

## Chapter 8

# The Role of the United States in the Future Security Architecture for East Asia—from the Perspective of China-US Military-to-Military Interaction

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What remains unchanged transcending all changes is benevolence. Knowing only what is changing without knowing what remains unchanged, the humankind will never enjoy peace.

—Xong Shili (1884–1968), Chinese philosopher

The East Asian region is in a grand transitional period. Its economic importance to world prosperity and its potential contribution to global peace are increasing. Nevertheless, the region, especially Northeast Asia, is not only the most militarised region in the world, but is also a region to date lacking any single regional organisation through which conflicts can be handled.<sup>1</sup> Economic cooperation and military hedging between major powers enhances simultaneously. The deviation of economy and security is not in the interest of lasting peace and prosperity and the fundamental interests of all concerned countries.

Whether it is in accord with the expectation of East Asian countries and their internal political groups or not, the United States will be the cornerstone of any meaningful and feasible future security architecture for East Asia. What is not certain is whether the United States will fulfil this role in a hegemonic security architecture or a harmonious one. There are sets of factors, internal and external to the United States, together with interactions between the major powers, which will shape the role of the United States in the future security architecture of East Asia. The direction, pace and structure of such an architecture will depend on the synergistic effects of these factors and interactions.

China is the strategic focus of the US East Asia security policy. In a major bi-partisan effort to devise a new national security strategy in 2005, the final report of a Princeton University study pointed out that the rise of China is one of the most important events in the early twenty-first century, and viewed China as one example of a major threat and challenge.<sup>2</sup> The US security community

is watchful of China's military development. The Pentagon's annual report on the topic is but the tip of the iceberg. China-US military relations are pivotal for East Asian security. They will determine the outlook and nature of the future security architecture in the region. Unfortunately, because of asymmetric US information and influence, the term and logic for an East Asian security architecture has been largely defined in an American way, shaping international perceptions on Chinese military issues and on the China-US military-to-military relationship.<sup>3</sup> It is in the interest of all concerned parties and of future generations in the Asia-Pacific region to understand the root dynamics of this relationship and its impact on any future regional security architecture.

### **Internal factors: The sources of US conduct**

As the extension of the US national will, interest, power and strategy, its security policy and posture toward East Asia and China is inevitably influenced directly or indirectly by the same internal factors that shape its overall power and policy. To make sense of the US role in East Asia security, we have to consider these internal factors. Graham Allison's framework of rational actor model, organisational behaviour model, and governmental politics model is an elegant conceptual guide for an explanation and prediction of US foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> In addition to Graham Allison's models, the author would argue that a military-economy synergy model should be considered for a comprehensive understanding on the root cause of US behaviour.

### **Rational actor model**

The starting point for all rational actors is their political objective. Since the end of the Cold War, the US strategic community has been seeking a new grand design or architecture to guide the planning of future forces; that is, a successor to 'containment' of the Soviet Union. In essence, this process seeks to reconfirm US strategic objectives. The distinctive character of current US strategic objectives can be summarised as the following three points.

The first aspect is freedom of action. In former US President George W. Bush's words, 'the U.S. needs no permission slip from the United Nations or anybody else to act'.<sup>5</sup> This view of its options, including military objectives, is the most important difference between the United States and almost all other countries. Freedom of action is the organising thread of the US national security, defence, and military strategy, as well as its national space policy. Freedom of action in reality is the capability to create events, make rules—'the authority to set the global agenda'.<sup>6</sup>

The second aspect is peerless military advantages. Freedom of action is impossible without 'military supremacy'. 'At their core, both liberty and law must be backed up by force.'<sup>7</sup> The United States takes military supremacy as

the core pillar of its world status, and wants to keep it permanently. Thus, redefining war on American terms (as Bush described it in February 2001),<sup>8</sup> to dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities, has become the objective itself.

The final aspect is to prevent any other country from dominating Eurasia. This point will be discussed later in the chapter.

