Early law and order policy was ad hoc and reactive. Weaknesses included a lack of strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, chronic policy inconsistency, and an absence of coordination between the principal agencies. Budget appropriations were more often the result of competitive negotiations between senior officials than the outcome of a rational assessment of the needs of individual agencies. The sheer number of agencies and departments make this one of the most challenging sectors of government. At present, the law and justice sector is made up of the Department of Justice and Attorney General, National Judicial Staff Services, Ombudsman Commission, RPNGC, Correctional Services, Magisterial Services, Office of the Public Prosecutor and Public Solicitor. Since the late 1990s, the Department of National Planning and Rural Development has taken a lead role in attempting to improve coordination and planning across the sector. Each department and agency has their own structures, operating procedures and corporate plans. Constitutional doctrines such as judicial independence impose further limits on inter-agency coordination.

Over the years, there have been numerous reports and policy reviews, and various attempts to establish mechanisms for coordination, as well as efforts — usually with significant donor input — to strengthen the institutional capacities of particular agencies. Policy reviews and crime summits have generated long lists of recommendations aimed at improving the functioning of agencies, enhancing inter-agency cooperation, strengthening crime control, reforming the law, and, more broadly, measures to address the underlying causes of lawlessness. While there may be some value in such exercises, they often produce extensive ‘wish lists’ that lack overall coherence and that make few concessions to the reality of resource constraints and limited institutional capacity. Moreover, these lists often fail to prioritize recommendations, provide costing or implementation plans, or integrate proposed changes with ongoing programs and plans in the agencies concerned. Implementation of recommendations arising from reviews is invariably partial and selective.

Lack of government support and effective leadership in the agencies has been a persistent problem. As in many other areas of policy, there has been little consistency between different governments and departmental administrations. New ministers and senior officials have sought to make their individual mark, often by deliberately distancing themselves from their predecessor’s initiatives. There has been a preference for setting up new mechanisms and initiatives rather than improving existing structures. Many of the same recommendations appear time and again, indicating the gap between policy rhetoric and implementation, as well as a serious lack of corporate memory among decision makers. Political leaders have been more concerned with responding to public pressure for quick-fix solutions than with engaging in the less glamorous task of sustained capacity building and reform aimed at improving the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. As in many other countries, the concerns and attention spans of politicians have often been short-term with a focus on symptoms rather than upon systemic problems.

There are numerous examples of this haphazard approach. In the first decade of independence, a crisis management approach evolved that was to prevail for the next two decades. Periodic crime crises contributed to mounting public anxiety and highlighted the acute limitations of routine law enforcement procedures as a deterrent to criminal violence. Various attempts were made to enhance coordination among the law and order agencies but pressure for immediate results usually inclined political leaders towards high profile crime control measures aimed at achieving short-term impacts. Reviewing the first ten year’s of Papua New Guinea’s law and order policies, Louise Morauta remarked that:

The growing focus on law and order as a major policy challenge is evident from the early 1970s. Concerns with the revival of tribal fighting led to the establishment of an official investigation that, among other things, ‘heard many complaints of a lack of judicial and police presence at village level and considers this lack as one of the prime causes of increased lawlessness in the Highlands’ (Papua New Guinea 1973, 7). The Inter-Group Fighting Act was passed in 1977. It provided for the declaration of ‘fighting zones’ in affected areas and a reversal of the onus of proof in certain criminal proceedings. However, the Supreme Court later declared a number of its provisions unconstitutional (Constitutional Reference No. 3 of 1978, Re Inter-group Fighting Act 1977, Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1978). In 1979, the government resorted to the declaration of a state of emergency in all five highlands provinces in response to tribal conflict.

The need for juvenile justice, police and prison reform, and improved coordination between agencies, were identified by a Peace and Good Order Committee set up to investigate rising urban crime (Papua New Guinea 1974). An international seminar on crime prevention in Port Moresby in 1975 led to the setting up of a Crime Prevention Council comprising senior agency officials. The seminar report advised that Papua New Guinea’s crime problems were closely linked to the weakness of its policing system (Biles 1976).

