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Power and responsibility in China's international relations

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Sharing the same bed while dreaming
different dreams.
Chinese saying

This chapter focuses on two aspects of China's international relations—power and responsibility. As the concept of power in international politics is well known, the chapter will pay more attention to the concept of responsibility.

Is China a responsible state in international society? This question is becoming increasingly interesting as China grows strong and comes to play a greater role in world affairs. To answer the question, one has to consider the following subsidiary questions.

- What is meant by responsibility?
- How can the responsibility of a state be assessed?
- What is China's responsibility?
- To whom is China responsible?
- What international society are we talking about?
- Why raise the issue of China's responsibility now?

Before I attempt to answer these questions, I have been agonising for quite a while over whether I should use the phrase 'China's international relations' or 'Chinese international relations' in the title of this chapter. 'China's international relations' gives the

impression that China is a single political entity—the Chinese state in this case—whereas the use of the word ‘Chinese’ in ‘Chinese international relations’ opens up a much wider scope to include not only the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a single political entity, but also Chinese thinking, Chinese style, Chinese political philosophy, and much more, apart from other political actors in China. In the following analysis, the word ‘China’ sometimes carries the wider connotation of including things ‘Chinese’.

This chapter is basically a concept paper.¹ It aims to make a survey of the area covered by the questions presented above from a macro-perspective. It does not attempt to define rigorously what is meant by power or what is meant by responsibility because, in so doing, it would be all too easy to become mired in disputes over details concerning definitions. Fortunately, many scholars have done excellent research in defining the concept of power, if not the concept of responsibility. I will only touch on some working definitions for the purpose of facilitating an analysis of more substantive issues.

What is meant by responsibility?

According to *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, the word ‘responsible’ can mean

‘liable to be called to account (to a person or for a thing)...morally accountable for one’s actions; capable of rational conduct; and...of good credit, position, or repute; respectable; evidently trustworthy’.

Seemingly the word ‘responsible’ or ‘responsibility’ carries some legal, moral, as well as social, connotations. As legal, moral, and social standards vary, to a greater or lesser extent, from one culture to another, the concept of responsibility is therefore laden with value-judgments—responsibility refers to something ethical or desirable. In comparison, the concept of power is more concrete and real; it refers to something feasible or practical.²

The word ‘responsibility’ in Chinese is *zeren*. The first character, *ze*, carries the idea of duty, and the second character, *ren*, carries that of burden. In traditional China, duties and burdens are handed

down or assigned by superiors and elders to their juniors and the young in a hierarchically structured society. Duties and burdens also come with certain social and occupational positions within a family or in the wider society. There are certain duties that one is expected to perform and burdens that one has to shoulder. In other words, there are things that one, as a member of a family or society, *ought* to do. This word *ought* carries a moral rather than a legal obligation.

Indeed morality plays a significant part in Chinese foreign-policy behaviour, depending on the time and circumstances in which events take place. As Shih Chih-yu has skillfully argued, Chinese leaders often 'present themselves as the supreme moral rectifiers of the world order'.³ He gives the following examples to support his argument,

- China's policy towards the Soviet Union was aimed primarily at shaming the Soviets for their betrayal of socialism
- China's policy towards the United States demonstrates China's anti-imperialist integrity
- China's Japan policy blames the Japanese for a failed Asiatic brotherhood
- China's Third World policy is intended to be a model for emulation.⁴

To the traditional Chinese mind, responsibility flows from something that one owes to another. Chinese leaders today probably feel they owe little or nothing to the outside world or, for that matter, countries in the West. Rather, it is the West that owes them a 'debt', because Western imperialists exploited China and humiliated their people for over 100 years before 1949. Why then should China be responsible to the outside world, or to the West, since it does not owe them anything? On the contrary, the West should according to this thinking be held responsible to China for what it had done to the country in the past. As a first step, Western countries should refrain from interfering in China's internal affairs.

