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Rakhine State Post-Coup: Arakan Army State-Building and Its Implications for Rohingya and Aid

Anthony Ware

Associate Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deakin University, Australia

Costas Laoutides

Associate Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deakin University, Australia

Abstract

The conflicts in Rakhine State have taken a surprising backseat on the national and international stage since the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar. Obvious concerns about the wellbeing, citizenship and return of Rohingya aside, the most surprising events have been with regards to the Arakan Army’s (AA) increasing moves to set up parallel state functions. There has been very little support for the National Unity Government in northern and central parts of Rakhine State, while the AA enjoys very strong popular support. Under the cover of COVID-19, and an ongoing ceasefire while the military are heavily stretched in other parts of the country, the AA has rapidly expanded its control through new de facto state institutional functionings. Since the coup, they have implemented new judicial, taxation, conflict resolution and security functions; taken a leading role in the COVID-19 response; and overturned major aspects of Rohingya policy at the local level. This signals a significant power shift in Rakhine State that is likely to reshape both state and (perhaps) national politics for decades to come. This chapter explores these changing dynamics, their likely trajectory and the implications for both domestic politics and international aid/peace-building. These developments will undoubtedly have significant implications for the Rohingya, but the nature of these implications is not yet clear or resolved, given that the underlying issues for the Rohingya remain unaltered.

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Prior to the 1 February 2021 coup, international attention on Myanmar was squarely focused on the conflicts in Rakhine State—notably, the plight of the Rohingya and the culpability of the Myanmar military¹ in the Rohingya genocide. Since the coup, however, Rakhine State has taken an unexpected backseat on the national and international stage, and the region has surprisingly become one of the more stable parts of the country. Concerns about Rohingya wellbeing remain: there has been no progress on the fundamental issues of citizenship for, and repatriation of, the million-plus refugees sheltering in Bangladesh, and the military has not budged on issues of Rohingya identity, rights or access to services. Nonetheless, since the coup, Rakhine State has been on a significantly different trajectory to most of the rest of the country, and there have been some significant developments there that may well reshape both that part of the country and, possibly, Myanmar national politics for decades to come.

The most surprising and significant development since the coup has been the consolidation of power by the Arakan Army (AA) and its political arm, the United League of Arakan (ULA). This chapter explores that phenomenon and its implications. Under the cover of COVID-19, and capitalising on a de facto ceasefire while the Myanmar military was heavily stretched in other parts of the country, the AA/ULA rapidly consolidated control and expanded its influence across large parts of Rakhine State. Commencing in November 2020, barely two months before the coup, and while never formalised, the ceasefire ended a two-year period of intense fighting that only ever seemed to further the reach and capability of the AA/ULA and attract new recruits and support. The ceasefire broke down in late 2022; however, as a consequence of the ceasefire and the region’s very limited participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)—which explains the absence of military backlash against anti-coup activities—the situation in the state became relatively peaceful for almost two years. After the coup, the AA/ULA were apparently seen by the military as a less immediate threat—a group to be dealt with later or via a different approach—although that has clearly changed now. But, at least until late 2022, while state institutions have become increasingly fragile and unable to provide basic services, the AA/ULA rapidly expanded its institutional capacity, transiting itself from an armed liberation movement to an increasingly de facto state-like entity. While its control of territory remains contested, since the coup, the AA/ULA has implemented new judicial, taxation, conflict resolution and security functions, taken a leading role in the COVID-19 response and overturned major aspects of Rohingya policy at the local level. The AA/ULA have filled a vacuum created by a withdrawing state, consolidating their own position and legitimacy both domestically and internationally in the process. This is a significant power shift in Rakhine State. If accompanied by attitudinal shifts and a reduction in intercommunal tension, which appears to largely be the case, these shifts in policy have the potential to help reshape national political debates over identity and citizenship nationally. In so doing, Rakhine State may perhaps offer the tiniest glimmer of hope towards a possible eventual end to conflict and identity politics in Myanmar.

This chapter explores these changing dynamics in Rakhine State, their likely trajectory and the implications for both domestic politics and international aid/peace-building. These developments will undoubtedly have significant implications for the Rohingya, both the half a million plus still living in Rakhine State and the million plus sheltering across the border, although it is not yet clear what those implications will be beyond the short term. The AA/ULA have fastidiously avoided confrontation or harassment of Rohingya within Myanmar, seeking to portray themselves as representing a more inclusive politics, but how far they would go in reality if they gained full territorial control is far from clear. Nonetheless, with some 200,000 Rakhine having been displaced by fighting over the 12 months prior to the coup, narratives of greater solidarity through shared victimhood are emerging between Rakhine and Rohingya villages. The politics is further affected by the National Unity Government’s (NUG) new-found support for the Rohingya. It is possible that this may be more a means to wedge the military and enhance support from the international community, while also leveraging international justice mechanisms to their side, than an example of real attitudinal change, but this is not yet clear. Certainly, the NUG’s long silence on Rakhine/AA/ULA issues is noticeable. Nonetheless, this is all new in Rakhine State and potentially very positive. This chapter explores these changes with a focus on policy implications for international actors and aid agencies seeking to assist Rakhine State and resolve the Rohingya issue.