To help define these objectives, the worst-case scenario is widely used, indeed over used, in US strategic planning. As the classical military planning method, worst-case scenario is not without merit. However, if the history of the Cold War told us anything, it should be that the so-called realistic mindset plus worst-case scenario led to an unnecessary and dangerous arms race between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The benefit of worst-case scenario cannot make up for its inherent cost and risk. Closer observation suggests that worst-case scenario and threat exaggeration is a means to mobilise internal resources rather than a rational assessment of the external environment. As the leading military power today, if the United States can find reasons to use a worst-case scenario, other countries have far more reason to do so. In fact, in the author's opinion, since the end of the Second World War, the United States has taken the lead in both the use of worst-case scenario, and in creating security dilemmas.

## Governmental politics model and organisational behaviour model

David R. Obey, former chairman of the US Congress House Appropriations Committee, has said that the way Congress reviews the Pentagon 'has certainly become dysfunctional. Congress, instead of being the watchdog, is the dog that has to be watched. ... The Congress committees entrusted to oversee the Pentagon budgets act like "a pork machine"'. He termed it 'outrageous' for the US Air Force to assert that

the reason we have to build the F-22 in the first place is because we sold so many F-16s around the world that we have to keep a qualitative edge over them. So when we say we will put a limit on your ability to sell the F-16s abroad, they say, You can't do that because it costs jobs.<sup>9</sup>

Obey's words illustrate the impact of US Congress 'pork-barrel politics' on military policy. Internal political consideration, military service parochialism, and interest-seeking defence industries combine to form a Political–Military–Industrial Complex, which plays 'the art of the possible' in respect of the defence budget. Former US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger said that it was not easy to 'keep the DOD a relatively harmonious whole'. He went on to say that 'many possible decisions, which would seem logically sound, will nonetheless be avoided, simply for the purpose of maintaining peace within

the family. ... The net result is the creation of side payments for almost everybody'.<sup>10</sup> RAND Corporation-based expert Kevin N. Lewis pointed out that

as a result of political influences, externally generated demands, and organizational inertia, even if we had an agreed long-range defense program, the odds of seeing it through to fruition would be poor. This effect, which I called discipline gap in planning, can have serious consequences.<sup>11</sup>

These 'serious consequences' were and are not merely within the United States. In fact, US scholar Gordon R. Mitchell believes that the Cold War arms race came from an internal American arms race: 'The Soviet Union was less an instigator of the arms race and more the straggling follower of a massive unilateral American military buildup.'<sup>12</sup>

The net results of 'rational actor, governmental politics and organisational behaviour' are grave and dangerous, which include but are not limited to the habit of threat exaggeration and huge defence expenditure. The United States had 'a tendency throughout the Cold War to exaggerate the threat'; and this tendency persists into the post Cold War era. On the myth of the 'missile gap' in the early 1960s, one US scholar has observed that 'Soviet force levels were a factor in the Pentagon's calculations, but were not the most important by any manner of means. In other words, U.S. deployment followed its own logic, and that implied a prior strategy'.<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile, Robert H. Johnson has said that 'the interaction between psychology, politics, and changes in the international environment are the keys to the explanation of U.S. conceptions of the threat and of the tendency of those conceptions to overstate the threat'.<sup>14</sup> As Columbia University history professor Carol Gluck pointed out, 'without some way to transcend our differences we are doomed to reenact the hostilities toward others that seem to lodge so deeply in our political unconscious'. The Working Group on Relative Threat Assessment of the Princeton Project on National Security noted that, 'in practice, bureaucratic and commercial incentives have a strong influence on the threats that are considered and treated seriously by the U.S.'<sup>15</sup> The habit and skills of threat exaggeration, internal political process, and armed services' inertia, have serious implications for the future security architecture for East Asia.

