From the Second Sino-Japanese War to the Pacific War

Following the May 15 Incident

National Unity Governments

In December 1931, the Wakatsuki cabinet resigned en masse. The direct cause was disunity in the cabinet surrounding the plan for a coalition that included members of the Seiyūkai party.¹ As a result of the cabinet’s dissolution, administrative power shifted from the Minseitō to the Seiyūkai, with the Seiyūkai president Inukai Tsuyoshi forming a new cabinet. For the position of foreign minister, the Inukai cabinet called upon Yoshizawa Kenkichi, former ambassador to France. When Shidehara left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had spent a cumulative total of five years and three months as foreign minister.² Now in political opposition, he was merely a House of Peers member.

As it happened, still more shocking events would occur the following year, in 1932. First, on 9 February, Inoue Junnosuke, who had just left his post as finance minister, was shot and killed by Onuma Shō, a member of the right-wing organisation, Ketsumeidan (League of Blood). Inoue was assassinated in Komagome, close to Shidehara’s temporary residence.³ This, however, was only a foreshadowing of what was to come. On 15 May Prime Minister Inukai was assassinated by young naval officers. This became known as the May 15 Incident.
Following the May 15 Incident and the death of Prime Minister Inukai, a new cabinet was formed, led by Saitō Makoto. Saitō was originally from the Imperial Japanese Navy and had no party affiliation. The formation of his government, therefore, was at the same time an end to the period of party-based cabinets, which had continued for eight years until that point. It should be noted that members of the Saitō cabinet were appointed from both the Seiyūkai and the Minseitō. For this reason, the Saitō cabinet, as well as the subsequent Okada cabinet, was referred to as a national unity government. On 27 May, Shidehara wrote to Saitō expressing his ‘utmost delight’ at the smooth formation of the cabinet. At the time of the London Naval Treaty on Disarmament, Shidehara had been working with Saitō, who had temporarily returned to Japan while serving as the governor-general of Korea. Given their past relationship, it can be presumed that Shidehara was not necessarily discouraged by the birth of the Saitō cabinet.

Shidehara even wrote a letter expressing the ‘utmost delight in my heart’ to House of Peers Member Izawa Takio, who had assisted in the formation of the Saitō cabinet. Later, in May 1934, Shidehara asked Prime Minister Saitō to select Suzuki Fujiya as a member of the House of Peers. Suzuki had been the chief cabinet secretary for the Hamaguchi cabinet. What made Shidehara most anxious was the direction of Japan’s policies on China. With the formation of the Saitō cabinet, Uchida Yasuya returned as foreign minister after a nine-year break. Under Foreign Minister Uchida, Japan recognised Manchukuo as a state in September 1932, and, in March 1933, it notified the League of Nations of its withdrawal in opposition to the adoption of the report of the Lytton Commission and the non-recognition of Manchukuo.

Ashida Hitoshi, who became a member of the House of Representatives after an initial career as a diplomat, would reflect upon this in the postwar years:

Soon after I gained a seat in the House of Representatives, in January, the eighth year of Shōwa [1933], I gave a speech criticising the military’s continental policy. When this led to me being attacked by the right-wingers, I received an invitation from Mr. Shidehara for a chat. He said to me, ‘At the very least, you’re brave enough to say things that will make you unpopular, aren’t you?’ To this day, I still strongly remember those words of consolation.
6. FROM THE SECOND SINO-JAPANESE WAR TO THE PACIFIC WAR

Of these continental policies, the ‘Rehe Strategy’ was of particular concern for Shidehara. In February 1933, the Kwantung Army had launched an assault on China’s Rehe province. This development prompted Shidehara to pay a visit to Saionji Kinmochi at his home in Okitsu. Yoshida Shigeru, who was then waiting for a new posting, had given Shidehara an idea. Like Shidehara, Yoshida was anxious about the situation in China. His proposal was to call a meeting of the Imperial Council to try to resolve the situation, and he wanted Shidehara to try to convince Saionji of this approach. However, despite Yoshida’s best efforts, he did not succeed in convening the Imperial Council. It should be noted that Shidehara was much more indifferent to this plan than Yoshida was.\(^7\)

Nevertheless, Shidehara did subsequently support Yoshida in other matters, such as requesting that he be dispatched to Europe. The Shōwa emperor also deeply trusted Shidehara.\(^8\)

Table 3: Prime ministers and foreign ministers, 1931–45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Foreign Minister</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inukai Tsuyoshi (1931–32)</td>
<td>Yoshizawa Kenkichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saitō Makoto (1932–34)</td>
<td>Uchida Yasuya, Hirota Kōki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okada Keisuke (1934–36)</td>
<td>Hirota Kōki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirota Kōki (1936–37)</td>
<td>Arita Hachirō</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hayashi Senjūrō (1937)</td>
<td>Satō Naotake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konoe Fumimaro (1937–39)</td>
<td>Hirota Kōki, Ugaki Kazushige, Arita Hachirō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiranuma Kiichirō (1939)</td>
<td>Arita Hachirō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe Nobuyuki (1939–40)</td>
<td>Nomura Kichisaburō</td>
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<td>Yonai Mitsumasa (1940)</td>
<td>Arita Hachirō</td>
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<td>Konoe Fumimaro (1940–41)</td>
<td>Matsuoka Yōsuke, Toyoda Teijirō</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tōjō Hideki (1941–44)</td>
<td>Tōgō Shigenori, Tanı Masayuki, Shigemitsu Mamoru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koiso Kuniaki (1944–45)</td>
<td>Shigemitsu Mamoru</td>
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<td>Suzuki Kantarō (1945)</td>
<td>Tōgō Shigenori</td>
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<td>Higashikuni Naruhiko (1945)</td>
<td>Shigemitsu Mamoru, Yoshida Shigeru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shidehara Kijūrō (1945–46)</td>
<td>Yoshida Shigeru</td>
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Note: Acting foreign ministers are not listed here.
A 20-Year Memorial Anniversary for Denison