Some Western analysts have pointed out that Chinese leaders are using this kind of 'victimhood' to drum up domestic support for their policies and to shore up their bargaining position with Western powers by shaming them.⁵ Some even suggest that the 'culture of shame and humiliation' is a 'nationalist myth'.⁶ To the

many Chinese who have suffered enormously, either physically or mentally, directly or indirectly, however, it was and is still very real. The fact that the story of Western exploitation of China and the lessons to be learnt have been passed on from one generation to another as a painful reminder does suggest that it is a factor to be taken into account when dealing with China and in assessing its responsibility.⁷

How can the responsibility of a state be assessed?

A common way to judge the credibility of a state is by judging what it does rather than what it says. In other words, a state could be judged by its deeds, its actions. But who is in a position to pass judgment? Is the UN Security Council, or its General Assembly, or its International Court of Justice capable of doing so? Is it countries in the West or in the East? Those in the North or in the South? Some powerful states? Or some form of international regimes or norms? How valid are their judgments if they do pass them? We know that there is no complete consensus on this amongst states, sometimes not even amongst a group of like-minded states. There are few generally accepted principles of international common law, except perhaps the UN Charter. But even some of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter are under dispute. For example, member states of the United Nations are divided as to whether humanitarian intervention should take precedence over national sovereignty.⁸ Some states choose to obey some laws while breaking others, whether they relate to human rights, trade, or political sovereignty. What is responsible to some may appear irresponsible to others. International responsibility is by and large a product of international civic awareness, but is very much grounded in, and defined by, local cultures and ideologies and is therefore severely contested at times.⁹

If absolute or complete consensus is difficult to achieve, then relative or near consensus may be possible. Very often, a group of like-minded states take collective action to tackle world problems on the basis of some sort of relative or near consensus.

To the Chinese mind, the linkage between power and responsibility depends on one's position in the scheme of things. It is of utmost importance to position oneself properly—only when one's position is properly established and 'named' can one behave in a 'correct' way.¹⁰ The idea of *dingwei* or positioning therefore becomes significant in determining one's behaviour. Apart from positioning, the term *dingwei* can mean the search for a place, the seeking of a proper role, or the undertaking of a process of negotiation to firm up one's position, thereby enabling one to avoid potential conflicts in the future. Because of the Chinese sense of history and collective memory, it is not inconceivable to assume that the idea of *dingwei* can be extended from China's domestic situation to its view of the world.

The Chinese sense of responsibility is very much tied to one's position of power, as indicated by the saying *quanli yu yiwu jundeng*, which can be roughly translated as, and represented by, the following approximation

$$\text{duty} + \text{burden} \approx \text{power} + \text{benefits}$$

where *yiwu* should be understood as 'appropriate' work (duty + burden) in the traditional meaning of the term, rather than 'voluntary' work.

It is useful to make a distinction between two forms of power—power as of right, which is derived from one's proper position; and power as of might, which is an empirical substance. The wielding of power can therefore be righteous when exercised from a proper position, but can be hegemonic and imperialistic and therefore morally corrupt when exercised for the purpose of selfish gain without rightful entitlement according to some set of moral principles. The conflict between China and the West, therefore, may not be purely over material interests or relative power gains, but may also be over ideological and moral principles, more so than most people would readily admit.

China's international position will therefore affect how it is going to behave, exercise its power, and fulfil its 'responsibilities'. To Chinese thinking, China's position in the world is buttressed by its power relative to others, and hence there is a need to understand

and determine accurately its comprehensive national power and that of other countries so that China can know where it stands in relation to others and how it should relate to or behave towards them.¹¹

Although the concept of comprehensive national power and its measurement lack precision,¹² its utility, to some Chinese analysts at least, lies in its ability to serve as a rough guide to assessing one's position in the world. One of the reasons why this concept has become so popular amongst Chinese analysts these days is that, since China is becoming strong, there is a need to take stock of its powers and its power base. Here of course we are dealing with something fuzzy rather than something precise, as the power of a state is difficult to measure and the situation of the world is ever changing. Hard power, such as military hardware, is relatively more static and is easier to measure, while soft power, such as culture or morality, is more fluid and hence more difficult to measure.

What is China's responsibility?

If we follow the Chinese line of thinking about *dingwei di wenti* (the issue of positioning), then we need, first of all, to ask what China's global position is before we attempt to make an assessment of its global responsibility. China conjures different images for different people. Some of the salient features of China's position may include the fact that China

- has a huge population
- is a nuclear power
- is a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations
- is a member of many important international organisations
- is a contributor as well as a recipient of aid.