## Military–Economy synergy model

How to explain the uniqueness of US strategic objectives? In almost all other countries, military policy and defence experts take the following three points as basic presumptions: the aim of the military is to defend; the military is the tool of foreign policy; and military expenditure is a burden to economy. Even though many US experts share this perspective, US national policy can be

described as its obverse: the aim of the military is freedom of action; foreign policy can be the tool of the military; and military expenditure can be the catalyst for the economy and an important source of core economic competence for the next generation. Richard R. Nelson, a US expert on national innovation, points out that defence expenditure is one of the two most important factors in understanding the US national innovation system.<sup>16</sup>

According to US scholar Diane Kunz, 'the US built its Cold War hegemony on the base created by the World War II production miracle. Washington then converted the bipolar geopolitical confrontation into fuel that powered its domestic economy. This synergy proved crucial'.<sup>17</sup> A RAND Corporation report echoes Kunz's observation by saying that

national power is ultimately a product of the interaction of two components: a country's ability to dominate the cycles of economic innovation at a given point in time and, thereafter, to utilize the fruits of this domination to produce effective military capabilities that, in turn, reinforce existing economic advantages while producing a stable political order.<sup>18</sup>

The military–economy synergy manifests itself as a chain of cause and effect relations:

Whoever controls space, therefore, will control the world's oceans. Whoever controls the oceans will control the patterns of global commerce. Whoever controls the patterns of global commerce will be the wealthiest power in the world. Whoever is the wealthiest power in the world will be able to control space.<sup>19</sup>

Put another way, it is a military–market nexus:

(1) Look for resources and ye shall find, but ... (2) no stability, no market; (3) no growth, no stability; (4) no resources, no growth; (5) no infrastructure, no resources; (6) no money, no infrastructure; (7) no rules, no money; (8) no security, no rules; (9) no Leviathan, no security; (10) no (American) will, no Leviathan. Understanding the military–market link is not just good business, it is good national security strategy.<sup>20</sup>

All empires enjoyed strong linkages between their military and the other sources of national power. The link could be military–land, military–commerce, military–industry, or military–finance. The United States is no exception. The only difference in its case is that it has compresses all these links into some 230 years rather than thousands of years. Kunz accurately points out that, in 1946, George Kennan explained in his 'long telegram' that, for domestic reasons, 'the Soviet Union needed a permanent enemy':

Soviet leaders are driven by necessities of their own past and present position to put forth a dogma which depicts the outside world as evil, hostile and menacing. ... [Kennan] was right—not only about the Soviet Union but about the United States as well.<sup>21</sup>

## External Factors

### China

Since the mid-1990s, US military strategic focus has shifted to East Asia, with China being one of the main driving factors, if not the only one in the longer-term.<sup>22</sup> The recent Iraq conflict and the global 'war on terror' have disrupted the process to some extent, but have not changed its direction. China is still the country at the 'strategic crossroads', needing to be hedged.<sup>23</sup> It is not a surprise to learn that, 'China is in the central place in U.S. strategic planning' and that 'for more than a decade the main efforts of Pentagon force planning have been preparing to fight with the big one (China)'.<sup>24</sup> In view of the tension over the Taiwan Strait and the 'uncertainty of future China choices', China will be the most significant factor in US military strategy. The Pentagon takes a China-US military conflict as the standard scenario on which to focus its force planning, military and war gaming exercises, and its transformation related activities.<sup>25</sup>

How much is rational or irrational in the above American judgements and measures towards China is discussed below. At this point, it is helpful to know the US side of the story. Thomas Barnett pointed out that the

China threat has a close relation with the interest of the U.S. military services. After the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the U.S. military services do not want to lose their status in American national security. They use the China threat as a convenient justification for budget requirements.<sup>26</sup>

US arms sales to Taiwan, which have a fatal influence on China-US military-to-military relations, can also be explained partly by the US internal political behaviour model.<sup>27</sup>