It was 3 July 1933. As the sun set upon Aoyama Cemetery, Shidehara lingered in front of the tombstone of former ministry adviser Denison. It had been exactly 20 years since Denison’s death from illness in Tokyo. Also in attendance was Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya. It was Uchida who hosted the gathering marking the anniversary of Denison’s passing.

Other diplomatic and political figures who came to pay their respects included Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki; Imperial Household Ministry Lord Chamberlain Hayashi Gonsuke; Matsui Keishirō, who had already retired from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; House of Peers Member Yoshizawa Kenkichi; and Yoshida Shigeru, who was still waiting to be assigned to a new position. These individuals were also joined by Arita Hachirō, who had just given up the post of foreign affairs vice-minister to Shigemitsu Mamoru; American and European Bureau Director-General Tōgō Shigenori; and Intelligence Department Director-General Amō Eiji. Of those gathered, however, it was Shidehara who had by far been the closest to Denison.

Before long, the attendees departed the cemetery and went to the foreign minister’s residence for a dinner in honour of Denison. Following the dinner, the group were loath to part and return home, so instead they started a discussion in the drawing room. It was there that Uchida asked Shidehara to say a few words, since he and Denison had had a ‘special relationship’. Shidehara related an anecdote that he had prepared for such an occasion.

Once, Denison had informed Shidehara that the Nile River was so fertile because of the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile further inland. Denison had said: ‘The [First] Sino-Japanese War is just like that meeting of the Blue Nile and the White Nile. Reactionary ideas and Europeanism were harmonized, fostering Japan’s advancement’. With the Russo-Japanese War, meanwhile, Japan ‘did not seek to rush forward, but at the right timing tightened the reins and then dealt with the Treaty of Portsmouth’. Denison had expressed the hope that, if the nation ever faced an existential crisis in the future, a similar attitude would help to open up a way forward.
With this anecdote, Shidehara may have sought subtly to prompt some self-reflection in Uchida, who tended to be dogmatically nationalist. Shidehara also mentioned how Denison, towards the end of his life, had wished to quit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and retire to Hayama. This wish was, unfortunately, left unfulfilled. A portrait of Denison watched over a subsequent discussion between Shidehara and Uchida. It was after 10 pm when the gathering finally dispersed.

In September that year, Uchida resigned as foreign minister. His successor was Hirota Kōki. Foreign Minister Hirota would remain in his position during the subsequent Okada cabinet, which formed in July 1934. Shidehara also expressed his admiration for Denison in a diplomacy roundtable discussion, the content of which was published in the Asahi Shimbun. This discussion took place at the Imperial Hotel on 19 February 1934. Along with Shidehara, other attendees included Makino Nobuaki, Akizuki Satsuo, Hayashi Gonsuke, Matsui Keishirō, Ishii Kikujiro and Yoshizawa Kenkichi. Kurino Shinichirō would have attended but was absent due to illness.

Beginning with treaty revision, the roundtable participants discussed a wide range of topics, including the First Sino-Japanese War, the Yihetuan Movement, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Russo-Japanese War and the era following World War I. This occasion similarly presented Shidehara with the opportunity to reminisce on Denison’s achievements and virtuousness to Japan’s most eminent diplomats. The discussion began at 3 pm and lasted until 11 pm.¹⁰

**Foreign Threats**

In January 1933, Adolf Hitler took power in Germany. Japan, which left the League of Nations in March that year, gradually came to seek an anti-communist partnership with the Nazi Party. Shidehara received information on developments in Germany from Ambassador Nagai Matsuzō. That he was critical of the Nazis is a matter of public record.¹¹

When 1934 began, Shidehara’s attention turned to the upcoming Second London Naval Conference on Disarmament, to be held as early as the following year. In April, he visited Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino and expressed his opinion. ‘The current authorities’, Shidehara argued, ‘are not capable of properly dealing with the situation’. Shidehara further suggested that Navy Minister Ōsumi Mineo be replaced. ‘The top priority
is to secure somebody far more capable for the role.' Makino had no objections on this front. Shidehara also conversed with Makino on the topic of Soviet policy.

In May 1934, Shidehara exchanged views with Konoe Fumimaro, the lord speaker of the House of Peers, concerning the Second London Naval Conference. Shidehara predicted that problems of the Far East, a number of issues regarding territory in China—and Manchuria, in particular—would not be covered during the conference. Konoe relayed Shidehara’s view to Kido Kōchi, lord keeper chief private secretary. Foreign Minister Hirota, on the other hand, believed that Far East problems could be up for deliberation. Shidehara turned out to be correct: problems of the Far East were not discussed at the Second London Naval Conference of 1935.

