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BECOMING A POLITICIAN

Born in February 1945, Matsuoka Toshikatsu was the eldest son of an ordinary farming household in Aso Town in Aso County in Kumamoto Prefecture.¹ His family home (*jika*) remains there to this day, in the locality that has been central to his whole political life. The setting is quintessentially rural in the Japanese style. As Matsuoka himself puts it, ‘in my boyhood, I grew up as a high-spirited young lad revelling in mother nature at the foot of Mt Aso, which is an active volcano in Kyushu.’²

EDUCATION AND EARLY CAREER³

After graduating from junior high school, Matsuoka lodged in Kumamoto City while attending the prestigious Seiseikô Prefectural High School in the city. He studied hard as well as learning karate, which he continued into his college days. One of his classmates at junior high school and high school said of him

[h]e was not a ‘clever student’ but worked quite hard preparing for the university entrance examination. In a big contrast to now, he was a quite inconspicuous student. In his high school days, he joined a cheer group and karate club and pretended to be a straight-laced person, but I often saw him chasing girls. I had a question about his behaviour.⁴

After graduating from high school, Matsuoka tried for two years to enter the National Defence Academy. Matsuoka’s choice of university was informed by his father’s career as a professional soldier (a former member of the military police).⁵ However, Matsuoka’s academic record was not good enough for him to make it into the defence academy. He explained his failure by saying that although he passed the first-stage examination, he failed the second-stage

examination, which was a medical test.⁶ He stopped taking the academy entrance examination, but continued to work hard and was accepted into Tottori University.

While Matsuoka was at Tottori University, he was not an especially remarkable student. A classmate said

...at that time, the wave of the student movement rushed here later than in the cities. When we were in our fourth year in spring, our school was blockaded. There were large numbers of apolitical students, and Matsuoka was one of them. He said, 'I want to be a soldier', and was popular in the karate club. He always wore jeans and shirts, and he attended classes faithfully, and his academic record was good.⁷

Matsuoka subsequently graduated with a BA in Forestry from the Faculty of Agriculture. He sat and passed the national public servant exam (*kokka kômuin shiken*) in Forestry and then the interview for entry into the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF),⁸ as it was known in the 1960s. Because he passed the Level One national public servant exam, he became a 'career' (*kyaria*) government official. However, because Matsuoka was a graduate in Forestry, his post in the MAF was that of technical official or specialist (*gikan*), not a generalist, or policy administrator (*jimukan*). Unlike *gikan*, *jimukan* typically had university qualifications in law, economics (including agricultural economics) or administration. They were the 'élite course' bureaucrats who climbed to high-ranking executive positions within the ministry, such as administrative vice-minister, director-general of the forestry, fishery or food agencies, or director of a MAF bureau. Matsuoka belonged to the non-élite technical stream along with others who had qualifications in forestry, civil engineering, veterinary and livestock sciences, and other technical fields.⁹ His employment as a *gikan* meant that he could only occupy positions within the ministry designated for technical specialists. Moreover, he could not aspire to the top administrative posts within the MAF. Technical bureaucrats could only rise as high as bureau assistant director (*jichô*) and for this reason were often considered 'quasi-career' bureaucrats.¹⁰ Matsuoka's inability to reach the highest levels of the ministry was to provide a spur to his political ambitions.

Having joined the MAF in 1969, Matsuoka spent 19 years there. This was an occupation, in his own words, that was 'connected to regional areas, particularly agricultural and forestry industries, and agricultural mountain villages'.¹¹ A lot of his time in the ministry was spent in the Forestry Agency,¹² reputedly a strong-hold of technical bureaucrats with specialist qualifications

in forestry. At one time Matsuoka became head of the Planning and Coordination Office of the Local Forestry Bureau in Akita Prefecture, and chief of the Teshio County Forestry Management Station in Hokkaido Prefecture. Hokkaido is Japan's most important prefecture in terms of the area of forestland (over 5 million hectares) and in terms of its forestry industry (logging). By 1988, Matsuoka had attained his highest post in the ministry as head of public relations in the Planning Division of the Forestry Agency.

Besides the Forestry Agency, Matsuoka also worked in the Minister's Secretariat, which is officially tasked with acting as a planning and general coordinating body for the entire ministry. In the Minister's Secretariat, he was head of the Planning Office. While working there, he was in charge of reformulating the 'Basic Plan for New Industry Cities and Industrial Infrastructure Special Regions' (*Shinsangyô Toshi to Kôgyô Seibi Tokubetsu Chiikî*), shifting the emphasis from prioritising production to prioritising livelihood-related facilities (*seikatsu kanren shisetsu*).¹³ The new plan proposed the further conversion of agricultural land, fishing grounds and forests for the promotion of construction and infrastructure, including the development of 10,200 hectares of land for industrial use, 110 public housing units, 160 hectares for other residential usage, and water pipes, roads, railways, ports and other transportation facilities, and health and education facilities.¹⁴

Like all bureaucrats in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF),¹⁵ as it became in 1978,¹⁶ Matsuoka was rotated every two to three years, enabling him, like other officials, to climb the *gikan* career ladder based on seniority rather than ability. He was also seconded for a while to the National Land Agency's Regional Development Division where he served as assistant director of the Mountain Village Heavy Snowbelt Development Division (a position reserved for *gikan*).¹⁷ It was not uncommon for MAFF bureaucrats to be seconded for a time to positions in the National Land Agency, because agriculture and forestry are both land-based industries. Matsuoka was also attached to the Secretariat of the National Land Agency for a time. While at the Land Agency, he drafted the Peninsula Promotion Law (*Hantô Shinkôhō*), a private member's bill (Diet members' legislation) incorporating depopulated area countermeasures.¹⁸

After a climb up the career ladder in the MAFF to a moderately high position, Matsuoka launched himself into politics. Bearing in mind that the national bureaucracy prefers to recruit law graduates from prestigious Tokyo

University (Tôdai), and that many MAFF *gikan* with degrees in civil engineering and agricultural sciences come from the prestigious Kyoto University, one MAFF ‘Old Boy’ (OB) speculated that because a ‘Tottori University graduate is a “lesser being” in the MAFF, Matsuoka may have realised that the limits of his ambitions within the organisation’.¹⁹ Tottori University was derisively described as a ‘Mickey Mouse university’ by a Matsuoka critic on a public website.²⁰ Another MAFF OB commented

...because Matsuoka failed to enter a university for two years, younger University of Tokyo graduates were promoted to important positions ahead of him. For that reason, it seems that he became a House of Representatives member, reversing his status with the big one, thus relieving years of pent-up feelings in one go.²¹

Matsuoka displayed the characteristics of a ‘status incentive politician’, described as ‘individuals who became politicians because of a need for prestige’.²² They are often former administrators.²³

Whatever his true motivations, in 1988 Matsuoka decided to pursue a career in national politics, resigning from his last post as public relations officer at the Forestry Agency and returning home to Kumamoto. This was despite the fact he would have been eligible for a pension had he worked for just one more year.²⁴ It would seem that he risked everything to enter politics. As he stated publicly, he was likely to go broke by resigning from his job to enter politics.²⁵

PREPARING TO ENTER POLITICS

Matsuoka’s preparations for the political arena had begun while he was still working in the MAFF. He gained a reputation for proactive subsidy allocation to local areas. Such subsidies could later be converted into votes and political funds—vital for electoral success. There were numerous tales of his ‘heroic’ exploits during his administrative career²⁶ as a deviser of ‘new works’. One former MAFF OB recounted that while Matsuoka was tackling measures to deal with heavy snow and problems with state-owned land—during his time in the Land Agency and Forestry Agency—he started new public works projects and acquired know-how for securing the necessary budget for these projects through his connections with politicians.²⁷

Matsuoka also took the first steps along the path to acquiring political funds by acting as a broker, which was to prove both lucrative and potentially dangerous for his subsequent political career. In 1986, while a public relations officer in the Forestry Agency, Matsuoka tried to use his ministry position and

contacts to obtain campaign finance to launch himself into politics. He offered to sell information to Sasaki Kichinosuke, one of the 'Kings of Real Estate' during Japan's bubble economy of the 1980s. At their peak, Sasaki's total assets were said to be worth ¥900 billion.²⁸ At the time, Sasaki was making arrangements for about ¥60 billion in bank loans for a tender to purchase a Forestry Agency site in Tokyo, located next to the Hotel Okura in Toranomon, Minato Ward. On the site was a demolished building. The person in charge at one of the banks, Kokumin Bank, which Sasaki had approached, brought Matsuoka along to meet Sasaki.²⁹ As Sasaki recalls

Matsuoka said 'I have the survey map of the Forestry Agency tender site, and I want you to buy the survey map'. As an experiment, I asked how much the price would be to buy the survey map. But reversing the question, Matsuoka asked 'if you want the survey map, say the amount'. When we asked to copy the map, Matsuoka said 'Since the map is real, you cannot copy it'. Because we had this sort of an exchange, I became rather suspicious. I thought that if I had made a successful bid for the land already, the survey map was important. But if my bid were unsuccessful, the map was nothing but a piece of paper. A large number of companies were participating in the tender for the site of the demolished building, and the issue was picked up by the television program, 'NHK Special', thus attracting public attention. However, in the final analysis, because Kokumin Bank suddenly terminated financing to us, a rival company, Company A, made a successful bid. I heard that the survey map had been taken to Company A.³⁰

In December 1987, Matsuoka (who was Forestry Agency public relations officer at the time) called Sasaki hoping to act as a broker for a local businessman in Kumamoto. As Sasaki recounts

Matsuoka said 'to tell you the truth, I have a utterly shameless request but a local construction company, Company T, needs temporary funds. It owns a mountain, and so do you think there would be a good buyer in Tokyo?' I had a feeling at the time from what Matsuoka was saying that they wanted to borrow ¥30 million. The next day, the president of Company T came to Tokyo and to my company with Matsuoka. As I thought, the negotiation to sell the mountain became a negotiation to borrow money. Matsuoka pestered me, saying 'because the company is a devoted supporter, can you help the company somehow?' I replied, 'to help the company, Mr Matsuoka, please become a co-signer for the loan'. I lent ¥30 million for three months at the annual interest rate of 15 per cent. I accepted the mountain as security for the loan. However, the bill was not honoured on the day it was due to be settled. The deadline was changed about 36 times and the bill was even renewed. I found out later that the mountain was located next to Namino Village, Kumamoto Prefecture, where Aum Shinrikyo³¹ followers were living in a group. Therefore, the mountain did not seem to have any value. Later, the loan was paid off, but Company T went virtually bankrupt.³²

In preparation for launching himself into politics, Matsuoka tried not only to amass the necessary funds but also to cultivate useful political connections. He formed close relationships with leading members of the agriculture and forestry 'tribe' (*nôrin zoku*). They were Nakagawa Ichirô from Hokkaido (who served as Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries in 1977–78, was a candidate for the LDP presidency and prime ministership in 1982, and who later hanged himself in January 1983)³³ and Tamaki Kazuo, Director-General of the Management and Coordination Agency in the Nakasone administration. Both Nakagawa and Tamaki were members of the Seirankai (Young Storm Society), an overtly nationalist body with extreme right-wing views. In fact, all the *nôrin zoku* at the time, including Watanabe Michio (who took over from Nakagawa as Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in 1978–79), were members of Seirankai.³⁴ Matsuoka was intimately connected to Nakagawa through MAFF study groups and in other contexts, and he was also close to Tamaki.³⁵

An ex-MAFF official, who was Matsuoka's former boss, revealed some of the background to Matsuoka's bid to enter politics.