Any assessment of China itself, let alone its responsibilities, must start with an understanding of China in the recent past, a China that had suffered for some 100 years under Western imperialism,¹³ experienced periods of internal strife, civil wars, and Japanese invasion, and then 30 years of excesses under revolutionary, communist rule. It has only begun to open up to the outside world,

more 'voluntarily' than before, since the late 1970s, and has by now attained some sort of normality and stability. China, however, is facing many difficulties in its development path—apart from its huge population, it is still a relatively backward developing country in the midst of drastic and fundamental socioeconomic change.¹⁴ It is still suffering from domestic political insecurity arising from crises of identity and legitimacy.¹⁵ What can one expect of China in its international behaviour?

A huge population. The task of feeding and sheltering 1.3 billion people has not been easy for China. The government is determined to eradicate poverty and raise the living standard of its people to the extent that it argues that the right to subsistence is more important than individual freedoms. Deng Xiaoping once reminded us that, if the Chinese were starving and forced to flee their home country in search for food elsewhere, would it not cause problems for the neighbouring region and the world at large? The world therefore has an interest to see that China can bring its people out of abject poverty and that the country can remain stable. In a speech made at Cambridge University in October 1999, President Jiang Zemin said that 'to ensure [the rights to subsistence and development] for our people is in itself a major contribution to the progress of the world's human rights cause'.¹⁶ To achieve the goals of modernisation and to raise the living standard of its people, China has been opening its doors and adopting new economic measures since the late 1970s, including the establishment of Special Economic Zones and the opening up of coastal and regional cities to foreign trade and investment.

A nuclear power. The successful testing of China's first atomic bomb in 1964 came as a morale boost to a people who had suffered and sacrificed so much. The depth of pride felt by Chinese, including those overseas, that China could join the rank of nuclear powers was almost boundless. China is proud not only because it is a nuclear power, but also because it is a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which it signed in September 1996.¹⁷ In the wake of the Pakistani and Indian missile and nuclear tests in April and May 1998, there were rumours that China might reconsider its treaty obligations and resume nuclear testing. On 3

June 1998, President Jiang Zemin pledged, in his first public reaction to nuclear tests in South Asia, that 'China has no intention of restarting its nuclear tests'.¹⁸ Either as a strategic move or as a gesture to maintain world peace, China has also pledged not to use nuclear weapons first and has asked other nuclear powers to do likewise. So far it has not stationed a single soldier or held military exercises outside its claimed territorial boundaries.

As a regional power, China has joined the Four-Party talks to find ways to end the conflict in the Korean Peninsula. It has joined and actively participated in regional security dialogues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, and in regional economic groupings, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. In the recent East Asian economic crisis, it resisted temptations to devalue its currency because a devaluation would have triggered another round of crisis. Consequently, China has had to endure a fall in economic competitiveness and consequent decline in exports. It has also made financial contributions to help some neighbouring countries affected by the crisis.¹⁹

A permanent member of the UN Security Council. As one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power, China can influence world events in a significant way and can bargain with other powers from a position of some strength. It speaks out on principles of non-interference, thereby helping the world's poor to resist the world's rich because in most cases of foreign intervention in domestic affairs it is the rich that intervene in the affairs of the poor rather than the other way round. China's burgeoning involvements in UN peacekeeping activities in Cambodia in 1992 and operations in Kuwait, Palestine, Liberia and the Western Sahara have enhanced its image as 'a good international citizen'.²⁰ Its most recent response, in which it chose not to exercise its veto after Jakarta agreed to the UN intervention in the East Timor crisis, is seen as 'responsible'.²¹

A member of key international organisations. Even by Asian standards, China is a latecomer to the world of international organisations, when compared with countries like Japan and India.