Regardless, Japan pulled out of the London Conference in January 1936. Then a group of military officers attempted to carry out a coup, in what became known as the ‘February 26 Incident’. Although Prime Minister Okada narrowly avoided harm, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Saitō Makoto and Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo were killed. Shidehara, who was staying at his Rikugien residence at that time, fled to Kamakura upon the instructions of police.

After the February 26 Incident, Foreign Minister Hirota replaced Okada as prime minister. The foreign minister of the new Hirota cabinet was Arita Hachirō. This government would later approve the November 1936 signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. The Soviet Union was naturally displeased, indicating that it was now unwilling to revise the Japan–Soviet Fisheries Treaty. It was then that Shidehara, who was still in political opposition, received a visitor: Konstantin K. Yurenev, the Soviet ambassador to Japan. Ambassador Yurenev alluded to the possibility of the Soviet Union refusing to sign the fisheries treaty. Shidehara strongly protested, arguing that a refusal would not only worsen the situation but also could ‘lead to us witnessing the tragedy of a Russo-Japanese War by April or May of next year’. He proposed that the two powers provisionally agree to extend the current treaty before it expired at the end of 1936.

Shidehara’s proposal was accepted. On 28 December, an interim agreement was signed in Moscow. A public proclamation of the agreement’s signing that same day would have helped ease tension between the two powers. In later years, Shigemitsu, Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, was displeased to learn of Shidehara’s unofficial diplomatic activities. According to Shigemitsu, the Soviet side:
Knew that the signing of an interim agreement had originally been suggested by Mr. Shidehara. This, unfortunately, revealed to them that the Japanese side had already given up on reaching an accord on a new treaty and would be satisfied with a mere interim agreement.\(^16\)

February 1937 saw the formation of a new cabinet under the leadership of Hayashi Senjūrō. The foreign minister was Satō Naotake.

**US Ambassador Grew: The Semblance of Shidehara Diplomacy**

Although Shidehara was a member of the House of Peers, he had no official post in government. Thus, he had almost no involvement in diplomatic negotiations during this period. The aforementioned Japan–Soviet Fisheries Interim Agreement was an exception. Nevertheless, that is not to say that Shidehara was left entirely without influence. Following the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt as president of the US in March 1933, preliminary negotiations commenced for a world economic conference. It was rumoured that both Shidehara and Ishii Kikujirō were strong contenders for the role of Japan’s plenipotentiary representative. In the end, Ishii was selected.\(^17\)

Deserving of closer attention here is the relationship between Shidehara and US Ambassador Grew. Grew was posted to Japan for close to 10 years, from 1932 until the war between Japan and the US began. Nevertheless, Grew was unable to correctly assess the political situation in Japan. His major sources of information were from moderates such as Makino Nobuaki, Kabayama Aisuke, Yoshida Shigeru and Shidehara. Grew first met Shidehara on 24 October 1932 and was deeply impressed. As he wrote in his diary: ‘I could talk with absolute frankness without the slightest fear of being misunderstood, and he has a fine sense of humor’.\(^18\)

Through his communication with Shidehara, Grew arrived at two conclusions. First, Japanese diplomacy would swing back like a ‘pendulum’ and, before long, return to a more normal state. Grew particularly hoped for a return to the kind of diplomacy that had been practised by Shidehara. Grew also saw a semblance of ‘Shidehara diplomacy’ in the approaches of Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki and Foreign Minister Satō Naotake. Although Shidehara and Grew were not in frequent contact, Grew came to see Shidehara as a pole by which to orient himself in interpreting
Japanese diplomacy. Second, Grew saw that the Shōwa emperor was a pacifist. Upon returning to the US in December 1941 after hostilities between the two nations had begun, he began to push for the preservation of the emperor system. His efforts were not unconnected to the present-day system of the emperor as symbol.

Grew’s faint hope of a return to the model of Shidehara diplomacy was to be cruelly betrayed by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, during the war years, Grew attempted to inform Americans of the moderate politicians and officials in Japan. In 1944, Grew published a collection of diary entries and official papers under the title *Ten Years in Japan*. In this book, Shidehara was frequently mentioned as a member of the Japanese moderates. Many Americans presumably first learned of Shidehara by reading *Ten Years in Japan*.19

While Grew saw a semblance of ‘Shidehara diplomacy’ in Hirota’s actions, such an interpretation does not appear in the recollections of Craigie, the British ambassador to Japan. According to Craigie, the Japanese army had been more sympathetic towards Foreign Minister Hirota of the Konoe cabinet than it had been towards former foreign minister Satō. This was because, for the army, Satō’s policy of appeasement towards China was ‘so unpleasantly associated with the name of Baron Shidehara’.20 It should be noted that, during this period, Shidehara continued to correspond with former ambassador Forbes.

The Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research Department

Amid these troubles both at home and abroad, in October 1936 Shidehara had the opportunity to give the directors of the Honolulu Museum of Art a tour of the Rikugien. The trip was organised through the America–Japan Society in the hope that it would help improve relations with the US.21

However, these hopes were not to be realised. The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 would further damage Japan’s foreign relations. At that time, the governing Konoe cabinet decided to restore
Hirota Kōki as foreign minister. Peace initiatives attempted under Foreign Minister Hirota include the Trautmann Initiative and the Wang Jingwei Initiative. These initiatives received their names from two key figures: respectively, Oskar Paul Trautmann, German ambassador to China, and Wang Jingwei, a powerful figure in the Chinese Nationalist Party. According to *A Shōwa Emperor Monologue*, the Shōwa emperor once stated that:

> After the fall of Nanjing, a peace initiative was carried out through the mediation of the German ambassador. However, according to Shidehara [Kijūrō, former foreign minister], Japan’s proposal at that time was apparently torn up by Soong Mei-ling [Madame Chiang Kai-shek] and never reached Chiang Kai-shek himself.²²

Another peace initiative undertaken during the Second Sino-Japanese War was the Ugaki Initiative. In May 1938, former war minister Ugaki Kazushige replaced Hirota as foreign minister in the Konoe cabinet. At that time, Ugaki made peace negotiations with China a condition for his joining the cabinet. While in agreement with this new Ugaki Initiative, Shidehara undertook his own manoeuvrings from the outside. Kido Kōichi, minister of health and welfare, wrote in his diary: ‘I have information that Mr. Shidehara is being very active outside of the cabinet’.²³ Shidehara also made contact with his ex-subordinate, Asian Bureau Director-General Ishii Itarō. Ishii had been working to try and prevent the Second Sino-Japanese War from expanding.

However, the Konoe cabinet was unsuccessful in resolving the conflict, leading to resignation en masse. A new cabinet was subsequently formed under Hiranuma Kiichirō in January 1939. Before his nomination as prime minister, Hiranuma was serving as the chairman of the Privy Council. During the Hiranuma cabinet, Shidehara met with Ugaki Kazushige and critically examined the proposal for an alliance between Japan and Germany.²⁴

At this time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Research Department was editing a compilation of ministry records and diplomatic officer memoirs. The Research Department had been established in December 1933. In June 1936, the Research Department published the first volume of *Dai Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* (Documents on Japanese foreign policy) from the Japan International Association.²⁵ This important inaugural volume was a systematic collection of diplomatic documents from the early Meiji period relating to unequal treaty reform. To this day it constitutes
a foundational resource for scholars seeking to understand Japan’s modern diplomatic history. By 1940, a total of nine volumes were published in this series. However, work ceased at that point due to the Pacific War. In fact, Shidehara himself assisted the Research Department with this project. Fonder of the ministry than anyone, meticulous Shidehara could hardly be indifferent to such an undertaking relating to ministry records and diplomatic history.26

Having been away from the ministry for so long by this point, Shidehara had no objection to writing his own contributions to the history of Japanese diplomacy. In February 1939, Shidehara wrote a draft for ministry officials, titled ‘Washington Kaigi no Rimen-kan Sonota’ (Behind the scenes of the Washington Naval Conference and others). In this text, Shidehara made reference to the ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘open door’ provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. He described how ‘in recent years I have heard speculation that these provisions were initially proposed by the U.K. and the U.S., so that these powers could restrict Japan’s economic activities in China’. However, he responded that the pursuit of:

Equality of opportunity and open-door [ideals] in China was originally promoted by our nation since the time of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as an important principle for regulating China’s relationships with outside nations.27

In a roundabout way, Shidehara was criticising contemporary Japanese diplomacy with respect to the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Next, in April of the same year, Shidehara wrote a paper detailing the circumstances surrounding the Japan–Soviet Fisheries Interim Agreement, again for practical use by ministry officials as a reference. It was titled: ‘Shōwa 11-nen 12-gatsu Nisso Gyogyō Zantei Kyōtei Seiritsu nikansuru Keii no Ichikyokumen’ (A perspective on the circumstances relating to the establishment of the Japan–Soviet Fisheries Interim Agreement in December, Shōwa 11 [1936]). Then, in April 1940, Shidehara composed another paper, titled ‘Gaikō Bunsho no Buntai, Kisōsha no Kokoroe narabini Shoshu no Keishiki’ (Writing style for diplomatic documents, important knowledge for drafters, different types of forms). In this text, Shidehara drew upon such sources as the teachings he once received from Denison on topics such as the diplomacy surrounding the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War, and the style rules to follow when writing diplomatic documents.28
World War II

In August 1939 Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed the German–Soviet Nonaggression Pact. The following month, Germany invaded Poland, triggering World War II. Shown to be at the mercy of developments in Europe, the Hiranuma cabinet resigned. The subsequent cabinets of Abe Nobuyuki and Yonai Mitsumasa were similarly short-lived.

In June 1940, Shidehara wrote an essay in English expressing his thoughts on the situation. In this English essay, titled ‘Outlook of the European War’, Shidehara considered the influence that World War II would have upon the Second Sino-Japanese War, while at the same time attempting to take a clear view of the events in Europe. He sent a five-page draft of this essay to Makino Nobuaki. However, he later asked Nobuaki to burn this draft, because it was based on inaccurate information.

In ‘Outlook of the European War’, Shidehara asserted that, in order to gain an upper hand in the war, Germany could take one of three paths. First, Germany could try to pressure the UK and France to surrender on the condition that they disarm themselves and dismantle their empires. Yet, Shidehara noted, this approach was unlikely to proceed smoothly. It was hard to believe that the UK or France would tolerate foreign domination. The British Commonwealth, in particular, was not under the influence of the German military. Second, Germany could seek a compromise, offering a peace deal that would spare the UK and France from complete defeat. Shidehara regarded this option as more feasible than the first. In this case, the UK and France would gradually recover their strength with the help of the US. Third, Germany could pursue the war to the very end. In this scenario, the UK and France would be supported by their colonies’ resources and would probably be more able than Germany to maintain the strength necessary for victory.

