At independence, the retiring Australian colonial government left Papua New Guinea with a defence establishment it was unlikely to be able to maintain, even with assistance through the DCP. The fact that Papua New Guinea did not face a significant external threat made it even more likely that these high standards would not be kept up. Even before the Bougainville crisis, the PNGDF had become substantially involved in internal security (that is, law and order) operations in support of the civil authority — though many in the defence establishment did not welcome this involvement, and there was early evidence of emerging problems of morale and discipline. The PNGDF’s inability to contain the conflict on Bougainville after 1989 highlighted weaknesses in defence planning and capacity, problems of troop discipline and morale, and tensions in relations between elements of the military and civil authorities.

These problems have been recognized and partially addressed in a series of defence reviews, which, since the late 1980s, have recommended changes in force structure to achieve a smaller, more mobile and highly trained force and more involvement in civic action. What stands out from this account, however, is that the frequency of reviews and recommendations has not been matched by action (indeed, setting up another review seems, in several instances, to have been an alternative to taking unpopular or unaffordable action). Few of the recommendations of successive reviews and enquiries have been fully implemented. For example, the downsizing of force strength, first mooted in 1993, had not been fully achieved in 2006, despite Australian assistance in covering the cost of the exercise; the proposed engineers base in the highlands, announced in 1991 and said to be under construction in 1999, has yet to be realized; and plans for a third battalion, around since at least 1996, remain unfulfilled. The high turnover of PNGDF commanders, Defence secretaries and Defence ministers throughout the 1980s and 1990s undoubtedly contributed to weak policy commitment. Meanwhile ageing assets and facilities have not been adequately maintained, and there was substantial damage to the Wewak barracks during the riots of 2001 and 2002. There has been no published report for the Department of Defence since 1994, and there are recurring allegations of financial mismanagement.

As against this, the military coup predicted by many observers at the time of independence has never occurred, and there seems to have been greater stability and consolidation in the Force since the early 2000s. PNGDF personnel have performed creditably in joint exercises with the Australian and other defence forces and as part of the RAMSI contingent in Solomon Islands. It remains to be seen whether this will provide a basis for a new direction in defence operations (though one suggested as early as 1985 following the success of the PNGDF intervention in Vanuatu), namely deployment of the PNGDF in international peacekeeping operations.