In 1977, the government commissioned a wide-ranging review of the role and needs of the RPNGC. The task force conducting the review made various recommendations, including the need for a clear and concise policy on policing, improved training, and the streamlining and review of the pay system (RPNGC 1977). While the government accepted the report, there was no systematic implementation of its findings. In 1981, the Port Moresby Committee for the Promotion of Law and Order was established at the instigation of the prime minister to provide a community voice on law and order matters. Following this, an Inter-Departmental Committee of Review on Law and Order was created in 1982 in an attempt to coordinate expenditure and funding of the main law and order agencies. However, this committee became ‘largely a trading exercise by the law enforcement departments for a share of the available financial cake’ (Clifford et al. 1984, 117).

Two major reports were published in 1984. The first of these was from the Committee to Review Policy and Administration on Crime, Law and Order established by the National Executive Council (NEC (cabinet)) under the chairmanship of a senior public servant, Leo Morgan (Department of Provincial Affairs 1983 [the Morgan Report]). ^[2]This report originated in a recommendation made by a sub-committee on law and order established at a meeting of the Premiers Council at Arawa, North Solomons Province, in October 1982. The terms of reference laid down by the NEC called for a comprehensive review of government policy and administration relating to law and order. As well as examining the law and order agencies, the report dealt with many social and economic issues in discussing the wider genesis of lawlessness. Key recommendations included:

The second report was a joint initiative between the Institute of National Affairs, a private-sector think tank, and the Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, a government-funded research body (Clifford et al. 1984). An anthropologist with longstanding Papua New Guinea experience, a former National Court judge, and the director of the Australian Institute of Criminology wrote the report. It documented the shortcomings of individual agencies and was critical of the weakness of planning and budgeting across the sector. Instead of inter-agency coordination, it stated that planning was conducted in isolation, while budgeting was a process of competitive negotiation between agencies pursuing their own institutional interests. A separate Law and Order Policy Development Unit staffed by non-agency personnel was proposed. This unit would advise the NEC and line agencies on law and order policy, evaluate programs, and monitor the implementation of NEC decisions.

A distinguishing feature of the Clifford report was its emphasis on the need to reduce the perceived gap between the realm of formal state justice and the myriad informal institutions of social control operating at community levels. In this regard, the report recommended a gradual shift in policy towards one that sought to incorporate informal (non-state) mechanisms in the maintenance of order and dispute resolution, while gradually reducing what it viewed as over-reliance on formal (state) structures (ibid. 252–253).

The radical character of the Clifford report was its move beyond a conventional focus on formal state agencies and its emphasis on the need to try and accommodate community-based mechanisms prevailing in rural and urban village settings. At its core was a critique of the appropriateness and sustainability of institutionalized criminal justice in Papua New Guinea and recognition of the existence of non-state resources that could be mobilized to enhance security and safety at local levels. Commenting on the evident deficiencies of the formal agencies, the report stated that:

Clifford et al. made the case for improving the articulation between state and non-state approaches to the maintenance of order and resolution of disputes. Engaging with ‘traditional’ and other community-based mechanisms was — and remains — a major challenge to those working in the formal justice sector. For many, such a move is viewed as threatening to their institutional and professional domains, as well as being potentially corrosive of the rule of law. The Clifford analysis also raised — without providing many answers — difficult practical issues about how to render operational the community engagement being proposed.

