Noyer’s first key address in relation to the global financial crisis came in June 2008. The day before the Banque de France annual report was released, Noyer addressed the General Assembly of the Office of Bank and Financial Coordination. Contextually, this can still be considered the pre-crisis phase in the French economy. The symptoms of the sub-prime crisis had remained largely contained to the United States and the United Kingdom, although its effects had been seeping through the international financial sector.

Noyer defined the cause of the problems as mismanagement of the system. ‘This situation originated in a general perception that investment opportunities in assets, apparently of good quality, were almost unlimited, and this altered the judgement of actors’^[6]. In this speech, Noyer proposed ‘an ensemble of good practices’^[7] more than specific policy proposals. For example, he affirmed the importance of the role of governance in terms of managing risk, as well as conveying that the banks that were best equipped to respond to challenges were those that invested early in developing evaluation and control procedures and developed their knowledge of the risks inherent in complex products. The media response to this address was largely neutral towards Noyer’s framing of the crisis and his leadership, although there was some disagreement with his portrayal of the severity of the crisis (Table 7.1). An article in Le Figaro expressed this disagreement, saying ‘even though on the stock exchange, banks have been seriously mismanaged, the Bank Commission wants to be more optimistic’^[8] (Bohineust 2008).

Table 7.1 Media response to Noyer’s 25 June 2008 speech

President Sarkozy’s address at Toulon in September 2008 came on the heels of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the United States. This event was a watershed event in the financial crisis. In France, this marked the escalation of the national crisis. Sarkozy’s approach at Toulon was twofold: he highlighted the uniqueness of the crisis and he made a call for a new international financial order. From the outset, Sarkozy labelled the crisis ‘a crisis of confidence without precedent’.^[9] He did, however, make a reference to the depression of the 1930s, noting the current crisis had seen no equivalent since. The majority of the population—those under the age of seventy—had not experienced the 1930s depression, so Sarkozy effectively conveyed the uniqueness of this crisis as the first of its kind in most peoples’ lifetimes. After this introduction, Sarkozy highlighted the pitfalls of the system that caused the crisis. ‘The financial crisis is not the crisis of capitalism. It is the crisis of a system which did away with the most fundamental values of capitalism, which in some sense, betrayed the spirit of capitalism’.^[10]

According to Sarkozy, capitalism had allowed the rise of the West throughout seven decades, but a betrayal of capitalist values had emerged. Having established its corruption as the fundamental cause of the crisis, Sarkozy proposed the reform of capitalism, because ‘anticapitalism does not offer any solution to the actual crisis’^[11]. Sarkozy’s plan for a new equilibrium between the market and the State started with the regulation of the banks and controlled remuneration. He insisted that the severity of the crisis was substantial, labelling it the end of the post-Cold War capitalist world.

This address is vital to understanding Sarkozy’s framing of the crisis because he illustrates the situation in terms of its exceptionality. Effectively, his message was that in an exceptional case, one called for an exceptional response. The media responded to this address with overall support for Sarkozy, but also with some concern about his policy proposals (Table 7.2). Most notably, the media acknowledged the significance of this speech. Le Figaro referred to it as ‘the day when Sarkozy called for mobilisation against the crisis’^[12] (Jeudy and Visot 2008). Les Echos mirrored this perspective, saying, ‘Nicolas Sarkozy’s discourse pronounced at Toulon on 25 September marks his entry into the war against the crisis’^[13] (Cornudet 2008). The Toulon address was undoubtedly Sarkozy’s first attempt at crisis exploitation in the face of a financial crisis that had worsened in the national economy.

Libération called Sarkozy’s ‘classic allocution’ messianique in his wish to be heard by the French, who feared for their economy (Guiral 2008). This fear was real, as demonstrated by a poll conducted by Ifop on 18–19 September, which indicated that 81 per cent of French respondents were concerned about the French economy in the financial crisis (Angus Reid Global Monitor 2008). Sarkozy’s attempt at crisis framing in the Toulon address failed to reassure the concerned French public, as evidenced by a CSA survey published in the newspaper Le Parisien on 28 September, which showed that 51 per cent of those surveyed did not have confidence in Sarkozy to reduce the impact of the crisis in France (Les Echos 2008).

Table 7.2 Media response to Sarkozy’s 25 September 2008 speech

One of Lagarde’s first public speeches after the manifestation of the crisis in France was delivered ahead of the upcoming budget for 2009. From the outset, Lagarde looked past the short term and framed the crisis beyond 2008–09. She noted that ‘the plan for programming public finance effectively brings us to 2012’^[14]. This foresight acknowledged the severity of the crisis at hand, which demonstrated that Lagarde’s was not a type-1 ‘business-as-usual’ frame, but rather a type-2 frame of crisis acknowledgment.

Lagarde maintained a matter-of-fact tone throughout this speech, conveying the grim financial projections but simultaneously reassuring that the eurozone was better situated than the US economy. With this comparison with the United States, Lagarde defined the crisis as one without precedent and also accounted for its origins in the US financial sector. ‘The turbulences endured by international financial markets over the past year reflect the consequences of a deep purge of the American financial sector’^[15]. Lagarde outlined the various proposals of the French Government for the five-year period to 2012, which included structural reforms for employment policy (targeted at employment candidates, seniors and youth), buying power, economic modernisation and a tripling of the research tax credit (CIR).

The media response to Lagarde’s presentation of the 2009 budget was focused primarily on public deficit figures and proposed policy, and there was neither support nor opposition expressed towards Lagarde herself (Table 7.3). There was implicit agreement with the severity of the crisis and its impact on the budget. For example, an article in Le Figaro agreed that the financial crisis had weakened the French economy. ‘The financial crisis which has raged for one year has finally impacted the global economy and provoked a net slowdown in France’^[16] (Lachevre and Visot 2008a).

One particular policy proposal that was criticised in the representative media response was related to civil servants. Le Monde stated that ‘30 600 jobs would be done away with in the public service compared to 20 900 in 2008. This is a little less than the promise of not replacing one for every two civil servants who leave for retirement’^[17] (Lachevre and Visot 2008a). This argument was well founded in the context of uncertainty about rising unemployment and it also brought to the fore the credibility of the government by questioning its commitment to its promises. On the whole, the media response to Lagarde’s presentation of the budget was critical of the government’s approach to the weakened economic conditions in France, but paid little attention to Lagarde herself.

Table 7.3 Media response to Lagarde’s 26 September 2008 speech

Lagarde’s next key address was delivered to the Senate and was titled ‘National plan for assuring the financing of the economy and restoring confidence’.^[18] In the opening lines of this address, Lagarde defined the financial crisis in the following terms: ‘the crisis through which we are living is excessive.’^[19] This crisis of excess was explained by four factors: the excess of speculation, the excess of credit in the United States, the excess of complexity in which the financial profession lost control of the tools it created and the excess of irrationality and panic on the stock exchange.

Lagarde then proceeded to outline the government’s proposal for management of the crisis. The proposal was threefold: first, the creation of a society of refinancing whereby funds would be raised with a state guarantee; second, the possibility of the State reinforcing the equity capital of French banks; and third, the Dexia guarantee in cooperation with Belgium and Luxembourg. On the first point, Lagarde made note of a marked contrast with the plan proposed by US Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, saying ‘our proposal is completely opposite to the Paulson plan…the American state proposes to take control of the worst assets…in France, the state will not buy the assets. It will loan to the banks.’^[20] This contrast was paramount in Lagarde’s greater narrative, which insisted that France remained in a better financial position than many other nations, especially the United States.

The media response to Lagarde’s 15 October speech was similar to that to her 26 September address in terms of the focus on government policy, rather than on Lagarde herself. Lagarde was effectively viewed as the representative or spokeswoman for a larger decision-making body. Most notable among the media responses illustrated in Table 7.4, Le Figaro conveyed agreement with the proposed policy because it would go a step further than other plans adopted in Europe and the United States: ‘French measures can serve to achieve two purposes by helping business to refinance themselves in the mid-term’^[21] (Lachevre 2008).

Table 7.4 Media response to Lagarde’s 15 October 2008 speech

Christian Noyer delivered a noteworthy address titled ‘Reflections on the crisis’ in October 2008. In the months since his address to the General Assembly of the Coordination Office, Noyer had been curiously absent from the public eye.

After this gap in public presence, Noyer continued his framing of the crisis at an address to the Crédit Agricole Congress on 21 October. According to Noyer, at this time, there were two certainties about the crisis: it would impact on the economy in the long term and it was defined as a crisis of liquidity. Noyer directed the focus away from the government’s leadership, towards the role of central banks, which effectively stood ‘in the front line’^[22] during the combat. Noyer organised his speech around four themes: the nature of the crisis, the policies put in place to manage it, the macroeconomic perspectives and financial regulation perspectives. On the last two themes, he reinforced that the fall in confidence was not centred on France, and he promoted the value of a deep knowledge of the banking sector, not only at the microeconomic level but in terms of limiting risk across the entire global system. His overarching message maintained that French banks were solid and profitable and he demonstrated support for Sarkozy’s push to organise Europe’s crisis response.^[23]

After his address at Nice, Noyer was presented by Le Monde as a timid figure in the shadow of Sarkozy, with the paper saying he was ‘inaudible in a room of 100 people’^[24] (Bacqué 2008). This was one of the very few articles that focused on the personality and leadership of Noyer himself, as most of the media and public attention was engaged with policies in the banking sector rather than its key actors (Table 7.5). Overall, there was more opinion on France’s banking policy than on the governor himself (Ganiko 2009). The article in Le Monde on 24 October detailed Noyer’s background and provided a very positive character reference as well as crediting Noyer with the plan for the bank guarantees.

Table 7.5 Media response to Noyer’s 21 October 2008 speech

One month after his Toulon address—and also subsequent to the Dexia rescue on 30 September 2008 by the French, Belgian and Luxembourg governments—Sarkozy delivered a key speech at Argonay. Conveying the truth to the French people was the dominant theme of his speech. Sarkozy reiterated the exceptional circumstances, also confirming that it was a global and not a French, or European, crisis. This effectively exogenised the cause and origin of the crisis. Building on his speech at Toulon in September, Sarkozy pinpointed responsibility for the crisis to the faults and errors of financial institutions. In advancing his declaration of the end of the post-Cold War capitalist world, which was introduced in his Toulon discourse, Sarkozy announced that ‘without doubt, this crisis will mark the true start of the twenty-first century, the moment when everyone will understand that it was time to change’^[25]. At Argonay, Sarkozy proposed the need for moralisation, transparency and protection. He announced a new strategic investment fund of €26 billion, the appointment of Réné Ricol to the position of National Credit Mediator and structural reforms such as opening businesses on Sundays.

In this speech, Sarkozy framed the responsibility for the crisis as lying outside France, but he accepted the responsibility of the French State to respond to it, and to act sooner rather than later. He continued to advocate the idea of a summit, in the form of a new Bretton Woods, thus reinforcing his commitment to fundamental changes to the global financial system. Table 7.6 demonstrates a similar media response to that of the speech at Toulon, with slightly more agreement with his policy proposals and a majority of overall support for Sarkozy. Le Monde illustrated such support for Sarkozy, saying that ‘it remains that the style of Nicolas Sarkozy, sometimes disparaged, has played more in his favour’ and quoted a German diplomat who said ‘during a crisis, hyperactivity becomes energy, arrogance becomes tenacity, unpredictability becomes pragmatism’^[26] (Ferenczi 2008). This demonstrated a sense of public support for Sarkozy’s leadership in a time of crisis.

Table 7.6 Media response to Sarkozy’s 23 October 2008 speech

Sarkozy’s third key speech was delivered at Douai, where he affirmed that the crisis was not a passing phenomenon. In this address, he also envisaged a longer-term framing of the crisis and proposed how France would emerge from it. In explaining the protracted nature of the global financial crisis, Sarkozy acknowledged the looming problem of higher unemployment: ‘it is unemployment that strikes up the crisis of confidence which precedes the economic crisis.’^[27] This framed the crisis as a chain of events. The address focused on government measures, especially in the explanation of the €26 billion stimulus plan. The stimulus was to be spent on public sector investments and loans for the French automotive industry, which employed, directly or indirectly, 10 per cent of the working population. Sarkozy portrayed this ‘massive investment plan’^[28] as a historic responsibility to remake France in terms of infrastructure, universities and research.