### US alliances

Military alliances are the pillars of America's military posture in East Asia. The adjustment and enhancement of bilateral military alliances, as well as building networks of alliances and various security partners, constitute the core of US security policy toward this region. Nonetheless, Aaron Friedberg, then deputy national security adviser of former US Vice President Dick Cheney, pointed out that

alliances are not, or should not be, ends in themselves; they are means for the attainment of larger strategic objectives. The collapse of the Soviet Union leaves China as the only country that could conceivably be capable, over the next several decades, of establishing itself as the preponderant power in Asia. It follows that the fundamental aim of American strategy in Asia must be not merely to promote stability, but rather to prevent Chinese hegemony.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, to prevent any other country from dominating Eurasia is a lasting US strategic objective. It is the precondition for America's ability to preserve its global dominance and freedom of action. This view of the United States as the 'supreme power' was outlined in the draft *Defense Planning Guidance*, drawn up in 1992 under the supervision of the then US Undersecretary for Defense Policy Paul Wolfowitz:

Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival. This is the dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. There are three additional aspects to this objective. First, the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue an aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.<sup>29</sup>

For this strategic objective, it is necessary for the United States to sustain measured tension within Eurasia. Without tension, the US military presence and the quality of military alliances will be difficult to maintain. French scholar Tod Foley pointed out that 'Europeans do not understand why the US refuses to resolve the Israel-Palestinian issue, although it can make a difference. They even wonder if the Americans want to keep this issue as a permanent hot point'. According to Foley, 'America is willing to create an atmosphere of tension, some kind of limited but dangerous war state'.<sup>30</sup> The fundamental principle of US grand strategy over the past century has been to manipulate the Eurasian balance of power to prevent the emergence of any hegemonic powers that are capable of harnessing Eurasia's vast resources and challenging US naval supremacy. The implementation of this strategy turned on the twin principles of economy of force and indirect action. Economy of force was realised by using allies to bear the strategic burden and the brunt of combat. Indirect action involved never

attacking an enemy frontally. Weakening an opponent through internal or external opposition, and relying on economic power to produce the pre-conditions of victory, was preferred to any premature test of military strength.<sup>31</sup>

As to multilateral security mechanisms, the United States assigns them to a supplement role. Former US President Bill Clinton put forward that ‘the ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum] and other multilateral security initiatives are a way to supplement our alliances and forward military presence, not supplant them’.<sup>32</sup> It seems quite logical that the Bush Administration should do its best to marginalise the role of the United Nations—the most important global multilateral security mechanism.

## China-US military-to-military interactions

China-US military-to-military relations are the weakest link in the overall bilateral relationship. We know from past experience that whenever disturbance or crisis has occurred in China-US relations, military-to-military relations have suffered first; and that these have been the last to be restored—well after the resumption of bilateral relations. This pattern is not in the interests of China, the United States, or the Asia-Pacific region.

At present, both countries have the intention to improve bilateral military relations. Nonetheless, before any durable progress can be made, we need to think more deeply about the essence of the problem. From the discussion above, we know that China is at the heart of US strategic thinking about East Asia. In the near-term, the US military has detailed operational plans to fight China during the course of any crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In the longer-term, the US military is taking various measures to hedge future uncertainties regarding China. Worse still, the near-term and longer-term considerations are mutually enforcing, which could potentially lead China-US military-to-military interactions into a kind of vicious spiral. Against this background, the best both countries could achieve together would be to prevent the worst outcomes, rather than to think what they could do together for better regional and global security.

US military policy toward Taiwan serves as a master-switch that decisively influences the direction, quality and process of China-US military interaction. China-US military relations are in inverse proportion to US-Taiwan military relations—the closer the US-Taiwan ties; the farther away the China-US military relationship. Against such a background, minor problems in China-US military relations raise significant issues which, in turn, can become big problems. And big problems can become insurmountable ones. Issues of transparency, code of conduct and reciprocity will continue to block the way if both sides fail to establish stronger mutual trust about their strategic goals. Everyone knows that preventing Taiwan from making reckless moves is the strategic bottom line for

China—a line that has to be defended at any price, against any enemy. The Chinese military has to prepare itself for this most difficult and complex situation. This is the overwhelming mission for the Chinese military. It is therefore unrealistic to expect a substantive increase of transparency about China's core military capabilities.

