

POPULATION POLITICS IN THE FASCIST ERA

Austria's 1935 population index

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Laws regulating immigration and citizenship in interwar Austria were part of a European trend of population politics in fascist and authoritarian states in the 1930s. A new proposal in 1935 for a population index, including identity cards for every person residing in Austria, was modelled on Italian legislation and signalled a shift towards totalitarian models of population management. While Austria's population index system was never implemented before Austria's annexation to Nazi Germany in 1938, it corresponded nonetheless to a broader pattern of fascist and authoritarian population policy across Europe in the interwar era. Official and public debates about the proposed population index reveal the dual aims of Austrian policy and opinion makers: first, to facilitate greater surveillance of citizens and non-citizens; and second, to reduce the number of Jews in Austria either through restricting immigration or by precluding Jews already residing in Austria from being naturalised. This connection between racism, migration and citizenship in the Austrian case illustrates the convergence of different strands of population politics as fascist and authoritarian states attempt to forge new citizens. Moreover, the interwar Austrian case highlights the interplay

between exclusionary practices of nationalism and citizenship and successive waves of mass migration during the twentieth century.¹ My article places the Austrian case within these broader processes of citizenship and state building in early twentieth-century Europe, but parallels could also be drawn with other post-imperial or post-colonial states.

FASCISM AND POPULATION POLICY

Despite dozens of specialised and comparative studies and definitions of fascism, scholars have yet to reach a consensus about what fascism is, and where it took root and came to power in the years between 1918 and 1945 in Europe.² If scholarship on the interwar European regimes and movements still does not have a clear and comprehensive definition of fascism, it has made virtually no headway into the murky hues of 'authoritarianism', a category scholars use loosely to characterise a broad range of states that appear to have some similarities with the accepted fascist states—Italy and Germany—but lack the mass movement, charismatic leader and popular consent that characterise the regimes in Italy and Germany. The

Austrian dictatorship under Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt von Schuschnigg (the latter took office as Chancellor after Dollfuss' assassination by Austrian Nazis in July 1934) typically falls into this latter category of authoritarian states that also exhibit elements of fascism. Lasting approximately five years from the dissolution of parliamentary democracy in March 1933 to annexation to Nazi Germany in March 1938, the regime constitutionally known as the *Ständestaat*, or corporate state, had a paramilitary force (the *Heimwehr* or home guard), state youth groups, welfare programs promoting motherhood as a patriotic duty and a one-party organisation, the Fatherland Front, of which membership was compulsory for teachers and public servants. Historians of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg state, seven decades after it ceased to exist, have been reluctant to move beyond the outdated and clumsy opposition of 'fascist' versus 'authoritarian' in their characterisations of the State—an approach pioneered by Hugh Seton-Watson and John Rath, notably, and modified only slightly by others such as Francis Carsten and Gerhard Botz.³

More recent attempts to see fascism as a trajectory of radicalising right-wing tendencies, rather than as a fixed category or 'type', have been more successful in shifting the debate away from a fascist-authoritarian dichotomy towards a more fluid definition emphasising processes over outcomes.⁴ Scholars who follow a process-oriented approach to the Austrian state, for example, argue that the regime represents a fascistising trajectory cut short by the country's annexation to Nazi Germany in 1938, though this is still the minority view.⁵ Such a conceptual and historiographical shift in studies of fascist

and authoritarian regimes in Europe also allows us to look more closely at the radicalisation of certain political, social and economic policies that seek total control of society. Historians have questioned the extent to which such policies did in fact result in conformism by the population, especially when we consider the sphere of everyday life within the constraints of official ideology: the experiences of women in particular teach us much about the limits of popular consensus as dictatorships attempted to rule over even the most private of citizens' choices, such as whether to procreate for the State.⁶ But questions remain unanswered in some respects: how did fascist and authoritarian states seek to exert control over their citizens; and how did this function to produce particular kinds of citizens or a particular notion of citizenship? This article shows the validity of the process-oriented approach to fascism for studies of population politics in the interwar period and in the Austro-fascist state. It does this, moreover, by demonstrating how fascist states sought to define the relationship between citizens and the State by ever-greater controls over citizens' mobility and choice of residence, and by ever-closer surveillance of citizens' recorded lives from cradle to grave. In this way, the relationship between fascism and citizenship can be seen as symbiotic processes of categorising, counting and excluding individuals in order to build and legitimise states.