The findings presented in this chapter are based on a close following of local news media reports, regular monitoring of social media posts in both English and Burmese/Rakhine by prominent activists, and regular discussions with Burmese and Rakhine key informants via secure online communication (Signal). For the safety of those involved, only the news media reports are fully referenced. The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections. The first two provide background context for the complex conflict in Rakhine State, and the rise of the AA/ULA pre-coup, their objectives and support. A third section then briefly looks at the literature about the path to recognition for autonomous regions—the path to de facto statehood. The fourth section then considers the amount of state-building and nation-building the AA/ULA have undertaken since the coup, in light of this theory. A fifth section then briefly explores the complex relationships the AA/ULA have with the (junta-led) State Administration Council (SAC), NUG and other armed minority groups, and what this means for the likelihood of achieving their objectives. The final section draws out the significant implications of the changed conflict and political dynamics for international actors, including bilateral donors and foreign states, as well as international agencies seeking to provide development, humanitarian and/or peace-building support.

The Rakhine conflict: Complex and intractable

The conflict in Rakhine State is complex, an intractable conflict that dates back many decades, if not centuries. Significantly, it is a conflict between three parties, not two: the Bamar-dominated state, the Rakhine and the Rohingya. We have previously examined these intersecting conflicts in detail and here offer only the briefest summary by way of background (for further details and sources, see Ware & Laoutides 2018, 2019). Driven by narratives about ethnicity that exacerbate social cleavages in an attempt to forge stronger group identities, these conflicts involve horizontal and vertical dimensions, and both armed and unarmed violence.

The first conflict dyad, and the most recognised by international audiences, is the campaign that has been waged by the state against the Rohingya, and counterattacks by some Rohingya on state security forces. This culminated in mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing in 2017, driving more than a million Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh. This conflict is not new; there are antecedents involving mass violence against Rohingya/Rakhine Muslims and mass exoduses in 1942, 1978 and 1991–92, each of which bear an eerie resemblance to recent events. This conflict is driven by narratives of the Rohingya being recent economic migrants, some versions suggesting that they arrived as labourers during British rule, others that most arrived illegally following independence. The reality is that large numbers of Muslims have lived in what is now Rakhine State for centuries; yet the narrative paints Rakhine State as a ‘Western Gate’ that needs to be firmly shut to prevent an even greater deluge of Muslims from the overpopulated subcontinent entering and overwhelming Buddhism and Burmese culture (Ware & Laoutides 2019). This is effectively Myanmar’s version of the toxic great replacement theory.

The second dyad, widely propagated inside Myanmar, is an intercommunal conflict between Rakhine and Rohingya communities, into which the Myanmar government/military claim they must intervene to maintain order. The 2012 violence highlighted this long simmering dimension, and the narratives underlying it appeal to domestic, religious-oriented audiences and emphasise sectarian cleavages. Charney (1999) argues that this communal tension dates to the aftermath of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26), and the return of large numbers of both Rakhine and Muslim refugees who had fled the harsh Burman occupation after their 1784 invasion. This intercommunal competition has a long history in Rakhine State, periodically boiling over into violence.

This chapter, however, is focused on the third dyad of this conflict, a dimension that has been largely overlooked by the international community until quite recently—namely, the struggle by Rakhine nationalists for autonomy or independence from the Bamar-led state. One of us (Ware 2015) flagged the significance of this dimension in a paper presented at a symposium in early 2013, just after the 2012 communal violence and well before the AA began moving troops to Rakhine State (see below). This conflict narrative harks back to the Bamar destruction of the Arakanese (Rakhine) kingdom at Mrauk-U in 1784, an event etched deeply into Rakhine collective memory. The principal grievance of the Rakhine ever since that time, popularised by late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century historical chronicles, has been Bamar domination. It is important to note that their principal grievance is not, and never has been, the presence nor actions of the Rohingya. Rakhine voters have demonstrated this deep distrust of Bamar authorities and desire for autonomy in every multi-party election in the country since independence, with support for Rakhine nationalist parties consistently as high or higher than any other minority in Myanmar in each of the 1951–52, 1956, 1960, 1990, 2010, 2015 and 2020 elections.