Detailed consideration of these two reports was diverted by an escalation of violent crime in Port Moresby in late 1984. Following a series of widely publicized criminal attacks, including the pack rape of a New Zealand woman and her daughter, which provoked the largest public demonstration in the capital’s ten-year history, the NEC agreed to a package of forty-nine crime control measures. These measures, many of which were distilled from the Morgan and Clifford reports, provided ‘something for everyone in cabinet’ and lacked any ‘clear overall theme’ (Morauta 1986, 9). One of the authors of the Clifford report complained of the ‘great difference of emphasis’ between the report and the government’s announced measures (Bill Clifford quoted in INA 1991, 2). The latter included proposed changes to laws, strengthening law and order agencies, support for village courts and urban local governments, improved police-community relations, ID cards, street lighting, and a review of urban settlement policy. More draconian proposals included mandatory corporal punishment for rape and violent crimes, boom gates for the major towns, and a review of the Vagrancy Act.

A small part-time implementation task force — replaced by a full-time body in 1985 — was formed to report to a Ministerial Committee on Law and Order. It prepared an NEC submission to review implementation of the forty-nine measures and identify funding priorities. However, a further spate of criminal violence in Port Moresby persuaded the government to take even more drastic action and the submission was never considered. In June 1985, Prime Minister Somare declared a state of emergency in the National Capital District (NCD), stating that the police were incapable of controlling the deteriorating situation using their normal powers (Draft Hansard, Tenth Day, 12 June 1985, 20). As mentioned earlier, a state of emergency had been declared in the highlands in 1979 but this was the first and only time it was used against urban crime. The 1985 emergency allowed the government to deploy the defence force in a civil capacity, increase police powers, prohibit public demonstrations, and impose a nightly curfew. For most Port Moresby residents, this measure brought welcome, albeit temporary, respite. Despite an estimated cost of K2.9 million (Papua New Guinea Post-Courier 2 October 1985), it also provided the government with an unequivocal expression of its commitment to confronting crime. Restrictions on movement and the presence of large numbers of police and soldiers ensured a significant reduction in reported crime. Raids by security personnel resulted in numerous arrests, seizure of stolen property, and the recapture of approximately 160 prison escapees.

The 1985 emergency set in motion what was to become a familiar pattern of reactive responses to localized outbreaks of criminal violence. These have typically included the announcement of an elaborate package of crime control measures with ‘something for everyone’, special policing operations, and, in the most serious cases, the imposition of temporary restrictions on movement. Prior to 1987, a curfew could only be imposed under the auspices of a state of emergency declared under the constitution. However, the Curfew Act of 1987 provided for the declaration of a curfew independently of a state of emergency. This served to normalize curfews as a routine instrument of crime control. Defence Force and Correctional Service personnel — the other two components of Papua New Guinea’s ‘disciplined services’ — have also been used to supplement over-stretched police on such occasions. While relatively few of the announced measures are implemented, the immediate impact of curfews and special security operations was the temporary restoration of public order and confidence until the next build-up when the whole process would be repeated again (Dinnen 2001, 63–71).

This normalization of emergency powers was, among other things, an acknowledgement of the weakness of institutionalized criminal justice practice in the face of serious escalations in violence and disorder. Supplementary measures were aimed at restoring order in designated areas through a combination of restrictions on movement, punitive raids, and orchestrated displays of militaristic strength. These displays belied the actual capacity of Papua New Guinea’s security forces to control crime and disorder on any significant scale. While providing short-term relief in the areas concerned, curfews and other special operations had little lasting impact on crime. Once the restrictions were lifted, crime rates begin to rise again. Such strategies were also extremely costly and further reduced resources available for general policing and other law and justice services. In addition, the arbitrary targeting of ‘suspect communities’ and the violence that routinely accompanies police raids, served to further aggravate high levels of distrust between police and many local communities. The concentration of crime control measures in particular areas also contributed inadvertently to the expansion of criminal networks as suspects moved to other towns and areas to avoid apprehension.

On assuming office in mid 1988, the Namaliu-led government promptly identified law and order as one of its policy priorities. A Ministerial Committee on Law and Order was established with wide terms of reference. These included the formulation of law and order policy; liaising with relevant government agencies; coordinating and monitoring law and order policy; and advising on crime rates, types of crime, treatment of offenders, and the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Papua New Guinea’s first National Law and Order Policy, prepared by the Ministerial Committee chaired by Justice Minister and former judge Bernard Narokobi, was announced in August 1988.