Many studies of population politics under fascist and authoritarian regimes have explored the eugenics and pro-natalist policies of the regimes,⁷ but so far another area of population management—migration and citizenship—has received little

attention. This oversight is surprising since arguably this aspect of population control reinforces the regimes' eugenics and pro-natalist programs. Carl Ipsen has argued that fascist population politics in Italy were characterised by a range of measures spanning nuptiality, fertility, mortality, emigration and internal migration: the Italian Fascist Deputy, Gaetano Zingali, explicitly referred to 'this famous demographic quintet' in a 1929 speech to Parliament.⁸ By exploring these multiple fronts of Mussolini's 'demographic battle', Ipsen extends the debate beyond Mussolini's 'battle for births' to include a spectrum of policies that the regime itself saw as part of a larger battle to create 'a new Fascist society'.⁹

Ipsen's analysis of fascist population policy in Italy merits further exploration here because of his emphasis on policies of migration and colonisation. Moreover, Italy makes for a particularly relevant comparative case study with the Austrian case because of a number of 'relational' elements between the two cases, as we will see below.¹⁰ Finally, although fascist population policy in Italy, unlike in Austria, did not seek to control immigration into the country, but rather to restrict emigration from Italy and regulate internal migration, the Italian case nevertheless highlights the interacting processes of citizenship practices, migration and other radicalised notions of population management under fascist governments.

EARLY POPULATION POLICY IN FASCIST ITALY (1922–29)

In the years of consolidating fascist rule in Italy between 1925 and 1929, the regime initiated a number of measures of popula-

tion control that broke decisively with the liberal era, which had witnessed soaring emigration abroad in order to ease the economic burden of the overpopulated and impoverished regions in southern Italy.¹¹ Whereas the first few years of fascism saw the regime continue to champion liberal policies on emigration, after 1925, Italian migration policy shifted focus from external to internal migration. In November 1926, a Public Security Law made all passports held by Italians in Italy invalid. Less than a year later, strict eligibility criteria for new passports were introduced—for example, only individuals with a work contract with an employer who was not a direct relative of the employee could be issued with a new passport. In 1930, fines and penalties were introduced for assisting or engaging in clandestine emigration. Repatriation taxes were removed to encourage return migration of Italians working abroad and terminology was changed to reflect the regime's new priority of bringing Italian workers home. The formerly named General Emigration Commission (CGE), the government department responsible for Italian emigration, was renamed in 1927 the General Directorate of Italians Abroad (DGIE) after Mussolini declared the word 'emigrant' defunct.¹² Carlo Levi describes the return émigrés as 'Americans' in his memoir of his political exile in the south under fascism, *Christ Stopped at Eboli*, written in the last years of Mussolini's rule. His use of the word was probably not a politically inspired choice, though it does evoke a local experience of politics in the south, ranging from the comic—the images of Roosevelt in place of Mussolini on their walls—to the tragic fate of those whose visit home to see relatives became

their own exile after losing their American riches in the Great Depression and being forced to stay and marry in the village they had tried to leave.¹³ The fascist regime also sought to discourage migration to cities by providing housing and transport for rural workers to work on state projects and subsidising charities that assisted state programs of internal migration.¹⁴ While these new policies were partially a reaction to international restrictions on migration, they cannot be seen solely in terms of a pragmatic response to external pressures since the United States—the country with the highest intake of Italian emigrants—introduced its immigration quotas in 1921 and again in 1924, some years before the laws on passports and internal migration were enacted in Italy. Rather, as Ipsen states, placed in the broader context of Italy's 'demographic quintet', Italian migration policy 'came on the heels of—and as an integral part of—the general move towards totalitarian social control initiated in January 1925'.¹⁵

Similarly, we can see the regime's efforts to centralise demographic statistics as part of a larger trend in European fascist and authoritarian regimes. State institutions for analysis of demographic statistics were established in Hungary and Poland in the 1930s, a few years after Italy founded its Central Statistics Institute of the Kingdom of Italy (ISTAT) in 1926.¹⁶ At the ceremonial inauguration of the new institute, Mussolini announced that in the fascist state, statistics would no longer be the sterile pursuit of numbers far from government corridors. Rather, 'the suggestive eloquence of figures' demanded their central place not just in the government but in universities as statistics entered the mainstream disciplines of law and political

science to train the next generation of statisticians.¹⁷ Figures could stir patriotic emotion in their viewer, just as speeches or songs could in their hearer, but while songs and speeches were aimed at an uneducated mass of devoted followers of *Il Duce*, statistics would capture the hearts and minds of university students and senior civil servants. The Fascist Deputy, Zingali, adept at turning fascist policy into an eloquent phrase, declared in his 1929 speech that in fascist Italy 'not only men, but also statistical data, have become dynamic, almost as if following with the same insistent rhythm the course of these glorious times'.¹⁸ As professor of statistics and economics at Catania, appointed deputy in Mussolini's government, Zingali himself embodied the rhythmic synthesis of numbers and oratory.