Some Americans think that China will handle its relations with other Asian countries and the United States in the way China treats Taiwan. This is wrong. There is a fundamental difference between the two. The nature of the Taiwan issue is domestic and the rest are external. Thus, US-Taiwan military relations should maintain a respectful distance from China's bottom line. Richard Haass is right in noting that 'the governments of the world's principal powers will cooperate with the U.S. only if there is a context in which their fundamental national interests are seen by their own publics to be protected'.<sup>33</sup>

As to America's longer-term concerns, we know uncertainties exist since the present generation cannot and should not make decisions for future generations. However, how should we prepare ourselves for such future uncertainties and what are we going to leave to succeeding generations? Are we leaving them operational concepts and weapons platforms to fight wars or the habits and a tradition of mutual trust and cooperation? Questions like this should be discussed among all the parties. Unfortunately, the Taiwan issue is continually blocking the way.

Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry and Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter have observed that China cannot be expected to fight with bows and arrows.<sup>34</sup> In other words, China's military capabilities will certainly develop along with its growing economy. Should Chinese military development follow certain rules? What strategic understanding should be reached with Asia-Pacific countries in general and the United States in particular? What are rules of the road to maintain regional and global security? What constitutes the legitimate use of force? We can and should discuss these issues. After all, China does not have any intention to challenge other countries, especially the United States, militarily. However, external factors relating to Taiwan have stopped us from engaging in substantial discussion. The conclusion is that the Taiwan question effectively pollutes the possibility of developing a meaningful and workable security architecture for East Asia.

## The defensive nature of China's defence policy

There are many articles and books discussing, guessing or interpreting China's 'grand strategy'; and it is quite strange that the majority of these works do not pay attention to or even mention the simple facts. In my analysis, the six commonsense facts about China defence policy are as follows.

First, China takes it as national policy to oppose military alliances. It is commonsense that any country, even one as powerful militarily as the United States, that might want to launch strategic offensive operations towards another country, must have military alliances. This national policy of China points clearly to the fact that China has no intention of launching strategic offensive operations against other countries. When China says it is a 'peace-loving country', it is definitely not empty rhetoric.

Second, China takes it as national policy to keep the central role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. This means that it is impossible for China to behave unilaterally on international security issues.

Third, China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. China is the only nuclear weapon state that has such a policy.

Fourth, China has called for an international pact to prohibit the weaponisation of outer space. If the United States cares about the 'future uncertainties' of China's military development, it can address these in the domain of outer space by joining China in negotiating such a pact. The US national space policy makes it clear that it fully understands, perhaps better than any other country, how important outer space is for future military operations.

Fifth, China honours its commitment to international arms control and non-proliferation.<sup>35</sup>

Sixth, on the principles of the use of force, China is fully committed to the UN Charter, which means that, beyond matters of self-defence, China will not use force internationally unless authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Regarding self-defence, China will not use force unless facing utmost provocation, when it is the last resort, and when an opposing country fires the first shot.

Does China have 'a grand strategy'? The answer is definitely 'no', if one has a true understanding of China's culture. What do the Chinese people want? For thousands of years, what they have wanted is encapsulated in the saying 'Good weather for the crops, the country prospers and the people are at peace' (*Feng Tiao yu shun, Guo Tai Min An*).<sup>36</sup> No more, no less. This has been the dream of the Chinese historically. It is the dream of today's Chinese, and it will be the dream of future Chinese. The Chinese are defined by China's culture. The key to the continuation of Chinese civilisation is exactly this culture. The Chinese do not aspire to be number one, but they do long for a harmonious domestic and international society. This was well understood by Arnold Toynbee.<sup>37</sup> To

explain and predict China's 'strategy' and future behaviour in US terms and in the logic of so-called 'realism' is almost meaningless.

