The three case studies of recently created implementation units, as well as the more theoretical discussions, have practical implications for those who wish to design similar processes or capabilities. They suggest the following:
First minister support is critical. It is obvious that to create implementation units (or the functional equivalent in monitoring capabilities) requires the interest and authority of the first minister, and locating them so that they carry the authority of the position. However, it is equally important that first ministers tap into the advice and reports of implementation units; otherwise their credibility will likely diminish quickly.
Create focused capabilities. The progenitors of implementation units thought carefully about their mandate and limited the scope of their activities with respect to the number of initiatives and how long the monitoring takes place. In part, this is sensible gardening of the ecology of central capabilities, but it can be seen as a shrewd strategy for overstretching resources, building credibility for assembling data and reporting, and avoiding overlap and conflict with other central actors.
Systematic reporting. Although the units may rely heavily on departments and delivery entities for data, following through with regular reporting on progress on key initiatives is bound to increase awareness and focus on implementation in the system. At the very least it creates rhetorical awareness of implementation issues and, if there is gamesmanship in reporting by delivery agencies and departments, then the responsibility for poor performance will rest on those departments and agencies, even if it will undoubtedly constitute a test for the entire government.
Possible role expansion. While implementation units may be precarious, there is a scenario that could see them take up more responsibility consistent with current mandates in the longer term. The upstream vetting, setting and monitoring the achievement of milestones, and reporting all constitute ‘transactions’ that can increase the knowledge of a central agency unit. After a handling a few cycles, implementation units should build considerable expertise on different strategies for developing indicators and clearing the path for initiatives. This is a medium term strategy, which could lead to a deeper role for such units, consistent with their mandate and capacities.
Enhanced role, more capacity. The case studies suggest that, if implementation units are expected to more deeply evaluate and aggressively negotiate the nature of implementation regimes for specific priority initiatives, then they should have ways to supplement generalist expertise in the units. The UK PMDU provides a good example of how this can be accomplished.
The lessons outlined above presume an interest in creating implementation units, but they could also apply to functional equivalents. Similar capabilities, processes, and reporting could be created or enhanced in other parts of cabinet offices, budget offices, or treasury or management board entities.