Table of Contents
As long ago as the 1970s the need had been identified for the purchase of a sealift ship to support the implementation of New Zealand’s defence and foreign policy in the South Pacific, and to support New Zealand’s involvement in UN operations. The proposed ship was to have an ice-strengthened bow for Antarctic operations, and helicopter facilities, but the cost at the time was seen as putting such a vessel beyond New Zealand’s reach. The 1978 Defence Review noted the need for ‘a general purpose logistic support capability. The adaptation of a suitable commercial vessel…is not discounted’.[1]
The need for a Logistic Support Ship (LSS) continued to be recognised, and the 1987 White Paper drew attention to the need to purchase some form of sealift vessel for New Zealand forces as an essential part of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)’s ability to mount effective operations in the region. With the impending withdrawal of the New Zealand battalion from Singapore, and the clear shift in focus to the South Pacific signalled in the White Paper, the Army’s Ready Reaction Force (RRF) had no means of moving quickly around either the Pacific or to Southeast Asia—there was insufficient transport to deploy and sustain a battalion group away from New Zealand. The White Paper commented: ‘A further and essential part of our ability to mount effective operations in the region is the purchase of a logistic support ship—probably a converted merchant ship.’[2]
Subsequent studies undertaken in 1988 suggested that a purpose-built LSS, initially with a displacement of up to 12 000 tonnes, be built. The vessel would have the capacity to transport up to 200 troops and heavy equipment, and be capable of unloading onto a beach, or onto conventional wharves.[3] Such a specialist ship, with landing craft and helicopters, could have cost up to NZ$240 million, and was ultimately seen as exceeding the necessary credible minimum.[4]
The 1991 Defence White Paper defined three security scenarios in which there might be a call for a limited deployment of forces in the South Pacific region: the need for evacuation of New Zealand nationals; a terrorist threat; or requests for assistance to respond to threats to law and order. The desired capability to respond to these tasks was seen as being able to deploy a sizeable force to those islands which have seats of government or significant centres of population. Once again the gap in transport and force projection capabilities was identified, and a call was made to review possible ways of closing the gap. The 1991 White Paper did set up a number of reviews and one of these saw the need for a vessel that would primarily move troops and equipment around the Pacific, and be available to provide support for peacekeeping operations. The Air and Sea Transport Review team concluded that there was no doubt that a military sealift capacity was a core capability element if the NZDF was to meet the defence tasks specified in the White Paper.[5] The team had a clear concern about the limitations of chartering, observing that the time taken for a vessel to be delivered to Auckland could not be quantified with any certainty. With few suitable vessels available for charter in Australia, New Zealand or the South Pacific, it was likely that a vessel would have to come from Europe, taking 36 days to get here. Whilst the Review team noted that there appeared to have been some reservations about the need for military shipping for strategic transport, they were of the opinion that ‘sea-lift is essential; otherwise the lack of a credible deployment capability should call into question the New Zealand Army’s present force structure’.[6]
The new vessel was to be capable of carrying supplies to the Islands in times of civil emergency, or to evacuate New Zealand citizens at times of civil unrest. The review saw a sealift ship deploying up to a company of personnel with their equipment and supplies, to provide reconstruction, rehabilitation or medical assistance. The vessel would also be expected to be able to provide sealift to offshore islands, especially the Chatham Islands, when other transport was unavailable, and to maintain the continuity of Cook Strait transportation between the North and South Island when other services were restricted or were unavailable. Importantly, the type of gap to be filled was re-defined, and it was suggested that the less ambitious task of operating into those ports which had wharf facilities might be sufficient. It was ultimately recommended ‘that the NZDF obtain a military sealift ship (MSS) based on a commercial medium size roll on/roll off ship as a matter of priority’.[7] This chapter traces the events that led to the purchase of such a ship, HMNZS Charles Upham, then its subsequent lease and ultimate sale.