While statisticians were being elevated to new positions in government and academia, ISTAT gained control over all demographic statistics except for migration, which were collated and published by the various government agencies for emigration and colonisation: the CGE/DGIE for emigration, the Commission for Migration and Colonisation (CMC) and Permanent Committee for Internal Migration (CPMI) for migration within Italy.¹⁹ The municipal population registers, which had collated and stored data on internal migration since 1862, formed a third body for demographic statistics. Whenever a person arrived in a new municipality, or *comune*, he or she would be registered and when they left the commune this record was cancelled. In addition to arrivals and cancellations, the population registers also recorded births, deaths and marriages. Legislation introduced in Italy in 1929 centralised the population registers by

giving authority to ISTAT to collect and store data on the population. Under the new legislation, ISTAT could instruct municipal authorities on record keeping and in turn municipalities were required to hand over their annual population registers to ISTAT. Omitting to report a birth or change of residence was a punishable offence, for example. And since most records of births, deaths and marriages were held in local parishes, the 1929 law effectively made parish activities subject to state surveillance and control, which strictly speaking was a violation of the Lateran Accords regulating church–state relations.²⁰

The centralising powers of ISTAT were constrained, however, by the fact that responsibility for data collection and collation lay ultimately at the municipal level with the mayor. Nor did ISTAT have access to full data on clandestine urban migration, which Mussolini sought initially to discourage through the colonisation projects and eventually banned in 1939.²¹ This limitation was a bone of contention for Italy's leading demographer in the fascist period, Corrado Gini, president of ISTAT from 1926 to 1932. Gini wanted to give more power to his organisation by employing state-trained statisticians, rather than local authorities, to collect data for the 1931 census.²² Although his proposal was rejected by the Interior Ministry, it showed that state functionaries planned to extend the powers of the State even further. The fact that Gini's proposal stalled does not imply its lack of reception among fascist policy makers, but rather, could simply indicate a lack of financial and human resources during these early years of consolidating power.

The above discussion sets up a broader context within which to evaluate Austria's population policies in the 1930s. I have already noted that the regimes in Poland and Hungary centralised their demographic systems in the 1930s. These developments outside Italy were entangled with the political changes inside Italy, not only at the level of government but, as we have seen, in the areas of higher education and scientific pursuits. Demographers outside Italy would certainly have been aware of Gini's cyclical theory of population growth, which had already reached an international audience years before the fascist regime came to power, and Gini's influence on Italian policymakers in turn influenced Austrian policymakers, as we will see.²³ Aside from demographic statistics, Italy's influence on the Austro-fascist state was evident in a number of other ways, directly and indirectly: in the merging of press and propaganda bureaus into a single ministry, for example, as well through Italy's supply of finances and weaponry to the *Heimwehr*.²⁴ Mussolini was also a close friend of the Dollfuss family: the Austrian Chancellor's wife and children were houseguests of *Il Duce* when Dollfuss was gunned down in the Hofburg Palace in July 1934. Therefore, despite fascism's inability to achieve the kind of expansion of state powers that functionaries such as Gini wished for, Italy was still a model example of population management in the interwar years.

AUSTRIA'S POPULATION INDEX

Italy's influence on Austrian policymakers is demonstrated by the legislation for a population index drafted between 1935

and 1938 by Austria's Federal Council of Culture (*Bundeskulturrat*). This legislation was modelled directly on the 1929 laws enacted in Italy. As in the case of Gini's proposal to the Interior Ministry in 1931, the legislation in Austria was eventually rejected because of a lack of finances, but it illustrated, nonetheless, the State's plan to achieve greater control over the population. The Austrian case also highlights the regime's intent to curb 'undesirable' immigration and residency in Austria, specifically of Jews. In the legislative and public discourses about the proposed legislation, therefore, we can trace Austria's 'demographic battle' on several fronts: citizenship, immigration and anti-Semitism.

The first ministerial discussions about the proposal for a population index in Austria took place in June 1935. In its earliest form, the scheme consisted of a system of compulsory registration for every adult resident in Austria whether citizen, foreigner or stateless. The registration of the entire population was intended to lay the groundwork for further administrative reforms and also for a new military service law.²⁵ The Federal Council for Culture, one of four government legislative councils created under the May 1934 constitution that formally marked the end of parliamentary democracy in Austria and the period of Austro-fascist rule,²⁶ then met to discuss the proposal in September 1935. The Speaker, Dr Lenz, stated at the outset of his address to council that the population index was to be the first of several measures aimed at reforming Austria's entire legal and administrative system of residency, immigration and welfare. He also placed the proposal for a population index in the broader European con-

text by claiming that industrial change and the economic crisis had transformed Europe from a 'culture of settling' to a 'culture of migrating'. Austria was 'perhaps the state of least resistance against socially undesirable elements' and for this reason it had been necessary to include foreigners as well as Austrian citizens in the population index. Just who these 'socially undesirable elements' were was plain from his claim that the increased numbers of stateless people had become an 'international affliction' on the Austrian state due to the reluctance or unwillingness of Austria's neighbours to take in former Austrian citizens who were now stateless.²⁷

The reference to stateless people in Austria was a reference to those former citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire who had been ineligible for citizenship in the new Austrian state under laws designed to exclude those who had resided in territories outside the borders of the new state before 1914. The new legislation on citizenship was promulgated on 5 December 1918, less than a month after the declaration of the Republic of 'German-Austria' on 12 November 1918.²⁸ The law restricted citizenship to those whose legal residence (*Heimatrecht*) had been in the territory of the republic before August 1914. This meant that refugees from the empire's borderlands who after 1918 found themselves on the territory of German-Austria were excluded from citizenship in Austria. The 1918 law directly affected the 70 000 Jewish refugees from Galicia who had remained in Vienna after the war but could not claim their place of domicile in the new Austrian state. A legal loophole for these refugees was introduced a year later under Article 80 of the Treaty of

Saint-Germain at the end of 1919. Under the terms of Article 80, citizens of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire could opt for citizenship in any successor state in which they identified 'according to race and language' with the majority of the state's population. Article 80 was adopted into Austrian legal practice in August 1920 with the proviso that proof of one's identification with the German language by way of graduation certificates from German primary, secondary or tertiary schools had to be shown in citizenship claims. This was an exercise in vain for many Jewish refugees who had no such proof available and for whom retrieval of the necessary documents was next to impossible and, even if they had been able to prove their German language credentials, anti-Semitic bureaucrats in the interior ministry and federal administrative court could still reject applications for citizenship on the grounds of race instead of language, given the ambiguity of the wording of Article 80.²⁹ Nonetheless, despite the legal obstacles to acquiring citizenship, the number of naturalisations including those of Jews did not decline significantly until after 1933 when a moratorium was placed on all naturalisations in Austria. Approximately 120 000 individuals were naturalised between 1919 and 1936, and a further 20 000 were naturalised under the terms of Article 80.³⁰ Thus, the move to freeze citizenship claims in 1933 came after a series of measures that defined citizenship in Austria according to language and ethnicity as well as territory. After 1933, citizenship was defined not only in ethnic and territorial terms, but in civic terms of ideological loyalty to the State. Loyalty to the State could be demonstrated through continuous residency and work in one

place, which excluded foreign workers and refugees from becoming Austrian citizens.

In his comments on the draft legislation, Lenz referred directly to Italy's 1929 law, on which the Austrian population index was modelled, and he recommended in line with the 1929 law that state inspectors be appointed to oversee the registration process and the various registry offices. And, like the Italian Interior Ministry, the Austrian legislators stopped short of Gini's recommendation that the State itself appoint professionals to carry out the registrations at the municipal level. The parallels with Italy can also be seen from the Austrian proposal to include in addition to the population index a compulsory identification card (*Erkennungskarte*) to be issued to every person over the age of eighteen, modelled on the Italian *Carta d'identità*. The Austrian card was to function as a domestic passport and would include the person's photograph, address, date of birth, nationality, occupation and any changes of occupation. As in Italy, the purpose of the identity cards was to help individuals better identify with the State by reminding them of their social obligations to the State: work and loyalty to one's country of birth.³¹

However, there is one important difference between the Italian and the Austrian models that highlights the racial 'front' in Austria's demographic battle, one not witnessed in Italy until after the Axis pact between Mussolini and Hitler in 1935 and Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1936. Unlike in Italy, where individuals and families were registered separately, the Austrian population index was to include details about an individual's family on the same index sheet. As Lenz pointed out in the

legislative discussions in the Federal Council for Culture, the inclusion of an individual's family details was deliberately designed to require Austrian citizens to declare any business and family links outside of Austria.³² As we will see below in the press discussions of the proposed law, the concern that some Austrians were supporting family members who were not Austrian citizens was directed primarily at Jews who had arrived in Vienna as wartime refugees and had been unable to prove their German linguistic and cultural credentials in the new Austrian state after the war. Even if the government did not articulate this concern directly, the implication in official statements was that certain foreigners in Austria were 'undesirable'. For example, the Interior Minister, Emil Fey, said in an address to the Federal Council of Ministers, which appeared in the press the next day, that the longstanding practice in Austria, as in Italy, that individuals had to register in the municipality where they had their legal residence, had led to many discrepancies between municipal records and also had allowed the 'non-Austrians' to stay out of the authorities' clutches.³³ In 1932, the Interior Ministry had deemed Nazis and communists 'undesirable': the Czechoslovakian-born German communist Egon Erwin Kisch had been denied entry to Austria on the grounds that his proposed lecture on Russia and China contained 'communist propaganda' that would undermine public order.³⁴ And in 1933, after the ban on the Nazi Party stripped Austrian Nazis who had left the country of their citizenship, statements about unwanted foreigners may have been taken to mean Nazi terrorists on Austrian soil. But by 1935, with the new Chancellor Schuschnigg

broaching a more conciliatory position towards Hitler and the underground Austrian Nazis, the proposed requirement that individuals declare their non-Austrian relatives to the authorities seemed to target a different group of foreigners: Jews fleeing persecution in Germany.

Moreover, the category included not only 'tramps', one council member observed, but also performers and artists who stayed in a particular place for only two months, a comment that drew the mirth of other council members. Apparently what struck the council as funny were the many prominent Jewish theatre directors, actors and other performers who had come to Austria from Germany since 1933, often staying only for the annual summer season of the Salzburg Festival before emigrating to America, and who were the butt of many anti-Semitic jibes during the festival. The festival season had just finished, but now a more sinister joke was to be played on them as the council moved to stamp 'ST'—abbreviated from '*stichtag*' or expiration date—on their identification cards.³⁵

One week after the Federal Council for Culture passed the proposed legislation for a population index and identification cards, the Minister of the Interior, Emil Fey, addressed the State Council on the proposed bill. His address was reprinted the next day in the *Neue Freie Presse*. Fey echoed the earlier claims by Lenz that the population index was to be the first of many new measures intended to overhaul the administration of the interior ministry, which Fey claimed had allowed 'undesired foreigners' and stateless individuals to enter and reside in Austria. The necessity of clamping down on unwanted immigration was also the reason why every resid-

ent of Austria—citizen and non-citizen—was to be included in the proposed index system. He singled out the police registration system as an immediate area in need of reform: the longstanding practice in Austria, as in Italy, was that individuals had to register in the municipality where they had their legal residence. But, according to Fey, that system had led to many discrepancies between municipal records and also had allowed the ‘non-Austrians’ to stay out of the authorities’ clutches. Minister Fey endorsed the identification cards as a way to simplify the current system, although he acknowledged the new system would be a burden in the short term for the population who would be required to register for the new cards, and for the authorities who had to implement the new system. But in the long run, the benefit of the system would be seen in the permanent contact between the individuals and the authorities, which would cultivate a ‘vibrant sense of belonging to the state’ and thereby serve the larger purpose of building a new state from the bottom up.³⁶

The next year, true to Fey’s word, the Austrian Migration Office produced the first draft of a new *Alien Act* to regulate the status of foreigners in Austria through a foreigner index system. The scheme built on the earlier proposal for a population index and was based on similar laws already in place in neighbouring countries, including Czechoslovakia, which had passed an *Alien Act* in March 1935. The legislation underwent three revisions over an 18-month period but, like the legislation for a population index, it was not implemented before Austria’s annexation to Germany in March 1938. In the final stages of negotiation, in January 1938, the gov-

ernment administration conceded that a system of indexing all 290 000 foreigners in Austria was too costly an exercise and settled instead on a register for all those who had arrived in Austria since 1 January 1933.³⁷ The *Alien Act* was significant, nonetheless, because it revealed the full extent to which Austria’s politicians were ready to mobilise the State’s powers to curb what they perceived was a wave of uncontrolled immigration that, if left unchecked, could potentially open the floodgates to more desperate and destitute refugees, genuine or otherwise.

PUBLIC DEBATES ON POPULATION POLICY IN AUSTRIA

By 1937, Austria’s right-wing newspapers were also lending their support to a new population index and immigration law with the same anti-Semitic overtones as the council chamber discussions of the bill. It must be noted here that the Austro-fascist state had banned the social democratic press and the Nazi Party organs, and had appointed commissioners over the editorships of the German-nationalist newspapers, which dominated the small provincial towns such as Linz, Graz and Salzburg. The German-nationalist newspapers in particular came under heavy scrutiny by the censor for their pro-Hitler sentiments. But on other issues, such as minority politics, or the immigration debate, these newspapers could also be counted on to support the Austro-fascist government.³⁸ In Graz, the *Volksblatt* welcomed new legislation to restrict foreigners living and working in Austria, claiming that foreign workers in Austria were taking jobs from unemployed Austri-

ans and citing Carinthia as an example, with 11 000 foreign workers and 15 000 'native' Austrians out of work.³⁹ The Styrian *Tagespost* also justified a more restrictive immigration policy by inferring that nearly all foreign workers in Austria were Jews. An editorial on 16 February 1937 claimed that as many foreigners had gained employment in Vienna in 1936 as Austrians had been looking for work. It alleged that foreigners exploited the Austrian economy by taking the profits outside the country, enabling the families of these foreigners to seek passage to Austria at the expense and exploitation of Austrian families.⁴⁰

In Vienna, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* ran six headline stories on the 'invasion' of Jews from Eastern Europe in a two-month period alone.⁴¹ In its New Year's Eve article in 1937, the newspaper called for a border block against the Jews: 'Austria needs an immigration law that takes into account the changing circumstances and protects the native population from the invasion of a locust swarm from the east.'⁴² Two days later, the newspaper published a letter to the editor, affirming the editorial's view that it 'is the uncontested right of the state to ban or control immigration...Austria needs neither the labour nor the financial ownership of the Eastern European Jews'.⁴³ A notice in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* for a public lecture series on 'The foreign guest in Austria' suggested that there were more than a few anti-immigration activists among the newspapers' readers and editors alike.⁴⁴

The newspapers tended to conflate the refugees during World War I and those from Germany after 1933 into one ostens-

ible flood of unwanted Jewish immigration. The *Tagespost* claimed that

[t]hese foreigners belong almost entirely to a certain group of political emigrants, who have once already moved to Austria and above all to Vienna in order to settle there, albeit partly for different reasons then. During the war and immediate post-war years, this influx, which was by no means always wanted as later became painfully apparent, came from the East. Now it is coming from the West.⁴⁵

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* also drew parallels between the wartime and post-1933 immigration. A front-page editorial on 17 December 1937 suggested that Austria was an attractive destination for German Jewish refugees because they had relatives in Vienna who had arrived from Poland and Russia after the war. The editorial claimed that attempts by the Austrian authorities to restrict immigration would be impossible, due to the well-organised, clandestine smuggling groups who allegedly provided false identity papers for the refugees. The newspaper estimated that between 100 and 150 people arrived without passports each month and found lodging and black-market work in Austria, prompting the newspaper to sound a clarion call for tighter controls on Jewish immigration: 'Protect our borders and our country from a new flood of Eastern European Jews!'⁴⁶

Such was the vehemence of these newspapers' anti-immigration lobby that even *The Times* correspondent in Vienna, Douglas Reed, noted their sentiments. He reported that Austria had 'been flooded

with immigrants from Germany and Poland, a fair proportion of whom have criminal records' and he predicted that 'a closer scrutiny is inevitable sooner or later'. He defended these sentiments as having 'nothing to do with anti-Semitism' and informed his English readers that the 'bulk of opinion in Austria sympathises with the views of these two newspapers'.⁴⁷ Reed's broad brushstrokes painted a sympathetic picture abroad that the Austrian authorities could scarcely have hoped for as vindication for their brand of population politics.

Population policies in Austria, as in Italy, were 'audacious in their aspirations but modest in their accomplishments', constrained as they were by the economic crisis in the 1930s.⁴⁸ Not only in fascist regimes, but elsewhere in Europe—in France, Britain, Belgium and Holland—as well as further afield in the United States and Australia, attempts to regulate the entry and residency of foreigners were a feature of protectionist labour policies against foreign workers.⁴⁹ But it was in fascist states that the legislation rapidly extended beyond economic protectionism to encompass the wider political and social spheres of citizens' everyday lives: from one's place of baptism and marriage to one's position of employment, and that of one's relatives. Even the act of registration was no longer just a parochial affair, with state-appointed inspectors poised to swoop on any inconsistencies in the paperwork and report back to the central authorities. In Austria, if we consider what was accomplished even if just at the level of legislative discussions, we can see that what took more than seven years for the Italian fascists to put in place required less than three in Austria. Moreover, the Austrian

legislative discussions in 1935 predated by a few years Nazi Germany's first population registration in 1938 and introduction of a national card index in 1939.⁵⁰ Therefore an examination of Austrian population politics in the interwar years needs to be placed in a larger context of European right-wing efforts to remake states and citizens on multiple levels: not just as mothers giving birth to soldiers, or programs for genetic breeding, which are the more commonly known spheres of population management in fascist states, but in the creeping legislation that sought to control society through controlling the mobility of the population and by declaring them members of the nation by way of a stamped piece of paper.

ENDNOTES

¹ I use citizenship and nationalism in the 'constructivist' sense of practices and processes, rather than the outcome-oriented and 'stages' approach of scholars such as Ernst Gellner and others, who explain divergences between ethnic-based and civic-based nationalism (and one could add citizenship) according to the various stages of industrialisation and cultural advancement of historically distinct groups of peoples and territories. Benedict Anderson's 1983 model of an imagined community is the best-known constructivist approach to nationalism, but see also Rogers Brubaker (2004, *Ethnicity Without Groups*, Harvard University Press, New York), which defines nationalism as 'a category of practice'.

² For some of the more well-known attempts at synthesis and definition, see Payne, Stanley 1995, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*, UCL Press, London; Griffin, Roger (ed.) 1995, *Fascism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford; and Paxton, Robert 2004, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, Knopf, New York.

³ See Seton-Watson, Hugh 1966, 'Fascism, right and left', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 183–97; Rath, John and Schum, Carolyn W. 1980, 'The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime: fascist or authoritarian?', in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (eds), *Who Were the Fascists?: Social roots of European fascism*, Universitetsforlaget, Bergen. See also Rath's essays in Volumes 27–30 and 32 of *Austrian History Yearbook* (1996–99, 2001).

Francis Carsten, the most eminent scholar of fascism in Austria, pioneered the two-pronged approach to fascism in Austria—that is, the view that the *Heimwehr* and the Nazi Party were two distinct fascist movements even if the regime itself was not fascist. See Carsten, F. L. 1977, *Fascist Movements in Austria: From Schönerer to Hitler*, Sage, London; and 1980, *The Rise of Fascism*, Second edition, Methuen, London. Gerhard Botz has also defined the Nazis and the *Heimwehr* as two ‘brands’ of fascism in Austria: the Nazis, representing ‘national fascism’ akin to German Nazism, and the *Heimwehr*, along with its close sibling, the *Frontkämpfervereinigung* (Front Veterans’ Association), representing ‘*Heimwehr* fascism’. The Christian Social Party and the Fatherland Front fall outside of the Austrian family of fascism in Botz’s assessment and, after the *Heimwehr* was absorbed into the Fatherland Front in 1936, he concludes that the *Heimwehr* also ceased to be fascist. See Botz, Gerhard 1980, ‘Varieties of fascism in Austria: introduction’, in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvat and Jan Petter Myklebust (eds), *Who Were the Fascists?: Social roots of European fascism*, Universitetsforlaget, Bergen.

⁴ See, notably, Kallis, Aristotle A. 2003, “‘Fascism’, ‘para-fascism’ and ‘fascistization’: on the similarities of three conceptual categories”, *European History Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 219–49; and Mann, Michael 2004, *Fascists*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

⁵ For the ‘Austro-fascist’ school of historians, see Tólos, Emmerich and Neugebauer, Wolfgang (eds) 2005, ‘*Austrofascismus*’: *Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934–1938*, Fifth edition, Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, Vienna; and Lewis, Jill 1990, ‘Conservatives and fascists in Austria, 1918–34’, in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), *Fascists and Conservatives: The radical right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe*, Unwin Hyman, London, pp. 98–117; and 1991, *Fascism and the Working Class in Austria, 1918–1934: The failure of labour in the First Republic*, Berg, New York. More recently, Tim Kirk has argued that the conditions under which Austro-fascism came to power in the early 1930s were the same as in Germany and Italy. See Kirk, Tim 1996, *Nazism and the Working Class in Austria: Industrial unrest and political dissent in the ‘national community’*, Cambridge University Press, New York; and his article, ‘Fascism and Austro-fascism’, (2003, *Contemporary Austrian Studies*, vol. 11, pp. 10–31).

⁶ The trend since the 1980s emerging from the ‘everyday life’ school of West German historians (*Alltagsgeschichte*) has been to challenge to various degrees the thesis of top-down rule in the dictatorships of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and Stalin’s Russia. Some, like Victoria de Grazia in *The Culture of Consent: Mass organization of leisure in fascist Italy*

(1981, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) and *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922–1945* (1992, University of California Press, Berkeley), and, more recently, R. J. B. Bosworth in *Mussolini’s Italy: Life under the dictatorship* (2005, Penguin, London), have questioned the limits of consensus in daily life under the dictatorship. For most Italians, as Bosworth writes, ‘everyday Mussolinism’ did not equate with ‘Fascist totalitarianism’. For others, notably Sheila Fitzpatrick, who coined the phrase ‘everyday Stalinism’ in her book *Everyday Stalinism—Ordinary lives in extraordinary times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (1999, Oxford University Press, New York), men, women and families lived their lives daily within a Stalinist orbit or ‘habitat’ so much so that Stalin’s Great Turn was less a ‘revolution from above’ than it was a ‘revolution from below’. A new generation of historians schooled in these earlier approaches has begun to write the ‘second chapter’ of *Alltagsgeschichte* in the face of its seeming irrelevance to the new cultural history. See Steege, Paul, Bergerson, Andrew Stuart, Healy, Maureen and Swett, Pamela E. 2008, ‘The history of everyday life: a second chapter’, *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 80, no. 2, pp. 358–78.

⁷ Studies of European population policies have focused mostly on Western Europe. See, for example, Quine, Maria Sophia 1996, *Population Politics in Twentieth Century Europe: Fascist dictatorships and liberal democracies*, Routledge, London. More recently, scholarship has also branched out to include Central and Eastern European regimes. See Turda, Marius and Weindling, Paul J. (eds) 2007, *Blood and Homeland’: Eugenics and racial nationalism in Central and Southeast Europe, 1900–1940*, CEU Press, Budapest.

⁸ Cited in Ipsen, Carl 1996, *Dictating Demography*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 88.

⁹ See Ipsen’s review of his own book in ‘Population policy in the age of fascism: observations on recent literature’ (1998, *Population and Development Review*, vol. 24, no. 3, p. 591).

¹⁰ On the value of ‘relational’ comparisons in European history—that is, historical comparisons that seek to use transnational approaches to explore the interactions and mutual influences between compared case studies—see Ther, Philipp 2003, ‘Beyond the nation: the relational basis of a comparative history of Germany and Europe’, *Central European History*, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 45–73.

¹¹ These dates correspond with the so-called Matteotti crisis, after the moderate socialist deputy and critic of the regime, Giacomo Matteotti, was murdered by a fascist gang in June 1924. The ensuing crisis involved a bungled investigation of the murder (the body did not turn up for two months), the prompt retreat of the majority of liberal parliament-

ary deputies in what was termed the 'Aventine Secession' and finally, in early January 1925, Mussolini's announcement of his personal dictatorship. The year 1929 marked the final consolidation of the dictatorship's power with the Lateran Accords restoring church-state relations.

¹² Ipsen, *Dictating Demography*, pp. 50–65.

¹³ Levi, Carlo 1947, *Christ Stopped at Eboli*, Translated by Frances Frenaye, Farrar, Straus, London, New York.

¹⁴ Ipsen, *Dictating Demography*, pp. 50–65.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁶ Weindling, Paul 1988, 'Fascism and population in comparative European perspective', *Population and Development Review*, vol. 14, p. 104.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 92–100.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 196.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 64, 100, 118.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 197.

