Having analysed the attempts to frame the global financial crisis by key New Zealand leaders, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the impact of crisis exploitation within the case. In particular, it is useful to focus on the two ‘games’ that lie at the core of crisis exploitation: the political game and the policy game (see Chapter 2, this volume).

In terms of the political game in New Zealand, the impact of crisis exploitation was noted, but probably not decisive. The National Party, led by John Key, maintained its convincing lead in the polls throughout and was eventually electorally successful. In one sense, this could be seen as a justification for those who argue that already-popular leaders are more likely to emerge successfully from a crisis situation (Wilkins 1987; Seeger et al. 2003). Such an inference would, however, ignore two important conclusions from the case. First, the Clark Government’s crisis exploitation—while unsuccessful—did have a noticeable impact on the polls. Its ultimate failure is explained just as well by the Key opposition’s competent crisis leadership as it is by Key’s general popularity. Moreover, throughout the period, the actions of all key players could be accommodated within a crisis-exploitation framework. This suggests, if nothing else, that the actors themselves considered crisis management to be of significant importance and they acted accordingly. In the terms outlined in the ‘political game’, an unpopular incumbent attempts first to minimise blame (box I) but then chooses to risk a blame showdown (box IV) in a last-ditch effort to reverse an imminent electoral defeat. This behaviour might be different to that posited as likely, ceteris paribus, in Chapter 2, but it can nonetheless be accommodated within the framework. Indeed, this chapter found such an accommodation to be illuminating.

It is in the context of the ‘policy game’ (see Chapter 2, this volume), however, that the utility of the framework is borne out. An interesting anomaly of the case, noted above in the analysis of English’s first speech act analysed in this chapter, is the extent to which the Key Government was successful at exploiting the economic crisis to implement ‘neo-liberal’ economic reforms. Such reforms were anomalous because in almost all other countries, including New Zealand’s close neighbour and financial partner Australia, the global financial crisis had led to the discrediting of neo-liberal economics.

Such a disparity in policy response between two close neighbours suggests the policy outcomes of crises are shaped by much more than the content of the crisis itself; it suggests the crisis framing is of the utmost importance to the policy outcomes. Boin et al.’s (2009) conception of a ‘policy game’ would seem an efficacious way to theoretically model this policy side of the framing contest. In the case of New Zealand, box III of Table 2.2 (Chapter 2) would seem to explain the neo-liberal outcome; there had been a major and swift rhetorical/symbolic change in New Zealand economic policy after the crisis, which was successfully framed as a consequence of New Zealand’s lack of competitiveness in global markets.

The key question remains: what determined success in these framing contests? Considering the political and policy games in New Zealand together, it seems there was one factor that could incorporate the impact of popularity and that of a persuasive crisis in explaining causation: credibility. Elsewhere, credibility has been considered to constitute the key factor in determining the success of ‘meaning making’ after a crisis (Boin et al. 2005:79–83). In the New Zealand case study, its significance seems to be demonstrated. The insurmountable challenge for the Clark Government was not unpopularity so much as the ‘credibility trap’: any attempt to exploit the crisis to reverse this unpopularity without that intention becoming transparent. Moreover, the Key Government’s early success in implementing significant neo-liberal policy reform would seem best explained by its ability to frame a crisis that struck during a home-grown downturn as being linked to the economic management that caused that downturn. If there is one salient lesson that the unique case of New Zealand should suggest to the scholar of crisis leadership, it is therefore the importance of credibility as a determinant in the political and policy outcomes of crises.