During 1991, the Review team considered a number of possible vessel types as solutions. They acknowledged that a Mercandian 1500 vessel could deploy 50 per cent of the vehicles and stores required by the RRF, and considered this size of vessel as the credible minimum. However, they believed the purchase of a vessel such as the Union Rotorua would be a more attractive option. Whilst it was somewhat larger than the minimum requirement, the Review team felt it would be ‘an economical and effective solution to the NZDF’s greatest current capability deficiency’.[8] It noted that the Union Rotorua almost exactly matched the dimension specification to deploy the RRF vehicles and equipment. The Union Rotorua was one of the first vessels to be considered for the task of providing logistic support. This vessel could have deployed all of the RRF’s vehicles and equipment in one lift. Admiral Sir Somerford Teagle recalled seeing the vessel in Sydney Harbour, looking large and imposing. He said to his Australian Defence Force (ADF) counterpart, ‘that could be our new Logistic Support Ship’,—though personally he was not wedded to any particular vessel type, more the capability any such vessel would bring to the NZDF. The Review team also saw the vessel as imposing, and thought that the perception of the size of the ship might be its only real disadvantage. With a length of 205 metres and a maximum laden weight of up to 24 000 tonnes, the ship did have a large profile. Whilst in international shipping terms it was only a medium-sized vessel, it was amongst the larger ships to visit New Zealand ports regularly, and would have been by far the largest ship operated by the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN):
There was a perception that she was too big—I don’t know why. There was no issue of her being too big in the maritime sense. As for the requirement that the chosen vessel should fit the Calliope Dock, that was just one of many criteria. I don’t believe that this on its own would be sufficient reason to reject the Union Rotorua.[9]
In all of the documentation that I have reviewed, there is no clear, rational explanation as to why the Union Rotorua was dropped from the short-list. The vessel was gas-turbine powered, and it was noted that the prime mover would soon need an overhaul.[10] However, its sister ship the Union Rotoiti was diesel-electric, and Teagle saw no reason why the Union Rotorua could not have been easily converted.
The estimated through life costs were NZ$10.02 million per year, as opposed to an estimated NZ$7.1 million for a Mercandian 1500, but the Review team were clear that the greater capability, capacity, speed and flexibility offset the increase in operating costs.[11] Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, the Review team’s observation of the vessel’s apparent lack of problems as regards stability or motion at sea with a light load should have been given more weight. Of particular note was the Review team’s observation about a Mercandian vessel already plying New Zealand’s waters. The Spirit of Freedom, a Mercandian 610 had been trading between Auckland and Lyttleton for four years and the Review team noted that, ‘designed for trade in the North Sea, this vessel, unless fully laden, is very uncomfortable at sea in the South Pacific’.[12] These were to be words of portent.
The 1997 NZDF Report, HMNZS Charles Upham: Review of acquisition and proposed conversion, went into some detail about the steps which led up to the purchase of HMNZS Charles Upham. In summary, the steps reported to have been undertaken were as follows:
In November 1991, the NZDF undertook an appraisal of the roll on/roll off vessel Union Rotorua. The ship was available for sale, and the Review team considered that, with suitable modifications, it would provide the minimum capacity required for sealift operations. In May of 1992 Cabinet authorised the investigation of costs to bring the Union Rotorua into service.
In June 1992 further studies within NZDF led to a refinement of the requirements for a new vessel, and the Union Rotorua was considered to be slightly too large for the these new requirements, and Cabinet authorised comparison with at least one other vessel.
In July 1992 the shipbroking firm of Rugg and Co. in the United Kingdom was engaged to investigate suitable ships on the second-hand market. Defence staff received a total of 33 available ships in 20 different classes, which they narrowed down to 21 ships in 9 classes, plus the Union Rotorua. In October 1992 this list was further refined down to 4 classes, and the option of building a new ship was considered, with yards in Korea, Poland and Spain being asked for indicative prices. (The Polish yard was slow to respond and not pursued further.)