Ever since he was sent to Land Agency, he wanted to be a politician. About 15 years after he entered MAFF, he and two Tokyo University graduate career officials who entered the MAFF in the same year as him, were somehow unpopular with their boss. Matsuoka became disgusted and started talking about resigning. At the time, he was associated with Nakagawa Ichirô and Tamaki Kazuo [former Director-General of the Management and Coordination Agency, and a leader of Seirankai]. He intended to receive their support when he ran for an election. Unfortunately, just before Matsuoka ran for an election, Tamaki died suddenly [in 1987].³⁶

Arai Satoshi, former MAFF official and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) member of the House of Representatives, recalled that when Matsuoka was a sub-section chief in the ministry, Arai formed a study group with him. However,

[w]hen former MAF Minister Nakagawa, with whom I got acquainted in a study group, ran for election as LDP president, I heard that Mr Matsuoka had got into an election car and supported Mr Nakagawa. I made an international phone call from Sri Lanka, where I had been sent, and said 'isn't that exceeding the duty of a public servant?' Mr Matsuoka replied, 'since the LDP presidential election is not subject to the Public Office Election Law (*Kôshoku Senkyôhō*), there is no problem'.³⁷

Around about the time he stood for election, Matsuoka commented, 'my master was Nakagawa Ichirô, and my teacher was Tamaki Kazuo'.³⁸ After both these prominent politicians died in succession, Suzuki Muneo, Nakagawa's

secretary, who stood successfully for his Lower House seat, stepped into the breach. He supported Matsuoka and thus took Nakagawa and Tamaki's places.³⁹

A report also surfaced of Matsuoka's conducting pre-election campaigning while he was a government official. A political affairs reporter recounted

[j]ust before Matsuoka ran for an election, when he was the Forestry Agency public relations officer, he returned to Aso Town, Kumamoto on the weekends and conducted an election campaign. At the time, pre-election campaigning by a government official became problematic in another municipality. Questions were raised about Mr Matsuoka's action.⁴⁰

Matsuoka was already showing a propensity to bend the rules if it meant furthering his political career.

THE REQUISITES FOR SUCCESS

Having resigned from the MAFF in 1988 with a view to contesting a seat in the next House of Representatives election, Matsuoka needed three vital prerequisites. These were a local support base (*jiban*), name recognition (*kanban*) and money (*kaban*).

Local support base

Matsuoka's choice of constituency was preordained. He would stand for election in the 5-seat district of Kumamoto (1). Kumamoto was his home prefecture and his home town, Aso Town, in Aso County, was located in Kumamoto (1). Matsuoka's electoral challenge was thus mounted from his hometown, Aso Town. The Aso region would become his main voting base (*shujiban*).⁴¹ This was the logical place on which to focus and construct his political support base. He could utilise all kinds of local connections, including family and social ties, links to local politicians and businesses, and associations with various social and economic groupings in the area, tapping into the forces of localism that generated 'hard' votes based on personal connections and loyalties. By mobilising these kinds of local community and blood ties, which were traditionally strong in rural areas, Matsuoka could secure support for a political career.

Matsuoka organised a personal support group (*kôenkai*) as his primary vote-gathering machine and body of grassroots supporters. Its main branches were in Aso Town and Kumamoto City. It was called the 'Matsutomokai'—the 'Matsu Friends Association'. It began with a few thousand members, but expanded as Matsuoka's campaign gathered steam. It functioned as Matsuoka's electoral organisation, campaign machine and political funding body all rolled into one.

Having chosen to stand for Kumamoto (1), Matsuoka sought official electoral endorsement from the LDP, which was his natural party given his background in agriculture and forestry. The majority of Japanese farm and forest owners, and rural dwellers supported the LDP, and, in those days, ex-MAFF bureaucrats always became LDP Diet members. However, Matsuoka's bid for endorsement by the LDP was unsuccessful.⁴²

Part of the problem of securing the backing of the LDP was the fact that Matsuoka would be standing for one of the five seats in Kumamoto (1) at the same time as four sitting LDP members. In the previous Lower House elections (in 1986), the district of Kumamoto (1) returned four members from the LDP, plus one politician from the Kômeitô. The losers were candidates from the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP). If the LDP endorsed yet another candidate, it would potentially split the LDP vote to the point where perhaps three or less LDP candidates would be successfully elected. Furthermore, the LDP had performed poorly in the 1989 Upper House election, and so it was likely that the total LDP vote would be down in the subsequent Lower House election.

The party also had a rule about endorsing only those candidates who had a strong local organisation and/or organisational support, name recognition and money. These attributes were far from assured in Matsuoka's case. At the same time, from Matsuoka's perspective, LDP endorsement was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for his candidature. Under the Lower House multi-member district (MMD) system, standing as an Independent would not necessarily be a barrier to success, because in the personalised, candidate-centred elections in which LDP candidates from different factions competed against each other, the party label was of secondary importance.

Matsuoka would run on the basis of a mobilised personal vote, not on the basis of his party affiliation. His own individual support group could step into the breach as an organisation providing local backing. In this respect, Matsuoka was no better or worse off than LDP candidates, who similarly relied on their own *kôenkai* to connect with voters. His personal support group would provide an organisational setting in which he could conduct various campaign activities directed at local voters in specific regions and occupational fields connected to his own interests and expertise.⁴³ Even as a member of the LDP, Matsuoka would not necessarily have had name recognition in the broader electorate, which he would have had to establish independently of the party.

Lacking LDP endorsement, Matsuoka formally stood as an Independent. This was not unusual for first-time candidates (and others) who could not secure the backing of the ruling party. Matsuoka's move to style himself as a 'conservative Independent' in the 'conservative kingdom' (*hoshu ôkoku*) of Kumamoto Prefecture further confirmed this. Independents like Matsuoka were simply LDP candidates who had been unsuccessful in securing the party's endorsement. As everyone knew, they were LDP in all but name.

Name recognition

Matsuoka was already well known in the Aso region because that was where his family home was and where his mother still lived. His pre-campaign activities, conducted whilst still in the ministry and in the period between when he resigned from the MAFF and the election, were directed at getting his name more widely known across the district. He organised meetings with local voters to publicise his candidature and to expand and consolidate his political support base. He painstakingly built a support base and fought an uphill battle against rival candidates, especially the well-established LDP candidates.

Matsuoka had good connections in Kumamoto City where he had attended Seiseikô High School, which had an influential alumni association. Reputedly its OB connections were abnormally influential in elections.⁴⁴ It was alleged that 'behind Matsuoka's latent power was this Seisei power, and, it is said, his connections with Seisei-line *yakuza*.'⁴⁵ On the other hand, having been a MAFF bureaucrat bestowed a certain degree of status and respectability as well as policy knowledge and a natural link to large numbers of farm and rural voters. Matsuoka claimed to be 'famous both in name and in reality for being an expert in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, which are especially the foundation of the country.'⁴⁶

The electoral district of Kumamoto (1) was semi-urban. In 1990, it had 413 persons per square km of population density compared with a national average of 332 persons, and it had five cities including Kumamoto City.⁴⁷ At the same time, it had five counties (including Aso County), encompassing more rural farming districts. The semi-urban character of the constituency meant that Matsuoka's election-campaign strategy could not be geared solely to rural dwellers, including agricultural and forestry voters.

According to the 1990 census, there were 23,121 farm households in the electorate, which made up 6.4 per cent of the total number of households.⁴⁸

At an average of 3.7 voters per farm household,⁴⁹ this comprised a potential support base of 86,268 farm votes, which was only 13.4 per cent of the total cast vote in Kumamoto (1).⁵⁰ Almost every farm household vote would need to be secured in order to win a seat based solely on the farm household vote. This made it necessary for Matsuoka to cast the net for potential supporters much wider.

Money

As previously noted, Matsuoka had already tapped into funds from business during his years in the MAFF by offering his services as a broker with company executives in exchange for money. As a declared candidate, however, Matsuoka established six organisations to gather political funds. Altogether, they collected a substantial total of ¥131 million for his first election bid.⁵¹ The first and most important of these was his personal support group, the Matsuoka Toshikatsu *kôenkai*, which was under the legal jurisdiction of the Kumamoto Prefecture Election Administration Commission, and which gathered ¥63 million.⁵²

The balance of officially reported funds was provided by five political funding groups under the administration of the Ministry of Home Affairs. These groups were the Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century Politics and Economic Discussion Association (Matsuoka Toshikatsu Shinseiki Seikei Konwakai), the 21st Century Discussion Association (21 Seiki Konwakai), the Green Friends Association (Ryokuyûkai) and the Matsuoka Toshikatsu Policy Research Association (Matsuoka Toshikatsu Seisaku Kenkyûkai). The Policy Research Association recorded the highest amount at ¥26 million.⁵³

Matsuoka had direct financial support from a key political backer in Tokyo, who was already an LDP member of the Diet and who wanted to build his own loyal following amongst LDP Diet members—a vital prerequisite for becoming a faction leader and holding high political office, including the prime ministership. Chairmanship of a faction guaranteed one's candidature for the party's presidency. This politician was Suzuki Muneo,⁵⁴ Nakagawa's successor as Matsuoka's patron. Suzuki made a good substitute for the LDP faction that would have selected Matsuoka for party endorsement and provided him with political funds, had Matsuoka been an official candidate of the LDP.

Political revenue and expenditure reports for 1990 reveal that Matsuoka's political funding groups received direct donations from Suzuki's own political

funding groups. The Matsuoka Toshikatsu Policy Research Association received ¥5 million from the Osaka Food Distribution Research Association (Ôsaka Shokuhin Ryûtsû Kenkyûkai), the Green Friends Association received ¥10 million from the 21st Century Policy Research Association (21 Seiki Seisaku Kenkyûkai) and the 21st Century Discussion Association received ¥10 million from the Hokkaido Development Research Association (Hokkaidô Kaihatsu Kenkyûkai).⁵⁵ The total sum obtained from Suzuki was ¥25 million, and, despite Matsuoka's not securing LDP endorsement, Suzuki also came to Matsuoka's side during the campaign.⁵⁶

THE CAMPAIGN

The February 1990 Lower House election followed the July 1989 Upper House election in which the LDP was 'defeated', meaning that it lost its Upper House majority for the first time since 1955. The 'defeat' was caused by three main factors: voters' rejection of the consumption tax (introduced in April 1989); the Recruit scandal tainting a large number of LDP Diet members, including many of its prominent leaders and cabinet members; and among farmers, a wholesale rejection of the Takeshita government's December 1988 agreement to liberalise the beef and citrus markets. The 1989 election became one of the JSP's biggest post-war election victories, with many women candidates scoring victories over standing LDP members. The same political wave carried over to the February 1990 election. Matsuoka was able to turn his non-endorsement by the LDP into an electoral advantage by mounting an anti-LDP offensive, campaigning against the newly introduced consumption tax and tapping into farmers' dissatisfaction with the government's agricultural policy: an issue on which the party remained vulnerable.

Matsuoka ran a typically candidate-centred campaign. He presented himself as 'an independent political entrepreneur with his own local organisation and his own marketing strategies'.⁵⁷ He was able to take advantage of an electoral system in which the individual basis of the vote (*kojin honi*) was extraordinarily strong, and the party basis (*seitô honi*) was extraordinarily weak.⁵⁸ His campaign slogan was 'Momotaro (peach boy) of the Heisei era'. Momotaro was a hero in Japanese folklore who destroyed the marauding *oni* (ogres). Matsuoka's catchphrase was 'Momotaro in Heisei destroys the demons'.⁵⁹ Another prominent Matsuoka campaign slogan was 'I am mounting a crusade against misgovernment' [*akusei taiji ni idomu*].⁶⁰

Unlike most former MAFF officials with political ambitions, Matsuoka did not get the backing of the MAFF for his campaign.⁶¹ He did not fit the normal pattern of an ex-MAFF official seeking national political office. Not only was he from a low-ranking university in a regional backwater, but also he did not occupy a particularly high position in the MAFF when he resigned from the ministry. Perhaps, most importantly, as a *gikan*, Matsuoka was not an OB from the Structural Improvement Bureau (now Rural Development Bureau), with links to the land improvement industry. This industry represented a vast and lucrative agricultural public works enterprise, which was a very important source of votes, organisational support and political funds for MAFF land improvement *gikan* who entered politics. Matsuoka did not have the advantage of this kind of leg-up into the political world. He did not possess the right qualifications to call himself a civil engineering *gikan*,⁶² and not being a *jimukan*, he could not base his campaign on being an 'organisational representative' (*soshiki daihyō*) of the MAFF in the Diet. He did not, for example, have an ex-MAFF administrative vice-minister heading up his campaign organisation, nor did he have campaign functionaries who were MAFF OBs.⁶³ In spite of all these disadvantages, Matsuoka tried to use his known MAFF connections to good effect in the election campaign.

In Kumamoto (1), eight candidates were competing for five seats. It was known as a closely contested constituency.⁶⁴ The JSP candidate, Tanaka Shōichi, was campaigning on an anti-consumption tax ticket, targeting housewives.⁶⁵ On that basis, he was thought to have scored a lead over the conservative camp. Kitaguchi Hiroshi from the LDP was a former director of Kumamoto City Agricultural Cooperative (Nokyo) and apparently had the agricultural, forestry and fisheries votes sewn up; while Noda Takeshi, another LDP Diet member and former Minister of Construction, reputedly obtained 'hard' votes from Kumamoto City and other urban areas in the electorate.⁶⁶ He was a leader of the commerce and industry 'tribe' (*shōkō zoku*), having been chairman of the LDP's Commerce and Industry Division and chairman of the Lower House Commerce and Industry Committee. Noda was well versed in fiscal, tax and economic policy and was also prominent in the LDP's Special Coal Countermeasures Committee, a salient fact in Kyushu given that at the time coalmines were being shut down in the prefecture.

