Innovations like policy implementation and delivery units do not spring out of thin air: they are responses of first ministers to perceived challenges, signals about how they expect policies should be designed and implemented. Whether such innovations are well-conceived and live up to their promise is one matter, one that will be addressed by the case studies. Here we consider how the policy environment might have changed to stimulate such action in several different jurisdictions.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, a common challenge for many OECD countries concerned stemming the growth in the size of government budgets and either cutting or rationalising programs. Public bureaucracies were depicted as having their own incentives, resistant to efforts by governments to control growth in programs, and political leaders unwilling or unable to take decisive steps. This led to the argument that governments should assert political priorities and control over public service institutions, buttressed by theoretical perspectives such as public choice and agency theory. As tough fiscal decisions were made by many governments, their focus was less about implementing new policies and more about scrutinising and changing existing policy regimes, and meeting aggressive expenditure targets and reorganisation timelines. In this context policy implementation naturally received less attention, executive careers were increasingly based on managerial performance as opposed to policy shrewdness, and policy capabilities (not to mention labour negotiation capabilities) in public service institutions waned in many jurisdictions. For similar reasons focused less on the challenges of policy design and implementation (Barrett, 2004) and more on scrutinising alternative ways to deliver government services, ensuring that big service transformation projects were on time and budget, and adopting performance regimes.
As some governments turned the corner in their efforts to stabilise deficits and climb back to surplus positions, this raised the possibility of investing in new policy initiatives. With the pain of cuts fresh in the minds of decision-makers, there were likely higher tests for what constituted prudent and worthwhile spending, and for ensuring that the funds led to intended results. Arguably, too, by the end of the 20th century policy-makers had a much better sense of the interconnectedness of issues, the need for alignment in the use of different governing instruments, and the reality that many policy solutions required working across the boundaries of departments and agencies within and across levels of government. Whether such appreciation for complexity and the need for horizontal and whole-of-government thinking emerged from lessons from downsizing and restructuring, the frames emanating from hypertext and we-based models, or systems thinking from the likes of Peter Senge and others does not matter. The important observation is that more citizens and policy-makers sought to be more careful about how new policy initiatives were designed, how well-aligned new instruments were with existing ones, and how quickly such initiatives could be put in place.
With this sketch of the recent evolution and swings in the governance environment for many OECD jurisdictions, we can venture several different hypotheses for establishing policy implementation and delivery units. They include:
Meeting government commitments. During the 1990s many political leaders as they campaigned for office committed to policy platforms with specific program commitments (i.e., the Liberal ‘Red Book’ in Canada; Gingrich’s ‘Contract with America’, British Columbia’s ‘New Era Commitments’, etc). Here delivery and implementation units can be seen as an additional tool for first ministers and their government to ensure that top political and government commitments get met – a means for ensuring that governments kept focused on its agenda and message.
Asserting political control. This hypothesis would be rooted in the presumption that departments and agencies would resist adopting new policies because they might compete with existing programs or not reflect the preferences of public service leaders. The goal of an implementation unit would be to bring pressure to bear and a spotlight on the public service.
Anticipating design challenges. This hypothesis would argue that there is a need to vet policy proposals from departments and agencies for whether they fully account for the complexity of problems and the interaction of pertinent policy instruments, perhaps wielded by other governments or with other sectors.
Navigating implementation challenges. The more complex a policy initiative, the more likely it will require capacity to manage and coordinate implementation in a multi-level governance context.
Addressing political optics. Given the loss of credibility of government with citizens, and the perceived need for governments to become more ‘business-like’, implementation units might be established to project a new image and focus on getting programs in place on time and within budget.
Interestingly, each hypothesis implies that a government might staff an implementation or delivery unit with different kinds of talent and expertise, where they are located at the centre, and what processes they engage with. That said, the case studies may reveal that governments had overlapping and reinforcing reasons for creating the units, and that, no matter the initial goals driving inception, they evolved over time.