The growth of resentment against even the Bamar-led civilian National League for Democracy (NLD) government after a single term is attested in the 2020 election results. Even though elections were cancelled in many parts of Rakhine State due to armed clashes, preventing an estimated 73 per cent of Rakhine State’s voters from casting a ballot (Kaung Hset Naing 2020), the NLD lost ground to Rakhine nationalist parties. Rakhine nationalist parties still won the fourth largest block of seats in the national Lower House, and third largest block in the Upper House. This included Rakhine nationalists winning in more southern areas of the state, where support for the nationalist parties has traditionally been weaker.

Adding to the conflict complexity, Rakhine State is the second poorest in the Union, and the northern townships where conflict has been focused constitute the poorest part of the country (World Bank 2015; also Ware & Laoutides 2018, 29). The region has suffered chronic underinvestment by the central government, and, despite Rakhine State being resource rich and strategically positioned between China and the Bay of Bengal, recent economic liberalisations have not translated into revenue and investment for the region. Further economic deterioration since the coup has hit key industries and increased the vulnerability of the population. In addition, around 148,000 Rohingya remain in internal displacement camps after the violence against them over the past decade, with a further 79,000 Rakhine also still displaced after the AA-Myanmar military conflict (UNHCR 2021). Most live in dilapidated or makeshift camps or are sheltering in monastery compounds.

Rise of the Arakan Army

From humble beginnings, and in the above context, the AA has become a leading actor in Rakhine State in under a decade, now controlling significant parts of the state and rapidly expanding its institutional capacity. The AA was formed as recently as April 2009. It drew its initial recruits from Rakhine working in the jade mines in upper Myanmar, and developed under the auspices of the Kachin Independence Army, a thousand kilometres from Rakhine State. The AA only existed in northern Myanmar until 2014. Indeed, the AA’s first operations in Rakhine State were as recent as March 2015 (BNI 2017; MPM 2013), triggering a major operation by the Myanmar military.

Many observers believed the AA would be defeated or sink into obscurity at that time (Gaung 2022), but it prevailed in major battles and demonstrated its combat capability. Violence escalated in 2018, after the Rohingya clearance operations were concluded, until a de facto ceasefire was declared in November 2020 with Japanese mediation, less than two months before the February 2021 coup. Ko Oo (2022) speculates that this ceasefire was part of military preparations for the coup, and that if the coup had been quickly successful, they would have resumed the Rakhine war sooner. Either way, with the coup only partially successful at best, there was minimal armed confrontation with the AA for 18 months after the coup—until the AA’s consolidation of power and growing alignment with resistance forces could no longer be ignored. What this has meant for the AA is discussed in detail later in this chapter. Where this heads next is uncertain. What is known is that, until recently, with the military preoccupied elsewhere in the country and seemingly relatively unconcerned about Rakhine State, the AA have consolidated their position and set up a range of activities that could best be described as institutional development, effectively state-building and nation-building, as they try to build the apparatus of a de facto state. We will discuss this more in subsequent sections.

The AA were excluded from the 2014–15 negotiations for a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (Aung Hla Tun 2015; Ye Mon & Lun Min Mang 2015). Both the military and the quasi-civilian NLD government branded the AA a terrorist organisation, easily dismissing them as new, small and opportunistic, and suggesting that they only formed in light of the peace process to try to gain a seat in negotiations and enhance the political voice of the Rakhine. Despite their growth and progress, they were excluded from the NLD government’s 21st Century Panglong Peace Process and continued to be branded as terrorists until late 2020 (Htet Naing Zaw 2020; ICG 2020). Indeed, during its term in office, the NLD government called for the military to ‘crush’ the AA (Reuters 2019) and, with this in mind, imposed the world’s longest internet shutdown in parts of Rakhine State (Kyaw Hsan Hlaing 2020).

The military and the NLD clearly misread the AA as a small and entirely new organisation, ignoring the long history of Rakhine nationalist armed struggle against Bamar domination, as we have documented elsewhere (Ware & Laoutides 2018). The AA is simply the most recent of many Rakhine nationalist armed groups (see also Smith 1994, 2007; Lintner 1999; South 2008), but this was not acknowledged by the Bamar-led state. Their analysis has also proven wrong in that the AA have grown rapidly in strength, organisation and popularity. Major General Twan Mrat Naing, leader of the AA, boasted in January 2022 that they had grown to over 100 battalions of 300 soldiers each, including 22,000 well-trained and battle-hardened soldiers now in effective control of 60 per cent of Rakhine State; 6,000 more soldiers deployed in allied territories; and an Auxiliary tasked with logistics and intelligence (Lintner 2022). More recent claims put the fighting force at over 30,000 troops (Gaung 2022; Ko Oo 2022). While those numbers may be inflated, and that level of control somewhat overstated, effective control of territory creates the conditions for the sort of transformation of an armed non-state actor into a state-like agent, as we are now seeing in Rakhine State, post-coup.