From Shidehara’s perspective, therefore, the general outlook for Germany was grim. Its flagrantly illegal actions were unlikely to be forgiven, and ‘the memory of the tragedy will long stand in the way of a lasting peace in Europe’. At the end of the essay, Shidehara quoted A. L. Kennedy’s work *Old Diplomacy and New, 1876–1922, from Salisbury to Lloyd-George*, concerning Germany and the UK during World War I. Kennedy wrote: ‘Germany had no scruples; we had some—too few for honor, too many for success’. Shidehara concluded ‘Outlook of the European War’ with the well-known observation: ‘History often repeats itself’.
wrote this manuscript on 14 June 1940—the very day the German army occupied Paris. Hitler’s advance continued unimpeded. Given this situation, Shidehara’s prediction that Germany would ultimately not prevail was quite insightful. It was the kind of assessment to be expected from a man such as Shidehara, whose ideals had been inspired by British-style diplomacy.

The Pacific War

Outbreak of War between Japan and the US

The second Konoe cabinet was formed in July 1940. This time, the post of foreign minister went to Matsuoka Yōsuke. Under his guidance, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September that year. As the above discussion makes clear, Shidehara was critical of Matsuoka’s diplomatic efforts and his siding with Germany.

October saw the inauguration of a new organisation of a government-made national movement known as the Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association). While Shidehara was a member of the House of Peers, he did not participate. Shidehara was absolutely opposed to the idea of Japan going to war with the US. Nevertheless, this is not to say that he personally did all that he could to prevent the situation from heading in that direction. Towards the end of July 1941, the Japanese army advanced into the southern part of French Indochina. In response, the Roosevelt administration banned all oil exports to Japan. It was then that Shidehara had a meeting with Prime Minister Konoe. Shidehara has left behind some testimony as to what was discussed during the meeting. According to Shidehara:

I did my best to warn Duke Konoe that his diplomatic policy was mistaken. Duke Konoe was extremely regretful that Japan had already taken such steps as signing the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact. In other words, Shidehara had urged Konoe to reflect seriously on how he had contributed to the current crisis.

Following this meeting, Konoe began to mull over a plan: to visit the US himself and meet directly with Roosevelt. Such a decisive stance was quite rare for Konoe. At the beginning of August, Konoe secretly dispatched
Itō Nobufumi, director-general of the Intelligence Department, to Shidehara’s residence in Sendagaya. The intention was to seek out the opinion of a third party concerning this plan. However, Shidehara:

Would not easily offer a constructive opinion, simply repeating modestly that he had been away from the political world for so long that he could not really say what ought to be done.\(^{35}\)

In the end, the cabinet collapsed without Konoe ever meeting Roosevelt. October 1941 saw the formation of the Tōjō Hideki cabinet, with Tōgō Shigenori as foreign minister. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, there was a final attempt at negotiations with the US. The proposal was that Japan would offer to withdraw its army from southern French Indochina on the condition that the embargo on oil exports would be dropped. It was Shidehara who initially suggested this approach. He had suggested it to Yoshida Shigeru, who then passed it on to Foreign Minister Tōgō, who in turn made his own additions. Even at the last minute, Shidehara responded to Yoshida’s request in offering advice to Konoe and Kido.\(^{36}\)

In the end, however, negotiations with the US were abandoned, and Japan ultimately launched an attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December.

**Kiyosawa Kiyoshi**

Even as the Pacific War loomed ever closer, Shidehara did not lose his interest in diplomatic history. In fact, through cooperation with diplomatic commentator Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, Shidehara began to involve himself in diplomatic history research. In June 1941, Kiyosawa published a historical overview titled *Gaikō-shi* (Diplomatic history).\(^{37}\) Kiyosawa presented a copy of his book to Shidehara. Shidehara’s letter of thanks is fascinating. He wrote:

There are many, even among our own citizens, who need to properly grasp the true nature of our government’s politics and actions … Your book is extremely valuable for its potential to help improve our present situation.\(^{38}\)

In other words, it was difficult for insiders and outsiders alike to fully appreciate the realities of Japanese diplomacy. Shidehara hoped that Kiyosawa’s work could make a significant contribution in this respect and thus even assist in addressing the then-unfolding crisis. Shidehara lamented the extent to which Japan’s citizens were ignorant of how diplomacy actually worked.
Even after war broke out between Japan and the US in December 1941, Shidehara continued to support Kiyosawa’s production of a chronology of Japanese diplomacy. Indeed, if anything, Shidehara was more of a scholar than Kiyosawa; he was very strict in noting erroneous entries or the omission of important documents. When given a copy of Tōan Kō Seiwa (A dialogue by Tōan-kō [Saionji Kinmochi]) by the editor Harada Kumao, Shidehara even pointed out a mistake with regard to the Chinese name that appeared in the work. 39 ‘Tōan’ was a moniker of Saionji Kinmochi. Harada had worked as Saionji’s secretary for many years, but the elder statesman passed away in November 1940.

