

New Zealand's First MMP Election

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IN a binding referendum held in 1993, a clear majority of New Zealand voters supported a proposal to replace the first-past-the-post (FPP) electoral system — used since 1853 — with the mixed-member-proportional (MMP) electoral system. MMP, which was closely modelled on the West German post-World War II electoral system and is often referred to as an 'additional member system' (Kaase, 1984:164), had been recommended by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System in 1986. The first MMP general election was held on 12 October 1996.

The Politics of Electoral Change

The path to electoral change, which centred for the most part on the notion of 'fair representation', was a response to three main factors. First, at the 1978 election Social Credit, a third party in New Zealand's mainly two-party system, won 16.1 per cent of the total votes cast but only 1.1 per cent of the parliamentary seats. Henceforth, with the notable exception of the 1987 election, a significant proportion of the total vote in each election was cast for parties other than the Labour and the National parties even though these two parties continued to win nearly all seats.

Second, the electorate became increasingly disenchanted after 1984 when both main parties, in turn, broke solemn commitments not to tamper with the basic infrastructure of New Zealand society (McRobie, 1991; 1992:404-11). According to the Heylen polls, the public's trust and confidence in parliament and its members plummeted from 32 per cent in 1975 to 4 per cent in 1992 (Heylen Research Centre, 1992).

Third, in both 1978 and 1981 Labour won more votes overall than National but failed to win office (James & McRobie, 1993:310). As a result, Labour promised that, once in power, it would establish a Royal Commission to examine the existing electoral system with a view to recommending change. The Commission was appointed in 1985 and presented its report to the Governor-General in December 1986.

The Commission's Report recommended that MMP should be adopted following extensive public debate, but only if a majority of voters approved the proposed change through a binding referendum to be held no later than the general election scheduled for 1990 (RCES, 1986: 64-5). Predictably, this radical proposal won virtually no support from sitting MPs, and it was not until the 1990 election approached that a bipartisan consensus emerged in favour of a referendum. The vic-

torious National Party later abandoned its commitment to hold a binding referendum prior to the 1993 election, and instead adopted a two-stage referendum process. An indicative referendum held in September 1992 strongly endorsed both the option of changing the electoral system and MMP as the preferred alternative (McRobie, 1993:57). In the November 1993 binding referendum, the adoption of MMP was endorsed by 53.9 per cent of the votes cast (Boston et al., 1996:22-3).

The Structure of MMP

The Royal Commission proposed a fully proportional electoral system in which all qualifying parties would be represented in parliament in proportion to their overall electoral support. Parliament would have 120 members, 60 elected to represent single-member constituencies (electorates) and 60 from closed, national lists prepared by registered parties.¹ Electors would have two votes — one for a political party and the other for their constituency MP — but the party vote alone would determine each party's total seat entitlement. To secure parliamentary representation, a party would have to reach a threshold of 4 per cent of the party vote or at least one constituency seat. Separate Maori constituencies, a feature of New Zealand's FPP electoral system since 1867, would be abolished and all electors registered on a single roll (RCES, 1986: 65-70).

The 1993 Electoral Act broadly followed this structure, although politicians incorporated a number of changes, of which the most important was the retention of separate Maori representation. Maori campaigned successfully to retain separate Maori representation and to ensure that the number of Maori electorates should be calculated in the same way as the number of General seats. After MMP was adopted, five Maori constituencies were established, raising the total number of constituency seats to 65 and reducing the number of list seats to 55. The threshold was set at 5 per cent in order to make it even more difficult for smaller parties to win seats under MMP.

The Royal Commission's Case for the Adoption of MMP

Early in its deliberations the Royal Commission embraced ten criteria for evaluating the advantages and drawbacks of both FPP and a range of possible alternative electoral systems. While acknowledging that no electoral system was likely to fully meet all criteria, its goal was to identify an electoral system that provided 'the most satisfactory overall balance between them' (RCES, 1986:11).

Of the ten criteria adopted (RCES, 1986:11-12), three stand out. First was *fairness between political parties*. The Commission came to the view that modern elections were first and foremost about choosing between alternative party governments. Second, there should be *effective representation for significant minority and special interest groups* and that MPs should also reflect other significant socio-

¹ The Commission accepted that overall proportionality could be maintained if there were more than 60 constituency seats and, therefore, fewer list seats.

economic characteristics making up the electorate. Third, as the indigenous people, *Maori should be fairly and effectively represented*; the Commission concluded that FPP had not served Maori well because, for more than 40 years, the dedicated Maori seats had been totally dominated by one political party.² Although significant, the remaining seven criteria were less important (see p. 340 below).