The political goal of the AA and its bureaucratic wing, the ULA, is summed up as the ‘Arakan Dream’, the long-held vision of the Rakhine people for collective self-determination. In promoting this goal, the AA/ULA appeal to a deep-seated sense of oppression, tapping into a vision of restored Rakhine sovereignty, lost when the Bamar conquered their Mrauk-U kingdom in 1784. While there has been some promotion of the idea of independent statehood, the official position is that Rakhine State could be a confederate member of a future post-coup Federal Union of Myanmar if the political arrangements are favourable, but this depends on being granted sufficient autonomy. This was recently restated by the leader of the AA, Major General Twan Mrat Naing, in January 2022:

we are not requesting or asking for what we want from our enemy who has deprived us by force. We shall create our own destiny with our own hands, no matter what they think. We must build on our own and earn what we deserve. My mission is to restore our sovereignty and reclaim a rightful political status for Arakan (Rakhine). (Lintner 2022)

It was restated by AA/ULA spokesperson Khaing Thu Kha during the first ever AA/ULA press conference in March 2022, highlighting it as policy not a single offhanded statement:

If there is no place for the political status we want in this union, we will have to create it ourselves and continue to build our government and our future nation-state together with the international community. (Western News 2022a)

The rise of the AA/ULA as a credible force has motivated a majority of people in Rakhine State to support the demand for self-determination and political autonomy. There have been several movements in the past that tried to promote political autonomy for Rakhine State, but none was able to generate mass support to the extent the AA/ULA have. After several years of intense fighting followed by a long de facto ceasefire, both political elites and the general population have become more confident in their support for the ULA/AA and the call for political autonomy.

State-building in emerging politico-territorial entities

Before providing an assessment of the extent and success of the AA/ULA in building new institutional structures, we need to review the role and basic components of state-building and nation-building in territories that seek international recognition. The first step of any national liberation movement towards having claims of autonomy recognised internationally is widely regarded as achieving a monopoly over the use violence in the territory they claim. Control of security is twofold: 1) keeping government forces out; 2) maintaining internal security among the population, thus preventing anarchy. Security allows the rebels to proceed with building institutions and infrastructure to deliver basic public services, then to create institutional structures and bodies that will exercise authority over the population. To this end, there is a gradual setting up of legislative, executive and judicial arms in tandem with the development of mechanisms for the collection and distribution of tax revenues. The next step in state formation is translating that authority over the population into a stable and systematic administration. Gradually, sections of a civil service apparatus develop and the administration seeks to reach all members of the community. The evolving bureaucracy provides a unified system of values, introduces the rule of law and gradually sets norms. In this bureaucratisation stage, the forming state becomes a centralised, impersonal systems of governance. A third potential step in the state-building process is the division of power between different institutions to facilitate a system of democratic governance, however, democratisation is not a necessary step in state formation. Several non-recognised entities have existed over a long period of time without a strong democratic footprint, while we increasingly witness an authoritarian turn in internationally recognised states (Ayoob 2001; Carbone 2013).

State-building is also coupled by a process of identity reconfiguration aiming at the creation of a coherent society in which the state will function—that is, nation-building. The emphasis is on the construction of a unified or inclusive identity as the core political identity of the people. National identity obtains a civic character that encompasses diverse ethno-linguistic and religious realities. This is an essential step for defining the political community. The challenge is how to achieve a successful coexistence of two different levels of identity: an overarching identity that brings the people together and diverse communal identities that reflect specific cultural and linguistic identities. Successful nation-building creates a sense of belonging to an all-embracing political dimension, while ethno-linguistic communities are seen as cultural (non-politicised) groups within this (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1990; Smith 1998).

The AA/ULA since the coup: Consolidation, state-building and nation-building

Ko Oo (2022) recently suggested that the AA/ULA used the ceasefire and post-coup period to quickly develop four priority areas: 1) strengthen the army, 2) build a civil administration, 3) establish peaceful relations with the Rohingya, and 4) improve relations with Bangladesh and seek their help with the Rohingya living within Myanmar. In light of the above theoretical overview, these priorities make perfect sense. The following three subsections look at the first three of these in turn: the AA/ULA’s consolidation, state-building and nation-building since the coup.

Consolidation: Strengthen the Arakan Army

The growth in size of the AA has already been noted, with AA leader Major General Twan Mrat Naing claiming over 30,000 troops (Lintner 2022; Gaung 2022; Ko Oo 2022). Recruitment has increased since the coup, with the AA being able to offer employment with hope and a purpose to young people who otherwise felt they lost their future in the coup. The growing legitimacy of the AA has also helped with recruitment, with experienced AA troops returning to their homeland from Kachin and Shan states providing training and support to the new recruits. Recent claims that over 100 junta soldiers have defected to the AA in Rakhine State has furthered such legitimacy (Irrawaddy 2022a). The bigger issue has been armaments, and, to that end, Twan Mrat Naing claims to have set up an arms and munitions factory in Rakhine (Ko Oo 2022). It is difficult to confirm if this is true, but Ko Oo believes it to be likely. Certainly, recent reports claim the NUG’s People’s Defence Forces have set up significant arms and munitions production within Myanmar since the coup, so it is quite plausible. Improved organisation and administration of the military has also allowed the AA/ULA to redirect staff to state-building functions (see next section).

The AA has simultaneously deepened its range of supports from the community. Rakhine entrepreneurs have become the main contributors of funding to the AA/ULA, while boatmen and truck drivers have helped transport weapons with their regular shipping. Weapons have been secretly stored in basements and other secret places, with local people, landowners, lawyers and local media outlets providing information and intelligence, all shaping and broadening the revolution.

The level of legitimacy of the AA is clearly increasing. Recently a number of rural schools raised the Arakan flag instead of the Union flag, a clear sign of where their loyalty and trust lies. On this note, the AA does not want to be hated by the people. When locals in Paletwa Township, Chin State, were reportedly beaten by AA troops in 2020, an official of the AA apologised to the public and punished the soldier who was responsible. The AA has also apologised for the killings of two Burmese traders accused of providing information to the Myanmar military during the armed conflicts in Rakhine State. Apology is a difficult choice, but optimal for developing its long-term credibility and status as accountable to its people. The same approach was followed towards soldiers when the AA captured prisoners of war, including the battalion commander from the Myanmar military; they were fed for several months and then elderly and sick soldiers were released. It can be said that these actions are building political prestige.

State-building: Build a civil administration

Some of Myanmar’s other minority group armies, such as the Kachin Independence Army, United Wa State Army and Karen National Union, have provided many of the services of a government in the areas under their control for decades. However, this is a new development in Rakhine State. The AA/ULA has been working for some time to build processes of institutionalisation and bureaucratisation that would increase the legitimacy of their presence in the eyes of the local population.

In December 2019, the AA/ULA announced the formation of an Arakan People’s Authority (APA) (Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint 2019), which would begin civil administration, policing and judicial functions in 2020, as well as collect taxes. More recently, the AA/ULA have begun referring to the APA as ‘the Arakan People’s Government’ (e.g. spokesman Khaing Thu Kha during the first ever AA/ULA press conference, see Gaung 2022). Significantly, the APA is notionally centred in Mrauk-U (RFA 2020), the former capital of the Arakan Kingdom that prevailed in the region for centuries before the Burmese invasion in 1784. The symbolism in making Mrauk-U the administrative capital is important as a step along the road towards fulfilling the Arakan Dream. The commencement of tax revenue collection has allowed the AA/ULA to administer areas under its control, fund the AA/ULA’s civil and political operations and increasingly rollout other services—although it has resulted in many residents currently being burdened by double taxation, to the AA as well as the SAC.

In May 2020, while still under NLD democratic rule, the AA/ULA demanded the immediate withdrawal of all government administrative offices and the military from northern Rakhine State. This was naturally ignored by the NLD government, but the APA has significantly expanded its administration since, setting up local structures that are different from Myanmar government divisions, and extending parts of its administration into southern Rakhine State, where its forces have less presence (Ko Oo 2022). The informal ceasefire implemented shortly before the coup was followed by the junta delisting the AA as a terrorist organisation in March 2021, that is, a few weeks after the coup (GNLM 2021). This, together with the military being preoccupied with conflicts in other parts of the country, allowed the AA/ULA to increase the role of the APA. After the coup, the civil administration in Rakhine State was faced with a wave of resignations and detentions of local administrators by Myanmar security. This situation created a gap in administration, as local communities rely on local administrators for leadership. In filling this void, the ULA/AA has increased its presence in policing, judicial services, public health and education.

The consolidation of the APA, and growth in policy and service capability, has been steady. In August 2021, the AA/ULA passed a law establishing a Justice Department and paid judiciary (DMG 2021a). Courts have been set up from the village-tract level up to district level, and wrongdoers are prosecuted in accordance with the new law. Although commencing online, some physical in-person courts are now appearing. The AA/ULA claim they received 3,838 cases in 2021, of which 50 per cent were resolved, and another 1,845 cases in the first quarter of 2022 (Gaung 2022; Western News 2022b). These include both civil and criminal cases, meaning it functions both in support of its own security function, and as a local conflict resolution mechanism.

At least some local lawyers suggest the ULA’s judiciary are gaining trust by avoiding corruption (Gaung 2022). On the other hand, there have been complaints about abuse of power and unfair decisions. The AA/ULA response has been to suggest ‘inexperience and public goodwill coexist. Mistakes are sure to be made along the way’ (Gaung 2022). They have also sought to increase the quality and the quantity of the training required, to reprimand and penalise AA members who have abused their power and to encourage the public to continue reporting any wrongdoing by its members. The AA/ULA has sought to include people from all ethnicities in its justice system, and they claim these people are increasingly trusting them and seeking their intervention as required.

An interesting indirect measure of trust in AA/ULA administrative capability and legitimacy is the way people obeyed public health orders issued by the APA during the COVID-19 pandemic. Stay-at-home orders issued in June 2021 were widely followed and led to the control of the infection rate in Rakhine State. In the same area of policy, the AA/ULA has rolled out a COVID-19 vaccination program, and included both Rohingya and other remote minority communities, demonstrating commitment to its inclusive approach. Interestingly, at the time, they procured most of their vaccines from the military government!

Nation-building: Establish peace with the Rohingya

Concurrent with the AA/ULA’s rapid progress in consolidating their position and state-building, they have also made significant progress in nation-building—and this development is most likely to have the greatest impact on national politics in the future, if consolidated. Nation-building in this context, as discussed above, is the process of reconfiguring the sense of identity in Rakhine State to create a more coherent society in which an alternate, potential state could actually function, a unified or inclusive identity that could gain national and international recognition and legitimacy. Again, this has been going on in other parts of the country for some time, but is a new and profound development in Rakhine State. The Kachin, for example, established a coherent sense of ‘Kachin’ identity out of the prior disparate tribal ethnicities over the past century or so, which particularly accelerated during the decades of conflict with the Burma/Myanmar state (Sadan 2013). In Rakhine State, the AA/ULA are now devoting considerable effort to redefining the competitive struggle between Rakhine and Rohingya into a more shared identity. They are hampered by the history of violent conflict, by the fact that the Rakhine and the Rohingya are not related in the manner of the Kachin tribes and by ongoing isolated incidents, but their attention to redefining identities appears considerable and deliberate.

Without wanting to overstate the situation, it is clear that the AA/ULA has adopted an approach to the Arakan polity that is distinctively more inclusive than the Burma/Myanmar state has previously done at any time since independence—including under the civilian-led NLD. Particularly significant in the AA/ULA’s approach is their rhetoric of being inclusive of all ethnic and religious groups in Rakhine State. This is in stark contrast to the narrative of Rakhine–Rohingya hatred, and a significant distinction from other Rakhine nationalist parties, who have long pushed ethno-nationalism as a key to political autonomy. Notably, the AA has not attacked the Rohingya, either in rhetoric or physically, and has even issued calls for them to join the AA. The AA/ULA seems to have recognised since its beginning that anything other than transforming relations with the Rohingya would be counterproductive towards achieving the ultimate goal of the Arakan Dream. For example, in one of the first official statements by the AA, issued as early as 2014 in response to a Foreign Policy Magazine article that accused them of having an anti-Muslim agenda, they responded:

The author demonized and accused the Arakan Army as [an] armed gang against Muslims. [The] AA is not a safe haven for the extremists to do as they pleased [sic]. Nor do we intend to harm any innocent people or groups against humanity. We are highly disciplined with morals and strongly committed to freedom, justice, human rights and dignity. The Arakan Army was only established to strive for our right to self-determination and equality which no honest man shall lose in his/her life. More importantly, [the] AA is not a religion based armed group which is only formed with Buddhists but people with other religious faiths are also allowed to join [the] AA in order to share our cause. This alone proves our belief in religious diversity and our desire to create an open society where basic human rights are guaranteed. (AA 2014)

Although the term ‘Rohingya’ remains a point of friction, perhaps in part because the AA/ULA has to deal with the strong ethno-nationalism that has long been promoted by the Arakan National Party, the AA leader stated the following in an interview in January 2022 (answering a question about whether it is feasible for Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and Christians to live together peacefully in Rakhine State):

It is achievable when we don’t have outsiders manipulating us and using one group against another. Evidently, our Arakan (Rakhine) state never had the current level of social stability and racial harmony during 1941/2 to 2019. Now, we have more social stability, racial tension has started to decline and more positive social activities can be found. These are observable shifts and more changes should be started from within. (Twan Mrat Naing, cited in Lintner 2022)

During a recent interview in Rakhine, AA leader Twan Mrat Naing took this further, saying that everyone living in the state were citizens of Arakan, regardless of race or religion (AK Media 2021). Similarly, in a public statement of solidarity ahead of International Mother Language Day on 21 February 2022, the ULA, referring to the relationship between the people of Rakhine State and the people of Bangladesh, declared:

We deeply regard that both our societies are historically and culturally interlinked. The Arakanese community is part of the Bengali nation, and the same way the Bengali community is part of our Arakan nation. Since both territories are comprised of our brothers and sisters, we firmly believe that it is our responsibility to serve both our people for the best. (ULA 2022)

Certainly, shortly after the coup, reports began circulating of the Myanmar military threatening not only Rakhine, but also Rohingya villages, warning them not to support the AA (Kyaw Linn 2022), and rumours were spread by the military of Rohingya and Rakhine cooperating in armed resistance in Rakhine State. These rumours were intended to alarm Bamar audiences, tarnish the domestic reputation of the AA and reinforce the need for military intervention in the region. To us, however, they highlight the significant work done by the AA/ULA, and the profound change of polity it signals.