The rest of the candidates were supposed to be fighting it out for the remaining votes. This group included the JCP and Kōmeitō candidates, and

the other two LDP candidates, Uozumi Hirohide and Matsuno Raizô. Uozumi had infiltrated the commerce and industry vote: he was a large stockholder in a road paving company, former chairman of the prefectural Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the former mayor of Kumamoto City as well as a former prefectural assembly politician. Moreover, he was knowledgeable in all prefectural issues associated with agricultural policy and regional development. He was a long-time rival of Matsuoka's, having attended Kumamoto High School, a rival school to Seiseikô High School. He also differed from Matsuoka in having made his way into politics through mayoral and prefectural office, compared with Matsuoka who was an ex-bureaucrat seeking a career in national politics.⁶⁷

Matsuno was a prominent and long-standing LDP politician from Kumamoto, with a good base of support in both regional areas and in the cities, where he had been chairman of a brewing company. Matsuno had been in the Diet almost continuously since 1947, elected in only the second election after the war. He was so senior in the LDP that he had been minister of almost everything. He usually received the backing of the agricultural cooperatives and had been a former Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries in Prime Minister Sato's administration. He had also been Minister of Transport, Director-General of the Defence Agency, and also chairman of the LDP's PARC and Executive Council.⁶⁸ However, pre-election coverage of his campaign by the media suggested that the Matsuno camp was in crisis mode because of the powerful rollback in support for Matsuno in local regions.⁶⁹

VICTORY!

When the results of the election were finally declared, Matsuoka scraped in at the bottom of the victors' list (in fifth position), but for him, the most important thing was that he had won a seat in the Lower House (see Appendix). Matsuoka described the electoral contest and his subsequent victory in the following terms: 'despite being an unknown candidate, I won by a narrow margin in the most famous, closely contested constituency in the whole country, after defeat seemed certain'.⁷⁰ The media reported that Matsuoka had put up a good fight.⁷¹

The final result saw the LDP lose two of its seats in Kumamoto (1) with the usual ranking of candidates in the electorate completely overturned. The two victorious LDP candidates were ranked lower than the two opposition party members. The biggest vote-winner was the JSP candidate,⁷² followed by the

Kômeitô candidate, followed by Noda and Uozumi, with Matsuoka coming in behind the two LDP candidates.

In winning a seat in Kumamoto (1), Matsuoka was victorious over Matsuno and Kitaguchi, both well-established LDP Diet members. As he boasted himself, 'I pushed aside senior (*senpai*) Diet members and was successfully elected'.⁷³ He scored extremely well against Matsuno, beating him by just over 2,300 votes (see Appendix A).⁷⁴ In fact, Matsuno's support was broadly distributed across the cities and towns of Kumamoto (1). He won more votes than Matsuoka in all counties and cities of the electorate except Kumamoto City and Aso County, although he was first-place getter in Oguni Town in Aso County. In the total vote count, Matsuno's county vote was lower than Matsuoka's, while his city vote was higher.⁷⁵ It was Matsuoka's really solid showing over Matsuno in Aso County (24,905 votes compared with 6,795 votes)⁷⁶ that gave Matsuoka victory over Matsuno, because Matsuno beat him in all the other counties and in the total city vote, but by a smaller amount overall. Matsuoka's slightly stronger showing in Kumamoto City also helped. Media commentary concluded that Matsuno's failure was due to the fact that he could not win against the tide of generational change. Matsuno himself also attributed his defeat to the changing of generations.⁷⁷

Matsuoka won by a smaller margin of around 360 votes over Kitaguchi, a second-generation politician and son of a Nokyo politician who had previously held the seat. Kitaguchi was also a Nokyo man through and through and had some of the agricultural cooperatives in the prefecture mobilising an organisational vote on his behalf. Despite this, Matsuoka still edged him out. Kitaguchi was stronger than Matsuoka in the cities including Kumamoto City, but despite winning more votes than Matsuoka in three counties, he scored a lower overall vote in the counties.⁷⁸ Once again, it was Matsuoka's extraordinarily strong showing in Aso County that came through for him, producing a much higher county vote. In fact, no other candidate came anywhere near Matsuoka as an electoral performer in Aso County. Nevertheless, taking the larger view, there was not much to separate Matsuoka, Matsuno and Kitaguchi, who won 12.6 per cent, 12.2 per cent and 12.5 per cent of the total vote respectively.⁷⁹

Matsuoka's electoral victory could be attributed to a number of key factors. First, in standing as a conservative Independent, he was not directly identified with the LDP, and in fact could use his independent stance to attack it for policies that were highly unpopular at the time. Choosing an Independent

candidate who failed to get LDP endorsement was one of the ways that traditional LDP voters could cast a protest vote against the party. Constituents could still vote conservative without going the whole way and voting for an opposition party member in the full knowledge that a candidate standing as a conservative Independent would invariably join the LDP after the election. This option 'regularly produced the defeat of LDP incumbents even as the LDP retained power'.⁸⁰ Matsuoka gained anti-LDP protest votes over issues such as agricultural trade liberalisation (in rural areas) and the consumption tax and money politics scandals (amongst city voters).

Second, as already emphasised, Matsuoka had an extremely solid electoral base in the Aso region. It was really Aso County with its 24,905 votes that delivered Matsuoka his seat. Matsuoka won more votes in Aso County than in any other single county (see Table 2.1). This county alone out of the five counties in Kumamoto (1) provided Matsuoka with just under a third of his total vote (see Table 2.1). He was the most popular candidate in 11 out of 12 towns in Aso County (see Table 2.1). Only in Oguni Town did he cede first place to another (Matsuno, as noted above). Matsuoka was also popular in Ozu Town and Kikuyo Town in Kikuchi County, where he was ranked first and second-highest vote-winner amongst all the candidates (see Table 2.1). In fact, Matsuoka was the most popular candidate overall in the rural counties, winning top place as vote-getter, with a total of 41,690 votes, or 51.5 per cent of his total vote tally (see Table 2.1). Of course, the Aso vote helped put him into this position, beating both Matsuno and Kitaguchi, who were also relatively strong in the counties.⁸¹ Aso County provided more than half of Matsuoka's total vote tally in the counties (41,690). Matsuoka clearly had a strong, geographically concentrated *jiban* in the Aso region. The media reported at the time that Matsuoka's campaign centred on the fact that he was from the Aso region.⁸²

Third, Matsuoka was a MAFF OB, which would have gained him the votes of both current and retired MAFF officials residing in his electorate as well as support from primary industry voters in the electorate. In addition, given his career background, some of his votes were undoubtedly generated by his alignment with and knowledge of agriculture and forestry matters and interests. He certainly stressed this in his campaign. He described himself in the Diet handbook as follows

[b]ecause of my background as a bureaucrat, I have my own original ideas about policies such as the consumption tax and agricultural and fisheries policies and so on. If you show considerable spirit to the citizens, then they will want to make friends with you and will become attached to you.⁸³

Matsuoka's success in the rural counties was indicative of strong sectoral (that is, agricultural and forestry) support. Because Matsuoka had been in the MAFF, farmers and forest owners regarded him as having useful personal connections with currently serving ministry officials, which could be mobilised to secure policy benefits such as subsidies for agricultural and forestry projects as well as other material benefits in the form of income support and border protection for agricultural products.

Six ex-MAFF bureaucrats were successful in the 1990 elections, four of whom represented electorates in Kyushu—including Matsuoka. He joined 115 other former bureaucrats-turned-politicians in the Diet in 1990, representing 15.2 per cent of the total Diet membership.⁸⁴ Amongst this group, 15 were from the MAFF.⁸⁵ It was not unusual for former bureaucrats to enter Diet politics. In fact, the central government bureaucracy was one of the main recruiting grounds for national politicians.

Matsuoka, however, was not your usual bureaucrat-turned-politician. Almost all former bureaucrats were so-called 'élite course' bureaucrats: that is, they had graduated from the Law Faculty of the University of Tokyo, and had served in their ministries as *jimukan*, not *gikan*. Matsuoka was from lowly Tottori University Faculty of Agriculture, with a degree in Forestry. The MAFF OBs in the Diet in 1990 were all Tōdai Law Faculty graduates, except for one who was a graduate of Tokyo University's Faculty of Agriculture, and another who was a graduate of Kyoto University's Faculty of Agriculture.⁸⁶ As already noted, Matsuoka had an unconventional background for an ex-MAFF Diet member. Perhaps that is why he was so ambitious and had so much to prove.

Even though Matsuoka was the most popular candidate in the rural counties in his electorate, and even though he was the candidate with the least number of votes in the cities (apart from the JCP candidate)⁸⁷—both of which underlined his rural orientation—he could not consider himself to be solely a representative of farm and forestry interests. Indeed, no significant statistical correlation was observable between the percentage of farm households in a particular municipality and the percentage of the total vote Matsuoka received from that municipality.⁸⁸ This was due to two main factors. Matsuoka could not break into the electoral power bases of the other LDP candidates, in particular, rural counties (Kitaguchi was relatively strong in all counties except for Aso County, but was particularly strong in Tamana County, while Matsuno was quite strong across all counties but particularly in Kikuchi County).⁸⁹ Matsuoka was,

Table 2.1 Farm household composition/votes cast for Matsuoka by municipality in Kumamoto (1) in 1990
Lower House election

Name of Municipality	No. of Farm Households	Farm Households as % of Total in Municipality/ies	Votes Cast for Matsuoka	% of Total Vote Cast	% of Matsuoka's Total Vote	Placing among 8 Candidates
Cities	6,002	2.3	39,183	9.7	48.5	7th
Kumamoto City	2,237	1.1	34,704	11.4	42.9	5th
Arao City	475	2.6	1,078	3.1	1.3	8th
Tamana City	1,151	8.7	1,427	5.2	1.8	7th
Yamaga City	1,035	9.9	1,161	5.6	1.4	7th
Kikuchi City	1,104	13.6	813	4.4	1.0	7th
Counties	17,119	17.2	41,690	17.5	51.5	1st
Horaku County	2,383	18.6	2,084	7.2	2.6	7th
Hokubu Town	601	11.0	945	9.0	1.2	7th
Kawachi Town	857	43.4	292	5.1	0.4	7th
Akita Town	329	11.9	392	6.2	0.5	7th
Temmei Town	596	23.0	455	6.9	0.6	7th
Tamana County	3,525	16.7	2,853	5.7	3.5	7th
Taimei Town	449	11.1	314	3.4	0.4	7th
Yokoshima Town	600	42.3	209	5.1	0.3	7th
Tensui Town	881	49.9	104	2.0	0.1	7th
Gyokuto Town	337	20.5	318	8.0	0.4	7th
Kikusui Town	209	10.5	598	11.7	0.7	5th
Mikawa Town	445	26.2	154	3.6	0.2	7th
Nankan Town	411	11.9	557	7.2	0.7	7th
Nagasu Town	193	3.8	599	5.7	0.7	7th
Kamoto County	3,144	29.8	3,193	8.4	3.9	7th
Kahoku Town	399	26.3	538	12.8	0.7	4th
Kikuka Town	566	27.7	352	6.1	0.4	6th

Kamoto Town	452	17.7	504	8.5	0.6	7th
Kao Town	441	29.4	394	9.4	0.5	7th
Ueki Town	1,286	43.7	1,405	7.9	1.7	7th
Kikuchi County	3,296	10.4	8,655	13.1	10.7	4th
Shichijo Town	483	33.9	222	5.39	0.3	6th
Kyokushi Town	388	28.2	313	8.4	0.4	6th
Ozu Town	697	9.9	3,184	22.7	3.9	1st
Kikuyo Town	575	8.5	2,181	16.8	2.7	2nd
Koshi Town	354	6.7	1,086	16.2	1.3	7th
Shisui Town	478	14.9	412	5.5	0.5	7th
Nishigoshi Town	321	4.8	1,257	9.9	1.6	5th
Aso County	4,771	20.7	24,905	45.5	30.8	1st
Ichinomiya Town	468	15.0	2,845	41.1	3.5	1st
Aso Town	986	17.1	8,741	64.0	10.8	1st
Minamioguni Town	344	25.7	1,261	36.7	1.6	1st
Oguni Town	420	15.0	1,489	21.7	1.8	2nd
Ubuyama Village	196	41.0	566	41.7	0.7	1st
Namino Village	220	40.7	574	40.6	0.7	1st
Soyo Town	479	33.0	1,822	50.4	2.3	1st
Takamori Town	523	21.4	2,468	43.4	3.5	1st
Hakusui Village	439	35.2	1,388	42.6	1.7	1st
Kugino Town	241	35.2	959	51.1	1.2	1st
Choyo Village	191	10.3	1,869	56.6	2.3	1st
Nishihara Village	264	19.8	923	27.1	1.1	1st
Total/average	23,121	6.4	80,873	12.6	100.0	5th

Sources: Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, *Heisei 2-nen Kokusei Chôsa Saishû Hôkoku Dai 3-kan Dai 2-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka Sono 2 Todôfuku*, *Shichôsen-ken 43 Kumamoto-ken*, pp. 288-289 and 294-303; Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, *Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 39-kai Shûgin Sôsenkyo*, p. 194.

therefore, competing for the farm vote against Matsuno and Kitaguchi: the two well-known politicians with established agricultural connections in the electorate.