The Royal Commission's emphasis on the central role of political parties in modern democracies led, inevitably, to a consideration of some form of proportional representation. After examining both the West German additional member system (the Commission itself coined the term 'mixed member proportional' to describe that system) and the variants of the Single Transferable Vote system (STV) used to elect Eire's Dail and the Australian Senate, it concluded that

... MMP is clearly superior. It is fairer to supporters of significant *political parties* and likely to provide more *effective representation* of Maori and other *minority and special interest groups*. It is likely to provide a more *effective Parliament* and also has advantages in terms of *voter participation* and *legitimacy*. (RCES, 1986:63; emphasis added)³

In the Commission's view, MMP fulfilled at least six of its ten criteria. It recognised the central significance of political parties, which electoral law had almost ignored under FPP. The abolition of separate Maori electorates and the introduction of a single common roll would enhance Maori representation because all MPs, not just those representing Maori electorates, would have to take account of Maori interests and concerns. MMP would also encourage parties to nominate lists which would enhance the representation of women and other groups that, historically, were under-represented under FPP. Finally, because the party vote would determine the final composition of parliament, nearly every vote cast would contribute positively to the result.

MMP in Practice: The 1993 and 1996 General Elections Compared

How does the experience of the first MMP election measure up against the expectations held for it?

Party representation. For 60 years New Zealand elections had consistently produced single-party governments, usually with significantly inflated parliamentary majorities. Between 1935 and 1993 the victorious party won an average of 58.1 per cent of the parliamentary seats with an average of 46.6 per cent of the total vote. By

² Labour won all four Maori seats at every election between 1943 and 1990. National has had at least one, and on occasions up to three, MPs of Maori descent representing General electorates.

³ In addition to MMP and STV, the Commission examined the Supplementary Member system (a system involving the allocation of Supplementary Seats), Approval Voting, Alternative (Preferential) Voting, and a range of alternative plurality systems such as At-large Voting, the Limited Vote, Single Non-transferable Vote, Cumulative Vote, and the Second Ballot (RCES, 1986:28-38.).

contrast, all parties other than Labour and National averaged 12.0 per cent of the total vote but won only 0.1 per cent of the seats. In 1993 Labour and National together won 69.8 per cent of votes cast but 96.0 per cent of the parliamentary seats.

In 1996 their share of parliamentary seats reflected their overall electoral support much more closely: 62.0 per cent of the party vote and 67.5 per cent of the seats. New Zealand First and the Alliance,⁴ both of which had contested the 1993 election with only minimal parliamentary success to show for their electoral support, also won seats proportionate to their electoral support. So did two new parties, the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT) and United, each of which won a constituency seat. In United's case this was vitally important because it meant that the 5 per cent threshold was waived. The Christian Coalition, on the other hand, won 4.3 per cent of the party vote but failed to gain parliamentary representation because it did not win at least one electorate seat. By ensuring that parliamentary seats are allocated to parties in proportion to their overall electoral support, the substantial distortions between votes won and seats gained have been eliminated. Table 1 details the results from the 1993 and 1996 general elections.

Table 1: Results of the 1993 and 1996 general elections

	1993		1996				
	Votes won (%)	Seats won	Party votes won (%)	Qualifying party's share (%)**	Electorate	List	Total
National	35.1	50 (50.5%)	33.8	36.6	30 (46.2%)	14 (25.5%)	44 (36.7%)
Labour	34.7	45 (45.5%)	28.2	30.5	26 (40.0%)	11 (20.0%)	37 (30.8%)
NZ First	8.4	2 (2.0%)	13.4	14.5	6 (9.3%)	11 (20.0%)	17 (14.2%)
Alliance	18.2	2 (2.0%)	10.1	10.9	1 (1.5%)	12 (21.8%)	13 (10.8%)
ACT	-	-	6.1	6.6	1 (1.5%)	7 (12.7%)	8 (6.7%)
United	-	-	0.9	1.0	1 (1.5%)	0	1 (0.8%)
Christian Coalition*	2.0	-	4.3	-	-	-	-
Others	1.7	-	3.2	-	-	-	-

*Christian Heritage Party in 1993. **After the 7.5% of party votes cast for parties failing to reach the 5% threshold.