China only started joining inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) when it gained its seat in the United Nations in 1971 and international non-government organisations after it adopted its open-door policy in the late 1970s. China is now a member of some 282 IGOs and 2,311 INGOs,²² including the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and other major organisations such as the International Red Cross and the International Olympic Committee. The reasons for joining these organisations are many, and include China's concerted effort to establish and consolidate its international legitimacy in competition with Taiwan, the transfer of technology, investment attractions, and so on. China's involvement in international organisations is very much a process of mutual legitimisation and mutual learning. It offers China an opportunity to learn about international norms, practices, and expectations.²³ China's participation in and contributions to international organisations, though increasing steadily, are still limited and hindered by a number of factors. These include

- tradition and ideology—the global structure of international organisations is very much a product of Western experience and most Chinese find participation in a social setting on an equal, individual footing, as exemplified by China's participation in international organisations, more alien than other cultures
- power dominance—the goals and agenda of international organisations are dictated by Western interests
- China's own lack of civic awareness and international understanding
- the paucity of its financial resources for participation in international organisations
- the use of English as the medium of communication in most international organisations.

Despite these limitations, China has intensified its participation in international organisations since the 1970s, and joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, having reached an agreement with the United States in November 1999 on the terms of entry, which included the freeing up of China's telecommunication and banking industries.²⁴

The giving and receiving of aid. China gave the largest amount of aid when it was relatively poor. This was largely directed to African countries such as Tanzania and Zambia in the 1950s and 1960s, for reasons that have been seen as ideological and strategic in nature. Now that China is getting relatively richer, it still sporadically gives aid—usually on very generous terms—to countries in Africa and elsewhere in order to compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. More interestingly, it is not shy of asking for and receiving international aid when it suffers from natural disasters or giving aid, increasingly through the International Red Cross, to others to alleviate their sufferings when approached.²⁵ Apparently, the philosophy of aid-giving in China has changed from purely strategic considerations to a combination of strategic and humanitarian objectives. The fact that it is willing to accept humanitarian aid from a wide variety of outside agencies and countries demonstrates that China has become more 'normal'—receiving aid from the outside is not regarded as a national shame.

Apart from the above points, China has more generally cooperated with other countries in certain areas of global concern, such as human rights, environmental protection, and arms control. It has signed or ratified some 220 multilateral conventions,²⁶ and is currently involved in the codification and development of international law, serving as members of Chinese nationality in the International Law Commission of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia War Criminals.²⁷ China has been seen as doing its part in maintaining the smooth transition to Chinese sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999. It has also curbed excessive outbreaks of anti-US feelings as a result of the US bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the US spy plane incident at Hainan Island in April 2001. In an effort to make its government policies more transparent to its own people as well as to outsiders, the Information Office of the State Council of the PRC started to publish White Papers in 1990.²⁸ So far, 26 White Papers have been published on policy issues ranging from human rights, defence, to those relating to Taiwan and Tibet.²⁹ China's

human rights record leaves a lot to be desired, but the country has signed the two international covenants on human rights—the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—and has engaged in human rights dialogues with other countries and groups.³⁰

This is not to suggest any direct causal relationship between China's sense of responsibility and its foreign-policy behaviour, but rather to indicate that China might be seen as behaving more responsibly these days.

Responsible to whom?

Aside China's responsibility to its own people (an interesting subject of investigation in itself given the fact that China is slowly evolving into a slightly less authoritarian system), to whom is it responsible outside its borders? If we accept the Chinese thinking that it owes little to the outside world, then this will be a moot point. Also, little room may be left for growth of a spirit of voluntarism and adventure, and a greater sense of responsibility towards the outside world given centuries of inward-looking development. A number of Chinese scholars have, however, just begun to debate China's responsibility to the outside world, especially to the Asia Pacific region.³¹

What international society? Is China in or out?³²

The international society as we understand it today is, like it or not, dominated by the West, particularly the United States. The existing set of international laws, rules, and norms are very much the product of Western experiences. Tying China to international society therefore basically means making China agree to the rules of the games played by Western powers. To what extent should China be involved in such a system? Should it instead make an effort to change or redefine the system? These are some of the issues that China has been struggling with since it came into substantive contact with the outside world. The process of

interdependence and multilateralism is not new; rather the actors involved in the international system are changing, as is the power distribution amongst them, their relationships, and the issues involved in such relationships.