The AA/ULA’s cause is thus not the removal of the Muslims from Rakhine but, it seems, the formation of a pan-Rakhine citizen identity out of the melting of ethnicities, cultures, languages and histories. In this nexus, the Rohingya Muslims have a role and place. The ‘Arakan Dream’, the vision of an autonomous Rakhine State, is undoubtedly primarily Rakhine-led, just as the Myanmar state they reject is primarily Bamar-led. There are no guarantees they will thoroughly address discrimination, equal rights and systemic injustices. Yet, their ‘Arakan Dream’ is very conciliary, now seeking to create space for Rohingya and Rakhine to live together, within a broader shared identify.

Significant work was done on this in the year or two prior to the coup, although not by the AA/ULA. A local process of dialogue and reconciliation occurred in Rakhine State through a series of meetings between Rakhine, Rohingya and other minority communities’ representatives, running from October 2020 to January 2021. This resulted in a ‘Declaration by the Diverse and United Communities of Arakan’, sometimes translated as the ‘Joint Declaration of Peaceful Coexistence in Rakhine State, Myanmar’. This declaration, completed and published on 18 January 2021, just two weeks prior to the coup (Nyi Nyi Lwin 2022a, 2022b), shows a social movement broader than simply the work of the AA/ULA.

Nonetheless, the AA/ULA have taken the lead in this space since the coup. Public communication by the AA/ULA has been consistent in their messaging about the inclusion of the Rohingya in their Arakan Dream. At a practical level, they have relaxed the central government’s travel bans on Rohingya, effectively allowing almost free movement of Rohingya in the areas under their control, enhancing livelihood opportunities and furthering social cohesion. Supporters have repeatedly stressed the need to prevent the Rohingya issue causing problems for the AA/ULA, and the AA/ULA appear to be monitoring incidences of racial violence, concerned that military supporters will stir up intercommunal violence to undermine the AA/ULA (DMG 2021b). The AA is cautious to avoid any incidents being allowed to be framed as anti-Rohingya. For example, despite reports/complaints about a local Muslim outlaw (Abdul Hakim) whose gang committed kidnappings and drug trafficking, the AA have reportedly not taken action against him for fear of it being reported as abuse of a Rohingya. Instead, the AA/ULA made it known that they would only act if Rohingya elders and religious leaders made a formal complaint against the gang leader.

Marking a sharp break with a succession of central governments, the AA/ULA have included Rohingya representatives in local administration (Kyaw Hsan Hlaing 2021). Kyaw Hsan Hlaing notes that the Rohingya had never been allowed to participate in civil administration under the NLD administration, or any previous central government, but now the AA is giving priority to mobilising Muslims in order to gain the trust of the Muslim community and control Rohingya insurgent activity in the region. The AA/ULA have now recruited Rohingya policemen and administrators in some ULA positions, training them in administrative office work, management and law (AK Media 2021). Ko Oo (2022) points out that Rohingya have equal access to the AA/ULA legal system, and claims that the AA/ULA deserve credit for Muslim students being allowed to return to in-person studies at Sittwe University (although this was actually a SAC Ministry of Education decision and is subsequently being restricted again, it may have been influenced by the changing social context that the AA/ULA have helped foment).

Relations with the SAC and NUG

In a bid to placate the AA, the SAC military council removed the AA/ULA from its list of terrorist organisations on 11 March 2021, just weeks after the coup. Their motivation appears to have been to both stabilise the informal ceasefire and allow themselves space to direct military resources elsewhere in the country. It appears to have worked: the AA issued a statement condemning the coup and violence against civilians in March (AA 2021), but otherwise did little to oppose the coup itself or come out in support of the NUG or People’s Defence Forces. This status quo, which allowed the AA/ULA to consolidate control and administration in Rakhine State as described above, continued until early 2022. In February 2022, AA/ULA officials attended Union Day celebrations in Naypyidaw, at the invitation of Min Aung Hlaing. For this, they were quite stridently criticised by some Rakhine, to the extent that the AA arrested one of the loudest critics, Arakan National Party central committee member U Khine Kyaw Moe (Irrawaddy 2022b). But then, on 24 March, the NUG extended an invitation to informal meetings (Western News 2022c), which the AA/ULA took up—and the military immediately responded by sending long convoys with 1,000 new troops and advanced weaponry into the AA stronghold of Paletwa, in southern Chin State (DVB 2022). The military chief, Min Aung Hlaing, countered by inviting the AA to peace talks on 22 April, which the AA declined, and things have spiralled since then. Unsurprisingly, AA/ULA officials proceeded with the meetings with the NUG on 16 May 2022; in its statement after the meetings, the NUG referred to the ULA/AA as the ‘Arakan People’s Government’ (BNI 2022). The army responded with obstruction, arrests and roadblocks to intercept shipments and movement more than direct military confrontation (Ko Oo 2022). Regular armed clashes have escalated throughout 2022.