Source: *AJHR* (1994, 1997).

Gender representation. Historically, New Zealand's parliament has been dominated by males; the Royal Commission noted (RCES, 1986:17) that:

(W)hile the percentage of women in New Zealand's current Parliament compares favourably with many other nations, ... the Commission share(s)

⁴ The Alliance, established in 1991, is a coalition of five parties: New Labour (formed in 1989 after its leader, Jim Anderton, broke with Labour), NZ Democrats (formerly Social Credit), Mana Motuhake (formed in 1981 after its first leader, Mātiu Rata, broke with Labour), Liberals (formed in 1991 by two disaffected National MPs), and the Greens.

the concerns expressed ... about the continued under-representation of women in our political system.

The first woman MP was elected in 1933; and it was not until 1993 that the proportion of female MPs exceeded 20 per cent. Further, until 1996 most women MPs belonged to the Labour Party; only once in the last four FPP elections did Labour not have more than half of all women MPs within its ranks.

The first MMP election brought about a significant increase in the number of female MPs: from 21.1 per cent in 1993 to 29.2 per cent following the 1996 election. Although still not proportionate to total population, it represents a substantial increase on any previous parliament. MMP has not only encouraged parties to nominate a greater proportion of women candidates but it has encouraged them to rank women candidates sufficiently high on their party lists for them to have a reasonable chance of being elected (Table 2). A recent study by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (*Sunday Star-Times*, 30 March 1997) ranks New Zealand sixth (behind the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands) in terms of its proportion of women MPs. Further, the number of women MPs is now distributed much more evenly across all parties with more than one MP in the parliament (see Table 3).

Table 2: Percentage of female candidates nominated by parties, 1993 and 1996

	<i>National</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>NZ First</i>	<i>Alliance</i>	<i>ACT</i>	<i>United</i>	<i>Christian Coalition*</i>	<i>All others</i>
1993	19.4	32.3	31.0	28.3	-	-	18.6	29.4
1996	24.4	35.7	24.6	35.4	19.1	20.7	20.8	26.7

*Christian Heritage in 1993.

Source: *AJHR* (1994, 1997).

Table 3: Female representation in the 1996 parliament, by party

	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Number of MPs from</i>	
			<i>electorates</i>	<i>list</i>
<i>National</i>	8	18.2	4	4
<i>Labour</i>	13	35.1	6	7
<i>NZ First</i>	4	23.5	0	4
<i>Alliance</i>	7	53.8	0	7
<i>ACT</i>	3	37.5	0	3

Source: *AJHR* (1997).

Ethnic representation. The ethnic composition of the first MMP parliament is also very much closer to the proportions that each group bears to the total population (Table 4). For the first time in New Zealand's history the parliament includes MPs of Maori, Pacific Island and Asian descent.

Table 4: Ethnic composition of the 1996 parliament

	Number of MPs	%	% of population (1996 census)
<i>European</i>	101	84.2	78.1
<i>Maori</i>	15	12.5	13.5
<i>Pacific Island</i>	3	2.5	4.6
<i>Asian</i>	1	0.8	3.8

Source: AJHR (1997).

In addition to the five Maori electorates created under MMP, most parties included Maori candidates near the top of their party lists. As a result, 15 MPs of Maori descent were elected in 1996: five to represent the separate Maori electorates, one to represent a General electorate, and nine from party lists. MMP has, therefore, resulted in a welcome spread of Maori parliamentary representation across a range of parties (Table 5). Henceforth, all parties are likely to pay much closer attention to Maori concerns: an outcome that the Royal Commission strove to achieve when recommending MMP as its preferred alternative to FPP. The same outcome can be expected for Pacific Islanders and Asians.