## **Conclusion: to start from commonsense**

Chinese philosopher Xong Shili (1884–1968) said that 'what remains unchanged transcending all changes is benevolence. Knowing only what is changing without knowing what remains unchanged, the humankind will never enjoy peace'.<sup>38</sup> Albert Einstein said that 'everything has changed except our manner of thinking'. Both Xong Shili and Einstein are right. This has been, is and will be one of the most important tenets of commonsense. The best way, and perhaps the only viable way, to discuss the future security architecture for East Asia is to start from commonsense.

A new world of closer and closer global interdependence is coming. With increasing interdependence, the common interests of major countries are enlarging and deepening. This is the objective and the true reality. The sources of difference or conflict are either subordinate or subjective, and in most cases they are merely distorted perceptions or opinions. In order to bridge the gap between distorted perceptions and true reality, we need new definitions and concepts regarding power and international relationships. If factors such as global warming, and the outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the H5N1 and H1N1 influenzas tell us something or anything, it is that as long as we breathe the same air, we have to share the same destiny. Nothing is more important than this common destiny. The potential supply of global and regional security exceeds our collective security requirements, thanks to the asymmetry between the military expenditure of the only superpowers and of major powers, and humanitarian assistance. The gap between global security requirements and the capacity to supply this security is a matter of will rather than of capacity—a matter of how to use force rather than of no use of force. Nonetheless, the gap between supply and requirement is growing. People in Africa, who have suffered so much for so long, are still suffering. Africans are forgotten, even though the continent's resources are not. Against this backdrop, pretending to be 'tough' to other major powers under the guise of so called 'realism' is itself unreal, and so short-sighted. Realism is an anachronism in a global era.

William Fulbright, former Chairman of the US Congress foreign relations committee, said that we should see the world as others see it:

Today we need a leadership that recognizes that the fundamental challenge in this nuclear hi-tech era is one of psychology and education in the field of human relations. It is not the kind of problem that is likely to be resolved by expertise—even the sophisticated expertise of our most gifted military thinkers, who delight in exotic weapons systems

and strategic doctrines that threaten the solvency of the richest nations as well as their physical survival. The attributes upon which we must draw are the human attributes of compassion and common sense, of intellect and creative imagination, and of empathy and understanding between cultures.<sup>39</sup>

It will be in everyone's interest to jointly explore a shared vision based on common interests. Mutual strategic confidence will flow from taking every opportunity to maximise the common interest. It will also be in everyone's interest to explore positive scenarios to balance the established worst-case scenario. We should and must be extremely cautious in applying the concepts of worst-case scenario and hedging in military planning. These strategic planning tools may be useful, but over-use of them may lead to unpalatable consequences. Judging from the lessons of the US-Soviet arms race, the United States and the Soviet Union needlessly wasted resources on a tremendous scale.

What is worse, the risks involved were much higher than the potential benefits that were realistically on offer. Only by guiding military policies on the base of common interests, and by exercising strong discipline to suppress the dominance of worse-case scenarios, will we be able to avoid strategic confrontation.

It is encouraging that some Americans have similar thinking. Ashton Carter and William Perry put forward the term 'responsible hedging'. They

point out that since Chinese military leaders cannot predict the future, they will prepare for the worst even as they hope for the best. Hedging is contagious. During the Cold War, hedging and worst-case-scenario assumptions led to a dangerous and expensive arms race.<sup>40</sup>

The final report of the Princeton Project on National Security pointed out that any new national security strategy 'should be interest-based rather than threat-based, and grounded in hope rather than in fear'.<sup>41</sup> Richard Haass is right in saying that 'most global issues require global responses'. No single country, no matter how powerful, can contend successfully on its own with transnational challenges. An effective multilateralism is based on keeping a respectful distance from the core interest of other major powers:

The goal of U.S. foreign policy should not simply be to maintain a world defined by U.S. military superiority. ... To have a chance of succeeding, the U.S. will need to view other major powers less as rivals and more as partners. The U.S. will have to accept some constraints on its freedom of action.

All of which brings us to the fundamental argument about opportunity:

The question is what Americans and others make of this moment. Time, resources, and potential have already been squandered. A different foreign policy, one based on promoting the world's integration while the opportunity to do so still exists, is urgently necessary.<sup>42</sup>

China's President, Hu Jintao, instructed China's military to regard making a major contribution to the maintenance of global peace and the promotion of common development as one of its historic missions. This is China's historic offer to the world and should not be refused. We Chinese are grateful to Australians when something bad happens to overseas Chinese in the South Pacific region; it has been Australia that has taken the lead and made a vital difference. We understand that China has its share of responsibility for regional and international affairs, and a duty to behave similarly. This is the commonsense approach for China-Australia security relations. We can see no reason why China and Australia cannot be closer security partners. If partnerships among all the major powers in Asia-Pacific region can be forged in this spirit, a future security architecture based on common interests and a shared vision will begin to take shape. In any case, what matters is what is remembered and emulated, not what is hated and resisted.<sup>43</sup> What matters is not to be more powerful or to be number one. What matters is what you do with your potential—create or destroy. What matters is to give rather than to take. Benevolence is humanity, which truly decides the greatness of any nation.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Niklas Swanström, Mikael Weissman and Emma Björnehed, 'Introduction', in Niklas Swanström (ed.), *Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, John Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 2005, p. 9, available at <<http://www.isdp.eu/node/1153>>, accessed 17 June 2009.

<sup>2</sup> *Forging a world of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*, Final Report of Princeton Project on National Security, Princeton University, Princeton, 2006, available at <<http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf>>, accessed 17 June 2009.

<sup>3</sup> Some China scholars, deeply influenced by US international relations and strategy theories, talk and write in US terms and logic, even when sometimes criticising US security policy. The terms and logic include, but are far from limited to, 'realist', 'nationalism', 'soft power', 'China-US structural, strategic contradiction', and 'the relation of established superpower and superpower candidate'. It is the author's opinion that this kind of influence would distort rather than facilitate a healthy understanding of China-US relations and the true issues of Asian security.

<sup>4</sup> Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, 'Introduction' in *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd edition, Longman, Reading, MA, 1999.

<sup>5</sup> Former US President George W. Bush's 2004 State of the Union Address, 20 January 2004, available at <<http://whitehouse.georgewbush.org/news/2004/012004-SOTU.asp>>, accessed 17 June 2009.

<sup>6</sup> Ron Huiskens, *The Road to War on Iraq*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no.148, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2003, p. 55.

<sup>7</sup> *Forging a world of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*, p. 8.

<sup>8</sup> George W. Bush, 'Remarks by the President to the troops and Personnel', Norfolk Naval Air Station, Norfolk, VA, 13 February 2001, available at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010213-1.html>>, accessed 5 May 2008.

<sup>9</sup> George C. Wilson, *This War Really Matters: Inside the Fight for Defense Dollars*, CQ Press, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 115–17.

