This chapter has been informed by a small, but interesting, set of cases for exploring the role and the evolution of implementation units. There is variation in jurisdictional complexity, ranging from sub-national jurisdictions (Queensland), to a unitary national system (the United Kingdom), and to a federal system (Commonwealth of Australia).

At the level of nation-states, it appears that implementation units have emerged mainly in parliamentary systems, although this is a very small sample from which to draw any firm conclusions. It is well understood that first ministers in many parliamentary countries have sought to exert further increase control over government priorities and managing the public service as a whole even as the challenge of doing so seems to steadily grow more daunting (Savoie, 1999; Weller, 2003; Burch and Holliday, 2004). This suggests that jurisdictions with ‘strong’ centre traditions are more disposed to such experimentation (Peters, 2003; Lindquist, 2000), in contrast to the more autonomous agency traditions and weaker central institutions often associated with Western European governments.

A comparative methodological perspective leads one to acknowledge that the small number of cases explored in this collection implies that most parliamentary national and sub-national jurisdictions have not established policy implementation units. This brute fact is even more interesting because there is likely considerable awareness in different cabinet offices around the world of the delivery and implementation units in the UK and Australia, since both governance systems are often considered exemplars of reform. Many first ministers and political or bureaucratic advisors have undoubtedly examined implementation units in the UK and Australia and decided not to emulate or adapt the concept in their jurisdictions. ^[4]

There are several reasons why an implementation unit may not be perceived as desirable or needed. First, such oversight can be seen as the responsibility of a budget office or management board, responsible for overseeing the budget and the management of the government and its programs. Second, the normal guidance given to ministers and their deputy ministers by first ministers, as well as the performance review and accountability process could be seen as sufficient for ensuring that a government’s priority initiatives are on track and implemented. Finally, having an implementation unit working out of the cabinet office, it could be argued, might be inconsistent with its mission as a coordinating agency and muddy the conventions of ministerial accountability.

Whether or not one agrees with these reasons, it points to the fact that creating policy implementation units are not the only way to improve implementation analysis and monitoring from the centre. There are other ways that this can be done, including the strengthening of the monitoring and challenge capabilities of finance departments, budget offices, and management boards. Moreover, the secretariats to cabinet committees could insist on higher-quality implementation analysis in the upstream of decision-making. This suggests that ministers and senior officials in some jurisdictions may recognise the latest incarnation of the implementation challenge, but find other institutional and process solutions for grappling with them (but we must recognise that many jurisdictions may simply have gaps in this regard). It is either the existence or the possible emergence of functional alternatives that, in jurisdictions that do have implementation and delivery units, may lead to competition, rivalry, or too much clutter or irritation, and the prospect of a first ministers either dissolving them or absorbing them into other central agencies.