The other factor was the large number of votes Matsuoka received from Kumamoto City. This proved to be the fourth and final reason why Matsuoka was victorious in the election. The cities in Kumamoto (1) generated 39,183 votes for Matsuoka, which amounted to 48.5 per cent of his total vote. The most important aspect of the distribution of his support was the cluster of votes Matsuoka won in Kumamoto City, which was his largest single source of support (34,704 votes, or 42.9 per cent of his total vote as shown in Table 2.1).

The fact that Matsuoka's city votes were so concentrated in one place suggests that they were generated less by programmatic appeals (Matsuoka's criticism of the consumption tax) than by more traditional kinds of social networks, in this case, the network centring on Matsuoka's old high school alumni association, which reportedly acted as Matsuoka's biggest vote-collecting machine.⁹⁰ One of his old school mates whose support he solicited said of him

[h]e pretended to be a hard-liner, but I got the impression that he was not a fervent soul. He was definitely not a person who left a good impression. However, since he was running for election, all his classmates supported him. A rally was held at a hotel. Although people said he would lose the election, he was able to get elected, and we were glad that it was worth supporting him. But after he was elected, he did not thank us. I have supported various other people, but it is unusual for there to be no telephone call to express his gratitude.⁹¹

In summary, Matsuoka was able to carve out an electoral niche for himself in Kumamoto (1) based primarily on his home town and Aso county connections, and his network of old school ties in Kumamoto City, in addition to his identification with and career background in the agricultural and forestry bureaucracy. His victory was constructed on the basis of an electoral coalition, which combined personal and local connections with the backing of special interests in agriculture and forestry, which married an area, or geographic zone (*chiiki wari*), vote to a sector or policy field (*seisaku bunya wari*) vote.⁹² In the mix were also programmatic (anti-LDP) appeals, particularly on issues such as the consumption tax and 'misgovernment'. Because the election was held in 1990, Matsuoka was able to exploit the LDP's electoral vulnerabilities at the time.

The *Yomiuri Shinbun* attributed Matsuoka's victory to a big rise in the mood for generational change, given that Matsuno was 73 (which the newspaper identified as a salient feature of the whole election, given that new candidates

won 25 per cent of the seats in that election).⁹³ Matsuoka himself was 45 years old, a relatively young age for entering politics, particularly following a bureaucratic career. The paper referred to Matsuoka's forming his political camp for the first time, appealing for political renewal (*seiji sasshin*) and for generational change in the representation of the electorate (*sedai kôdai*), and his gaining support from his alma mater (his old school in Kumamoto City) and from Kasumigaseki OBs.⁹⁴

Although Matsuoka was not endorsed by the LDP, he was seeking support predominantly from customary LDP voters. The composition of his electoral support cut across both the two main vote divisions in Lower House electoral politics—geographic region and sectoral specialisation. In this fashion, Matsuoka, (albeit standing as an Independent), was able to differentiate himself from other LDP candidates by pointing out his special characteristics as an individual candidate (*tokka*) in terms of both region and policy field.

JOINING THE LDP

After he won his Diet seat, Matsuoka joined the LDP. There was no contradiction in his having attacked the party during the campaign and joining it afterwards. Becoming a member of the LDP after the election was the norm for successful Independents who had sought but failed to get the party's endorsement in the election. The custom was for the party to welcome such Independents into the fold, especially if the size of the LDP's majority in the Diet were an issue. The LDP, internally, contained both government and opposition forces in the form of the mainstream (the factions who supported the LDP president) and the anti-mainstream (those factional groupings who opposed his election). These vertical divisions were reinforced by horizontal ones amongst groups of Diet members representing differing sets of sectional interests, who often opposed their own administration's decisions on policy as part of an entrenched pattern of 'government versus party' conflict in policymaking.

Within the LDP, Matsuoka joined the Seiwakai faction led by Mitsuzuka Hiroshi,⁹⁵ and received a ¥20 million in political funds from the faction.⁹⁶ However, it was Suzuki (who was not a member of this faction) and not Diet members who belonged to the Seiwakai, who took Matsuoka around and introduced him to each office in the Diet members' office building.⁹⁷ Suzuki's 21st Century Policy Research Association also donated ¥50,000 towards Matsuoka's celebration party.⁹⁸

Moreover, the LDP had lost two of its sitting members in Kumamoto (1), and so Matsuoka would bolster its ranks. Last but not least, victory in 1990 was a sufficient demonstration to the LDP that Matsuoka was a vote-winner, especially as Matsuno and Kitaguchi gave up politics altogether. In this way, Matsuoka gained membership of the LDP via the back door. The LDP endorsed his candidature in all subsequent Lower House elections—in 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003 and 2005.

Matsuoka also had to join the party of government in order to place himself in a position to influence policy, particularly measures relating to agriculture and forestry. Being a member of the ruling party was also vital in order to gain direct access to administrative officials who exercised discretionary power over the allocation of public works projects to particular regions and public works contracts to particular companies, and/or who could grant particular administrative dispensations to companies, individuals and organisations. This was virtually impossible for an Independent member of the Diet or a member of the Opposition to do.

WITH A VIEW TO THE 1993 ELECTION...

The election of 1993—which was the first poll that Matsuoka contested as an officially endorsed LDP candidate—was very different from the 1990 poll. On the positive side, Matsuoka started much further ahead than in 1990 when he was a newcomer striving to break into the ranks of Diet members representing the electorate. In the interim since the last election, Matsuoka bolstered his name recognition and consolidated his support base in Kumamoto (1). His first term in the Diet and his membership of the LDP assisted in both respects, attracting greater numbers into his *kôenkai* in search of the favours and benefits that flowed from having a personal, institutionalised connection and channel of communication with a Diet member.⁹⁹

Another factor that augured well for Matsuoka was the LDP's split prior to the election, which left only two LDP candidates standing in Kumamoto (1) instead of the customary four. The LDP might have split at the centre, but for electoral purposes it was always split at the local level, meaning that Matsuoka was facing no more electoral competition than normal. Matsuoka and Noda were the only two LDP-endorsed candidates left. Noda's support base was primarily in the cities.¹⁰⁰ Uozumi had left to join the breakaway Renewal Party,¹⁰¹ leaving Matsuoka as the strongest LDP candidate in rural areas with

connections to primary industry voters. One of the advantages of standing as a sector-specific candidate was that Matsuoka could tap into support from the interest groups operating in the agricultural and forestry sectors. Representing their interests was a way of harnessing their support over the entire electoral district and receiving hard support, meaning reliable votes, in return.¹⁰²

Over time, Matsuoka built up stronger connections to the agricultural cooperative organisations in his district, including the Kumamoto Prefecture Farmers' Political League (Kumamoto-ken Nôgyôsha Seiji Renmei, or *nôseiren*) as well as at the centre, including the national political arm of the agricultural cooperatives, the National Council of Farmers' Agricultural Policy Campaign Organizations (Zenkoku Nôgyôsha Nôsei Undô Soshiki Kyôgikai), or National Council (Zenkoku Nôseikyô) for short. This grouping was newly established in 1989. Matsuoka addressed gatherings of local representatives of the agricultural cooperatives and attended large functions of the Nokyo faithful organised by the National Council.

Matsuoka also developed links with specific producer groupings such as dairy farmers through the prefectural dairy farmers' political league (*rakunô seiji renmei*). He addressed national conventions of dairy farmers and made a point of attending the joint councils of local and central dairy farmers' political leagues. He also built a close relationship with tobacco farmers through the tobacco cultivation associations (*takabo kôsaku kumiai*). He became an advisor to the National Central Union of Tobacco Cultivation Associations (Zenkoku Tabako Kôsaku Kumiai Chûôkai), which was the mouthpiece for the country's 23,000 tobacco farmers. It campaigned directly against the Ministry of Health and Welfare's plans to cut national smoking rates. The total number of leaf tobacco farmers was small, but they were strongly unified. Moreover tobacco farming was important in Kumamoto Prefecture.¹⁰³ Tobacco farmers in Kumamoto (1) thus became a reliable source of votes for Matsuoka.

As an OB of the Forestry Agency, Matsuoka had a natural connection with the forest associations (*shinrin kumiai*) that represented forest owners, who harvested their timber for sale on the domestic market in Japan.¹⁰⁴ In Kumamoto Prefecture, there were approximately 42,000 members of the forest associations. Their activities included logging (trees that were more than 40 years old), marketing logs and providing guidance for members about management of their forestland.¹⁰⁵

For all of these primary industry groupings, the key issue was the price received for their product on the domestic market. As most commodities were subject to administrative price intervention, LDP Diet members could exert influence on price policymaking, and in so doing, harness the organisational backing of these groups in elections. Between 1990 and 1993, Matsuoka put his foot on the lower rungs of all the appropriate ladders in farm and forestry policymaking in the LDP and in the Diet.¹⁰⁶

Going into the election, Matsuoka had much stronger organisational support from agricultural and forestry groupings than he did in 1990. This also helped to differentiate him from Noda and Uozumi. Noda, as before, centred his voting base on urban, commercial interests, and Uozumi, while ex-LDP, obtained his primary backing from commerce and industry organisations.

On the negative side, one of the other candidates contesting the election was Hosokawa Morihiro, the very popular ex-governor of Kumamoto Prefecture (1983–91). This was an election in which Hosokawa, who was playing the main role in the Japan New Party¹⁰⁷ boom, was a powerful force eating into the support strata of both the LDP and JSP. Indeed, everyone standing in Kumamoto (1) was affected by the ‘Hosokawa typhoon’. Although Matsuoka and Noda, as the only two LDP candidates, tried to use the split in the LDP as some kind of springboard to consolidate their support amongst conservative voters, some groups, hitherto out-and-out supporters of the LDP such as the Kumamoto Prefecture *nôseiren*—Nokyo’s political front organisation—and the prefectural medical association, decided to support Hosokawa and the Japan New Party.¹⁰⁸ Matsuoka’s face reportedly went very pale when Hosokawa stood as a candidate.¹⁰⁹ The two were reputedly not friendly with each other at all. The constituency that Matsuoka inherited was from Fujita Yoshimitsu who was a distant relation of Hosokawa’s. Matsuoka ‘feared that in regional areas where local connections and blood relations are important, the people he was counting on for votes would support Hosokawa like tumbling snow’.¹¹⁰ As one commentator put it, ‘Hosokawa was the “emperor”. He was a famous governor. He transcended local and blood connections and took votes as if a typhoon had blown through. Matsuoka of course, went for bribery, and furiously distributed rice balls with ¥10,000 notes in them. There were police in his office despite it being during an election period’.¹¹¹

Hosokawa’s entry into the race, and his absorption of votes that would have normally flowed to the other parties, meant that the competition amongst the

remaining candidates was made all the more severe. Noda, Matsuoka and Uozumi in the conservative camp were slightly ahead, while Tanaka and Kurata Eiki (representing the JSP and Kômeitô respectively) were about even. Noda had very strong support from the conservative camp, whilst Matsuoka had thoroughly infiltrated the rural areas. Unluckily for Tanaka, some of the progressive/reformist vote was also flowing to Hosokawa. Noda Masaharu, standing as an Independent, was appealing for support for his own independent rice policy.¹¹²

BEER COUPONS OR VOTE-BUYING?

For Matsuoka, money was another issue altogether. In 1991 and 1992 (non-election years) official donations to his political funding groups and personal support organisation dipped—from ¥131 million in 1990 to around ¥110 million and ¥104 million respectively.¹¹³ As 1993 was an election year, funding levels rose again—to around ¥126 million.¹¹⁴ The largest portion flowed to the Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century Politics and Economics Discussion Association (¥75 million), with ¥56 million donated to Matsuoka's *kôenkai*.¹¹⁵

Kumamoto was infamous for the old-fashioned vote-buying system of finding a ¥10,000 note in a cabbage delivered to voters' houses. Even in the 1990s, this system was still in evidence.¹¹⁶ Buying votes with money was described as 'commonsense' in some local towns and villages of the prefecture.¹¹⁷ Kumamoto was also famous for the distribution of soy sauce and pickled leaf mustard at election time.¹¹⁸

One month before the 1993 election, Matsuoka ordered ¥25 million worth of beer coupons contained in 10 boxes that were delivered to his Diet office. To obtain the beer coupons, he used Mitsukoshi Department store's reception system that allows unlimited credit for certain special customers.¹¹⁹ Matsuoka had been introduced to Mitsukoshi by Hirota Daisuke, another user of the system. Hirota, a self-proclaimed construction consultant, was a character with a history.¹²⁰ Rumours connected him to a former politician's secretary, Ozaki Mitsurô, who was arrested over a scandal and who was also audited by the National Taxation Office.¹²¹ Hirota was chairman of a company called Miyauchi Denkô, which changed its name to Japan Orando.¹²² Matsuoka became a reception client in June 1993, and almost immediately issued his first order for beer coupons. Because it was such an expensive order, the store liaison officer assigned to look after Matsuoka initially thought to himself, 'you must be joking'.¹²³ However, when he checked with Matsuoka's office, Matsuoka's

secretary brushed aside his reservations saying, 'there's no time. We need it next month' (July 1993, when the Lower House election was due to be held).¹²⁴ The beer coupons, like tailoring coupons, were extremely convertible, and so Mitsukoshi did not want to go ahead with the expensive sale.¹²⁵

To make matters worse, when the time came for payment, Matsuoka did not honour the debt. Mitsukoshi repeatedly pressed him for payment, including a threat to go to his office in Kumamoto. The department store finally received a promissory note in lieu of payment. The drawer of the promissory note was Hirota.¹²⁶ However, accepting such a note was not store policy, and when the store officer visited Matsuoka's home in Tokyo, he was given cash to cover the debt owed (approximately ¥25 million). The band around the cash was from the Sanwa Bank. At the time, Hirota had been using the Sanwa Bank for his business transactions, and so the Mitsukoshi people assumed that the money had originated from Hirota.¹²⁷

Matsuoka continued to make purchases using the reception system and also continued to default on payment. Hirota again covered Matsuoka's bill with a promissory note. When the store objected to this system of payment, Hirota was enraged. He phoned and visited the Mitsukoshi Head Office along with an influential right-wing figure. He also stopped paying his account. When interviewed, Hirota declined to acknowledge even knowing Matsuoka, saying that all the transactions had been made through a representative of Matsuoka's *kôenkai*, a Mr T, who had subsequently died. Matsuoka himself also denied knowing Hirota and denied making any of the transactions, blaming Mr T, who clearly could not answer for himself.¹²⁸

THE 1993 ELECTION RESULTS

When the results of the 1993 election were declared, Matsuoka was ranked third amongst the five successful candidates (see Appendix). This was two rungs higher than in 1990, but was well behind the very popular Hosokawa, who was way out in front of everyone else with 213,125 votes (see Appendix). Overall, the Japan New Party won 25.16 per cent of the votes, while the LDP secured 20.83 per cent. It was the first time that the LDP had vacated its position as the leading party in Kumamoto (1) since the amalgamation of the conservatives in 1955.¹²⁹ For the LDP, the entire election was held in the shadow of the Japan New Party boom.

Hosokawa claimed nearly 40 per cent of the votes in Kumamoto City and was also the most popular candidate overall in the rural counties, which

meant that Matsuoka ceded top ranking to Hosokawa in regional areas. In fact, Hosokawa had broad support across all parts of the electorate, suggesting strong personal popularity.

Next in ranking to Hosokawa were Noda Takeshi in second place with 93,824 votes and Matsuoka with 82,620 votes. The split in the LDP and Uozumi's defeat left Matsuoka as the only LDP politician with strong connections to farm and forestry voters across the entire electorate, given that Noda's connections were mainly with business, although he gained respectable support from county voters.¹³⁰ The election results thus served to reinforce Matsuoka's sectoral differentiation strategy.

All up, Matsuoka's vote tally was only a small improvement on his 1990 performance, with 12.95 per cent of the total cast vote (see Appendix). This suggested a stable support base, with supporters who were not easily deflected by Hosokawa's appeal. On the other hand, Matsuoka appeared to have hardly gained in electoral performance in spite of his having secured a position in the LDP and in the Diet over the previous three years.

Apart from Hosokawa's taking a large slice of the total vote, the rankings amongst the various party candidates settled back more into the normal order of things with the JSP and Kômeitô candidates coming in behind the LDP candidates (in fourth and fifth position respectively) in contrast to the 1990 election (see Appendix). This was despite the fact that the LDP, as a whole, lost its majority in the Lower House in this election, gaining only 223 seats in the 511-seat Diet. The JSP as a party also went down to a massive defeat with only 70 seats. These figures provided the context in which a non-LDP coalition took power for the first time since 1955.

The two dominant features of Matsuoka's electoral performance—the fact that his total vote tally hardly changed and the fact that distribution of his support was broadly similar to the 1990 election result—suggested that the composition of Matsuoka's vote was hard rather than soft or floating. Matsuoka was not a politician that attracted floating votes. Nor, it would seem, did he have much personal popularity, the kind that produced such high levels of support that Hosokawa enjoyed for instance.

The only movement in Matsuoka's votes was the decline in voting support in the cities (where his overall support fell by 3000 or so votes) and the somewhat larger gain in rural votes (see Table 2.2). In Kumamoto City alone, Matsuoka's

Table 2.2 Farm household composition/votes cast for Matsuoka by municipality in Kumamoto (1) in 1993
Lower House election

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Tamana City	1,151	8.7	2,608	10.0	3.2	4th
Yamaga City	1,035	9.9	2,852	14.0	3.5	3rd
Kikuchi City	1,104	13.6	1,205	6.7	1.5	6th
Countries	17,119	17.2	46,599	22.5	56.4	2nd
Hotaku County ^b	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Tamana County	3,525	16.7	7,518	15.3	9.1	3rd
Taimi Town	449	11.1	1,621	17.2	2.0	3rd
Yokoshima Town	600	42.3	811	20.1	1.0	3rd
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Gyokuro Town	337	20.5	613	16.4	0.7	3rd
Kikusui Town	209	10.5	368	7.5	0.4	4th
Mikawa Town	445	26.2	1,362	32.2	1.6	1st
Nankan Town	411	11.9	1,140	15.1	1.4	3rd
Nagasu Town	193	3.8	1,054	10.2	1.3	4th
Kamoto County	3,144	29.8	5,162	14.1	6.2	4th
Kahoku Town	399	26.3	687	16.9	0.8	3rd
Kikuka Town	566	27.7	717	13.5	0.9	4th
Kamoto Town	452	17.7	1,057	19.1	1.3	2nd
Kao Town	441	29.4	728	18.1	0.9	3rd
Ueki Town	1,286	43.7	1,973	11.2	2.4	4th

Kikuchi County	3,296	10.4	8,649	12.6	10.5	4th
Shichijo Town	483	33.9	443	11.2	0.5	3rd
Kyokushi Town	388	28.2	491	13.9	0.6	3rd
Ozu Town	697	9.9	2,882	19.6	3.5	2nd
Kikuyo Town	575	8.5	2,133	15.8	2.6	2nd
Koshi Town	354	6.7	885	7.6	1.1	6th
Shisui Town	478	14.9	642	8.3	0.8	5th
Nishigoshi Town	321	4.8	1,173	8.8	1.4	6th
Aso County	4,771	20.7	25,270	47.7	30.6	1st
Ichinomiya Town	468	15.0	2,711	41.1	3.3	1st
Aso Town	986	17.1	8,300	62.2	10.0	1st
Minamitoguni Town	344	25.7	1,297	38.9	1.6	1st
Oguni Town	420	15.0	2,616	39.4	3.2	1st
Ubuyama Village	196	41.0	722	54.7	0.9	1st
Namino Village	220	40.7	821	60.1	1.0	1st
Soyô Town	479	33.0	1,688	49.1	2.0	1st
Takamori Town	523	21.4	2,128	40.3	2.6	1st
Hakusui Village	439	35.2	1,490	47.2	1.8	1st
Kugino Town	241	35.2	975	52.8	1.2	1st
Chôyô Village	191	10.3	1,521	46.4	1.8	1st
Nishihara Village	264	19.7	1,001	29.8	1.2	1st
Total/average	23,121	6.4	82,620	12.95	100.0	3rd

Notes: ^a Farm household data are for 1990. ^b Horaku County was merged into Kumamoto City on 1st February 1991.

Sources: Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, *Heisei 2-nen Kokusei Chôsa Saishû Hôkoku Dai 3-kan Dai 2-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka Sono 2 Todôfiken, Shichôsen-ken 43 Kumamoto-ken*, pp. 288-289 and 294-303; Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, *Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 40-kai Shûgin Sôsenkyo*, p. 153.

vote tally fell by more than 7,000 votes, suggesting that some of his original supporters had switched their allegiance to Hosokawa. The even split between city and rural votes for Matsuoka in the 1990 election expanded to a 10,000 or so vote margin in 1993, with county support clearly starting to predominate. His county vote tally rose by 5,000 or so votes overall. Only in Kamoto County did his votes fall appreciably.

Aso County, on the other hand, went from strength to strength, supplying 25,270 votes, or just over 30 per cent of Matsuoka's total vote (see Table 2.2). This result pointed to continuing solid local support from his home county. Matsuoka was uniformly ranked top vote-winner in all the towns and villages of the county (see Table 2.2) suggesting a hardening of his *jiban*.

THE 'KARATE KINGS' FIGHT IT OUT

Top of the list of losers in the 1993 general election in Kumamoto (1) was Uozumi, who had joined the Renewal Party. Matsuoka reportedly destroyed Uozumi's *jiban* in the election, with the result that Uozumi performed poorly, coming just below last on the elected list by a margin of 2000 votes (see Appendix).¹³¹

In the 1994 mayoral election for Kumamoto City, Uozumi and Matsuoka engaged in an unscheduled but publicly televised karate fight in the square in front of the election office of one of the candidates. The two men had very different backgrounds and career histories and were also on bad terms and arch rivals. Matsuoka was known as a conservative, whereas Uozumi had followed Ozawa Ichirō, the flag-bearer of reform, and split from the LDP. Matsuoka had become excessively agitated at the gathering in the square, and, when Uozumi tried to restrain him, Matsuoka jumped on Uozumi. They exchanged karate slaps, Matsuoka's glasses went flying and he ended up with a cut lip.¹³² What surprised the *Asahi* journalist who investigated the event was that there was so little sympathy for the victim, Matsuoka, who was slapped by Uozumi, and very little criticism of Uozumi, the perpetrator of the slap.¹³³

The local media were covering the event, but only the *Asahi* reported it. The response from other media groups was that 'this is within the limits of normal in Kumamoto'.¹³⁴ Kumamoto had a reputation as a land of political strife and fierce electoral contests in which all-night vigils were held around fires in steel drums to prevent people from crossing over to the 'enemy's' side. As for Matsuoka, he went on to acquire a reputation for being hot-blooded,

argumentative and a hard drinker.¹³⁵ What is more, he became known in Nagata-chô as the one man who hit his secretaries with his fists.¹³⁶ Other reports also surfaced of Matsuoka's physical altercations with Diet members.¹³⁷

REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS

Over two elections, Matsuoka had constructed an electoral coalition centring on his *jiban*, agricultural and forestry interests and sections of the city vote. This coalition required careful attention to a range of interests – local, sectional and client-based.

Local interests

Of all the victorious candidates standing in Kumamoto (1) in the 1990 and 1993 elections, Matsuoka had the most regionally concentrated vote, with wide variations in the percentage of the total vote he obtained across the cities, towns and villages that made up Kumamoto (1). Matsuoka's political stronghold was clearly in the Aso region. That was where his primary *jiban* was located. He was consistently the most popular candidate there over two elections. He also gained a substantial percentage of his total vote from Kumamoto City. In fact, these two sources of support comprised just under two-thirds of his vote tally (74 per cent in 1990 and 64 per cent in the 1993 election, as shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2).

Such regionally concentrated support encouraged Matsuoka to make a strong commitment to a specific locality and to engage in policy activities that delivered 'regionally concentrated policy services' (*chiiki shûchûgata seisaku sâbisu*).¹³⁸ This meant directing pork-barrel benefits, particularly public works projects, to his *jiban*.¹³⁹

For politicians such as Matsuoka, the beauty of public works was that they could be guided to a particular place—they were location-specific, and so their beneficiaries could be identified and votes could be harvested in return. Public works were different from general policy benefits that were delivered uniformly to broad sub-categories of voters, such as all rice farmers, or all dairy farmers wherever they were located.

By guiding benefits (*rieki yûdô*)—such as public works—to a specific locality, Matsuoka could secure high support rates within his *jiban* and a strong personal vote.¹⁴⁰ A large part of Matsuoka's policy activities were, therefore, geared to getting public resources directed to particular regions, such as funds for

agricultural, forestry and rural infrastructure development, including agricultural and forest roads, and community facilities of various kinds.

At the same time, such projects doubled as support for construction companies in the electorate. They advantaged not only the beneficiaries of the facilities that were built, such as road users, school children, and the patrons of sports and cultural facilities, but also the executives of both large and small construction companies and their employees, many of whom were locally-based, including part-time farmers. In this sense, public works projects had high utility as an electoral strategy geared to the mobilisation of both votes and political funds. In geographic terms they could also be used to service both Matsuoka's urban and rural support bases, because some construction companies were located in Kumamoto City. Public works thus provided, for Matsuoka, a bridge between urban and rural areas.

Public works also served indirectly as industry promotion policies and policies to promote the regional economy. They generated wider spin-offs for industry and business in the area—not just local, but also regional and prefectural—as well as for employment and regional development as a whole. Kumamoto was well known as a region with a culture of dependency on public works,¹⁴¹ and Matsuoka claimed to be especially concerned with the development of Kumamoto Prefecture as his 'birthplace'.¹⁴²

The incentive generated by the distribution of Matsuoka's voting support was, therefore, for him to engage in politics that benefited local interests in regional areas (*rieki yûdô seiji*)¹⁴³ and to become a 'benefit-guiding type of politician' (*rieki yûdôgata no seijika*). Matsuoka continued the 'long-established tradition in which the gaining of subsidies and public works was seen as a good achievement'.¹⁴⁴ By providing voters and local industries in his home region with public works, Matsuoka could secure in exchange his own interests such as votes, funding and support.¹⁴⁵

Rieki yûdô seiji was also an important means for Matsuoka to build a strong following amongst local politicians in a line from the centre (Matsuoka as a Diet politician) to the periphery (prefectural and municipal politicians, including mayors and assembly members, who were dependent on the flow of funding from the centre for their own public works programs). Such projects helped local politicians obtain support from voters in local elections. They enhanced the image of particular local politicians as effective representatives who could draw government resources back to their local areas. They also

demonstrated the utility of the local politicians' links to national Diet politicians and thus their standing and importance. The return for Matsuoka was the role local politicians played as *kôenkai* kingpins, election campaigners and generators of support amongst voters loyal to them. Through this system, it was Matsuoka, the individual Diet member, not the party (LDP), who delivered benefits to his local politician supporters and to localities that were the most important to him politically.

Directing public works projects to his local region required Matsuoka to engage in policy interference, that is, interference in the administrative affairs of the bureaucracy. It meant interceding with and exerting influence over officials in the MAFF (and other ministries such as the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Transport), because it was government officials who decided where particular public works projects would be located.

Because Matsuoka had not been a mainstream career official in the MAFF and only had a BA in Forestry from Tottori University, he did not have an automatic foothold for influence within the MAFF when he started out as a politician. His big break was the Uruguay Round Agriculture Countermeasures Expenditure (*UR Nôgyô Taisakuhi*) package. It provided an opportunity for him to start exercising enormous power over the distribution of special agricultural and rural public works projects funded either totally or partially by the package.¹⁴⁶ Officially the policy was designed to compensate farmers for greater exposure to international trade competition as a result of the Hosokawa administration's agreement to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) finalised in March 1994 for initial implementation in the 1995 fiscal year. The total budgetary allocation for the countermeasures package was ¥6.01 trillion over six years (1995-2001). In practice, the package provided a huge financial boost for local public works projects.

Since the nature of the expenditure package represented just a 'grab for money' (*tsukamikin*), how it was to be used was not clear. Matsuoka himself said that 'there is an abundance of funds. There was no choice but to use the money for projects'.¹⁴⁷ With that money, Matsuoka constructed large-scale facilities in his constituency.¹⁴⁸

Sectional interests

Matsuoka's strong support from rural counties made it inevitable that he would represent agricultural and forestry interests in the party and in the Diet. One

of his primary policy-related activities in Tokyo was policy intervention, whereby he would participate in the making of policy decisions for the agriculture and forestry sectors—in the committees of the LDP's PARC, in Diet standing committees (Kokkai *iinkai*), and in Diet members' activities (*giin katsudô*) in the Diet members' leagues (*giin renmei*).

Agriculture and forestry policy included both distributive measures (those involving the allocation of public funds) and non-distributive measures (those relating to the regulation of markets etc.). For the most part, however, agriculture and forestry policy, even when it was distributive, was not locality-focused, but targeted to broad groups of farmers such as rice producers. Agricultural subsidies for price support schemes, for example, applied not only to particular types of producers in Matsuoka's electorate, but also across the entire Kumamoto Prefecture, and in most cases across the entire nation. Such benefits could not be restricted to farmers in certain localities or electoral *jiban*. They contrasted with subsidies for agricultural and rural public works, which, although included under the broad umbrella of agricultural policy in the aggregate (that is, allocating total quantities of funds annually), were essentially geared to an electoral strategy focusing on local, rather than sectional interests.

Moreover, broadly focused agricultural and forestry policies, including subsidies, applied to all members of a group irrespective of whether or not they supported Matsuoka. The incentive was for Matsuoka to try and influence these policies as a means of maximising farm and forestry votes, but he could not withhold benefits from those who did not support him. The connection between voter and politician, in this case, was indirect. In this respect, agricultural policies possessed the characteristics of programmatic policies, even though they applied to a specific group of producers. Nonetheless, though indirect, the electoral benefit from supporting industry-wide policies was potentially substantial.

The combination of high levels of rural support and Matsuoka's career experience in the MAFF practically preordained his political career as a typical agriculture and forestry Diet member (*nôrin giin*), with a primary specialism in agriculture and forestry policy, a niche in which he could bring his specialised knowledge of agricultural and forestry administration to bear. Creating an identity as a *nôrin giin* also served to distinguish Matsuoka from other LDP rival candidates and politicians from Kumamoto (1). Support generated by agricultural and forestry-related policy activities was derived from all those

areas of his electorate where people were gainfully employed in agriculture and forestry. It was not specific to his *jiban* in the Aso region.

A sectionalist orientation was also important in enabling Matsuoka to maintain profitable relations with the interest groups operating in this field. These could sometimes be the specific beneficiaries of policy measures and subsidies for their own organisational purposes. In return, producer groups could be mobilised to provide various forms of organisational backing, including campaign assistance, votes and funds.

Representing agricultural and forestry interests enabled Matsuoka to exploit the organisational muscle of farm and forestry-related interest groups. The biggest and most comprehensive grouping, which mobilised the most primary industry votes in the electorate, was Nokyo. Within Nokyo, the Kumamoto Prefecture *nôseiren* was the most important group for Matsuoka; it had branches in each county of his electorate and sub-branches in the municipalities.

Table 2.3 Ranking of Kumamoto Prefecture as an agricultural producer/ by commodity and farm/forestry households, 2000 (per cent)

Product/households	Ranking
Rushes (for tatami mats)	1 st (95%)
Corn	1 st (35%)
Tomatoes	1 st (11%)
Tobacco	2 nd
Strawberries	3 rd
Ginger root	3 rd
Japanese mandarins (<i>mikan</i>)	4 th
Number of beef cattle-feeding households	4 th
Sweet potatoes	5 th
Raw milk production	6 th
Wheat and barley	9 th
Chinese cabbages	9 th
Japanese radishes	10 th
Carrots	10 th
Rice	14 th
Total number of farm households	13 th
Farm households in prefecture (per cent)	13 th
Total number forest households (67% joint farm-forest households)	16 th

Source: Nôrinsuisanshō, Tōkei Jōhōbu, 2003. *Dai-77 Nôrinsuisanshō Tōkeihyō* [*The 77th Yearbook of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Japan*], 2000-2001, Tokyo, Nôrin Tōkei Kyōkai, pp.4, 160-230, 426.

Matsuoka's sectionalist orientation ensured that he undertook activities designed to deliver policy benefits not only to farm and forest owners in general, but also to specific sub-groupings of producers within this larger occupational category. The production profile of Kumamoto Prefecture as a whole indicated that certain commodities were going to be more important to Matsuoka than others (see Table 2.3). The prefecture was well known for its production of rushes for *tatami* mats, tobacco, corn, horticultural products such as tomatoes, strawberries and ginger root, fruit such as *mikan*, livestock products such as beef and milk, and sweet potatoes. As Table 2.3 shows, Kumamoto Prefecture had the second highest number of tobacco farms of any prefecture in Japan in 2000.

Forests were also a feature of Kumamoto's primary industry landscape. More than two-thirds (67 per cent) of farm households were also forest households (*rinka*),¹⁴⁹ meaning that agricultural landholders also owned some forestland. Of the 24,049 forest households in Kumamoto Prefecture in 2000, 15,221 owned 1-3 hectares.¹⁵⁰ Only 1,223 households were making sales of forestry products, although 7,278 household members were engaged in forestry.¹⁵¹

Matsuoka also emphasised forestry policy because he had spent most of his time in the MAFF in the Forestry Agency, where he had been posted to prefectures such as Hokkaido and Akita. However, forestry policy was not restricted to taking care of the interests of small-scale forest owners in his electorate, just as his agricultural policy specialism did not apply simply to farmers in his own constituency. Forestry policy meant looking after the interests of timber companies that logged the forests, including state forests, and companies wanting to convert forestland to other uses such as factories and industrial complexes, residential sites, golf courses and leisure facilities, agricultural land and public land. In addition, forest policy extended to the construction of forest roads (*rindô*) through non-state-owned forests with the assistance of national government (and, to a lesser extent, prefectural government) subsidies. The Kyushu region had more forest roads than any other region except for Tohoku even though its forest area was relatively small, and almost all of these roads were managed by municipal governments. Forestry public works, as with all public works, took the representation of forestry interests out of the realm of sectional interests, and into the sphere of local interests and also into clientelistic politics, where Matsuoka could intercede on behalf of individual clients or small groups of clients.

Clientelistic interests

The search for votes and political funding encouraged Matsuoka to undertake deals for particular clients, usually through direct, personal contacts between himself and those seeking his intermediation on their behalf.¹⁵² In this role, Matsuoka acted as a political broker or private mediator for individual clients, who sought personal, private favours, and as a political 'fixer' for small groups of clients who petitioned for particular policy favours. The key aspect of such clientelistic relations was the personalised connection between Matsuoka and those seeking his mediation, and the delivery of the requested favours as political patronage. Matsuoka's conduct of politics on an individual basis (*kojin honi no seiji*) led inevitably to a political culture of patronage (*onkoshugiteki na seiji bunka*).¹⁵³

Matsuoka's ability to deliver such benefits was critically dependent on Japan's system of discretionary governance by the central government bureaucracy and on the ability of ordinary ruling party backbenchers to maintain direct channels of communication with, and influence over, serving government officials. Bureaucrats had the power to grant the favours; they decided which public works projects should go where (*kashozuke*),¹⁵⁴ and which private companies should undertake these projects. Using their discretionary powers, bureaucrats could even use the promise of subsidies to influence local governments in their selection of which tradespeople they would select to work on projects.¹⁵⁵ Bureaucrats were also responsible for deciding whether, or how much of, a particular subsidy would be provided to a particular group, and for a host of other kinds of administrative decisions that impacted on the lives of individuals and the incomes of companies and producers of various kinds. Government officials could arrange for exemptions for particular individuals, groups or companies from certain administrative rules and regulations.

Within their administrative fiefdoms, bureaucrats were the government, and politicians such as Matsuoka were able to use their position as Diet members to prey on government in this sense. In his role as broker or 'fixer', Matsuoka's job was to solicit, obtain or extract administrative favours from bureaucrats. He maintained a parasitic relationship with them, feeding off the benefits they provided and converting these benefits into political goods for his own purposes.

Central government dispensations and subsidies, including those for particular public works projects such as roads, sports and tourist facilities,

served as a basis for Matsuoka to build a range of clientelistic relationships with supporters. He established personal links with individual local politicians, local businessmen and company executives, as well as with the leaders and officials of local groups and sectoral organisations, who were dependent on central government administrative discretion and largesse and who could supply votes and funding in exchange for favours mediated by Matsuoka.

In this context, Matsuoka functioned as a 'benefit and concession-guiding type of politician' (*riken yûdôgata no seijika*).¹⁵⁶ Whilst benefits involved directing public works to particular local regions (*rieki yudo seiji*), 'concessions' (*riken*) usually meant obtaining specific favours for particular clients. A large majority of such favours in Matsuoka's case were for construction companies and other businesses servicing the public works industry.¹⁵⁷ Public works contracts provided these companies with business opportunities they would not otherwise have had. Through his involvement in the public works industry, Matsuoka was able to build personal links with construction company executives and others who then became a major source of political funding in return for the delivery of political patronage in the form of public works contracts.¹⁵⁸ The system worked as follows: Matsuoka would 'drop funds from the agriculture, forestry and fisheries budget into the locality (*jimoto*), Matsuoka would then allow local companies to get involved in the public works projects funded by this budget, and finally, Matsuoka would then receive political funds from these companies'.¹⁵⁹

Matsuoka's services as a broker were, however, not totally dependent on the provision of central government largesse. In his search for votes and political funds, he was encouraged to field personal requests for favours not only with bureaucrats, but also with other politicians and political leaders, with members of administrative staffs and organisational officials, and even with business leaders.

Some of Matsuoka's key linkages and activities as a mediator or political broker were generated via his *kôenkai*, which served as a communications hub between Matsuoka, the Diet politician, and those local entities who submitted various requests for his patronage. His *kôenkai* provided a mechanism for channelling the particularistic demands of private individuals, local politicians, company executives and organisational officials directly to Matsuoka, the politician. Through his *kôenkai*, Matsuoka undertook direct associations with his supporters and offered them his patronage in the form of various services and policy activities in exchange for votes and political funds. The *kôenkai*

thus institutionalised clientelism and its inevitable corollary—patronage politics. Matsuoka personally delivered favours to particular clients in exchange for their personal loyalty and support.

This was essentially a feudal system of politics. Matsuoka was treated like an overlord whom supplicants approached seeking favours in exchange for which they pledged their loyalty (in the form of votes and/or political funds). The behaviour in which it resulted was covert and completely lacking transparency: it easily led to corruption.

NOTES

- 1 Kumamoto Prefecture is located in the northeast of the large island of Kyushu, which lies at the southwestern end of the main Japanese island of Honshu.
- 2 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Rirekisho' ['Curriculum Vitae of Matsuoka Toshikatsu']. Available from <http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/008.html>
- 3 Some of the following details were obtained from 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Rirekisho'. Available from <http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/008.html>
- 4 Nakanishi Akihiko and Journal Reporter Group, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin' ['The Suspicious Person Called Matsuoka Toshikatsu'], *Bungei Shunjū*, 1 September 2002, pp. 184–85.
- 5 *ibid.*, p. 184.
- 6 *ibid.*, p. 185. According to two other reports, Matsuoka spent two years at the National Defence University and then withdrew.
- 7 *ibid.*, p. 185.
- 8 The Japanese title was Nōrinshō.
- 9 The National Personnel Authority divides MAFF entrance exams into three levels. The MAFF applies the following categories of levels as follows: Level I is the highest and encompasses both *jimukan* (law, economics and administration), and *gikan* (agronomy, forestry, engineering, human sciences, livestock science etc.). Levels II and III cover all fields. Special exams are also offered for livestock science and veterinary science. In addition, the MAFF has its own interview tests to those who pass these exams. Available from http://www.maff.go.jp/saiyou/saiyou_top.html
- 10 Nishikawa Shinichi, 'Tako Tsubo ni Tojikomotte Ōkoku o Gyūjiru Nōgyō Doboku' ['The Agriculture Civil Engineering Technical Bureaucrats Stuck in a Foxhole and Controlling Their Kingdom'], *Shūkan Daiyamondo*, 20 April 2002, p. 48.
- 11 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Purofuiru' ['Profile'], in Seisaku Jihōsha, *Seikan Yōran* [*A Handbook of Politicians and Bureaucrats*], 1990, First Half Year Edition, Tokyo, Seisaku Jihōsha, March 1990, p. 269.
- 12 The Japanese title is Rinyachō. Along with the Food Agency and the Fisheries Agency, this has been one of the three agencies of the MAFF, although the Food Agency, which, from 1942 onwards bought and sold rice and regulated rice marketing throughout Japan as well as regulating rice production since 1969, has now been disbanded. What was left of its rice-market and production-related functions were taken over a new Food Department of the MAFF.
- 13 Matsuoka Toshikatsu, 'Shinsan-Kōtoku Chiiki no Shinkihon Keikaku no Gaiyō' ['Outline of the New Industry-Industrial Special Regions New Basic Plan'], *Rinya Jihō*, April 1977, p. 4.
- 14 Matsuoka, 'Shinsan-Kōtoku Chiiki no Shinkihon Keikaku', p. 35.
- 15 Its Japanese title is Nōrinsuisanshō.
- 16 It became the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries at the height of international negotiations over the law of the sea, when Nakagawa Ichirō was minister and led the Japanese side in these

negotiations. At the time, the ministry thought it would be a good idea to emphasise the fact that fisheries were part of its administrative domain.

- 17 The National Land Agency is now incorporated into the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport as a result of the reorganisation of the central government bureaucracy in January 2001.
- 18 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin', p. 185.
- 19 Nakanishi Akihiko and Special Reporting Group, 'Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Riken no Kyôbô' ['Suzuki Muneo and Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Conspiracy for Concessions'], *Bungei Shunjû*, May 2000, p. 100.
- 20 'Ni Chaneru Kako Rogu' ['Channel 2, Previous Entries/Log'], Giin Section. Available from <http://piza.2ch.net/giin/kako/987/987905181.html>
- 21 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin', p. 185.
- 22 Book review by Brad Glosserman of Ofer Feldman, *The Japanese Political Personality: Analyzing the Motivations and Culture of Freshman Diet Members*, St Martin's Press/Macmillan Press, 2000, *The Japan Times*, 13 July 2000.
- 23 *ibid.*
- 24 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Rirekisho'. Available from <http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002/public/008.html>
- 25 See <http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html>
- 26 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Rirekisho'. Available from <http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002/public/008.html>
- 27 Nakanishi and Special Reporting Group, 'Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu', p. 100.
- 28 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin', p. 180.
- 29 *ibid.*, p. 181.
- 30 *ibid.*
- 31 Aum Shinrikyô was a religious group, whose followers carried out a poison gas attack on the Tokyo subways in March 1995, which killed 12 people.
- 32 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin', p. 181.
- 33 Nakagawa died in circumstances that remain obscure. Various rumours circulated following his death. One held that Nakagawa had feuded with faction leader Mitsuzuka Hiroshi and/or Suzuki Muneo, who was his secretary at the time. Another rumour held that Nakagawa might have been killed by the CIA or the Soviet's KGB. *Tôkyô Shinbun*, 3 August 2005.
- 34 Nakanishi Akihiko and Special Reporting Group, 'Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu', p. 105.
- 35 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin', p. 185.
- 36 *ibid.*, p. 185. See also Chapter 6 on 'The Identical Twins of Nagata-chô'.
- 37 Nakanishi Tomiki, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu (Jimin Daigishi): Igai na Sugao to Shûkin Ryoku' ['Matsuoka Toshikatsu (LDP Diet Member): An Exceptional "Warts and All" and Money Collecting Power'], *Shûkan Asahi*, February 2002, p. 28.
- 38 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin', p. 185.
- 39 *ibid.*
- 40 *ibid.*
- 41 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 19 February 1990.
- 42 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Purofuiuru', p. 269. Even though this is what Matsuoka is quoted as saying in the Diet handbooks, other sources suggest that he did not want endorsement from the LDP.
- 43 Machidori, 'The 1990s Reforms Have Transformed Japanese Politics', p. 39.
- 44 See <http://piza.2ch.net/giin/kako/987/987905181.html>
- 45 *ibid.*
- 46 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Rirekisho'. Available from <http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002/public/008.html>
- 47 Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, 1991. *Heisei 2-nen Kokusei Chôsa Saishû Hôkokusho Nihon no Jinkô (Shiryô Hen) [1990 National Census Closing Report Japanese Population (Data Edition)]*, Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku,

- Tokyo, pp. 2–3, 526–27; Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, 1991. *Heisei 2-nen Kokusei Chôsa Saishû Hôkoku Dai 3-kan Dai 2-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka Sono 2 Tôdôfuken, Shichôson-ben 43 Kumamoto-ken* [1990 National Census Report, Vol. 2, Second Basic Statistical Results 2 Prefectures and Municipalities, Edition 43 Kumamoto Prefecture], Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, Tokyo, pp. 288–89 and 294–303; and Vol. 3, pp. 2–3.
- 48 *Heisei 2-nen Kokusei Chôsa Saishû Hôkoku Dai 3-kan Dai 2-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka*, pp. 288–89 and 294–303; and Vol. 3, pp. 2–3.
- 49 Calculated from nationwide average figures in Nôrinsuisanshō, Tôkei Jôhōbu, 1992. *Dai-66 Nôrinsuisanshō Tôkeihyô* [The 66th Statistical Yearbook of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries], 1989–90, Nôrin Tôkei Kyôkai, Tokyo, pp. 5 and 20.
- 50 For the total cast vote in the district of Kumamoto (1) in the 1990 Lower House election, see the Appendix.
- 51 Kitamatsu Masahiko *et al.*, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki: Sono Ôsei naru Shûkin Nôryoku no Kiseki’ [‘An Exhaustive Analysis of Matsuoka Toshikatsu Diet Member: The Tracks of a Vigorous Money-Collecting Ability’], *Zaikai Tenbô*, December 2002, p. 47.
- 52 *ibid.*
- 53 *ibid.*
- 54 See Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-cho’ for an elaboration of Matsuoka’s relationship with Suzuki Muneo.
- 55 Kitamatsu, *et al.*, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki’, p. 46.
- 56 “‘Nishi no Muneo’ Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Sokkin Hisho mo Yukue o Kuramashita” [“Muneo of the West” Matsuoka Toshikatsu’s Close Associate and Secretary Also Disappears], *Shûkan Bunshun*, 4 July 2002, p. 38.
- 57 Curtis, *The Logic of Japanese Politics*, p. 143.
- 58 Tatebayashi, *Giin Kôdô*, p. 4.
- 59 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, p. 185.
- 60 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 19 February 2005.
- 61 Personal interview, Ministry of Finance official, January 2003.
- 62 These are known as civil engineering ‘types’ (*dokenya*), who form the most powerful subgrouping of *gikan* within the MAFF. Their business is public works including land improvement. Because of their command over a large slice of the MAFF budget, ‘they have an air of arrogance and so are easy to spot in the MAFF’. Itô Teri and Editorial Department, ‘O’warai Nôrinsuisanshō’ [‘The Comical MAFF’], *Shûkan Daiyamondo*, 20 April 2002, p. 73.
- 63 In the 2001 Upper House election, for example, MAFF OB Fukushima Keishirô, who stood for the national (PR) constituency of the Upper House, received such support. His campaign organisation was headed up by Takagi Yûki, who had just retired as MAFF administrative vice-minister. Takagi was subsequently appointed as President of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation, a top ‘descent from heaven’ (*amakudari*) post for MAFF OBs.
- 64 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, p. 185.
- 65 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 15 February 1990.
- 66 *ibid.*
- 67 ‘Karate 4-dan (Shinseitô) ga 2-dan (Jimintô) o Haritao shita Yoru’ [‘The Night that the Karate 4th Level from the Renewal Party Pushed Over the Karate 2nd Level from the LDP’], *Shûkan Asahi*, 9 December 1994, p. 32.
- 68 In 2005, at the age of 88, he was advisor to the prime minister, former chairman of the Japan Karate Association and advisor to the Karate no Michi (The Karate Way) World Federation.
- 69 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 15 February 1990. Matsuno was ranked fifth amongst vote-winners in the 1986 elections, and although he increased his vote slightly in the 1990 elections, it was still not enough to get him over the line. See below.
- 70 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Rirekisho’. Available from <http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/008.html>

- 71 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 15 February 1990.
- 72 The JSP won 136 seats in this election, a substantial increase on the 83 seats it had at the time of the Diet's dissolution. The *Asahi* newspaper described the JSP's electoral victory in 1990 as a 'huge onslaught' (*daiyakushin*). It followed the JSP's outstanding performance in the Upper House elections of 1989.
- 73 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Purofuiru', p. 269.
- 74 Matsuno was not the only senior LDP politician with ties to farm and rural-regional interests to be defeated in this election. So were two other big names in the agricultural scene in Kyushu—Etô Takami from Miyazaki (1) and Yamanaka Sadanori from Kagoshima (3). Etô was Minister of Transport at the time, while Yamanaka was the chairman of the LDP's Tax System Investigation Committee. He was held personally responsible for the introduction of the consumption tax. In fact, he was described as 'the real parent of the consumption tax' (*shôhizei no umi no oya*), despite this, he lost by only 28 votes. Other losers of note were Horinouchi Hisao, former Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, as well as other senior LDP politicians who had held posts such as Minister of Construction, Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency, and the Director-General of the Defence Agency. The election result produced a real clean-out of LDP 'big shot Diet members' (*daibutsu giin*) and caused quite a stir at the time.
- 75 Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, 1990, *Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 39-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo* (Heisei 2-nen 2-gatsu), *Dai 15-kai Sangiin Tsûjô Senkyo* (Heisei Gannen 7-gatsu) [*Asahi General Survey of Election: The 39th House of Representatives General Election (February 1990), The 15th House of Councillors Regular Election (July 1989)*], Asahi Shinbunsha, Tokyo, p. 194.
- 76 Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, *Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 39-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo*, p. 194.
- 77 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 19 February 1990.
- 78 Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, *Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 39-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo*, p. 194.
- 79 *ibid.*
- 80 Curtis, *The Logic of Japanese Politics*, p. 59.
- 81 Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, *Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 39-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo*, p. 194.
- 82 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 15 February 1990.
- 83 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Purofuiru', p. 269.
- 84 Calculated from data in *Seikan Yôran*, 1990, First Half Year Edition, pp. 472–75.
- 85 *Seikan Yôran*, 1990, First Half Year Edition, pp. 472–75.
- 86 Of the two former MAFF *gikan* in the Diet in 1990—a graduate from Tokyo University's Faculty of Agriculture, and a graduate from Kyoto University's Faculty of Agriculture—both were agricultural engineering Diet members (*nôgyô doboku giin*).
- 87 Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, *Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 39-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo*, p. 194.
- 88 I am grateful to Yusaku Horiuchi for calculating the correlation coefficient between the percentage of farm households in each municipality and the percentage of the total vote Matsuoka received. The correlation coefficient was 0.162 (insignificant). The regression coefficient was also insignificant (0.220).
- 89 Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, *Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 39-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo*, p. 194.
- 90 'Karate 4-dan', p. 34.
- 91 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin', p. 185.
- 92 These terms are borrowed from Tatebayashi, *Giin Kôdô*, p. v. He argues that some Lower House electorates were divided up geographically (*chiiki wari*) along the lines of different candidates' *jiban*, while others were partitioned along policy sector (*seisaku bunya wari*) lines. Some were divided up by a mixture of both as in the case of Kumamoto (1). The division along the lines of each candidate's *jiban* amounted to a strategy of mutual respect for each candidate's geographic sphere of influence. In the elections, each candidate committed himself to representing a specific locality. The sectoral (policy field) division cut across the geographic division and was a strategy to fill in particular policy gaps across the entire electorate, which was partitioned according to the policy fields in which the candidates specialised. This often amounted to a division by economic or industry sector, such as agriculture,

commerce, construction and small business. *Giin Kôdô*, p. 49. According to Tatebayashi, these two major kinds of vote divisions were designed to mitigate competition amongst candidates from the same party (i.e. LDP) and to maximise the number of LDP candidates elected from the district. *Giin Kôdô*, p. v.

93 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 20 February 1990.

94 *ibid.*

95 The factional lineage extends from former Prime Minister Kishi through to former Prime Minister Fukuda and Abe Shintarô. Its most recent leader is former Prime Minister Mori. Matsuoka joined when Mitsuzuka Hiroshi was faction leader after Abe died. Other Diet members representing Kumamoto (1) were from the Watanabe and Takeshita factions, so the Mitsuzuka faction was a logical choice for Matsuoka. Mitsuzuka was also a member of Seirankai to which Nakagawa and Tamaki, Matsuoka's original Diet member patrons belonged.

96 Kitamatsu *et al.*, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki', pp. 46-47. See also below.

97 *ibid.*

98 *ibid.*

99 See also below.

100 In the 1993 elections Noda won just over two-thirds of his total vote in the cities of Kumamoto (1).

101 Its Japanese title was Shinseitô. In December 1992, the Takeshita faction (Keiseikai), which was the largest in the LDP, split into two with the departure of the group led by Hata Tsutomu and Ozawa Ichirô. In June 1993, 44 LDP Hata faction members resigned from the LDP and formed the Renewal Party led by Hata, with Ozawa as secretary-general, and 10 junior more left-wing LDP members left to form the New Party Harbinger (Shintô Sakigake) led by Takemura Masayoshi. In the subsequent (July) Lower House election, the LDP failed to win a majority.

102 This point is generalised by Tatebayashi, *Giin Kôdô*, p. 49. He argues that the different groups that supported the LDP were thus distributed amongst the various Diet members according to a policy division of labor. *Giin Kôdô*, p. 34.

103 See below.

104 There were 1.67 million forest-owner members of the 990 forest associations in Japan (see <http://www.zenmori.org/profile/gaiyou1.html>). By 2003, their numbers had fallen to 1.64 million individual members of 970 forest associations (personal communication, General Affairs Department, National Federation of Forest Associations, December 2005). Even though, unlike the agricultural cooperatives, they are not called 'cooperative unions' (*kyôdô kumiai*), they are in fact cooperatives organised along the same structural and functional lines as Nokyo. As the majority of forest owners in Japan are small-scale, like farm owners, they establish forest associations and cooperate for the purpose of forest management, the purchase of production and harvesting inputs, and the sale of timber. Prefectural federations of forest associations operate in every prefecture, and a national federation, the National Federation of Forest Associations (Zenkoku Shinrin Kumiai Rengôkai), or Zenshinren is the national body.

105 See <http://www.kumamori.or.jp>

106 See Chapter 4 on 'Exercising Power as a *Nôrin Giin*'.

107 Its Japanese title was Nihon Shintô.

108 Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, 1993. *Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 40-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo (Heisei 5-nen 7-gatsu)*, *Dai 16-kai Sangiin Tsûjô Senkyo (Heisei 4-nen 7-gatsu)* [*Asahi General Survey of Election: The 40th House of Representatives General Election (July 1993)*, *The 16th House of Councillors Regular Election (July 1992)*], Asahi Shinbunsha, Tokyo, p. 19.

109 See <http://piza.2ch.net/giin/kako/987/987905181.html>

110 *ibid.*

111 *ibid.*

112 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 14 July 1993.

113 Kitamatsu, *et al.*, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki', p. 47.

114 *ibid.*

- 115 *ibid.*
 116 'Karate 4-dan', p. 34.
 117 Hasegawa Hiroshi, 'Kanjûdanomi no Hazama de Shundô' ['Wriggling Through the Gaps of Bureaucratic Demands and Requests'], *Aera*, 18 February 2002, p. 25.
 118 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin', pp. 185–86.
 119 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu, Nishi no Muneo no Gyôten Sukyandaru: Mitsukoshi "Nisenmanen Bîruken" Fumitaoshi Kosaku' ['Matsuoka Toshikatsu, Muneo of the West's Astonishing Scandal: The Plot Not to Pay for the Mitsukoshi "¥20 Million Beer Coupons"'], *Shûkan Bunshun*, 5 September 2002, p. 168.
 120 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu, Nishi no Muneo no Gyôten Sukyandaru', p. 169.
 121 *ibid.*
 122 *ibid.*
 123 *ibid.*, p. 168.
 124 *ibid.*
 125 *ibid.*
 126 *ibid.*, p. 169.
 127 *ibid.*
 128 *ibid.*, p. 170.
 129 Asahi Shinbun Election Headquarters, *Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 40-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo*, p. 19.
 130 *ibid.*, p. 153.
 131 'Karate 4-dan', p. 32.
 132 *ibid.*
 133 *ibid.*, p. 34.
 134 *ibid.*, p. 35.
 135 Nakanishi and Special Reporting Group, 'Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu', p. 100.
 136 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi ni Hisho no Taishokukin & Kyûyo Pinhane Giwaku' ['Suspicion that Matsuoka Toshikatsu is Raking Off His Secretary's Retirement Money & Allowances'], *Flash*, 5 February 2002, p. 15.
 137 See <http://piza.2ch.net/giin/kako/987/987905181.html>
 138 Tatebayashi generalises this point. See *Giin Kôdô*, p. 2.
 139 *ibid.*, p. 49.
 140 *ibid.*
 141 Hasegawa, 'Kanjûdanomi no Hazama de Shundô', p. 23.
 142 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, 'Kumamoto-ken kara no Seisaku Teian' ['A Policy Proposal from Kumamoto Prefecture'], in *Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]*. Available from <http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html>
 143 For a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, see Kôno Takeshi and Iwasaki Masahiro, 2004. *Rieki Yûdô Seiji—Kokusai Hikaku to Mekanizumu [Politics That Benefit Local Interests—Mechanism and International Comparison]*, Ashi Shobô, Tokyo.
 144 Hasegawa, 'Kanjûdanomi no Hazama de Shundô', p. 25.
 145 Nakano generalises this point. See Nakano Minoru, 1992. *Gendai Nihon no Seisaku Katei [Policy-Making Process in Contemporary Japan]*, Tôkyô Daigaku Shuppankai, Tokyo, p. 124.
 146 Matsuoka was made chairman of the LDP subcommittee disbursing this expenditure. See Chapter 4 on 'Exercising Power as a *Nôrin Giin*'.
 147 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, 'Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin', p. 183.
 148 For details, see Chapter 4 on 'Exercising Power as a *Nôrin Giin*'.
 149 This meant that they owned one hectare or more of forestry area.
 150 Nôrinsuisanshō, Tōkei Jōhōbu, *Dai-77 Nôrinsuisanshō Tōkeihyō*, p. 427.
 151 *ibid.*, pp. 428, 430.

- 152 For the definitive study of clientelism in Japanese politics, see Scheiner, Ethan, 2006. *Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- 153 Tatebayashi generalises this point. See *Giin Kôdô*, p. 11.
- 154 *Kashozuke* means the designation (by bureaucrats) of an area that will become a place where public works subsidised by central and prefectural governments (usually a combination thereof) will be carried out. As Itô explains, ‘politicians, through their introduction of budgets to local areas (constituencies,) which are called the designated places (*kashozuke*), respond to the expectations of companies and voters’. Itô, ‘Heisei Jiken Fuairu: Nôrin Jigyô Hojokin o Dokusen Suru Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 64.
- 155 For example, for a long time, in relation to the MAFF’s agricultural structure improvement (*nôgyô kôzô kaizen*) projects (*jigyô*), ‘a system of “group leader administration” (*hanchô gyôsei*) operated in which the opinions of the assistant divisional chiefs in charge (*tantô kachô hosa*), namely *gikan*, were particularly influential. This was because the standards for authorising (*nintei*) the project district (*chiku*) and for allocating the project cost were not transparent. Such a process created room over a long period for new selections and budget allocations to be made at the discretion of the person in charge, who had greater specialised knowledge and experience.’ See the interim report of Watanabe Yoshiaki, who chaired the MAFF’s ‘Committee for Investigations Relating to Agricultural Structure Improvement Public Works’, which was established in late 1999. The report was quoted in Ishii Kôki, ‘Nôsuishô Osen: Amakudari Konsarutanto ga Genkyô da’ [‘MAFF Contamination: The *Amakudari* Consultants Are the Ringleaders’], *Bungei Shunjû*, May 2000, p. 199.
- 156 ‘Za Sankuchuari: Jimintô “Nôrin Zoku”’ [‘The Sanctuary: LDP “Agriculture and Forestry Tribe”’], *Sentakû*, Vol. 30, No. 2, February 2004, p. 59.
- 157 In Japanese, the concept of *riken* often involves the idea of businesses colluding with public organisations and politicians.
- 158 See Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-chô’.
- 159 Nakanishi and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 104.