²³ Gini's theory, first presented at an international conference in Trieste in 1911, built on other prewar demographic theories that emphasised environmental factors, rather than social Darwinian ideas, in explaining the rise and fall of fertility. Gini developed the idea of differential fertility by which different classes in a nation reproduced at different rates. See Ipsen, *Dictating Demography*, pp. 45–6, 221–8.

²⁴ On the press and propaganda merger in Austria, see El Refaie, Elisabeth 2002, 'Keeping the truce? Austrian press politics between the "July Agreement" (1936) and the Anschluss (1938)', *German History*, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 56. On Mussolini's patronage of the *Heimwehr*, see Kerekes, Lajos 1966, *Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie: Mussolini, Gömbös und die Heimwehr*, Europa Verlag, Vienna.

²⁵ Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA)/Archiv der Republik (AdR), Bundeskulturrat (BKA)/Heimatsdienst (HD), Carton 6, *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 23 June 1935.

²⁶ The other three were the federal councils for the state, provinces and the economy. Members of these four councils made up the *Bundesrat*. See Jelavich, Barbara 1987, *Modern Austria: Empire to republic*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 203–4; Rath and Schum, 'The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime: fascist or authoritarian?', p. 251.

²⁷ Österreichische Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), 04R106/1–Bundeskulturrat, 18 September 1925.

²⁸ The republic remained officially known as 'German-Austria' until the Allies insisted at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that the prefix 'German' be dropped.

²⁹ For a discussion of the 1918 citizenship law and amendments under the Treaty of Saint-Germain, see Timms, Edward 1994, 'Citizenship and "Heimatrecht" after the Treaty of Saint-Germain', in Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms (eds), *The Habsburg Legacy: National identity in historical perspective*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp. 160–1. On the effects of the legislation on the Jewish refugees in particular, see Grandner, Margarete 1995, 'Staatsbürger und Ausländer: Zum Ausgang Österreichs mit den jüdischen Flüchtlinge nach 1918', in Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb (eds), *Asylland Wider Willen: Flüchtlinge in Österreich im Europäische Kontext seit 1914*, J. and V. Edition, Vienna; and Hoffmann-Holter, Beatrix 1995, 'Abreisendmachung': *Jüdische Kriegsflüchtlinge in Wien 1914–1923*, Böhlau, Vienna, pp. 229–34.

³⁰ Illigash, Jürgen 1999, 'Migration aus und nach Österreich in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Bemerkungen zum Forschungsstand', *Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 26, no. 1, p. 14; John, Michael 1999, '"We do not even possess ourselves": on identity and ethnicity in Austria, 1880–1937', *Austrian History Yearbook*, vol. 30, p. 47.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Neue Freie Presse*, 25 September 1935, p. 4.

³⁴ Rathkolb, Oliver 1995, 'Asyl- und Transitland 1933–1938?', in Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb (eds), *Asylland Wider Willen: Flüchtlinge in Österreich im Europäische Kontext seit 1914*, J. and V. Edition, Vienna, pp. 109–11; Heiss, Gernot 1995, 'Ausländer, Flüchtlinge, Bolschewiken', in Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb (eds), *Asylland Wider Willen: Flüchtlinge in Österreich im Europäische Kontext seit 1914*, J. and V. Edition, Vienna, pp. 96, 99.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Neue Freie Presse*, 25 September 1935, p. 4.

³⁷ Rathkolb, *Asyl- und Transitland 1933–1938*, pp. 117–19.

³⁸ On the German-nationalist press in Salzburg, for example, see Thorpe, Julie 2006, 'Provincials imagining the nation: pan-German identity in Salzburg, 1933–1938', *Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 179–98.

³⁹ *Grazer Volksblatt*, 1 January 1938, p. 3; 27 January 1938, p. 6.

⁴⁰ *Tagespost*, 16 February 1937 (*Abendblatt*), p. 1.

⁴¹ See *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 17 December 1937, pp. 1–2; 31 December 1937, pp. 1–2; 5 January

1938 (*Abendblatt*), p. 1; 7 January 1939, p. 1; 1 February 1938, p. 1; 8 February 1938, p. 1.

⁴² *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 31 December 1937, pp. 1–2.

⁴³ *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 19 December 1937, p. 4.

⁴⁴ *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 17 March 1936, p. 4.

⁴⁵ *Tagespost*, 16 February 1937 (*Abendblatt*), p. 1.

⁴⁶ *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 17 December 1937, pp. 1–2.

⁴⁷ Cited in Clare, George 1981, *Last Waltz in Vienna: The destruction of a family 1842–1942*, Macmillan, London, p. 158.

⁴⁸ Ipsen, *Dictating Demography*, p. 90.

⁴⁹ In France, where more than 1.5 million foreign workers had arrived by 1928, a law for the ‘protection of national manpower’ was introduced in 1926 to regulate the type and duration of work permits. The law had the immediate effect of reducing the number of foreign workers arriving annually in France from 162 000 in 1926 to 64 000 in 1927. See Singer-Kérel, Jeanne 1991, ‘Foreign workers in France, 1891–1936’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 14, no. 3, p. 287.

⁵⁰ Weindling, ‘Fascism and population in comparative European perspective’, p. 110.