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menuAlliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation
- First Page
- Preliminary Pages
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1. Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation
- Part I: Alliances, Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability in the Indo-Pacific
- 2. US Defence Strategy and Alliances in the Indo-Pacific
- 3. Nuclear Deterrence and the US–China Strategic Relationship
- 4. US Allies and Nuclear Weapons Cooperation
- 5. The Future of Arms Control and Strategic Stability in the Indo-Pacific
- Part II: Political-Military Challenges in Alliance Planning for Escalation
- 6. NATO: Ambiguity about Escalation in a Multinational Alliance
- 7. South Korea: The Limits of Operational Integration
- 8. Japan: The Political Costs of Deterrence
- 9. Australia: Maximising Discretion in an Untested Alliance
- Part III: Nuclear Weapons and Non‑Nuclear Capabilities
- 10. New Capabilities and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe
- 11. Nuclear Sharing and NATO as a ‘Nuclear Alliance’
- 12. US Nuclear Weapons and US Alliances in North-East Asia
- 13. The Impact of New Capabilities on the Regional Deterrence Architecture in North-East Asia
- 14. Australia’s Shrinking Advantages: How Technology Might Defeat Geography
- Part IV: Bringing the Public Along: Talking about Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence
- 15. Non-Nuclear Allies and Declaratory Policy: The NATO Experience
- 16. Public Communication on Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament: The Challenge for Australia
- 17. On ‘Campaigning’ for Nuclear Deterrence
- Conclusions
- 18. Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century
- Author Biographies