Shidehara met with Kiyosawa again at the end of February 1943 to relay details on proceedings in the House of Peers. According to Shidehara, several members had inquired as to the ‘postwar plan’, but Foreign Minister Tani Masayuki of the Tōjō cabinet had simply replied that it was under consideration. Aoki Kazuo, the minister for Greater East Asia, had reacted furiously, demanding: ‘How can you ask about postwar plans when the war is still going on?’ 40

On 20 November 1944, Kiyosawa visited Shidehara at his home. Shidehara brought Kiyosawa up to the second floor, where he had an impressive study of over 36 square metres. Shidehara’s study was filled with books, including recent publications. Kiyosawa had come to ask Shidehara to give an address on the occasion of the inauguration of the Japanese Diplomatic History Research Institute. Shidehara willingly accepted and even promised to join the institute in an advisory role. The new institute was inaugurated on 5 December that year. Along with Shidehara himself, attendees included such figures as Itō Masanori, Ishibashi T anzan, Tamura Kōsaku, Uehara Etsujirō, Matsumoto Jōji, Ashida Hitoshi, Baba Tsunego and Shinobu Junpei. Following welcomes by Kiyosawa and Ashida, it was time for Shidehara’s address. Shidehara used the opportunity to share some little-known anecdotes regarding the Russo-Japanese War and the Washington Naval Conference. Later, he would attend regular meetings of the institute, giving him the opportunity to go into more detail about his memories of various Japanese diplomatic events.

Kiyosawa wrote in his diary that Shidehara ‘was certainly an extremely capable diplomat’. Kiyosawa also transcribed the contents of these discussions, which he sent to Shidehara. While Kiyosawa also visited other diplomatic figures such as Matsui Keishirō, Ishii Kikujiro and
Makino Nobuaki, he thought that when it came to powers of recollection, ‘Shidehara was outstanding’.\textsuperscript{41} Shidehara gave another address to Kiyosawa’s institute on 18 January 1945. However, he was apparently dissatisfied with Kiyosawa’s shorthand notetaking. He wanted every word and phrase captured, down to the smallest detail. His solution was to write the draft for his talk himself and give it to Kiyosawa. According to Kiyosawa, Shidehara was:

Very sensitive about [the importance of] accurate wording, both as a diplomat and as a man of law. If I shared a draft with him, he would make so many changes that the original text would become entirely obliterated.\textsuperscript{42}

Shidehara also published some anecdotes about Denison in a diplomatic journal, \textit{Gaikō Jihō}.\textsuperscript{43}

**Arguments for an Early Peace**

During this time, around 1943, the war situation began to deteriorate. Though now a former diplomat, Yoshida Shigeru made great efforts to secure a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Along with Wakatsuki Reijirō, Yoshida began to lay a plan to gain Masaki Jinzaburō’s cooperation in forming a new cabinet, headed by Kobayashi Seizō. His hope was to install Shidehara as foreign minister and ‘entrust him with conducting peace talks’.\textsuperscript{44} Though perhaps not to the extent that Yoshida did, Shidehara also contributed to this plan. He spoke with figures such as Konoe, Kido, Prince Takamatsu and Prince Higashikuni in an attempt to bring them around. The idea was to sue for peace with the UK and the US under favourable conditions, while the war situation was still sufficiently advantageous. Shidehara held to the idea of suing for an early peace until at least August 1943.\textsuperscript{45}

In reality, by this time, there was no real hope for establishing a peace agreement. In June 1944, Japan lost the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and, the following month, the island of Saipan fell to the Allied forces. By this stage, it was undeniable that Japan was losing. At around this time, Shidehara was able to keep up with events via sources such as House of Representatives Member Tsurumi Yūsuke. Shidehara also attended, on a near-monthly basis, the regular meetings of the Diplomatic Research Institute hosted by the Gaikō Jihōsha (Diplomatic Review Company). There, he would listen to explanations provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by military officials.\textsuperscript{46}
In July 1944, a new cabinet was formed under Koiso Kuniaki. On the Allied side, meanwhile, October that year saw the issuance of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal. This proposal concerned the founding of a new international organisation that could replace the League of Nations after the war. In response to this development, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Sawada Renzō invited Shidehara to his residence in December. Also in attendance on that day was temporary ministry employee Takayanagi Kenzō, professor at the University of Tokyo. The topic for discussion was how to respond to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal. We do not know for sure what kind of comments Shidehara made. However, we do know that Shidehara was sceptical not only of the League of Nations but also of its successor, the United Nations. Presumably, had Japan still been at war, he would not have supported the proposal.

At this time, Shidehara began to argue to Kiyosawa that ‘attempts at reaching a peace deal are completely hopeless and only harmful’. If Japan wants peace, he thought, ‘we should create a situation where the other side is forced to seek it’. As the war situation became increasingly grim, Shidehara apparently began to embrace the view that Japan should resist to the bitter end. Kiyosawa was unable to comprehend Shidehara’s thinking in this regard. Kiyosawa could not foresee how an opportunity for peace could ever arise out of stubborn resistance.

Shidehara was also resistant to the plan to end the war put forth by former member of the House of Representatives Uehara Etsujirō. Uehara had met with figures such as Shidehara, Wakatsuki Reijirō, and Okada Keisuke. Okada himself had already given up on the Koiso cabinet. According to Uehara, however, Shidehara ‘simply thought that [Japan] ought to resist to the very end; [Shidehara] was not thinking about domestic political matters at all’. Uehara therefore decided to seek out Kiyosawa’s assistance in convincing Shidehara.