As early as May 2022, the AA accused the military of disrupting AA/ULA administrative, taxation and judicial activities, including by deploying additional troops near ULA courts and threatening and arresting members of the local ULA administration as well as persons involved in legal cases (RFA 2022). The military has also allegedly been attempting to destroy relations between the Rakhine and the Muslim communities through harassment and attacks. The Myanmar Army have reinforced their position, bringing in at least two brigades to support the three stationed in Rakhine State, and deployed air strike and navy capability on the Kaladan River. The number of armed engagements has continued to escalate during 2022, with the military blockading Sittwe and other major cities in the north, pushing civilian populations to the brink of starvation. This may have slowed further progress in state-building and nation-building, but has not, at this point, reversed the progress. Notably, while the Rohingya did not take sides during the 2019–20 fighting between the AA and military, as Ko Oo (2022) notes, both sides are now working hard to mobilise the Rohingya, a move that highlights the concerns the military have about the potential powershift if there is widespread reconciliation between the two communities.

Implications for international actors

So, what do these tectonic shifts in relations and power in Rakhine State mean for international actors? The first significant implication concerns access for humanitarian aid and other organisations. The rise of the AA/ULA means access not only needs to be negotiated with the SAC, which is problematic enough, but also with the AA/ULA for most of the areas with the greatest need in Rakhine State. The junta will not want this to occur. There are several implications of this, including more complications for international agencies in negotiating memorandums of understanding (MoUs), visas, etc. And, of course, the junta is less likely to allow access to areas under AA control, citing security concerns. So, accessing displaced populations and those most affected by conflict is going to be increasingly difficult—especially the Rohingya populations in Rakhine State. A more flexible approach may be via increased cooperation with local non-government organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) in design and delivery, as argued for by Décobert in this volume (see Chapter 12). However, for this to work, a good deal of thought and discussion needs to go into ways of minimising the additional security risk to staff in these organisations, and significantly relaxed accountability processes surrounding implementation need to be introduced. Any increase in use of local NGOs/CSOs in the provision of aid to the Rohingya is even more difficult and needs significant thought and planning.

A second major implication for international actors is around alignment and legitimisation. One of the key principles of international aid in normal situations is that it should align as closely as possible with national systems, rather than create duplicate, parallel systems. That, of course, strengthens the systems of the state, and helps build their legitimacy, something the international community is in virtual consensus about wanting to avoid. Negotiating MoUs and gaining access to run any programs in Myanmar is fraught enough in terms of legitimisation—there is no suggestion aid should align with, and in any way strengthen, the systems and bureaucracy behind the SAC. And while significant parts of the international community would like to strengthen the NUG and their processes, systems, departments and so on, they have little capacity in Rakhine State. Therefore, the question that needs significant debate is this: with the AA/ULA increasingly in effective control of significant territory and rapidly institutionalising, should or could international aid align with AA/ULA structures and processes and, if so, by how much? Either way, international actors will need to tread more carefully than usual in Rakhine State and take account of AA/ULA institutions and state-building.

Interrelated with this is the question of how much recognition, support or other means of boosting legitimacy the international community would like to give to the emerging AA/ULA. Indeed, it is not clear whether such recognition, support or boosts to legitimacy would help the people of Rakhine, including the Rohingya, or goad the military into more ferocious operations in the region. A further complication is the AA/ULA’s reputation for engaging in illicit activities, notably, drug trafficking—although they are not alone in this, with most other armed militias and minority armies around the country similarly engaged.

A final implication for the international community was raised by Ko Oo (2022), and that is whether there is a tactical and practical advantage to improve relations between Bangladesh and the AA, to help with the Rohingya, both inside Myanmar and in laying a foundation for a long-term solution to the refugee problem in Bangladesh, through changed attitudes and communal dynamics in Rakhine State and along the border. This is an unresolved question, worthy of international consideration. The observations above highlight the strategic relevance of humanitarian engagement in Rakhine to all parties. Given the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, any engagement by international actors will convey strategic benefits for one of the sides to the conflict: therein lies the moral dilemma for international donors.

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