The media response to the Douai address continues the pattern of the response to Sarkozy’s other speeches. Table 7.7 demonstrates overall support for Sarkozy, but slightly higher disagreement with his policy proposals. Two journalists for Le Figaro called the policy proposal in this speech ‘an arsenal of anti-crisis measures’^[29] (Lachevre and Visot 2008b).

Table 7.7 Media response to Sarkozy’s 4 December 2008 speech

Lagarde’s 2009 New Year address was more reflective than her previous speeches. It conveyed optimism for the year ahead. There appeared to be a deliberate absence of explanation and accounting for the crisis in this address in order to focus on asserting the success of crisis management to date, as well as on future plans. As such, with the early manifestation of the crisis behind her, Lagarde outlined four reasons for hope in 2009, including positive economic signs such as inflation coming down again to 1.6 per cent in November 2008, even though it had gone as high as 3.6 per cent in July 2008. Other reasons were the induction of a new administration in the United States led by President, Barack Obama, and Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner; Europe retaining the unity and international standing it had gained under the French presidency; and the government’s actions, such as the stimulus plan. There was little discussion of Lagarde’s New Year address in the papers analysed in this chapter, suggesting just how much of the media spotlight on this matter was focused on Sarkozy. Where reports were found, there was little disagreement with Lagarde’s framing of the crisis (Table 7.8).

Table 7.8 Media response to Lagarde’s 13 January 2009 speech

Noyer delivered his address ‘Global financial crisis: public and private strategies in response to the crisis’^[30] in the United Arab Emirates, on 21 January 2009. This was a key speech, as Noyer readdressed two key themes of the crisis—its nature and the policies in response to it—and delivered it in an international location. In this speech, Noyer simplified the definition of the crisis. He called it a crisis of liquidity that began in August 2007 and moved to affect the economy on a large scale. Noyer noted that, in addition to a crisis of liquidity, it was also a crisis of securitisation, where the packaging of debt into a financial product, for the purpose of rating and trading, did not discriminate against bad debt. After this, Noyer provided a further explanation of the crisis by describing how the instability of financial structures had been concealed and the chain reaction this had initiated. According to Noyer, there were two fundamental realities: first, responsibility for the crisis was concentrated in the hands of financial institutions; and second, in order to remedy the consequences of this, structural innovation was necessary. Having established the causes, and thereby the responsibility for the crisis in the financial sector, Noyer ushered in the role of the State. According to him, the State held the responsibility to modify the policy budget, which in turn would restart the economic machine. Noyer referred, in addition to the French domestic economy, to a wider plan for Europe, especially in light of the French EU Presidency. The media response to Noyer’s address largely ignored his framing of the causes of the crisis and his overall leadership, although there was some disagreement about his severity framing and the policies that his speech put forward.

Table 7.9 Media response to Noyer’s 21 January 2009 speech

At Saint-Quentin, Aisne, Sarkozy delivered the last key speech during this chapter’s 12-month period of analysis. In this address, Sarkozy referred to values and morality while reiterating that this was an unprecedented crisis. A notable departure from his earlier speeches was evident in the explicit reference to public opinion, which had manifested in protests through early 2009. Sarkozy acknowledged this dissent, saying, ‘my task is to listen to those who protest, but I also have the responsibility to listen to those who do not march in protest’.^[31] It is in this speech that one can perceive the type-3 framing at play. Sarkozy claimed that the crisis gave new freedoms to think, to imagine, to act and to invent France’s future. In even more straightforward terms, Sarkozy affirmed that ‘it is necessary to benefit from the crisis’.^[32] Sarkozy insisted, however, that in order to realise these freedoms and opportunities, everyone had a moral responsibility, including himself.

Table 7.10 demonstrates that, despite continuing public protests and declining popularity ratings, there was still overall support for Sarkozy in the media. In the context of the speech at Saint-Quentin, Libération posed the question: ‘What to say to reassure a public opinion which repudiates him in the opinion polls? Speak of values and landmarks’^[33] (Guiral 2009b).

In contrast with earlier media responses, some articles after this speech took electoral issues into consideration; ‘to have his nose on the crisis does not prevent him having an eye on his campaign promises and the presidential election of 2012’^[34] (Cornudet 2009). With the 2012 election in mind, other articles discussed the post-crisis era.

Table 7.10 Media response to Sarkozy’s 24 March 2009 speech