- <sup>10</sup> Peter L. Hays (ed.), *American Defense Policy*, 7th edition, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997, pp. 103 and 107.
- <sup>11</sup> Paul K. Davis (ed.), *New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 1994, p. 102, available at <[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR400/](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR400/)>, accessed 17 June 2009.
- <sup>12</sup> Gordon R. Mitchell, *Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy*, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 2000, p. 31.
- <sup>13</sup> Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997, p. 332.
- <sup>14</sup> Robert H. Johnson, *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and after*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1997, p. 2.
- <sup>15</sup> *Forging a world of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*, p. 8.
- <sup>16</sup> Richard R. Nelson, *National Innovation System: A Comparative Analysis*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 29–30.
- <sup>17</sup> Diane B. Kunz, *Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy*, The Free Press, New York, 1997, p. 2.
- <sup>18</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, Melissa McPherson and Jerry M. Sollinger, *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age: Analyst's Handbook*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 4, available at <[http://rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1110.1/](http://rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1110.1/)>, accessed 17 June 2009.
- <sup>19</sup> George Friedman and Meredith Friedman, *The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-first Century*, Crown Publishers, New York, 1996, p. 411.
- <sup>20</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, 'Glossary' in *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating*, G.P. Putnam & Sons, New York, 2005, p. xvii.
- <sup>21</sup> Kunz, *Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy*, p. 328. Similar observations can be found in other materials. In 1999, Samuel Huntington noted: 'At a 1997 Harvard conference, scholars reported that the elites of countries comprising at least two-thirds of the world's people—Chinese, Russians, Indians, Arabs, Muslims, and Africans—see the United States as the single greatest threat to their societies. They do not regard the United States as a military threat, but as a menace to their integrity, autonomy, prosperity, and freedom of action. They view it as intrusive, interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, hypocritical, and applying double standards, engaging in what they label 'financial imperialism' and 'intellectual colonialism', with a foreign policy driven overwhelmingly by domestic politics.' (Huntington quoted in Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight, *Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century*, Public Affairs, New York, 2001, p. 52)
- <sup>22</sup> 'China has the potential to become a major military power in Asia'. The United States will keep 'the core capability to fight two major theatre wars in overlapping time frames', and ensure that the United States 'has sufficient military capabilities to defeat aggression by a larger adversary'. 'Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States'. See former US Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, May 1997, available at <<http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ESDP&fileid=76C8F71A-89B7-5A1D-F9E9-B4851BF35DC0&lng=en>>, accessed 17 June 2009; and former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, US Department of Defense, 6 February 2006, available at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf>>, accessed 17 June 2009.
- <sup>23</sup> *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, available at <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/>>, accessed 17 June 2009.
- <sup>24</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century*, Penguin Group, New York, 2004, p. 181.
- <sup>25</sup> Jonathan Pollack, *Strategic Surprise? Sino-American relations in the 21st century*, US Navy War College Press, Newport, RI, 2003.
- <sup>26</sup> Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century*, p. 108.
- <sup>27</sup> Zhang Qinming and Luo Binhui, 'Foreign Policy Decision-Making Models and Analysis on Determining Factors of American Arms Sale Policy', *American Studies Quarterly*, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, March 2006.

- <sup>28</sup> Robert Kagan and William Kristol (eds), *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*, Encounter Books, New York, 2000, pp. 198–99.
- <sup>29</sup> Draft Defense Planning Guidance quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, 'US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop: A One-Superpower World', *New York Times*, 8 March 1992.
- <sup>30</sup> Translated by the author from the Chinese version. Tod Foley, *The Decline of the American Empire*, World Knowledge Press, Beijing, 2003, p. 7.
- <sup>31</sup> Friedman and Friedman, *The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-first Century*, p. 97.
- <sup>32</sup> US Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, February 1995.
- <sup>33</sup> Richard N. Haass, *The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course*, Public Affairs, New York, 2005, p. 147. Also, in the same book, Haass said that an effective multilateralism is based on keeping a respectful distance from the core interest of other major powers. A number of factors will affect the behaviour of other governments when it comes to associating themselves with US leadership, including the extent to which the United States is responsive to their concerns when their vital interests are in play.
- <sup>34</sup> Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, 'China on the March', *National Interest*, March/April 2007, p. 17.
- <sup>35</sup> *China's National Defense in 2006*, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, available at <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm>>, accessed 5 May 2008. See also Richard N. Haass, *The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course*.
- <sup>36</sup> Nan Huaijing, one of the most respected scholars in China, has quoted this saying.
- <sup>37</sup> Arnold Toynbee, *Mankind and Mother Earth: A Narrative History of the World*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1976.
- <sup>38</sup> Translated by the author from Xong Shili, *Tenet for Reading Classical Chinese (Du Jing Shi Yao)*, The Chinese People University Press, Beijing, 2006.
- <sup>39</sup> J. William Fulbright, *The Price of Empire*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1989, p. 232.
- <sup>40</sup> Carter and Perry, 'China on the March', p. 16.
- <sup>41</sup> *Forging a world of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*.
- <sup>42</sup> Haass, *The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course*, pp. 17, 22, 26, 32 and 202.
- <sup>43</sup> Donald W. White, *The American Century: the Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1996, p. 438.