Conversely, how could control theory be seen by criminologists as one of the most empirically supported of all theories without confronting it with the difficult macro questions and with alternative cascade explanations? Does it makes sense to say that the United States has so much more crime than Canada, Europe or Japan because Americans are less able to control their impulses? Explaining crime as a cascade phenomenon is a path that might deploy Bandura’s (2000) distinction between self-efficacy and collective efficacy and Robert Sampson’s analyses of concentrated disadvantage and social support for transformation from anomie to collective efficacy. Hope resides there for renewed prospects of micro–macro theoretical synthesis.
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