Another plan to end the war was formulated by seven professors from the University of Tokyo Law Department, including Nanbara Shigeru, Takagi Yasaka and Tanaka Kōtarō. They had received word of the moderate peace policy advanced by Undersecretary of State Grew and other members of the State Department. Nanbara and Takagi argued that ‘we should take appropriate steps with regard to the war situation, while emphasizing the need to protect the national polity’. However, Shidehara was similarly nonplussed at this idea. Shidehara conversely told Nanbara and his associates that a scorched-earth policy was the only option; the citizens of...
Japan needed to fight until the bitter end. The professors were extremely surprised and disappointed by this stance. Responding in such a fashion, Shidehara must have seemed particularly lacking in enthusiasm for peace, even when compared with Ugaki Kazushige, whom Nanbara and Takaki had also spoken with.

In the Great Tokyo Air Raid of 10 March 1945, Shidehara’s one-time matchmaker, Ishii Kikujirō, went missing. Shidehara’s residence in Sendagaya also burned down. Concerning what was left of the book collection bequeathed to him by Denison, Shidehara noted that:

> It was destroyed in Shōwa 20 [1945] when my home in Sendagaya was hit by bombing. Not a single volume remains. Reflecting back upon the past, I am truly filled with deep emotion.\(^51\)

In April, yet another cabinet was formed. This time the leader was Suzuki Kantarō. In the bombing of 26 May, even the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was destroyed, forcing the staff to move to the fourth floor of the Ministry of Education.\(^52\) In July, Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori began to seek a peace accord via Soviet mediation. Konoe Fumimaro’s name arose for the role of special envoy to the Soviets. The plan was for Konoe to visit the Soviet Union with a special letter from the Shōwa emperor. Shidehara was deeply mistrustful of this proposal. A letter from the emperor would have no hope of changing the course of events. If anything, it would simply bring trouble to the imperial household. Naturally, the response from the Soviet Union was frosty, and the proposal was abandoned.\(^53\)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs records that have been made public in recent years show that Shidehara’s premonition about the plan was correct. According to these records, in mid-July a message was sent from Tokyo to Moscow. It ‘effectively’ expressed, ‘in accordance with the will of the emperor of Japan, the desire to end the war’.\(^54\) The main meaning of the emperor’s letter that Konoe was supposed to bring with him had apparently reached the Soviet Union regardless. Premier Stalin relayed the details of the emperor’s message to the UK and the US during the Potsdam Conference. However, thanks to their interception of Japan’s radio communication, US president Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes were already well aware of Japan’s efforts to seek peace through mediation with the Soviet Union.
At the beginning of August, US forces dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet Union also entered the war against Japan, advancing into Manchuria and Sakhalin. Japan now had no choice but to accept the Potsdam Declaration, through the Shōwa emperor’s ‘imperial decision’ or seidan in Japanese.

From Defeat to Recovery

This chapter has traced Japan’s path from the collapse of the Wakatsuki cabinet to wartime defeat. Now in political opposition, Shidehara had already been effectively forgotten. Probably his only direct participation in diplomatic affairs was with the negotiations for the Japan–Soviet Fisheries Interim Agreement. That said, his mind remained sharp. This was demonstrated by his participation in various roundtable discussions, while at the same time assisting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research Department with their efforts to compile historical documents. Even with respect to his relationship with Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, Shidehara remained, if anything, too exact when it came to accounts of events in Japanese diplomatic history. Shidehara also displayed some insight when formulating his assessment of how World War II was likely to unfold.

However, when it came to the formulation of peace plans, Shidehara did not demonstrate the kind of resolute action displayed by Yoshida Shigeru. Although he proposed suing for early peace after the Pacific War began, the hard realities of the time did not permit such a strategy. What is particularly enigmatic is how Shidehara became a proponent of fighting to the bitter end once the Pacific War reached its final stages. He had lost his ability to understand the situation. There is an undeniable inconsistency between this position and his previous call for suing for an early peace.

There are two possible ways of understanding Shidehara’s thinking in this regard. The first interpretation is that Shidehara was poor at handling a crisis. This interpretation fits with how he reacted to the Manchurian Incident as foreign minister. The second interpretation was that Shidehara foresaw Japan’s total defeat. Although this theory cannot be proven on the basis of historical documents, it is not altogether unlikely. It may be that Shidehara anticipated that Japan would be utterly defeated and yet held onto the hope that it would subsequently recover.
6. FROM THE SECOND SINO-JAPANESE WAR TO THE PACIFIC WAR

Endnotes

1 This chapter is based on my previous work: Hattori Ryūji, ‘Nicchū Sensō-ki no Shidehara Kijūrō’ [Shidehara Kijūrō during the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War], Chūō Daigaku Seisaku Bunka Sōgi Kenkyū-jo Nenpō, no. 7 (June 2004): 3–15.