Table 5: Non-European ethnic composition of 1996 parliament, by party

	<i>Maori</i>				<i>Pacific Island</i>				<i>Asian</i>			
	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Elect. MPs</i>	<i>List MPs</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Elect. MPs</i>	<i>List MPs</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Elect. MPs</i>	<i>List MPs</i>
<i>National</i>	1	2.3	0	1	1	2.3	0	1	1	2.3	0	1
<i>Labour</i>	4	10.8	0	4	2	5.4	1	1	0	-	-	-
<i>NZ First</i>	7	41.2	6	1	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
<i>Alliance</i>	2	15.4	0	2	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
<i>ACT</i>	1	12.5	0	1	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-

Source: AJHR (1997).

Age cohort representation. The first MMP election has resulted in a broader spread of age cohorts than did the last two FPP elections. The last three FPP parliaments were dominated by MPs in the 40-44 year age cohorts but in 1996 two cohort peaks — 40-44 and 50-54 — were evident. The peak age cohort for incumbent MPs was 40-44; for newly elected MPs it was 50-54. The largest male cohort was 40-44; the largest female cohort was 45-49, followed by 50-54. Female MPs are generally older than their male counterparts. Finally, there is a marked difference between the age distributions of electorate and list MPs. The number of electorate MPs rises steadily through each cohort until the 40-44 year age group, after which it declines steadily. For list MPs, however, the number rises through each successive cohort until 50-54 before it drops away. Contrary to most expectations, the first

MMP election has significantly broadened the age structure of parliament, at least temporarily.

Geographical representation. New Zealand's FPP electoral system required each electorate's total population to fall within a range of plus or minus 5 per cent of the overall mean. Although single-member electorates remain under MMP, fears were expressed (principally by opponents of change) of unbalanced geographic representation arising from a maldistribution of list MPs. Advocates of MMP responded that it was in the interests of all parties to ensure that their party lists were geographically balanced. This expectation made an already difficult exercise even more arduous. Parties were expected not only to produce lists that took full account of gender and ethnicity, but also to ensure that their lists were also geographically balanced, so that, regardless of the election result, all parts of the country were fairly represented.

Table 6 illustrates the geographic spread of MPs. At a superficial level the distribution of representation across the two islands seems as close to fair as could be expected. On closer examination, however, this table reveals imbalances: New Zealand First, ACT and National are over-represented in the North Island, while Labour and the Alliance are over-represented in the South Island. Even within each island, representation is not always evenly distributed: for example, all four South Island Alliance MPs live in the Greater Christchurch urban area, while Otago-Southland, with 8.3 per cent of New Zealand's population, has only 5 per cent of the MPs.

Table 6: Geographic composition of the 1996 parliament, by party

Party	North Island Number of seats			South Island Number of seats		
	Electorate	List	Total (%)	Electorate	List	Total (%)
National	23	11	77.3	7	3	22.7
Labour	18	8	70.3	8	3	29.7
NZ First	6	8	82.4	0	3	17.6
Alliance	0	9	69.2	1	3	30.8
ACT	1	6	87.5	0	1	12.5
United	1	0	100.0	0	0	0.0
Totals	49	42	75.8	16**	13	24.2
Population*			75.1			24.9

*1996 Census. **Includes Te Tai Tonya electorate, part of which is in the North Island.

Sources: *AJHR* (1997); Statistics New Zealand (1997).

Such are the vagaries of MMP voting. The MMP electoral system is designed to compensate parties which do not win their fair share of seats through the constituency contests by awarding them sufficient list seats to ensure that their parlia-

mentary representation fairly reflects their overall electoral support. Since parties cannot predict precisely which electorates they will win, they are unable to order the candidates on their lists to guarantee that parliament will accurately reflect the geographic distribution of the population. When considered in this light, the geographic distribution of representation in the first MMP parliament is probably as good as can be expected.

Forming the Coalition Government

The election marked the end of the first stage in the transition to the MMP environment. Since, as expected, no one party won a clear majority of the parliamentary seats, a coalition government, or perhaps a single-party minority government, had to be negotiated. The formation of the new government took nine weeks and was not completed until shortly before Christmas. Given that this was the first real experience New Zealand politicians had had of coalition formation across parties, the time taken was not unreasonable. What made the process quite unusual was that New Zealand First (the third largest party) conducted negotiations separately but simultaneously with both National and Labour Parties. Never before in the democratic world have separate coalition negotiations taken place with two different parties at the same time.