The policy comprised an extensive set of recommendations aimed at improving the workings of justice and law enforcement agencies, as well measures to address underlying causes, such as enhanced law awareness, education, labour and employment, and urban development. There was also an ambitious plan to create a ‘super ministry’ — the Ministry for Law, Order and Social Justice headed by either the prime minister or deputy prime minister assisted by assistant ministers or ministers of state (Papua New Guinea 1988, 43). This single ministry would be responsible for the entire array of law and order related agencies, including the courts and tribunals, the state solicitor, public solicitor, public prosecutor, police, correctional service, public curator, registrar-general, juvenile justice, secretary and principal legal advisor, ombudsman commission, law reform, and censorship board. Needless to say, the considerable practical and constitutional difficulties entailed in bringing so many institutions and agencies together ensured that no such ‘super ministry’ eventuated. It was also recommended that a permanent Law and Order Secretariat be established outside the Justice Department to coordinate programs among different agencies and departments, and non-government organizations. Provincial law and order committees would provide coordination in the provinces.^[3] There was also a proposal to establish a Law, Order and Justice Foundation to engage with the wider community and secure funds for local programs.

The Foundation for Law, Order and Justice (FLOJ) was formed out of the Papua New Guinea Community Law Awareness Program in 1989. FLOJ was incorporated as a private company and initially received support from government and the private sector. Its objectives were to undertake research, policy development and advice, program design and implementation, and coordination between government law and order agencies. NEC later approved a merger between FLOJ and the existing Secretariat for Law and Order and the merged body was given the task of advising the Ministerial Committee for Law, Order and Justice. However, the Ministerial Committee was abolished in 1990 as part of a government cost-cutting exercise (INA 1991, 21). FLOJ survived for several years as an independent proponent of crime prevention and community-oriented justice initiatives. It was also the basis for another NGO, Peace Foundation Melanesia, which emerged in the second half of the 1990s.

Following another law and order crisis in Port Moresby, a National Crime Summit was held in February 1991. The Namaliu government announced a package of crime control measures that included the reintroduction of capital punishment for murder, rape, and drug offences; the tattooing of convicted offenders; additional maximum security prisons; identity cards; vagrancy laws; and the forcible repatriation of ‘unemployed people and troublemakers’ (Papua New Guinea Post-Courier 15 March 1991). Foreshadowing developments more than a decade later, the Summit also called for the deployment of Australian police in line positions in the RPNGC. Capital punishment was subsequently re-introduced as an available sentence in the case of convictions for wilfull murder. In response to the summit, the prime minister’s department — echoing earlier calls — requested the setting up of a National Crime Council to coordinate all crime control and prevention measures, advise government, and monitor the overall crime situation (INA 1991, 30).

The Namaliu government also threw its support behind a controversial proposal to establish a National Guard. In March 1991, NEC approved the establishment of a National Guard Task Force to provide one year of national service training to all young men aged between thirteen and nineteen years with an emphasis on military training, discipline and community work (Papua New Guinea Post-Courier 15 March 1991). Karl Stack, the minister for Forests and originator of the scheme, announced that a force of up to 5,000 Nepalese Gurkhas would conduct the training. However, the prospect of Gurkha-trained youth roaming the towns and countryside on the completion of their national service led to growing opposition to the proposal. Despite attempts to replace the militaristic model with one that stressed personal development and vocational training, the scheme was never implemented (Times of Papua New Guinea 6 June 1991).

In mid 1991, the government published a strategic paper, Security for Development, with the stated aim of integrating its response to the earlier crime summit into a comprehensive and planned approach to law and order. The paper noted that:

It also acknowledged that the security forces (police and Defence Force) were unable to cope with rising levels of lawlessness and disorder and that the most serious security threats facing Papua New Guinea were internal rather than external. This view was shared in Canberra, and in the same year the Papua New Guinea and Australian governments released a joint statement announcing that Papua New Guinea would give the highest priority to internal security needs, while Australia would assist Papua New Guinea’s disciplined forces maintain internal security.