In November a team of Defence personnel inspected the four second-hand class of ships, and held discussions with the Spanish and Korean shipyards, with the outcome being that either a new or second-hand ship would be suitable. Of the second-hand ships, the Mercandian 2-in-1 class was the preferred option.
In December 1992 BMT Defence Services Limited in the United Kingdom was selected to review Defence’s estimates for the conversion cost for a Mercandian 2-in-1 class vessel, comment on the practicality of the conversion, and also to carry out comparisons with a new vessel. During that month a specification was also drawn up which was to be used for the evaluation and subsequent purchase of the chosen vessel (see Appendix 3, User Requirement). At the end of January 1993 BMT Defence Services concluded that a conversion was feasible, but indicated that the vessel class failed to meet specification in a number of areas including a narrow quarter ramp and low deck height, and that stabiliser tanks would be required for helicopter operations. There were also concerns about vessel motion. In addition it commented that there was very little difference in cost between a second-hand and new vessel.
In April 1993 Defence sought Cabinet approval for the purchase of either a second-hand or a new vessel. Cabinet, though, decided to defer a decision until it had reviewed the forthcoming Defence Consolidated Resource Plan. The 1997 NZDF Review notes that officials were surprised that, at this point, Cabinet stressed that the main rationale for acquiring the vessel was to be able respond to natural disasters and other emergency situations in the South Pacific region. Cabinet at this time also invited the Minister of Defence to investigate the possibility of cooperating with Australia in the financing and use of a military sea-lift ship.
In late 1993, the Australian Government offered to lease the heavy landing ship, HMAS Tobruk, to the NZDF. In November a brief was developed for the Chief of Naval Staff to assist with discussions. It was noted in the brief that there were some important shortfalls against the user requirement, most notably that the ship had only half of the cargo capacity of a Mercandian vessel, and that the vessel required significantly more crew—144 as against 65. (This was potentially a concern for the RNZN at the time, though it was noted that the RFA operated with a crew of 65, so some personnel savings were likely.) Discussions were held with several senior Royal Australian Navy (RAN) officers during the period 14-18 February 1994 and ‘the general feeling was that the ADF wished to lease the vessel to New Zealand rather than have us buy it’. Significantly, it was stated that ‘the RAN ... obviously do not wish to be put in a position where they make an offer which we might turn down’.[13]
The NZDF assessed its suitability and initially was supportive of pursuing this option. The Tobruk still had significant cargo and personnel carrying capacity, with the ability to land resources across the beach. However, it was apparently not clear at this stage what the costs involved would actually be.[14] Nevertheless, it was recommended that this option be pursued, and on 11 May 1994 the Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray wrote to his New Zealand counterpart, Warren Cooper, with a firm offer of a lease for the ship. Later that month, Cabinet gave approval for discussions to proceed with a view to acquiring the vessel, which Australia would retain some access to each year. At the time, an officer, not part of the team claimed: ‘The team is going through the motions. We will have a look at her, but the politicians have already decided to take her.’[15] Senior Defence personnel agreed that it would be politically beneficial for the New Zealand Government to take the Tobruk, but the Tobruk was described as a 25 year old ship in a 10 year old body. An engineering officer was reported to say: ‘The country will pay dearly. She’s an orphan, so parts will be expensive. She will be a nice little earner for the dockyard’s new operators.’[16] However, a meeting held on 9 June with representatives from the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF, agreed that the Tobruk offered an acceptable interim solution to meet the MSS requirement; and that the aim should be to obtain a Cabinet decision in time to agree a lease with the Australians in Darwin on 28–29 July 1994.
Within less than two weeks the situation seemed to have markedly changed. In a Position Paper, approved by the Secretary for Defence, attention was drawn to the original reasons why agreement had been given for pursuing the lease of the Tobruk. Of some importance was the continuing requirement by the ADF for the capabilities of a New Zealand crewed and operated Tobruk for exercises and contingencies, which was an important Closer Defence Relations (CDR) consideration. The avoidance of capital costs was also seen as an advantage, though not decisive.
In the event, on 21 June 1994 the Australians advised that they wished to sell the Tobruk, offering a deferred purchase or lease to purchase option. (In a Minute to the Cabinet Subcommittee, the price of A$58 million was mentioned as the current value of the ship.[17]) It was observed that the purchase of the Tobruk, based on the Australians having no further use for it, had no inherent advantages for New Zealand. This removed any CDR benefits for New Zealand and, coupled with an availability date which kept slipping, Defence in New Zealand decided that the purchase was not the right decision. A negotiating team was still nevertheless due to leave for Australia; they were advised clearly by the Secretary of Defence that they were ‘to ensure that our Australian colleagues have a full appreciation of the new position in respect of acquiring an MSS capability … and that other than for CDR considerations, New Zealand has no interest in Tobruk’.[18]
In the Alliance Report of 1998, The Biggest Lemon Ever To Leave Auckland, it was reported that New Zealand was offered the vessel at the then cost of about NZ$18.57 million. The Audit Office was told by the NZDF that while the Tobruk was offered in May 1994 at a price of A$7 million, plus a quantity of spares at a further A$7 million, these were preliminary estimates only and subject to negotiation.[19]
Rear-Admiral David Campbell was at the time Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS) in the RAN. His recollection was that ‘the Minister said the Kiwis could have the ship for nothing’. Campbell went on to say that the principal reason was that whilst the RAN could no longer afford the Tobruk (with two replacement ships arriving), the Minister ‘was very anxious that her capability not be lost to the alliance in the SW Pacific’.[20] So keen was Senator Robert Ray on retaining the capability that he was prepared to give the ship away. With an offer like that on the table, coupled with the very strong political pressure Ray was exerting, the New Zealand Government had to examine the proposal very seriously. The planned visit mentioned above went ahead, and Campbell received an official visit from representatives of the RNZN and the MoD:
It was plain to me from the outset that they had no intention of taking the ship. Before the visit there had been some trans-Tasman enquiries and preliminary negotiations. I recall one such item being ‘Would we include the ship’s inventory of spare and repair parts?’ Reluctantly, I agreed. They were probably worth more than the ship herself, but I understood the Minister wanted the transfer to go ahead and so I was prepared to forego the revenue. In my office, they wanted to know (actually it was stronger than a question; it was more like a demand) whether Australia would pay for her next scheduled refit? Absolutely not, I said—an answer that they knew perfectly well was the only possible one. It was evident to me that they were genuinely worried about her relatively high manning and the cost of the forthcoming refit, but at the same time they were desperate to get other reasons why they should not accept her. The negotiations, on their part, were perfunctory and dutiful and I never thought that they were sincere.[21]
In November 1997 the then New Zealand Minister of Defence spoke to this decision:
After several months of discussion the RAN recommended that New Zealand should buy the vessel, but that it would not be available for two years (i.e. by 1996) and the cost of this would be considerably higher than New Zealand had anticipated. In view of this, and taking into consideration the very high operating costs for the vessel, the NZDF determined that it was not worth continuing with further discussions.[22]
In reviewing the correspondence of the time, it seems as if there was an initial willingness to seriously consider the Tobruk despite the vessel’s shortcomings. As noted previously, the potential benefits to CDR were seen as being important: ‘On balance we considered the CDR contribution New Zealand could make by taking on the Tobruk were worth these disadvantages.’[23] In this minute, Gerald Hensley, the Secretary of Defence, commented that leasing the Tobruk was seen as an acceptable interim trade-off solution because it meant New Zealand could have made a significant contribution to CDR. The change from a lease proposition to a possible purchase was seen to change that considerably. Yet two elements do not quite fit: Rear-Admiral Campbell’s recollection that the Minister was willing to give the ship away to maintain the capability in the region (which was confirmed by Dick Gentles—‘Yes, they did offer it to us free of charge’);[24] and Campbell’s response to my question as to whether there would have been a likely ongoing CDR requirement? ‘With Tobruk do you mean, whether donated, leased or sold? Yes, most certainly.’[25]
Were bureaucratic politics an issue with the Tobruk? The memo from the Secretary of Defence was very clear in the message it sent to officials who were going to Australia. Or was the Tobruk really a vessel that was going to be too expensive to run and maintain? Undoubtedly the Tobruk would have been an expensive vessel to man and operate, costing perhaps NZ$4 million per annum more in operational costs. This is though quoted as a maximum cost, and again like the Union Rotorua it was observed: ‘The Tobruk can do many things that even a converted Charles Upham will not be able to.’[26] It was suggested by the Alliance Party in 1998 that ‘the real additional operating costs had we purchased the Tobruk would probably have come in at much less than this figure’.[27] The Alliance Party went on to suggest that, in retrospect, not proceeding with the acquisition of the Tobruk was probably a mistake. The Audit Office report argued with these sentiments, saying that there would have been a delay with the vessel entering NZDF service; that further delays would have been incurred because of the necessity to refit the engines; and that, as with the Charles Upham, there was no guarantee that funds would be available to complete the necessary work. Nevertheless, despite the decision not to take the Tobruk, the vessel has continued to prove useful in combined regional operations ‘turning up like that nautical nemesis the Flying Dutchman’[28] —providing logistic support in the Bougainville operation in 1994, subsequently visiting Wellington on 30 May 1998 to unload Army equipment used in Bougainville, and taking New Zealand troops to East Timor in 1999. In 2005 the vessel transported troops and equipment to Iraq. Although concerns had been raised in 1994 about the ship’s longevity, the HMAS Tobruk was still in service in 2009.
The prospect of a LSS had been under consideration for 15 years by the time Defence asked Cabinet in 1993 for approval to purchase a vessel. However, at this point the consultants preparing the 1997 Review commented that they understood that the Prime Minister’s Department had given indications that the Military Sea-lift Ship project should not be promoted. Officials prepared a new report for Cabinet but it wasn’t considered because of the forthcoming 1993 General Election.
In July 1994 the decision was made within Defence to proceed with the purchase of a second-hand ship. Four issues were identified which led to this decision; a vessel could be acquired quickly (it was already almost three years since the first potential vessel had been inspected); cashflow would be improved; no large initial outlay would be necessary, and the smaller sum spent and shorter lifespan of this initial ship would allow for experience to be gained which would better inform requirements over the longer term. The Ministry then asked the broker who had previously handled the earlier enquiry to update them on the availability of Mercandian 2-in-1 class vessels, rather than review the market again. Following protracted discussions the Mercandian Queen II became available, approval was sought from Cabinet to purchase the vessel and this approval was given on 28 November 1994.
In the supporting documentation to the Cabinet Subcommittee from the Minister of Defence, the caution was made: ‘If we decide against sealift, the Australians could perceive us as not being serious about maintaining a credible defence effort.’[29] In a further memorandum to the Cabinet Subcommittee dated 22 November 1994, the Minister of Defence spoke to Treasury’s concern about the financing of the proposed acquisitions that were to be discussed at Cabinet, including the MSS. He noted that Treasury acknowledged that the MSS would be a flexible and desirable asset and that, in Treasury’s view:
the decision on whether to purchase a ship involves a trade-off between three key factors:
Cost: A fully capable MSS costs $60m being $25 million for the initial capital and an additional $34m required to upgrade for the ship (sic) for carrying troops and helicopter. The additional operating costs of $7m annually are significant. No compensating or offsetting capability is proposed. The operating costs are to be met by unspecified internal efficiencies and adjustments.
Risk: The likelihood of a major deployment of military forces without sufficient warning time to charter commercial shipping is a critical factor in assessing the case for the MSS.