The agreement, dated 10 December 1996, confirmed the formation of a majority coalition National-New Zealand First government whose objective was 'to provide sound and stable Government for New Zealand for a three year term concluding with the 1999 General Election ...' (Coalition Agreement, 1996:5). Although it expressly acknowledged that each party would retain its own identity and organisation, it prohibited either partner from supporting

... any policy advanced by any other non-Coalition party or private member and, if a bill is introduced to the House, shall not vote in favour of such bill or abstain upon the vote unless and until the consent in writing has been obtained by both Parties to the Coalition. (Coalition Agreement, 1996:7)

Despite the demise of FPP and the hope that MMP would result in more consensual government, the three-line whip appears still to be alive and well.

The agreement is also noteworthy in a number of other respects. Before the election, New Zealand First argued that the size of Cabinet should not exceed 15 (New Zealand First, 1996: Democracy Policy, 9) but the agreement provides for a total ministry of 26, of which 20 are inside Cabinet. National will have three-quarters of the Cabinet seats until October 1998, but then must surrender three places to New Zealand First. A similar arrangement applies to the six ministerial positions outside Cabinet.

The resolution of disputes between the coalition partners is also provided for. 'Fundamental disputes' are defined as those 'which could lead to substantial injury to the Coalition and which appear on reasonable grounds to be incapable of satisfactory long term resolution by negotiation'. If one occurs, a Coalition Dispute

Committee, consisting of the leaders, deputy leaders and presidents of the coalition partners will be required to seek a resolution through negotiation. If agreement cannot be reached, either party may give written notice to the other 'that unless the matter is resolved within ... seven days the Coalition will be terminated' (Coalition Agreement, 1996:10-11).

Evaluation

New Zealand's first MMP election substantially met its supporters' expectations. Although electorates are now larger in both population and geographic terms, the direct link between MP and elector has been preserved and, if early arrangements by parties to deploy list MPs in regions where they are not well represented continues, may well be enhanced. With more women, Maori and Pacific Island MPs, and the election of New Zealand's first Asian MP, parliamentary representation is now more broadly based. Since most votes cast counted towards the final composition of the House of Representatives — 92.5 per cent compared with 45.0 per cent in 1993 — voter participation was judged to be more effective, thus enhancing the legitimacy of the new government. MMP is clearly fairer to significant political parties, which now win seats in proportion to their overall electoral support. The first election eventually produced a coalition majority government; with the tacit support of ACT and the sole United MP, it appears to have a comfortable majority which should allow it to implement most of its agreed policies.

So far, there is little evidence one way or the other to indicate whether MMP will result in a softening of the economic and social policies pursued over the past decade. Although New Zealand First's election campaign emphasised fiscal responsibility combined with a more 'caring' approach to social concerns, the few policy decisions to date — for example, postal services deregulation and the sale of small hydroelectric power stations to private interests — suggest that National is still very much in control. Each party, however, acknowledges that it is dependent on the other to remain in power. Maintenance of the coalition in the longer term, then, will depend on a certain amount of give and take on both sides, and this may lead, ultimately, to some softening of policy objectives.

A surprisingly large percentage of electors — approximately 37 per cent⁵ — gave their electorate vote to a candidate of a different party from the one that gained their crucial party vote. This may be no more than a reflection of electors endorsing a candidate's personal qualities regardless of their preferred party. But if this pattern becomes a permanent feature of the MMP environment, electorate MPs may become even more entrenched than ever. Electorates could thus become personal fiefdoms, returning popular or respected incumbents regardless of party affiliation for as long as they choose to stand. The ultimate effect could be that elec-

⁵ This figure is approximately three times larger than the equivalent figure for Germany.

toral overhang⁶ becomes a permanent feature of New Zealand's MMP electoral system.

At this stage it is difficult to assess whether MMP will result in greater political integration. With the emergence of a majority coalition government, the old FPP 'us' and 'them' divisions are still very much in evidence and the consensus model still seems far off. Decisions made in the secrecy of the Cabinet room can still be forced through the parliament. Perhaps more time, and the retirement of the politicians first elected under the FPP system, are needed before a more consensual, cross-party decision-making model can emerge. Nor is there any evidence as yet that political parties will be more vibrant, vital and effective than under FPP. Party memberships in the latter years of FPP were very low and declining, and the number of activists even smaller. Any reversal of this trend will depend very much on whether citizens conclude that, under MMP, political parties again provide them with the most appropriate avenue for the expression of political opinion.