Security for Development called for an expert body to monitor and give advice on crime, and the establishment of an Office of Security Coordination to provide policy advice on security needs. An Office of Security Coordination and Assessment (OSCA) was subsequently established in the Department of the Prime Minister, in mid 1991, to coordinate, in consultation with law and order and security agencies, the implementation of government policy.

Paias Wingti became prime minister in 1992 and set up a National Law, Order and Justice Council (NLOJC). FLOJ served as a secretariat to the new Council which was charged with making recommendations to the Policy Coordination and Management Committee (PCMC) in the prime minister’s department and through it to the National Planning Council. Its principal task was to develop a new law and order policy and detailed program of implementation. Approved by the NEC in late 1993, the aims of this — the second — national law and order policy were:

Various working groups comprising agency officials and representatives from the non-government sector convened to finalize programs and implementation strategies in six broad areas:

The working groups did a great deal of work in 1994 and a number of projects were ready for implementation. There was also an attempt to integrate the recommendations of yet another law and order report that had been prepared independently by an adviser to the prime minister in 1994 (Spencer Report 1994). The latter included proposals for greater integration of the functions of the disciplined forces, improved national planning and training, emphasis on mediation and conflict resolution, and enhanced national awareness of law and order developments. While devoting considerable time to policy development, the Wingti administration was not immune to more reactive responses in the face of periodic crime crises. For example, in 1993 it announced a familiar package of repressive measures. Measures implemented included the passing of the controversial Internal Security Act, which was consistent with the broader trend of normalization of emergency powers and allowed for severe restrictions on freedom of movement and association in areas affected by high levels of crime or social disorder (Dinnen 1993). In reality, the capacity of the Papua New Guinea state to implement such measures beyond narrowly prescribed localities was — and remains — extremely limited. In addition, the Supreme Court in 1994 upheld a constitutional challenge against certain sections of the act on the grounds that they were inconsistent with due process provisions of the constitution.

Sir Julius Chan succeeded Paias Wingti as prime minister in August 1994 and replaced the former Council (NLOJC) with a new Law Order and Administration Committee chaired by a senior bureaucrat. The committee was tasked with preparing the Chan government’s policy on law and order, but, as far as is known, no policy was ever produced. Most of the energy of the new administration was expended on addressing Papua New Guinea’s rapidly deteriorating fiscal situation. Measures adopted included the devaluation of the national currency (the kina) in mid September, followed by its flotation in early October 1994. Calls to declare a state of emergency or impose a curfew in Port Moresby were dismissed by senior police officers as ‘too expensive’ (Papua New Guinea Post-Courier 24 November 1994). Continuing public concern with urban crime led Prime Minister Chan to declare 1996 ‘the year of law enforcement’ and announce a series of measures to increase ‘police firepower’ and target ‘hard-core criminals’ (The National 6 November 1996). Late the following year, a nationwide curfew was introduced, initially for two months but subsequently extended for an unprecedented period of nine months in the NCD (The National 11 August 1997). The Chan government lost office in 1997 in the wake of the tumultuous Sandline Affair (Dinnen et al. 1997). It was succeeded by the volatile Skate administration, which was, in turn, replaced by the reformist government led by Sir Mekere Morauta in 1999. During the Skate administration, a Law and Order Summit in Port Moresby resulted in the announcement of a package of (over 50) familiar strategies designed to counter lawlessness. A Plan of Action for Law and Order 1999–2002 was prepared as an NEC submission but never formally approved.

By the mid 1990s, the most critical problems facing Papua New Guinea’s struggling criminal justice system were well known. These included:

These problems had been exacerbated by the chronic lack of policy consistency and absence of coordination between agencies in the sector. As stated in a joint review of the law and order sector in 1993 under the Papua New Guinea-Australia Development Cooperation Programme: