One approach to the study of leadership is the quasi-psychoanalytic method pioneered by James David Barber (1972). While John Henderson’s work on New Zealand prime ministers borrows heavily from this model, and makes a number of useful observations about leadership under PR, Barber’s highly deterministic and arbitrary schema fails to capture the essence of leadership in a Westminster parliamentary system. One of the most helpful aspects of Henderson’s work, however, is his four categories of leader: achievers, power-seekers, reluctants and performers (1992). A second and potentially more useful approach has been offered by Dennis Kavanagh (1990) in his work on British prime ministers. Building on James McGregor Burns’ distinction between transformational and transactional leadership, Kavanagh proposes a cyclical typology containing two styles of leadership: mobilising leadership and excessive, or reconciling, leadership. ‘Mobilising’ leadership may be required in times of national crisis or when there is a need for radical reform. ‘Excessive’ leadership, on the other hand, comes into prominence when there is need for greater social cohesion and consensus, typically after the destabilising premiership of a mobilising leader. While this model works well in single party governments such as that of the United Kingdom, it has less value when applied to coalition democracies, where the emphasis on co-operation, compromise and consensus is unlikely to be cyclical, but rather continuous.

Combining features of these two models, this chapter proposes a functional model that identifies the three distinct sets of characteristics or leadership styles required of a New Zealand politician. While leaders are called upon to exercise all three functions, the model calls for an overall judgment about the characteristic that most distinguishes that person’s style of leadership. Mobilisers are the great performers who use the channels of mass communication to inspire and persuade others to be their followers. In a parliamentary system, such politicians must display a range of skills, including extempore public speaking and debating. Examples of mobilising politicians are David Lange and Winston Peters. Legislators, on the other hand, are the analytical thinkers who not only have a detailed grasp of public policy, but have the ideological commitment and tenacity to see it enacted. Unlike Mobilisers, Legislators are often prepared to sacrifice personal popularity and ambition for the sake of principle. While Lange was a superb salesman for the government’s free market reforms, Roger Douglas, Geoffrey Palmer and David Caygill were its architects.

The third category of leaders, and the one most appropriate to the behaviour of prime ministers in a PR environment, are the Managers. Unlike the Mobilisers, who practice the power of mass persuasion, and the Legislators, who achieve transformational change, Managers are the pragmatists who value consultation and compromise, and who appreciate that decisions are forged through hard-fought trade-offs with political allies and adversaries. In short, the Manager ‘must balance the needs of a complex array of frequently competing groups, including consultants, advisers, cabinet colleagues, coalition partners, backbench MPs, public servants and the voting public’ (Miller and Mintrom 2006: 5). Examples of Managers include some of New Zealand’s most successful and long-term prime ministers, notably Peter Fraser, Keith Holyoake and Helen Clark.

Under the former two-party system, the transition from opposition leader to prime minister was relatively straightforward. As guardians of the party’s ideology, party leaders were expected to be highly programmatic and partisan, even dogmatic. Those who became prime minister were able to behave in much the same manner, thanks to a parliamentary majority and absence of veto players, notably the minor parties and independents. Cabinet had to be managed, but there was little need to consult or compromise with the Opposition, thus ensuring that relations remained as robust during the parliamentary term as they had been in the campaign. As McLeay has pointed out, while the role of party leader is largely unchanged, ‘MMP [PR] has meant that an effective prime minister can transcend party allegiance in a way that was not possible when leaders and followers were either inside or outside of government, and politics was entirely a zero-sum game’ (2006: 109). Within days of an election, competitors morph into allies, and policies once firmly rejected are incorporated into the government’s legislative agenda. Because it requires a mixture of guile and good grace, the role of prime minister is quickly transformed from that of mobilising party leader to reconciling coalition manager. This is not to suggest that the leader of a coalition has to be pliant to be effective; in fact, Clark’s style of leadership is frequently depicted in the media as strong, unbending, and even ruthless.

Defenders of the highly centralised system of leadership selection practised in New Zealand and Australia argue that those closest to the action are best able to assess the relative merits of prospective leaders. They may draw on survey data showing that party delegates and members, and even more so voters, lack knowledge of the internal dynamics of their parliament and government. While they may be well placed to evaluate the mobilising powers of aspiring leaders, especially by observing an election campaign, they are clearly less competent to judge legislative and managerial competence. To accusations of elitism, they are likely to respond that MPs worth their salt will canvass opinion among grassroots party members before voting for the leader.

On the other hand, those who advocate a more democratic selection process argue that ordinary citizens can compensate for any lack of institutional knowledge by bringing a detached and less self-interested approach to their decision. They might also warn against trying to anticipate how people will respond to the challenge of leadership, as illustrated by the selection of Clark as party leader in 1993. At the time she became leader, Clark was in open conflict with the Alliance leader, Jim Anderton, mainly over his split with Labour in 1989. Between 1993 and 1996 relations between the two continued to deteriorate to a point where any prospect of a coalition agreement had all but disappeared. It was this tough, take-no-prisoners approach to leadership that helped make Clark such an appealing prospect as leader. Those MPs who voted for her could hardly have predicted that her reputation as prime minister would be built on an ability to work closely in government with Anderton, for three years her deputy prime minister, as well as with parties as ideologically distant from Labour as United Future and New Zealand First.

Perhaps the most satisfactory outcome to this debate would be to find a compromise similar to that reached by the British Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. It grants MPs the right to provide a shortlist of potential leaders, with party delegates or members making the final selection.