2 Broadly speaking, there are two views on Shidehara’s career regarding the period beginning here and stretching until the outbreak of the Pacific War. According to the first interpretation, Shidehara was a pacifist who was tirelessly concerned with the fate of Japan. A classic example of this view is presented in Shidehara Peace Foundation, Shidehara Kijūrō, 492–551, which focuses on Shidehara’s correspondence with his close friend, Ōdaira Komatsuchi, to emphasise that ‘Shidehara was a noble-minded human being, patriotically concerned for the welfare of his country’. It is in this context that the text emphasises incidents such as Shidehara’s objection to Japan forming the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

The second interpretation sees Shidehara as an apologist for invasion, which is evident in Kunugi Toshihiro, ‘Shidehara Kijūrō: “Heiwa Gaikō” no Honne to Tatemae’ [Shidehara Kijūrō: The underlying motives and the official stance of the ’diplomacy of peace’], in Haisen Zengo [Before and after the defeat], ed. Hiroshi Yoshida et al. (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1995), 85–131. According to Kunugi, Shidehara was an ‘international apologist for the Kwantung Army’ during the period of the Manchurian Incident, and even as defeat inevitably approached in the Pacific War, he argued that Japan had to resist to the bitter end.

Thus, we have been presented with two different interpretations of Shidehara’s actions in this period. In the following discussion, I clarify the matter through historical documents that have become public in recent years, including Itō and Hirose, Makino Nobuaki Nikki; Yoshida Shigeru Memorial Project Foundation, Yoshida Shigeru Shokan; Prince Takamatsu Nobuhito, Takamatsu-no-miya Nikki [The diary of Takamatsu-no-miya], vols 4–7 (Tokyo: Chuōkōronsha, 1996–1997); Izawa Takio Document Research Association, Izawa Takio Kankei Bunsho. Through these historical documents, Shidehara’s stance will be contrasted with that of Yoshida Shigeru.


4 Shidehara to Saitō, 27 May 1932, in ‘Saitō Makoto Kankei Bunsho’, Correspondence Department, Reel 34.

5 Shidehara to Izawa, 1 June 1932, in Izawa Takio Document Research Association, Izawa Takio Kankei Bunsho, 266; Shidehara to Saitō, 14 May 1934, ‘Saitō Makoto Kankei Bunsho’, Correspondence Department, Reel 34.

For further information on Izawa during this period, see Kurokawa Norio, ‘Chūkan Naikaku-ki no Izawa Takio’ [Izawa Takio during the period of the interim cabinet], in Izawa Takio to Kindai Nihon [Izawa Takio and modern Japan], ed. Onishi Hiroshi (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō Shuppan, 2003), 141–65.

6 Asahi Shimbun, 11 March 1951.


8 Itō and Hirose, Makino Nobuaki Nikki, 495, 588, 611.

9 Kishi Kuramatsu, ‘Ko-Gaimushō Hōritsu Komon Denison-shi 20 Nenki Tsuioku-kai-ki’ [Records of the 20-year anniversary memorial for the late Mr Denison, legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], September 1933, in Gaimushō Gaikokujuinin Yatoiire Ikken (Fu-Keiyakusho) Bessatsu ‘Denison’-shi Kankei. There is also a document titled ‘Denison Tsuioku-kai deno Makino Nobuaki Danwa (1 Tsuzuri)’ [A discussion on Makino Nobuaki at the Denison anniversary memorial (a writing pad)],


11 Nagai, ‘Shidehara Danshaku no Omoide’.


The expectations that Grew had for Shidehara were not realistic for Japan at that time. Baba Tsunego suggested that, even if Shidehara diplomacy were to revive, the situation would not have significantly changed. See Baba Tsunego, ‘Shidehara Gaikō wa Doko e Yuku’ [Which way for Shidehara diplomacy], *Bungei Shunjū*, no. 6 (June 1933): 206–10. For details on Grew’s expectations with Foreign Minister Hirota, see Maxwell McLaughey Hamilton diary, 29 September 1933, Maxwell McLaughey Hamilton Papers, Box 1, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.


26 Outline of a dialogue with Shidehara (Komagome Residence), 24 October 1933, in ‘Shōshushi Kankei Zakken’, vol. 1.
32 Shidehara, ‘Outlook of the European War’.
34 Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Nakajima Yadanji-shi no Nihon Sensō Kahi no Dorasu ni Shōshu no Keishiki’ [Testimony relating to Mr Nakajima Yadanji’s work to promote the avoidance of war and an early peace], 8 May 1949, in ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 7; Shidehara, Gaikō 50 Nen, 207–09.
35 Itō Nobufumi, ‘Nihon no Shin-Gaikō to Shidehara-san’ [Mr Shidehara and Japan’s new diplomacy], date unknown, in ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 13.
43 Shidēhara Kijūrō, ‘Gaijin nimo Kono Hito Ari’ [Even among foreigners there are men such as this], Gaikō Jihō, no. 948 (August 1944): 24–28.
It should also be noted that Higashikuni Narihiko, Higashikuni Narihiko Nikki: Nihon Gekidō-ki no Hiroku [The diary of Higashikuni Narihiko: Confidential papers on Japan’s era of tumult] (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1968), 121–23, is not a correct reprinting of ‘Higashikuni-no-miya Nisshi’.
47 The full details of this matter remain unclear, even within works such as Sawada, Gaienshon Hiroba; Sawada, Zaikuk, Zaibutsu.
6. FROM THE SECOND SINO-JAPANESE WAR TO THE PACIFIC WAR


49 Kiyosawa Kiyoshi also depicted Shidehara as indifferent to attempts to bring the war to an end. See Kiyosawa, Ankoku Nikki, 563–64; Watanabe Tetsuzō, Tenno no Aru Kuni no Kenpo [The constitution of a nation with an emperor] (Tokyo: Jiyū Asia-sha, 1964), 166.


51 Shidehara, Gaikō 50 Nen, 248.


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