There are also machinery issues to be considered. The geographic imbalance of representation noted above could be largely rectified if the allocation of list seats were determined regionally rather than through a single national list. While this would help ensure that all parts of the country were represented by both electorate and list MPs, it would tend to undermine the key element of MMP: that the key choice for electors is between competing nationwide parties (RCES, 1986:69). And even if regional lists were to be introduced, there is no guarantee that this would prevent the potential for imbalance created by the compensatory nature of MMP.

Still to be tested is the provision, which applies to constituency seats only, for a by-election to be held whenever an electorate MP resigns or dies. This has the potential to upset the party political balance determined by the previous general election, for the Electoral Act makes no provision for any consequential adjustment to be made to the distribution of list seats. It would be clearly more appropriate for the party which originally won the seat at the last election to nominate a replacement for the remainder of the parliamentary term. While this would undoubtedly be opposed by some electors on the grounds that *they* should be the ones to elect the new MP, it is a more appropriate solution because MMP is, first and foremost, a party electoral system. In marked contrast, any list seat vacancy is simply filled by the next available person on that party's list at the previous election.⁷

Taken overall, New Zealand's first experience with MMP met most expectations. Notwithstanding some poll findings, electors did understand the relative importance of the party vote and the electorate vote, and the final result was broadly

⁶ The term 'overhang' (from the German *Überhangmandate*) refers to the situation where a party wins more constituency seats than the total number of seats it is entitled to overall. Where this occurs, the party retains all constituency seats won but does not share in the distribution of list seats.

⁷ This provision was activated unexpectedly soon after the 1996 election when Prime Minister Bolger appointed Jim Gerard, Deputy Speaker and a list MP in the new parliament, to the post of High Commissioner to Canada: a manoeuvre that helped him to fulfil the terms of the Coalition Agreement on the distribution of Cabinet seats between the governing parties.

consistent with the electorate's mood at the time of the election. What voters had not anticipated, however, was the lengthy delay in forming a government. What electors had not realised was that the transition to the MMP environment did not end with the October 1996 election; it is not likely to conclude until New Zealanders have assessed the performance of the present coalition government and passed their collective judgement at the next general election, presently scheduled for late 1999.

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First-past-the-post and the mixed-member-proportional electoral systems: a comparison of outcomes

<i>Criterion</i>	<i>FPP</i>	<i>MMP</i>
<i>Fairness between political parties</i>	NO — winning party over-represented at expense of all other parties.	YES — each qualifying party won seats in proportion to party vote share.
<i>Effective representation for minorities and special interest groups</i>	NO — women, and Pacific Island and Asian communities consistently under-represented.	YES — significant increase in number of women MPs; Pacific Island and Asian communities represented in broad proportion to numbers in 1996 parliament.
<i>Effective Maori representation</i>	NO — Maori consistently under-represented in terms of their total numbers.	YES — MPs of Maori descent broadly proportionate to total Maori population.
<i>Political integration</i>	? — adversarial system encouraged tendency for hardening of divisions between groups.	? — too early to tell whether MMP will be more integrative (early signs not promising).
<i>Effective representation of constituents</i>	YES — single-member electorates provided clearly identifiable representation for individuals.	YES — single-member electorates remain an integral part of the MMP electoral system.
<i>Effective voter participation</i>	NO — FPP led to large numbers of 'wasted' votes; especially in so-called 'safe' electorates.	YES — party vote determines composition of parliament — nearly all party votes contribute to final result.
<i>Effective government</i>	YES — FPP and single-party governments able to act swiftly and decisively when necessary.	? — coalition governments likely to be the norm; this likely to slow decision-making process.
<i>Effective parliament</i>	NO — under FPP the Executive was dominant — Cabinet generally got its way.	Possibly — since no party has an absolute majority, coalitions of support will need to be built up in parliament.
<i>Effective parties</i>	Probably — although only minute numbers of citizens belonged to parties and fewer still were active.	Possibly — depends on whether citizens believe that parties provide the most appropriate avenue for the expression of political opinion.
<i>Legitimacy</i>	YES — the result of FPP elections accepted as producing legitimate governments with right to govern.	Probably — some years must elapse before we can be sure that the electorate at large accepts results of MMP elections.