Underlying the idea and practice of bringing China to international society³³ is the assumption that China is not in—it is out; it is the Other. This is basically a Western perspective. From China's point of view, it has long been part of international society, but has not been a hegemonic power in the global sense of reaching out and setting rules for others to follow; rather it has been an underdog of the system. China has been struggling through this system, trying to change the rules but without much success, mainly because it was weak. Now that it has become stronger and more confident, it wants to integrate more with the outside world, demanding international respect and the place that it thinks it deserves and establishing a presence that the West cannot ignore.

US policy towards China has been one of 'conengagement'³⁴—a combination of containment and engagement. During the Cold War, containment predominated, but in the post-Cold War era engagement has come to the fore. The United States is sometimes unsure whether it should engage or contain China because it is not certain whether China is in or out of international society. If China is in, then one set of rules will apply. If it is not, then another set of rules applies.³⁵

Engaging China means socialising China into the existing system so that it can become one of Us—a responsible member, abiding by its rules and norms. As pointed out by Wang Hongying,³⁶ however, socialising China has its limits. First, while China can learn to be more cooperative through participation in multilateral activities, it can also come to realise and reassure itself of the effectiveness of the use of force in world affairs. In other words, China can become more liberal as well as more realist (in the *realpolitik* sense). China suffered tremendously under the West's so-called 'gunboat' diplomacy in the past and has recently witnessed the use of force by the United States in the Gulf War and in Yugoslavia. Chinese leaders were shocked when they saw on television the pin-point accuracy and firing power of high-tech

weapons and the scale of destruction caused. They realised how far behind their weapons system was and decided that their military modernisation had to be accelerated.

Second, the process of multilateralism only affects a very small number of Chinese officials who are dealing with foreign affairs and trade. Their preference for multilateralism faces strong domestic opposition from the military as well as from the state industrial sector.³⁷ The effects of these officials' individual learning are yet to be established empirically, not to mention the generally assumed spill-over effects from the individual level to the state level.³⁸

Third, the traditional world view based on Sinocentrism and on a hierarchically structured world order presents obstacles to embracing multilateralism. The Chinese realist school of thought tends to favour bilateral dealings over multilateral cooperation.³⁹ China's policy towards resolving disputes over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is a case in point.

Socialising is a slow and tortuous process, especially for an old and established civilisation like China. For most Western observers and decisionmakers, who expect quick results, socialising China can be a frustrating exercise because China sometimes appears to be responsible, sometimes not.

Why raise the issue of responsibility now?

The reason for raising the issue of responsibility seems obvious—China is becoming strong, or has the potential to become very strong. In parallel with its growing strength, China is increasingly involved in world affairs. When China was weak and isolated, responsibility did not seem to figure much as an issue, especially when viewed from a Western perspective. At that time it was, for the West, a matter of trying to contain China, confront it, stop it from spreading its form of communism and revolution, and use it as a lever to balance the power of other countries such as the former Soviet Union. The assumption here is that a rising China should assume greater responsibilities in world affairs.

However, responsibility to international society is not the language used by decisionmakers in China.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the meaning of responsibility has changed over time—in the revolutionary days, it meant responsibility to support and promote international struggles. Mao Zedong was of the opinion that it was responsible behaviour to help the proletariat of the world revolt and overthrow the decadent, imperialist regimes and the 'old world order'.⁴¹ Now the term means Great Power responsibilities. As pointed out by Jia Qingguo, a professor of international politics at Peking University, China opposed military intervention in Yugoslavia, partly to fulfil its responsibility of upholding international law.⁴² More generally, China pledges never to become a hegemon (meaning a bully) even if it becomes rich. This, to Chinese leaders, is responsible behaviour towards achieving world peace.

The term responsibility is not used by Chinese academics in their writings. A comprehensive and up-to-date Chinese encyclopaedia of international politics makes no reference whatsoever to the term 'responsibility'.⁴³ On the contrary and as should be expected, the ideas of power and power politics are covered extensively; so are related topics such as national interest and national sovereignty.⁴⁴ By and large, Chinese international relations literature dwells mainly on policy analysis at the state-to-state level.⁴⁵ When China exercised its veto against the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in certain countries that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan such as Haiti and Guatemala,⁴⁶ it was obviously trying to balance its national interests with its international obligations as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. When China negotiated its terms of entry to the World Trade Organization, it was again trying to balance its national interests with its international obligations to adhere to the rules and regulations of the international (read Western) trading regime. The contradiction between realist and idealist aspirations,⁴⁷ though not clearly spelt out in the current academic literature, does seem to enter into the calculus of decisionmakers in China nowadays.