Priority: Ministers will need to assess whether providing this new capability should proceed when there are other pressures on defence resources to maintain existing capabilities such as the Orion fleet.[30]
Cabinet approved the expenditure of up to NZ$26 million for acquisition and initial modification of a MSS, and noted that the updated Defence Consolidated Resource Plan (DCRP) was to include provision for further expenditure of up to NZ$34 million for phase 2 modifications. The sale was finalised on 16 December 1994 at a purchase price of Danish Kroner 55 000 000, or NZ$14.15 million. A Defence official reportedly said: ‘There is a feeling of relief around defence that the project has been finally realised.’[31]
Once the purchase was completed, the vessel was to be delivered after carrying a cargo to defray costs, and it sailed as a merchantman under the New Zealand flag. The vessel arrived in New Zealand on 14 March 1995, and was delivered to the RNZN the following day. It was formally commissioned into the RNZN in October 1995, being named, by his widow, after one of New Zealand’s most famous war heroes, Charles Upham. The Minister of Defence, Warren Cooper, said at the time that he expected that the vessel would be well used in exercises, UN peacekeeping deployments, and in emergency relief work.
From the outset it had been clear that the vessel would need modification. The initial modifications were to be limited to essential work to bring the ship into immediate service, but even at this stage the vessel was said to be useable and able to carry a full range of freight: ‘The MSS will be able to meet its primary function without the follow on modifications and it will also to a large degree be able to perform effectively its assigned ancillary tasks.’[32]
The Charles Upham was 133 metres in length with a displacement of 7220 tonnes. It had a single engine and single screw. As a commercial vessel, the Charles Upham carried a merchant crew of seventeen. Refitted for a helicopter, she would have permanent accommodation for up to 65, with the capacity to accommodate an additional 150. In a four page New Zealand Defence Quarterly article, much was made of the arrival of the new ship, the contribution she would make to the NZDF, and the modest alterations necessary:
The helicopter deck apart, most modifications are not likely to be structural or expensive. Even so, the Defence Force is in no tearing hurry because, says Ministry of Defence Project Director, Peter Ware, they ‘want to get it right.’ No firm decision will be taken on major alterations for some months, during which crews will be able to get operational experience of the ship. … Many decisions have yet to be taken before the Charles Upham is fully operational, but at this stage the future of New Zealand’s military transport looks bright. Certainly the ship will give a much needed boost in an area that has long been lacking, and it looks set to do so at a minimum cost to the taxpayer.[33]
During the next several months the crew was able to get operational experience of the ship, and the above bright predictions were to be proved sadly wrong.
The 1997 Review of the Charles Upham drew attention to the Air and Sea Transport Review which followed the 1991 White Paper, and recommended an ‘80/20’ solution for the purchase of a MSS. That is, acquiring most of the capability needed to meet most of the likely operational circumstances. Having the ability to unload at an unimproved wharf was therefore one of the fundamental requirements. Nevertheless, the Review itself pointed out that cargo handling equipment ‘appears to be an area not fully considered at the time (late 1992)’.[34] It went on to say that part of the proposal was to use a forklift for large container handling; however, the vessel had a weight limit of 17 tonnes per single axle, whilst the forklift had a weight of 20 tonnes per axle, even when not loaded. This seems to have been a major oversight, especially when no requirement was made for the vessel to have its own lighterage facilities. The Review expressed surprise about this, saying that it seemed inevitable that there would be some missions where wharves were either damaged, or non-existent. It seemed increasingly as though the ship could not achieve the 80/20 solution, and that reaching some of those islands which had seats of government or significant populations was not as possible as had been hoped. The vessel was reportedly unable to access Rarotonga, and there were fears that fitting it with cranes to unload heavy cargo would cause it to roll.
[1] Defence Review 1978, Government Printer, Wellington, 1978, p. 28.
[2] Defence of New Zealand, Review of Defence Policy 1987, Government Printer, Wellington, 1987, p. 35.
[3] HMNZS Charles Upham: Review of acquisition and proposed conversion, NZDF Report No. 210, 14 April 1997.
