Australia’s development assistance program has undergone a series of changes since independence, moving progressively from budget support (the primary form of assistance from 1975 to 1989) to program aid in the 1990s. In the thirty years following independence, more than $A240 million was provided to strengthen Papua New Guinea’s law and justice system. Reflecting concerns with the deteriorating capacity of the police and a conventional view of the centrality of police systems in the management of crime and disorder, 69 per cent of this assistance was directed at the RPNGC (AusAID 2003, 36). Prior to 1989, numerous police training courses, missions, police postings and consultancies were undertaken through AIDAB (now AusAID), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and various Australian state police forces. A series of design and appraisal missions developed a proposal for a RPNGC development project. Phase I of the project began in 1989 with a core focus on organizational development, human resource management, and development of training and management systems. Commencing in January 1993, Phase II provided operations support and training. The focus was on advisers facilitating improvement rather than directly implementing change. Phase III began in March 2000 and was extended until 2005 before being folded into the new sector-wide law and justice program. It represented a departure from the first two phases and attempted to improve the capacity of the RPNGC to effectively enforce law and to work with the community to preserve peace and good order. This phase also had a significant capital works component.

Despite the criticisms leveled at the RPNGC development project, there is little doubt that it contributed in a number of technical areas, though how sustainable the benefits were remains an open question. Against a domestic context of chronic under-resourcing and other problems, it has also been argued that, ‘the project helped maintain the constabulary’s operations at an acceptable level’ (Wan 2000, 112). In other words, without the material support provided by the project, the condition of the RPNGC would probably have deteriorated even faster than it has. However, few would disagree with the general conclusion that the results of over fifteen years of institutional strengthening have been disappointing. In terms of overall improvement in police performance, positive outcomes are hard to discern.

Such an assessment is by no means confined to the RPNGC development project. All of the criminal justice agencies have experienced varying degrees of difficulty in absorbing, implementing and sustaining the new ideas and practices promoted through large-scale institutional strengthening projects operating within strict budgetary and contractual timeframes. In addition, the perennial problem of inadequate and poor management of resources facing the principal agencies has served to marginalize ‘development objectives until operational priorities, such as payment of wages, utilities, food bills, vehicle and equipment maintenance, are met’ (Pitts 2002, 0113).

As outlined in Table 13.1, Australia has supported institutional strengthening activities with most of the principal agencies, including the Attorney General’s Department, courts, prisons, the ombudsman and the public legal services.

In mid 2003, there was a significant shift in Australia’s strategic thinking and engagement with the Pacific islands region, including Papua New Guinea. This entailed the adoption of a more robust stance with an emphasis on timely and tangible outcomes and a growing insistence on securing ‘value for money’. The broader context of these changes was the dramatically changed international security environment following the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. Subsequent ‘terrorist’ attacks closer to home, notably in Indonesia, accentuated the potential security risks posed by struggling states in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood.

Table 13.1 Australian Development Assistance to the Law and Justice Sector (up to 2005)

Source: AusAID Website, www.ausaid.gov.au

One practical outcome was the progressive securitization of Australian development assistance with a strong emphasis on enhancing the security capabilities of neighbouring states viewed as vulnerable. An effective law and justice system and, in particular, efficient police structures, was seen as a critical bulwark against insecurity and instability. The focus on security has also been accompanied by a shift in modes of delivery, with increasing resort to the direct insertion of Australian personnel, including police officers, into ‘inline’ positions in institutions being strengthened, rather than the former reliance on advisers working alongside local counterparts. There is also growing emphasis upon a whole-of-government approach to capacity building, with a range of Australian government agencies involved in development assistance work.

This changing approach was manifested in the short-lived Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) in Papua New Guinea. The ECP was a bilateral assistance package initially agreed at the Australia-Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum in Adelaide in December 2003. It involved substantially increased Australian assistance to policing, other law and justice agencies and border management, as well as economic and public sector management. Australian personnel, drawn from the Australian Federal Police (AFP), other state forces, and a number of government agencies, were to be placed into inline positions in the RPNGC and other key Papua New Guinea institutions. The policing component, involving up to 230 Australian police officers, was costed at $A800 million over a five year period and was to be additional to the existing aid program to Papua New Guinea.

The first batch of civilian officials under the ECP was sent to Port Moresby in mid February 2004. However, disagreement between the two governments over conditions of deployment caused lengthy delays in the implementation of the program. Canberra insisted that Australian police and certain other personnel be provided with immunity from prosecution under Papua New Guinea law, while Port Moresby refused to grant blanket immunity. Eventually a compromise was agreed between the two governments. Australian police began arriving in September 2004. Around twenty officers were sent to Bougainville, while others were deployed in stages to Port Moresby. Despite overwhelming public support in PNG for the deployment of Australian police, reservations were expressed by a number of Papua New Guinea leaders. There was also considerable resistance from elements in the RPNGC. In May 2005, Papua New Guinea’s Supreme Court delivered its judgement on a constitutional challenge to the immunity provisions under the ECP initiated by Morobe governor and former judge, Luther Wenge. The court ruled unanimously that certain provisions of the enabling legislation, including those dealing with immunity, were unconstitutional (Papua New Guinea Post-Courier 19 May 2005). This resulted in the immediate withdrawal of the Australian police personnel although non-police officials deployed under the ECP continued their work. Subsequently, a ‘watered down’ version of the police component of the ECP commenced implementation in 2006, though, this time, with Australian police advisers rather than inline police officers.