Conclusion

Let me sound a note of warning here. Since there is no concrete evidence to show that Chinese leaders take their global responsibility into account when they make foreign-policy decisions, there is a danger that we may be setting up a straw man only to destroy it—an academic exercise in futility.

Having said that, we may still ask: is China then a responsible state? The answer to this question is elusive. Unless we have a commonly accepted set of standards to help us to make an assessment, we can hardly say for sure that one country is more responsible than another. Also, unless we make an international comparison across countries, we can hardly say conclusively that country A is more responsible than country B.

If we compare China's situation now with its situation say some twenty years ago, then, by using the correlation between position and behaviour as a yardstick, we may reasonably conclude that China has become more responsible. If Chinese leaders, by dint of their positions of power in the country, do feel some strong sense of responsibility, then it is most likely to be a sense of responsibility towards their own families and eventually their nation and civilisation, rather than towards the outside world. After all, the 'outer' world was, at least in the pre-modern days, unimportant to most Chinese, élites and commoners alike.⁴⁸ Things have changed, of course, especially as a result of globalisation of various kinds, but tradition and culture still persist.⁴⁹

Notes

- ¹ For a more quantitative analysis on a similar topic, see Gerald Chan, 'Is China a 'responsible' state? Assessing its multilateral engagements', Paper presented at the International Studies Association convention held in Hong Kong, 26–28 July 2001.
- ² E-mail communication with Professor K.K. Leung of the Department of Applied Social Studies, City University of Hong Kong, November 1999.
- ³ Shih Chih-yu, *China's just world: the morality of Chinese foreign policy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 243.

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- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Steven Goldstein, quoted in CNN news at <http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/asian.superpower/neighbors>.
- ⁶ Michael Yahuda, 'China's foreign relations: the Long March, future uncertain,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 159 (September 1999):652. Ishihara Shintaro, a former right-wing LDP member of Parliament and currently the Governor of Tokyo, once rejected outright the existence of the Nanjing Incident in 1937 as a fabrication. Ishihara is but one among many extreme right-wing nationalists in Japan.
- ⁷ Chen Jie, 'China's Spratly policy,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 34, no. 10 (October 1994):894.
- ⁸ Frank Ching, 'UN: sovereignty or rights?' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 October 1999, 40.
- ⁹ Personal communication with Dr Ray Goldstein, School of Political Science and International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 8 October 1999.
- ¹⁰ A traditional Confucian thought, deriving from the popular saying that *mingzheng, yanshun*, meaning roughly that 'if one's name is properly given, then one's words can become righteous'.
- ¹¹ Apart from Confucian influence, this line of Chinese thinking can also be attributed to the teachings of the famous Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, author of *The Art of War*, who wrote 'know one's situation and the situation of others, fight a hundred battles and be able to win them all'.
- ¹² See Gerald Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: a framework for analysis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 30–33.
- ¹³ Michael Yahuda, 'China's search for a global role,' *Current History*, Vol. 98, no. 629 (September 1999):266.
- ¹⁴ Jia Qingguo, 'Economic development, political stability and international respect,' *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 49, no. 2 (Winter 1996):573–76.
- ¹⁵ Wang Fei-ling, 'Self-image and strategic intentions: national confidence and political insecurity,' in Deng Yong and Wang Fei-ling (eds), *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China views the world* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), chapter 2.
- ¹⁶ *Evening Post*, Wellington, 23 October 1999, 8.
- ¹⁷ China has yet to ratify it. The Treaty needs to be ratified by the 44 nuclear-capable states. Twenty-six have ratified, 15 have signed but not ratified, including the United States, and three (India, North Korea, and Pakistan) have not even signed. See *Time*, 25 October

- 1999, 20. The treaty was under review by China's People's National Congress as of mid 2000. See www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5196.html, accessed on 3 August 2001.
- ¹⁸ *South China Morning Post*, 4 June 1998. Earlier, an anonymous senior Foreign Ministry official in Beijing was quoted as saying that China would consider resuming tests if the nuclear arms tension between India and Pakistan worsened (*Ibid.*, 2 June 1998).
- ¹⁹ For example, China contributed US\$1 billion as part of an IMF effort to bail out Thailand during its financial crisis.
- ²⁰ J. Mohan Malik in *International Herald Tribune*, 8 October 1999, electronic edition.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*
- ²² Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organizations 2000/2001* (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1999), 1488. The figures do not include those for Hong Kong.
- ²³ For an incisive analysis of China's learning process in nuclear non-proliferation issues, see Hu Weixing, 'Nuclear nonproliferation', in Deng and Wang (eds), *In the Eyes of the Dragon*, chapter 6. David M. Lampton discusses the issue of learning in his book *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
- ²⁴ *Asiaweek*, 26 November 1999, 50–53.
- ²⁵ For some discussions on the origins of China's shift from its strict observance of self-reliance to its acceptance of international aid, see Gerald Chan, *China and International Organisations* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), 75–80.
- ²⁶ www.fmprc.gov.cn/premade/8275/duobian.htm, accessed on 26 June 2000.
- ²⁷ E-mail communication with Dr Zou Keyuan, Research Fellow, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, October 1999. For China's approach to, and compliance with, international law, see Zou Keyuan, 'Chinese approach to international law', in Hu Weixing, Gerald Chan and Zha Daojiong (eds), *China's International Relations in the 21st Century* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2000), 171–93.
- ²⁸ These White Papers are the products of the Bureau of Overseas Propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department. The Information Office of the State Council is under the dual leadership of the State Council and the Central Propaganda Department. See Wan Ming, 'Human rights and democracy,' in Deng and Wang (eds), *In the Eyes of the Dragon*, 102 (and note 9).

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²⁹ www.china.org.cn/e-white/index, accessed on 4 July 2001. These twenty-six papers are

- Progress in China's Human Rights Cause in 2000
- China's Population and Development in the 21st Century
- China's Space Activities
- China's National Defence in 2000
- Narcotics Control in China
- The Development of Tibetan Culture
- Fifty Years of Progress in China's Human Rights
- National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China
- China's National Defence
- The Development of China's Marine Programs
- Human Rights in China
- Criminal Reform in China
- Tibet—Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation
- The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China
- The Situation of Chinese Women
- Intellectual Property Protection in China
- Family Planning in China
- China: arms control and disarmament
- The Progress of Human Rights in China
- The Situation of Children in China
- Environmental Protection in China
- The Grain Issue in China
- On Sino-US Trade Balance
- Progress in China's Human Rights Cause in 1996
- Freedom of Religious Belief in China
- New Progress in Human Rights in the Tibet Autonomous Region

³⁰ On 28 February 2001, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the PRC ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with some reservations on issues relating to labour rights. A spokesman of the Standing Committee said that it took China three years and four months to ratify the Covenant, compared with Britain's 8 years, Italy's 11 years and Belgium's 15 years. 'The United States, however, has not yet ratified the covenant, though it signed it 24 years ago'. The spokesman also said that Taiwan's signing of those Covenants in the name of China in 1966 was 'illegal'. See *Xinhua News* in www.china.org.cn, (accessed 4 July 2001). Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is still pending, as of mid 2001.