[4] The Defence of New Zealand 1991, A Policy Paper, GP Print Ltd, Wellington, 1991, p. 80.
[5] Review of Defence Air and Sea Transport, Report of Review Team, Volume 1, Wellington, 1991, p. vii.
[6] Review of Defence Air and Sea Transport, Report of Review Team, p. 32.
[7] HMNZS Charles Upham: Review of acquisition and proposed conversion, p. 1.
[8] Review of Defence Air and Sea Transport, Report of Review Team, p. viii. [my emphasis]
[9] Admiral Sir Somerford Teagle, Personal interview, 20 September 2003. The requirement that the vessel should fit the Calliope Dock, as was specified in the 1992 User Requirement (see Appendix 3), effectively meant that HMNZS Union Rotorua could no longer be considered.
[10] Review of Defence Air and Sea Transport, Report of Review Team, p. 40.
[11] Review of Defence Air and Sea Transport, Report of Review Team, p. 40.
[12] Review of Defence Air and Sea Transport, Report of Review Team, p. 14.
[13] Minute NA 11925-0002 from DPPR to CNS, 23 February 1994, p. 5, contained in Official Information Pertaining to the Military Sealift Project HMNZS Charles Upham, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, November 1998, p. 6.
[14] See answer to written question 15929 of 26 November 1997, quoted in The Scandal of The Charles Upham, Alliance Party, Wellington, November 1997, p. 2. This says that the Royal Australian Navy indicated ‘that the ship could be leased at a very attractive rate (sum not disclosed)’. Whilst lease costs were not discussed in detail, expressions such as ‘at a price you can afford’ were apparently used. (See Minute NA 11925-0002 from DPPR to CNS, 23 February 1994.)
[15] Ric Oram, ‘Defence rethink on troop ship’, New Zealand Herald, 25 July 1994.
[16] Oram, ‘Defence rethink on troop ship’.
[17] Minute PF/3310-16, 28 June 1994, p. 3, contained in Official Information Pertaining to the Military Sealift Project HMNZS Charles Upham.
[18] Minute PF/3310-16, 28 June 1994, p. 5.
[19] HMNZS Charles Upham, Report on Concerns Raised by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Office of the Controller and Auditor-General, Wellington, 24 September 1998, p. 36.
[20] Rear-Admiral David Campbell, Personal correspondence, 15 September 2003.
[21] Campbell, Personal correspondence, 15 September 2003.
[22] See answer to written question 15929 of 26 November 1997, quoted in Alliance Party, The Biggest Lemon Ever To Leave Auckland, Wellington, July 1998.
[23] Minute PF/3310-16, 28 June 1994, p. 5.
[24] Dick Gentles, Personal interview, 12 November 2003.
[25] Campbell, Personal correspondence, 15 September 2003.
[26] Alliance Party, The Biggest Lemon Ever To Leave Auckland, p. 5.
[27] Alliance Party, The Biggest Lemon Ever To Leave Auckland, p. 5.
[28] HMNZS Charles Upham, Report on Concerns Raised by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, p. 4.
[29] Memorandum from Minister of Defence to Chair, Cabinet Sub-Committee for Defence, Security and External Relations, 31 October 1994.
[30] Memorandum from Minister of Defence to Chair, Cabinet Sub-Committee for Defence, Security and External Relations, 22 November 1994, pp. 7–8.
[31] Ric Oram, ‘New ship to work her passage carrying cargo’, New Zealand Herald, 3 January 1995.
[32] Memorandum from Minister of Defence to Chair, Cabinet Sub-Committee for Defence, Security and External Relations, 22 November 1994, p. 4.
[33] Matthew Wright. ‘Sealift for Soldiers’, New Zealand Defence Quarterly, Number 8, Autumn 1995, pp. 21–22.
[34] HMNZS Charles Upham: Review of acquisition and proposed conversion, p. 19.