Table of Contents
At independence the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), under the command of a Papua New Guinean officer, was widely regarded as one of the best trained and most cohesive institutions of the new state — though defence policy was still largely determined by Australia. The PNGDF’s successful intervention in support of the newly independent government of Vanuatu, in the ‘Santo rebellion’ of 1980, further boosted its image and morale (see Gubb 1994). Over the years — against a background of growing problems of internal security culminating in the Bougainville conflict of 1988–2001, increasing pressures on government resources, occasional tensions between the PNGDF and civil authority, and recurring problems of discipline within the PNGDF — the objectives of defence policy, and the role of the PNGDF, have been reviewed on several occasions. Measuring the effectiveness of defence policy, in the absence of a visible external threat, is always difficult, and Papua New Guinea has enjoyed a relatively benign external security environment. However, the PNGDF has also played a significant role in supporting the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) in internal security operations, where its performance has been more visible. As in other areas of policy, the record of policy making and implementation in defence has been a mixed one, with changing (and sometimes conflicting) objectives, poor follow-through in policy decisions, and a perception, both within the PNGDF and amongst many outsiders, that the resources allocated to defence have been less than adequate and often poorly managed.
This chapter provides a brief overview of the record.[1]
In the decade or so before independence there was some debate as to whether Papua New Guinea needed a defence force, and especially about whether an army, if there were to be one, should have any role other than that of defending the country against external aggression. There were some who supported the idea of a paramilitary force with police and military functions, and some who suggested not only that there should be a defence force but that it be represented in cabinet.[2] Others, seeing Papua New Guinea’s emerging military as a ‘super tribe’, saw it as a potential threat to a post-independence democratic state. In the event, the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) proposed that Papua New Guinea have a defence force, but it expressed the view that the defence force should be ‘firmly oriented towards external defence’ and added:
…we have very serious reservations about the possibility of a future Papua New Guinea Government using the army against its own people in any but the most extreme cases of civil disorder, and then subject also to specific conditions (CPC 1974, chapter 13 p.3).
The CPC report provided the basis for the constitutional provisions defining the functions of the PNGDF (see Constitution Ss 201–205). Following the CPC’s recommendation that there be ‘a dual but integrated structure’ in which the minister for defence would be advised ‘by senior civilian and military officers of equal status’ (CPC 1974, chapter 13 p.4), the constitution recognized the commander, PNGDF as principal military adviser on matters relating to the Force, and an officer of the public service (in practice the secretary of the Defence Department) as the civilian adviser, with powers prescribed by legislation. A Defence Act was passed in 1974 and a Department of Defence created the same year. Coordination of defence policy was achieved through the creation of a Defence Council, comprising the minister, Defence secretary, and PNGDF commander. Broader questions of national security policy are referred to a ministerial National Security Council, and a National Security Coordinating Committee.
The Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR), the forerunner of the PNGDF, was created during the Second World War, disbanded in 1946 and re-formed in 1951. It was, however, until 1964, part of the Australian Army’s Northern command, with headquarters in Brisbane. In that year PIR headquarters were established in Port Moresby, but Australian officers continued to predominate and orders came from Canberra. A marked expansion of the force took place in the 1960s, in the context of perceived expansionist threats from Indonesia, and a program of localization was commenced. The PIR’s first Papua New Guinean officers, Ted Diro and Patterson Lowa, graduated from Officer Cadet School at Portsea in Australia in 1963. In 1973, what had become Joint Force Papua New Guinea was redesignated Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), and two years later Brigadier-General Diro became its commander.
[1] For more detail see May (1993; 2001/2004, chapters 10,11), Dorney (1998), the annual reviews in Asia Pacific Security Outlook (Tokyo and New York: Japan Centre for International Exchange), Laki (2000a,b), and Rogers (2003).
[2] The early debate over defence and the defence force is reviewed in May (1993, 3-13).