- ³¹ See Ye Zicheng, 'Zhongguo shixing deguo waijiao zhanlue shizai bixing [Strategy of Great Power diplomacy is imperative for China—some problems on China's diplomatic]', *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* [World Economics and Politics], no.1 (2000), 10; Pang Zhongying, 'Zai bianhua de shijieshang zhuiqiu Zhongguo de diwei [To establish China's status in a changing world]', *World Economics and Politics*, no. 1 (2000), 38; and Chen Quansheng and Liu Jinghua, 'Quanqiu zhong de Zhongguo yu shijie [China and the world under globalisation]', *Zhongguo waijiao* [Chinese Diplomacy], no. 3 (2000), 4.
- ³² For some analyses in this area, see Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Engaging myths: misconceptions about China and its global role', *Harvard Asia Pacific Review*, Vol. 2, no. 1 (Winter 1997–98), 9–12; and Samuel Kim, 'China in and out of the changing world order', *Occasional Paper 21*, World Order Studies Program, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1991.
- ³³ See, for example, 'The World of China, or China of the World', *China Today*, December (2000):10–13.
- ³⁴ The word 'conengagement'—a combination of containment and engagement—comes from the research of a team of scholars at Rand. See Zalmay M. Khalizad et al., *The United States and a Rising China: strategic and military implications* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1999), 72–75. Gerald Segal, in his article 'Tying China into the international system', *Survival*, 37, no.2 (Summer 1995), suggests also that the West should contain China on one hand, but tie China into the world economic market at the same time. The rationale is that the more China is connected with the world the less likely it will use force to settle disputes (thanks to Dr Huang Xiaoming and Christina Chan of the School of Political Science and International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington, for their advice and help in tracing the sources).
- ³⁵ For an interesting short essay on the myths surrounding US engagement policy towards China, see Johnston, 'Engaging myths: misconceptions about China and its global role'. For a book-length treatment on engagement policy from the perspectives of some Asia Pacific countries, see Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (eds), *Engaging China: the management of an emerging power* (London: Routledge, 1999). In the latter part of the Clinton administration, the United States regarded China as a 'strategic partner'. In his presidential election campaign, George W. Bush said that China was a 'strategic competitor'. After his visit to Beijing in July 2001,

Secretary of State Colin Powell used the term 'constructive cooperation' to describe the current state of US-China relations. Despite the change of rhetoric, the term 'conengagement' seems to sum up well in a single word the US policy towards China in the past three decades or so.

- ³⁶ Wang Hongying, 'Multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy', in Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan and Daojiong Zha (eds), *China's International Relations in the 21st Century: dynamics of paradigm shifts: dynamics of paradigm shifts* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2000).
- ³⁷ Thomas J. Christensen arrives at a similar point. See his 'Pride, pressure, and politics: the roots of China's worldview,' in Deng and Wang (eds), *In the Eyes of the Dragon*, 246. He recalls from his research in China that 'the foreign ministry (*Waijiaobu*) is so reviled in other sections of the government that it is now often referred to as the *Maiguobu* (translated as Ministry of Compradors or, perhaps, Ministry of Traitors), 255 (note 15).
- ³⁸ For an up-to-date and detailed analysis of related issues across a number of functional areas such as trade, defence, human rights, the environment, and others, see David M. Lampton (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
- ³⁹ A recently published book in China casts serious doubts about the benefits of the process of globalisation to China and sparks off heated debates amongst academics about the merits of China's active interactions with the outside world. The book, entitled *China's Road: under the shadow of globalisation*, was co-authored by Wang Xiaodong and Fang Ning and published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press. It has become a best-seller in the country. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 January 2000, 16-18.
- ⁴⁰ Personal communication with Dr Huang Xiaoming, 13 October 1999.
- ⁴¹ E-mail communication with Professor Ting Wai of the Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, 26 November 1999.
- ⁴² E-mail communication with Professor Jia Qingguo, Associate Dean of the School of International Studies, Peking University, October 1999.
- ⁴³ Liu Jinji, Liang Shoude, Yang Huaisheng, et al. (eds), *Guoji zhengzhi dacidian* [A dictionary of international politics] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1994).

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- ⁴⁴ See, for example, Yan Xuetong, *Zhongguo guojia liyi fenxi* [Analysis of China's national interest] (Tianjin: Tianjin People's Press, 1996).
- ⁴⁵ Gerald Chan, 'A comment on an international relations theory with Chinese characteristics', *Asian Review*, 8 (Autumn and Winter, 1998): 176–84 (in Chinese).
- ⁴⁶ See Wang Jianwei, 'Managing conflict: Chinese perspectives on multilateral diplomacy and collective security', in Deng and Wang (eds), *In the Eyes of the Dragon*, 80–81.
- ⁴⁷ Personal communication with Dr Huang.
- ⁴⁸ Richard J. Smith, *Chinese Maps: images of 'All Under Heaven'* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 78.
- ⁴⁹ This is attested by the 'anti-globalisation' book in China. See note 39 above.